

Court File No.

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
(COMMERCIAL LIST)
IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT,
R.S.C. 1985, C. C-36, AS AMENDED

**IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF SILVER
STREAMS HOMES INC., SILVER STREAMS HOMES (PUCCINI) INC., 2148993 ONTARIO
INC., 2148990 ONTARIO INC., 2147681 ONTARIO INC. AND 2147650 ONTARIO INC.**

Applicants

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SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
COMMERCIAL LIST**

**IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS
ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED**

**IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF SILVER
STREAMS HOMES INC., SILVER STREAMS HOMES (PUCCINI) INC., 2148993
ONTARIO INC., 2148990 ONTARIO INC.,
2147681 ONTARIO INC. and 2147650 ONTARIO INC.**

Applicants

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2.	<i>Elan Corporation v. Comiskey (Trustee of)</i> (1990), 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101, 1 O.R. (3d) 289 (WL) (Ont. C.A.).
3.	<i>Lendhorf General Partners Ltd.</i> (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24, 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275 (WL) (Ont. Gen. Div.).
4.	<i>Sun Indalex Finance, LLC v. United Steelworkers</i> , 2013 SCC 6.
5.	<i>Century Services Inc. v. Canada</i> , 2010 SCC 60, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379.
6.	<i>Re Nortel Networks Corp.</i> , (2009), 55 C.B.R. (5th) 229 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).
7.	<i>Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., Re</i> (2010), 63 C.B.R. (5th) 115 (WL), 2010 CarswellOnt 212, 2010 ONSC 222 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).

8.	<i>Comstock Canada Ltd., Re</i> , (2013) 4 C.B.R. (6th) 47, 2013 CarswellOnt 9796.
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TAB 1

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2004 CarswellOnt 1211, 48 C.B.R. (4th) 299

Stelco Inc., Re

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS
AMENDED

IN THE MATTER OF A PROPOSED PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT WITH RESPECT TO
STELCO INC. AND THE OTHER APPLICANTS LISTED IN SCHEDULE "A"

APPLICATION UNDER THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS
AMENDED

Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Farley J.

Heard: March 5, 2004

Judgment: March 22, 2004

Docket: 04-CL-5306

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Bob Thornton, Kyla Mahar for Ernst & Young Inc., Monitor of the Applicants

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David R. Byers for CIT

Kevin McElcheran for GE

Murray Gold, Andrew Hatnay for Retired Salaried Beneficiaries

Lewis Gottheil for CAW Canada and its Local 523

Virginie Gauthier for Fleet

H. Whiteley for CIBC

Gail Rubenstein for FSCO

Kenneth D. Kraft for EDS Canada Inc.

Subject: Insolvency

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Proposal — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Application of Act

Steel company S Inc. applied for protection under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("CCAA") on January 29, 2004 — Union locals moved to rescind initial order and dismiss initial application of S Inc. and its subsidiaries on ground S Inc. was not "debtor company" as defined in s. 2 of CCAA because S Inc. was not insolvent — Motion dismissed — Given time and steps involved in reorganization, condition of insolvency perforce required expanded meaning under CCAA — Union affiant stated that S Inc. will run out of funding by November 2004 — Given that November was ten months away from date of filing, S Inc. had liquidity problem — S Inc. realistically cannot expect any increase in its credit line with its lenders or access to further outside funding — S Inc. had negative equity of \$647 million — On balance of probabilities, S Inc. was insolvent and therefore was "debtor company" as at date of filing and entitled to apply for CCAA protection.

Cases considered by Farley J.:

A Debtor (No. 64 of 1992), Re (1993), [1993] 1 W.L.R. 264 (Eng. Ch. Div.) — considered

Anvil Range Mining Corp., Re (2002), 2002 CarswellOnt 2254, 34 C.B.R. (4th) 157 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

Bank of Montreal v. I.M. Krisp Foods Ltd. (1996), [1997] 1 W.W.R. 209, 140 D.L.R. (4th) 33, 148 Sask. R. 135, 134 W.A.C. 135, 6 C.P.C. (4th) 90, 1996 CarswellSask 581 (Sask. C.A.) — considered

Barsi v. Farcas (1923), [1924] 1 W.W.R. 707, 2 C.B.R. 299, 18 Sask. L.R. 158, [1924] 1 D.L.R. 1154, 1923 CarswellSask 227 (Sask. C.A.) — referred to

Bell ExpressVu Ltd. Partnership v. Rex (2002), 2002 SCC 42, 2002 CarswellBC 851, 2002 CarswellBC 852, 100 B.C.L.R. (3d) 1, [2002] 5 W.W.R. 1, 212 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 287 N.R. 248, 18 C.P.R. (4th) 289, 166 B.C.A.C. 1, 271 W.A.C. 1, 93 C.R.R. (2d) 189, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559 (S.C.C.) — considered

Challmie, Re (1976), 22 C.B.R. (N.S.) 78, 1976 CarswellBC 63 (B.C. S.C.) — considered

Clarkson v. Sterling (1887), 14 O.R. 460 (Ont. C.P.) — considered

Consolidated Seed Exports Ltd., Re (1986), 69 B.C.L.R. 273, 62 C.B.R. (N.S.) 156, 1986 CarswellBC 481 (B.C. S.C.) — considered

Cumberland Trading Inc., Re (1994), 23 C.B.R. (3d) 225, 1994 CarswellOnt 255 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — considered

Davidson v. Douglas (1868), 15 Gr. 347, 1868 CarswellOnt 167 (Ont. Ch.) — considered

Diemaster Tool Inc. v. Skvortsoff (Trustee of) (1991), 3 C.B.R. (3d) 133, 1991 CarswellOnt 168 (Ont. Gen.

Div.) — referred to

Enterprise Capital Management Inc. v. Semi-Tech Corp. (1999), 1999 CarswellOnt 2213, 10 C.B.R. (4th) 133 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Gagnier, Re (1950), 30 C.B.R. 74, 1950 CarswellOnt 101 (Ont. S.C.) — considered

Gardner v. Newton (1916), 10 W.W.R. 51, 26 Man. R. 251, 29 D.L.R. 276, 1916 CarswellMan 83 (Man. K.B.) — considered

Inducon Development Corp., Re (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 306, 1991 CarswellOnt 219 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — considered

Kenwood Hills Development Inc., Re (1995), 30 C.B.R. (3d) 44, 1995 CarswellOnt 38 (Ont. Bkcty.) — considered

King Petroleum Ltd., Re (1978), 29 C.B.R. (N.S.) 76, 1978 CarswellOnt 197 (Ont. S.C.) — considered

Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24, 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275, 1993 CarswellOnt 183 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — considered

Maybank Foods Inc. (Trustee of) v. Provisioners Maritimes Ltd. (1989), 92 N.S.R. (2d) 283, 75 C.B.R. (N.S.) 317, 45 B.L.R. 14, 237 A.P.R. 283, 1989 CarswellNS 27 (N.S. T.D.) — considered

Montreal Trust Co. of Canada v. Timber Lodge Ltd. (1992), 15 C.B.R. (3d) 14, (sub nom. *Timber Lodge Ltd. v. Montreal Trust Co. of Canada (No. 1)*) 101 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 73, (sub nom. *Timber Lodge Ltd. v. Montreal Trust Co. of Canada (No. 1)*) 321 A.P.R. 73, 1992 CarswellPEI 13 (P.E.I. C.A.) — referred to

MTM Electric Co., Re (1982), 42 C.B.R. (N.S.) 29, 1982 CarswellOnt 170 (Ont. Bkcty.) — considered

New Quebec Raglan Mines Ltd. v. Blok-Andersen (1993), 9 B.L.R. (2d) 93, 1993 CarswellOnt 173 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of) (1990), 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101, (sub nom. *Elan Corp. v. Comiskey*) 1 O.R. (3d) 289, (sub nom. *Elan Corp. v. Comiskey*) 41 O.A.C. 282, 1990 CarswellOnt 139 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

Olympia & York Developments Ltd. (Trustee of) v. Olympia & York Realty Corp. (2001), 2001 CarswellOnt 2954, 16 B.L.R. (3d) 74, 28 C.B.R. (4th) 294 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Olympia & York Developments Ltd. (Trustee of) v. Olympia & York Realty Corp. (2003), 2003 CarswellOnt 5210, 46 C.B.R. (4th) 313, (sub nom. *Olympia & York Developments Ltd. (Bankrupt) v. Olympia & York Realty Corp.*) 180 O.A.C. 158 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

Optical Recording Laboratories Inc., Re (1990), 2 C.B.R. (3d) 64, 75 D.L.R. (4th) 747, 42 O.A.C. 321, (sub nom. *Optical Recording Laboratories Inc. v. Digital Recording Corp.*) 1 O.R. (3d) 131, 1990 CarswellOnt 143 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

Pacific Mobile Corp., Re (1979), 32 C.B.R. (N.S.) 209, 1979 CarswellQue 76 (Que. S.C.) — referred to

PWA Corp. v. Gemini Group Automated Distribution Systems Inc. (1993), 103 D.L.R. (4th) 609, 49 C.P.R. (3d) 456, 64 O.A.C. 274, 15 O.R. (3d) 730, 10 B.L.R. (2d) 109, 1993 CarswellOnt 149 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

PWA Corp. v. Gemini Group Automated Distribution Systems Inc. (1993), 49 C.P.R. (3d) ix, 10 B.L.R. (2d) 244 (note), 104 D.L.R. (4th) vii, 68 O.A.C. 21 (note), 164 N.R. 78 (note), 16 O.R. (3d) xvi (S.C.C.) — referred to

R. v. Proulx (2000), [2000] 4 W.W.R. 21, 2000 SCC 5, 2000 CarswellMan 32, 2000 CarswellMan 33, 140 C.C.C. (3d) 449, 30 C.R. (5th) 1, 182 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 249 N.R. 201, 49 M.V.R. (3d) 163, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61, 142 Man. R. (2d) 161, 212 W.A.C. 161 (S.C.C.) — referred to

Sklar-Pepler Furniture Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 312, 86 D.L.R. (4th) 621, 1991 CarswellOnt 220 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — considered

Standard Trustco Ltd. (Trustee of) v. Standard Trust Co. (1993), 13 O.R. (3d) 7, 21 C.B.R. (3d) 25, 1993 CarswellOnt 219 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — considered

TDM Software Systems Inc., Re (1986), 60 C.B.R. (N.S.) 92, 1986 CarswellOnt 203 (Ont. S.C.) — referred to

Viteway Natural Foods Ltd., Re (1986), 63 C.B.R. (N.S.) 157, 1986 CarswellBC 499 (B.C. S.C.) — referred to

Webb v. Stenton (1883), 11 Q.B.D. 518 (Eng. C.A.) — referred to

633746 Ontario Inc. (Trustee of) v. Salvati (1990), 79 C.B.R. (N.S.) 72, 73 O.R. (2d) 774, 1990 CarswellOnt 181 (Ont. S.C.) — considered

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. B-3

Generally — referred to

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3

Generally — referred to

s. 2(1) "insolvent person" — referred to

s. 2(1) "insolvent person" (a) — considered

s. 2(1) "insolvent person" (b) — considered

s. 2(1) "insolvent person" (c) — considered

s. 43(7) — referred to

s. 121(1) — referred to

s. 121(2) — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

s. 2 "debtor company" — referred to

s. 2 "debtor company" (a) — considered

s. 2 "debtor company" (b) — considered

s. 2 "debtor company" (c) — considered

s. 2 "debtor company" (d) — considered

s. 12 — referred to

s. 12(1) "claim" — referred to

Winding-up and Restructuring Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. W-11

Generally — referred to

Words and phrases considered:

debtor company

It seems to me that the [*Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36] test of insolvency . . . which I have determined is a proper interpretation is that the [*Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3] definition of [s. 2(1)] (a), (b) or (c) of insolvent person is acceptable with the caveat that as to (a), a financially troubled corporation is insolvent if it is reasonably expected to run out of liquidity within reasonable proximity of time as compared with the time reasonably required to implement a restructuring.

MOTION by union that steel company was not "debtor company" as defined in *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*.

Farley J.:

1 As argued this motion by Locals 1005, 5328 and 8782 United Steel Workers of America (collectively "Union") to rescind the initial order and dismiss the application of Stelco Inc. ("Stelco") and various of its subsidiaries (collectively "Sub Applicants") for access to the protection and process of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* ("CCAA") was that this access should be denied on the basis that Stelco was not a "debtor company" as defined in s. 2 of the CCAA because it was not insolvent.

2 Allow me to observe that there was a great deal of debate in the materials and submissions as to the reason(s) that Stelco found itself in with respect to what Michael Locker (indicating he was "an expert in the area of corporate restructuring and a leading steel industry analyst") swore to at paragraph 12 of his affidavit was the "current crisis":

12. Contending with weak operating results and resulting tight cash flow, management has deliberately chosen not to fund its employee benefits. By contrast, Dofasco and certain other steel companies have consistently funded both their employee benefit obligations as well as debt service. If Stelco's management had chosen to fund pension obligations, presumably with borrowed money, *the current crisis* and related restructuring plans would focus on debt restructuring as opposed to the reduction of employee benefits and related liabilities. [Emphasis added.]

3 For the purpose of determining whether Stelco is insolvent and therefore could be considered to be a debtor company, it matters not what the cause or who caused the financial difficulty that Stelco is in as admitted by Locker on behalf of the Union. The management of a corporation could be completely incompetent, inadvertently or advertently; the corporation could be in the grip of ruthless, hard hearted and hard nosed outside financiers; the corporation could be the innocent victim of uncaring policy of a level of government; the employees (unionized or non-unionized) could be completely incompetent, inadvertently or advertently; the relationship of labour and management could be absolutely poisonous; the corporation could be the victim of unforeseen events affecting its viability such as a fire destroying an essential area of its plant and equipment or of rampaging dumping. One or more or all of these factors (without being exhaustive), whether or not of varying degree and whether or not in combination of some may well have been the cause of a corporation's difficulty. The point here is that Stelco's difficulty exists; the only question is whether Stelco is insolvent within the meaning of that in the "debtor company" definition of the CCAA. However, I would point out, as I did in closing, that no matter how this motion turns out, Stelco does have a problem which has to be addressed - addressed within the CCAA process if Stelco is insolvent or addressed outside that process if Stelco is determined not to be insolvent. The status quo will lead to ruination of Stelco (and its Sub Applicants) and as a result will very badly affect its stakeholder, including pensioners, employees (unionized and non-unionized), management, creditors, suppliers, customers, local and other governments and the local communities. In such situations, time is a precious commodity; it cannot be wasted; no matter how much some would like to take time outs, the clock cannot be stopped. The watchwords of the Commercial List are equally applicable in such circumstances. They are communication, cooperation and common sense. I appreciate that these cases frequently invoke emotions running high and wild; that is understandable on a human basis but it is the considered, rational approach which will solve the problem.

4 The time to determine whether a corporation is insolvent for the purpose of it being a "debtor company" and thus able to make an application to proceed under the CCAA is the date of filing, in this case January 29, 2004.

5 The Monitor did not file a report as to this question of insolvency as it properly advised that it wished to take a neutral role. I understand however, that it did provide some assistance in the preparation of Exhibit C to Hap Steven's affidavit.

6 If I determine in this motion that Stelco is not insolvent, then the initial order would be set aside. See *Montreal Trust Co. of Canada v. Timber Lodge Ltd.* (1992), 15 C.B.R. (3d) 14 (P.E.I. C.A.). The onus is on Stelco as I indicated in my January 29, 2004 endorsement.

7 S. 2 of the CCAA defines "debtor company" as:

"debtor company" means any company that:

(a) is bankrupt or insolvent;

(b) has committed an act of bankruptcy within the meaning of *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* ["BIA"] or deemed insolvent within the meaning of the *Winding-Up and Restructuring Act*, whether or not proceedings in respect of the company have been taken under either of those Acts;

(c) has made an authorized assignment against which a receiving order has been made under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*; or

(d) is in the course of being wound-up under the *Winding-Up and Restructuring Act* because the company is insolvent.

8 Counsel for the Existing Stelco Lenders and the DIP Lenders posited that Stelco would be able to qualify under (b) in light of the fact that as of January 29, 2004 whether or not it was entitled to receive the CCAA protection under (a) as being insolvent, it had ceased to pay its pre-filing debts. I would merely observe as I did at the time of the hearing that I do not find this argument attractive in the least. The most that could be said for that is that such game playing would be ill advised and in my view would not be rewarded by the exercise of judicial discretion to allow such an applicant the benefit of a CCAA stay and other advantages of the procedure for if it were capriciously done where there is not reasonable need, then such ought not to be granted. However, I would point out that if a corporation did capriciously do so, then one might well expect a creditor-initiated application so as to take control of the process (including likely the ouster of management including directors who authorized such unnecessary stoppage); in such a case, while the corporation would not likely be successful in a corporation application, it is likely that a creditor application would find favour of judicial discretion.

9 This judicial discretion would be exercised in the same way generally as is the case where s. 43(7) of the BIA comes into play whereby a bankruptcy receiving order which otherwise meets the test may be refused. See *Kenwood Hills Development Inc., Re* (1995), 30 C.B.R. (3d) 44 (Ont. Bkcty.) where at p. 45 I observed:

The discretion must be exercised judicially based on credible evidence; it should be used according to common sense and justice and in a manner which does not result in an injustice: See *Re Churchill Forest Industries (Manitoba) Ltd.* (1971), 16 C.B.R. (NS) 158 (Man. Q.B.).

10 Anderson J. in *MTM Electric Co., Re* (1982), 42 C.B.R. (N.S.) 29 (Ont. Bkcty.) at p. 30 declined to grant a bankruptcy receiving order for the eminently good sense reason that it would be counterproductive: "Having regard for the value of the enterprise and having regard to the evidence before me, I think it far from clear that a receiving order would confer a benefit on anyone." This common sense approach to the judicial exercise of discretion may be contrasted by the rather more puzzling approach in *TDM Software Systems Inc., Re* (1986), 60 C.B.R. (N.S.) 92 (Ont. S.C.).

11 The Union, supported by the International United Steel Workers of America ("International"), indicated that if certain of the obligations of Stelco were taken into account in the determination of insolvency, then a very good number of large Canadian corporations would be able to make an application under the CCAA. I am of the view that this concern can be addressed as follows. The test of insolvency is to be determined on its own merits, not on the basis that an otherwise technically insolvent corporation should not be allowed to apply. However, if a technically insolvent corporation were to apply and there was no material advantage to the corporation and its stakeholders (in other words, a pressing need to restructure), then one would expect that the court's discretion would be judicially exercised against granting CCAA protection and ancillary relief. In the case of Stelco, it is recognized, as discussed above, that it is in crisis and in need of restructuring - which restructuring, if it is in-

solvent, would be best accomplished within a CCAA proceeding. Further, I am of the view that the track record of CCAA proceedings in this country demonstrates a healthy respect for the fundamental concerns of interested parties and stakeholders. I have consistently observed that much more can be achieved by negotiations outside the courtroom where there is a reasonable exchange of information, views and the exploration of possible solutions and negotiations held on a without prejudice basis than likely can be achieved by resorting to the legal combative atmosphere of the courtroom. A mutual problem requires a mutual solution. The basic interest of the CCAA is to rehabilitate insolvent corporations for the benefit of all stakeholders. To do this, the cause(s) of the insolvency must be fixed on a long term viable basis so that the corporation may be turned around. It is not achieved by positional bargaining in a tug of war between two parties, each trying for a larger slice of a defined size pie; it may be achieved by taking steps involving shorter term equitable sacrifices and implementing sensible approaches to improve productivity to ensure that the pie grows sufficiently for the long term to accommodate the reasonable needs of the parties.

12 It appears that it is a given that the Sub Applicants are in fact insolvent. The question then is whether Stelco is insolvent.

13 There was a question as to whether Stelco should be restricted to the material in its application as presented to the Court on January 29, 2004. I would observe that CCAA proceedings are not in the nature of the traditional adversarial lawsuit usually found in our courtrooms. It seems to me that it would be doing a disservice to the interest of the CCAA to artificially keep the Court in the dark on such a question. Presumably an otherwise deserving "debtor company" would not be allowed access to a continuing CCAA proceeding that it would be entitled to merely because some potential evidence were excluded for traditional adversarial technical reasons. I would point out that in such a case, there would be no prohibition against such a corporation reapplying (with the additional material) subsequently. In such a case, what would be the advantage for anyone of a "pause" before being able to proceed under the rehabilitative process under the CCAA. On a practical basis, I would note that all too often corporations will wait too long before applying, at least this was a significant problem in the early 1990s. In *Inducon Development Corp., Re* (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 306 (Ont. Gen. Div.), I observed:

Secondly, CCAA is designed to be remedial; it is not, however, designed to be preventative. CCAA should not be the *last gasp* of a dying company; it should be implemented, if it is to be implemented, at a stage prior to the death throe.

14 It seems to me that the phrase "death throe" could be reasonably replaced with "death spiral". In *Cumberland Trading Inc., Re* (1994), 23 C.B.R. (3d) 225 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), I went on to expand on this at p. 228:

I would also observe that all too frequently debtors wait until virtually the last moment, the last moment, or in some cases, beyond the last moment before even beginning to think about reorganizational (and the attendant support that any successful reorganization requires from the creditors). I noted the lamentable tendency of debtors to deal with these situations as "last gasp" desperation moves in *Re Inducon Development Corp.* (1992), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 308 (Ont. Gen. Div.). To deal with matters on this basis minimizes the chances of success, even if "success" may have been available with earlier spade work.

15 I have not been able to find in the CCAA reported cases any instance where there has been an objection to a corporation availing itself of the facilities of the CCAA on the basis of whether the corporation was insolv-

ent. Indeed, as indicated above, the major concern here has been that an applicant leaves it so late that the timetable of necessary steps may get impossibly compressed. That is not to say that there have not been objections by parties opposing the application on various other grounds. Prior to the 1992 amendments, there had to be debentures (plural) issued pursuant to a trust deed; I recall that in *Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)* (1990), 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101, 1 O.R. (3d) 289 (Ont. C.A.), the initial application was rejected in the morning because there had only been one debenture issued but another one was issued prior to the return to court that afternoon. This case stands for the general proposition that the CCAA should be given a large and liberal interpretation. I should note that there was in *Enterprise Capital Management Inc. v. Semi-Tech Corp.* (1999), 10 C.B.R. (4th) 133 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) a determination that in a creditor application, the corporation was found not to be insolvent, but see below as to BIA test (c) my views as to the correctness of this decision.

16 In *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) I observed at p. 32:

One of the purposes of the CCAA is to facilitate ongoing operations of a business where its assets have a greater value as part of an integrated system than individually. The CCAA facilitates reorganization of a company where the alternative, sale of the property piecemeal, is likely to yield far less satisfaction to the creditors.

17 In *Anvil Range Mining Corp., Re* (2002), 34 C.B.R. (4th) 157 (Ont. C.A.), the court stated to the same effect:

The second submission is that the plan is contrary to the purposes of the CCAA. Courts have recognized that the purpose of the CCAA is to enable compromises to be made for the common benefit of the creditors and the company and to keep the company alive and out of the hands of liquidators.

18 Encompassed in this is the concept of saving employment if a restructuring will result in a viable enterprise. See *Diemaster Tool Inc. v. Skvortsoff (Trustee of)* (1991), 3 C.B.R. (3d) 133 (Ont. Gen. Div.). This concept has been a continuing thread in CCAA cases in this jurisdiction stretching back for at least the past 15 years, if not before.

19 I would also note that the jurisprudence and practical application of the bankruptcy and insolvency regime in place in Canada has been constantly evolving. The early jails of what became Canada were populated to the extent of almost half their capacity by bankrupts. Rehabilitation and a fresh start for the honest but unfortunate debtor came afterwards. Most recently, the *Bankruptcy Act* was revised to the BIA in 1992 to better facilitate the rehabilitative aspect of making a proposal to creditors. At the same time, the CCAA was amended to eliminate the threshold criterion of there having to be debentures issued under a trust deed (this concept was embodied in the CCAA upon its enactment in 1933 with a view that it would only be large companies with public issues of debt securities which could apply). The size restriction was continued as there was now a threshold criterion of at least \$5 million of claims against the applicant. While this restriction may appear discriminatory, it does have the practical advantage of taking into account that the costs (administrative costs including professional fees to the applicant, and indeed to the other parties who retain professionals) is a significant amount, even when viewed from the perspective of \$5 million. These costs would be prohibitive in a smaller situation. Parliament was mindful of the time horizons involved in proposals under BIA where the maximum length of a

proceeding including a stay is six months (including all possible extensions) whereas under CCAA, the length is in the discretion of the court judicially exercised in accordance with the facts and the circumstances of the case. Certainly sooner is better than later. However, it is fair to observe that virtually all CCAA cases which proceed go on for over six months and those with complexity frequently exceed a year.

20 Restructurings are not now limited in practical terms to corporations merely compromising their debts with their creditors in a balance sheet exercise. Rather there has been quite an emphasis recently on operational restructuring as well so that the emerging company will have the benefit of a long term viable fix, all for the benefit of stakeholders. See *Sklar-Peppler Furniture Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia* (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 312 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at p. 314 where Borins J. states:

The proposed plan exemplifies the policy and objectives of the Act as it proposes a regime for the court-supervised re-organization for the Applicant company intended to avoid the devastating social and economic effects of a creditor-initiated termination of its ongoing business operations and enabling the company to carry on its business in a manner in which it is intended to cause the least possible harm to the company, its creditors, its employees and former employees and the communities in which it carries on and carried on its business operations.

21 The CCAA does not define "insolvent" or "insolvency". Houlden & Morawetz, *The 2004 Annotated Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (Toronto, Carswell; 2003) at p. 1107 (N5) states:

In interpreting "debtor company", reference must be had to the definition of "insolvent person" in s. 2(1) of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* . . .

To be able to use the Act, a company must be bankrupt or insolvent: , 16 C.B.R. 1, [1934] S.C.R. 659, [1934] 4 D.L.R. 75. The company must, in its application, admit its insolvency.

22 It appears to have become fairly common practice for applicants and others when reference is made to insolvency in the context of the CCAA to refer to the definition of "insolvent person" in the BIA. That definition is as follows:

s. 2(1) . . .

"insolvent person" means a person who is not bankrupt and who resides, carries on business or has property in Canada, and whose liability to creditors provable as claims under this Act amount to one thousand dollars, and

(a) who is for any reason unable to meet his obligations as they generally become due,

(b) who has ceased paying his current obligations in the ordinary course of business as they generally become due, or

(c) the aggregate of whose property is not, at a fair valuation, sufficient, or, if disposed of at a fairly conducted sale under legal process, would not be sufficient to enable payment of all his obligations, due and accruing due.

23 Stelco acknowledges that it does not meet the test of (b); however, it does assert that it meets the test of both (a) and (c). In addition, however, Stelco also indicates that since the CCAA does not have a reference over to the BIA in relation to the (a) definition of "debtor company" as being a company that is "(a) bankrupt or insolvent", then this term of "insolvent" should be given the meaning that the overall context of the CCAA requires. See the modern rule of statutory interpretation which directs the court to take a contextual and purposive approach to the language of the provision at issue as illustrated by *Bell ExpressVu Ltd. Partnership v. Rex*, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559 (S.C.C.) at p. 580:

Today there is only one principle or approach, namely the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.

24 I note in particular that the (b), (c) and (d) aspects of the definition of "debtor company" all refer to other statutes, including the BIA; (a) does not. S. 12 of the CCAA defines "claims" with reference over to the BIA (and otherwise refers to the BIA and the *Winding-Up and Restructuring Act*). It seems to me that there is merit in considering that the test for insolvency under the CCAA may differ somewhat from that under the BIA, so as to meet the special circumstances of the CCAA and those corporations which would apply under it. In that respect, I am mindful of the above discussion regarding the time that is usually and necessarily (in the circumstances) taken in a CCAA reorganization restructuring which is engaged in coming up with a plan of compromise and arrangement. The BIA definition would appear to have been historically focussed on the question of bankruptcy - and not reorganization of a corporation under a proposal since before 1992, secured creditors could not be forced to compromise their claims, so that in practice there were no reorganizations under the former *Bankruptcy Act* unless all secured creditors voluntarily agreed to have their secured claims compromised. The BIA definition then was essentially useful for being a pre-condition to the "end" situation of a bankruptcy petition or voluntary receiving order where the upshot would be a realization on the bankrupt's assets (not likely involving the business carried on - and certainly not by the bankrupt). Insolvency under the BIA is also important as to the Paulian action events (eg., fraudulent preferences, settlements) as to the conduct of the debtor *prior* to the bankruptcy; similarly as to the question of provincial preference legislation. Reorganization under a plan or proposal, on the contrary, is with a general objective of the applicant continuing to exist, albeit that the CCAA may also be used to have an orderly disposition of the assets and undertaking in whole or in part.

25 It seems to me that given the time and steps involved in a reorganization, and the condition of insolvency perforce requires an expanded meaning under the CCAA. Query whether the definition under the BIA is now sufficient in that light for the allowance of sufficient time to carry through with a realistically viable proposal within the maximum of six months allowed under the BIA? I think it sufficient to note that there would not be much sense in providing for a rehabilitation program of restructuring/reorganization under either statute if the entry test was that the applicant could not apply until a rather late stage of its financial difficulties with the rather automatic result that in situations of complexity of any material degree, the applicant would not have the financial resources sufficient to carry through to hopefully a successful end. This would indeed be contrary to the renewed emphasis of Parliament on "rescues" as exhibited by the 1992 and 1997 amendments to the CCAA and the BIA.

26 Allow me now to examine whether Stelco has been successful in meeting the onus of demonstrating with credible evidence on a common sense basis that it is insolvent within the meaning required by the CCAA in regard to the interpretation of "debtor company" in the context and within the purpose of that legislation. To a

similar effect, see *PWA Corp. v. Gemini Group Automated Distribution Systems Inc.* (1993), 103 D.L.R. (4th) 609 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. dismissed [(1993), 49 C.P.R. (3d) ix (S.C.C.)] wherein it was determined that the trial judge was correct in holding that a party was not insolvent and that the statutory definition of insolvency pursuant to the BIA definition was irrelevant to determine that issue, since the agreement in question effectively provided its own definition by implication. It seems to me that the CCAA test of insolvency advocated by Stelco and which I have determined is a proper interpretation is that the BIA definition of (a), (b) or (c) of insolvent person is acceptable with the caveat that as to (a), a financially troubled corporation is insolvent if it is reasonably expected to run out of liquidity within reasonable proximity of time as compared with the time reasonably required to implement a restructuring. That is, there should be a reasonable cushion, which cushion may be adjusted and indeed become in effect an encroachment depending upon reasonable access to DIP between financing. In the present case, Stelco accepts the view of the Union's affiant, Michael Mackey of Deloitte and Touche that it will otherwise run out of funding by November 2004.

27 On that basis, allow me to determine whether Stelco is insolvent on the basis of (i) what I would refer to as the CCAA test as described immediately above, (ii) BIA test (a) or (iii) BIA test (c). In doing so, I will have to take into account the fact that Stephen, albeit a very experienced and skilled person in the field of restructurings under the CCAA, unfortunately did not appreciate that the material which was given to him in Exhibit E to his affidavit was modified by the caveats in the source material that in effect indicated that based on appraisals, the fair value of the real assets acquired was in excess of the purchase price for two of the U.S. comparators. Therefore the evidence as to these comparators is significantly weakened. In addition at Q. 175-177 in his cross examination, Stephen acknowledged that it was reasonable to assume that a purchaser would "take over some liabilities, some pension liabilities and OPEB liabilities, for workers who remain with the plant." The extent of that assumption was not explored; however, I do note that there was acknowledgement on the part of the Union that such an assumption would also have a reciprocal negative effect on the purchase price.

28 The BIA tests are disjunctive so that anyone meeting any of these tests is determined to be insolvent: see *Optical Recording Laboratories Inc., Re* (1990), 75 D.L.R. (4th) 747 (Ont. C.A.) at p. 756; *Viteway Natural Foods Ltd., Re* (1986), 63 C.B.R. (N.S.) 157 (B.C. S.C.) at p. 161. Thus, if I determine that Stelco is insolvent on *any one* of these tests, then it would be a "debtor company" entitled to apply for protection under the CCAA.

29 In my view, the Union's position that Stelco is not insolvent under BIA (a) because it has not entirely used up its cash and cash facilities (including its credit line), that is, it is not yet as of January 29, 2004 run out of liquidity conflates inappropriately the (a) test with the (b) test. The Union's view would render the (a) test necessarily as being redundant. See *R. v. Proulx*, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61 (S.C.C.) at p. 85 for the principle that no legislative provision ought to be interpreted in a manner which would "render it mere surplusage." Indeed the plain meaning of the phrase "unable to meet his obligations as they generally become due" requires a construction of test (a) which permits the court to take a purposive assessment of a debtor's ability to meet his future obligations. See *King Petroleum Ltd., Re* (1978), 29 C.B.R. (N.S.) 76 (Ont. S.C.) where Steele J. stated at p. 80:

With respect to cl. (a), it was argued that at the time the disputed payments were made the company was able to meet its obligations as they generally became due because no major debts were in fact due at that time. This was premised on the fact that the moneys owed to Imperial Oil were not due until 10 days after the receipt of the statements and that the statements had not then been received. I am of the opinion that this is not a proper interpretation of cl. (a). *Clause (a) speaks in the present and future tenses and not in the past.* I am of the opinion that the company was an "insolvent person" within the meaning of cl. (a) because by the

very payment-out of the money in question it placed itself in a position that it was unable to meet its obligations as they would generally become due. In other words, it had placed itself in a position that it would not be able to pay the obligations that it knew it had incurred and which it knew would become due in the immediate future. [Emphasis added.]

30 *King Petroleum Ltd.* was a case involving the question in a bankruptcy scenario of whether there was a fraudulent preference during a period when the corporation was insolvent. Under those circumstances, the "immediate future" does not have the same expansive meaning that one would attribute to a time period in a restructuring forward looking situation.

31 Stephen at paragraphs 40-49 addressed the restructuring question in general and its applicability to the Stelco situation. At paragraph 41, he outlined the significant stages as follows:

The process of restructuring under the CCAA entails a number of different stages, the most significant of which are as follows:

- (a) identification of the debtor's stakeholders and their interests;
- (b) arranging for a process of meaningful communication;
- (c) dealing with immediate relationship issues arising from a CCAA filing;
- (d) sharing information about the issues giving rise to the debtor's need to restructure;
- (e) developing restructuring alternatives; and
- (f) building a consensus around a plan of restructuring.

32 I note that January 29, 2004 is just 9-10 months away from November 2004. I accept as correct his conclusion based on his experience (and this is in accord with my own objective experience in large and complicated CCAA proceedings) that Stelco would have the liquidity problem within the time horizon indicated. In that regard, I also think it fair to observe that Stelco realistically cannot expect any increase in its credit line with its lenders or access further outside funding. To bridge the gap it must rely upon the stay to give it the uplift as to pre-filing liabilities (which the Union misinterpreted as a general turnaround in its cash position without taking into account this uplift). As well, the Union was of the view that recent price increases would relieve Stelco's liquidity problems; however, the answers to undertaking in this respect indicated:

With respect to the Business Plan, the average spot market sales price per ton was \$514, and the average contract business sales price per ton was \$599. The Forecast reflects an average spot market sales price per ton of \$575, and average contract business sales price per ton of \$611. The average spot price used in the forecast considers further announced price increases, recognizing, among other things, the timing and the extent such increases are expected to become effective. The benefit of the increase in sales prices from the Business Plan is essentially offset by the substantial increase in production costs, and in particular in raw material costs, primarily scrap and coke, as well as higher working capital levels and a higher loan balance outstanding on the CIT credit facility as of January 2004.

I accept that this is generally a cancel out or wash in all material respects.

33 I note that \$145 million of cash resources had been used from January 1, 2003 to the date of filing. Use of the credit facility of \$350 million had increased from \$241 million on November 30, 2003 to \$293 million on the date of filing. There must be a reasonable reserve of liquidity to take into account day to day, week to week or month to month variances and also provide for unforeseen circumstances such as the breakdown of a piece of vital equipment which would significantly affect production until remedied. Trade credit had been contracting as a result of appreciation by suppliers of Stelco's financial difficulties. The DIP financing of \$75 million is only available if Stelco is under CCAA protection. I also note that a shut down as a result of running out of liquidity would be complicated in the case of Stelco and that even if conditions turned around more than reasonably expected, start-up costs would be heavy and quite importantly, there would be a significant erosion of the customer base (reference should be had to the Slater Hamilton plant in this regard). One does not liquidate assets which one would not sell in the ordinary course of business to thereby artificially salvage some liquidity for the purpose of the test: see *Pacific Mobile Corp., Re* (1979), 32 C.B.R. (N.S.) 209 (Que. S.C.) at p. 220. As a rough test, I note that Stelco (albeit on a consolidated basis with all subsidiaries) running significantly behind plan in 2003 from its budget of a profit of \$80 million now to a projected loss of \$192 million and cash has gone from a positive \$209 million to a negative \$114 million.

34 Locker made the observation at paragraph 8 of his affidavit that:

8. Stelco has performed poorly for the past few years primarily due to an inadequate business strategy, poor utilization of assets, inefficient operations and generally weak management leadership and decision-making. This point is best supported by the fact that Stelco's local competitor, Dofasco, has generated outstanding results in the same period.

Table 1 to his affidavit would demonstrate that Dofasco has had superior profitability and cashflow performance than its "neighbour" Stelco. He went on to observe at paragraphs 36-37:

36. Stelco can achieve significant cost reductions through means other than cutting wages, pensions and benefits for employees and retirees. Stelco could bring its cost levels down to those of restructured U.S. mills, with the potential for lowering them below those of many U.S. mills.

37. Stelco could achieve substantial savings through productivity improvements within the mechanisms of the current collective agreements. More importantly, a major portion of this cost reduction could be achieved through constructive negotiations with the USWA in an out-of-court restructuring that does not require intervention of the courts through the vehicle of CCAA protection.

I accept his constructive comments that there is room for cost reductions and that there are substantial savings to be achieved through productivity improvements. However, I do not see anything detrimental to these discussions and negotiations by having them conducted within the umbrella of a CCAA proceeding. See my comments above regarding the CCAA in practice.

35 But I would observe and I am mystified by Locker's observations at paragraph 12 (quoted above), that Stelco should have borrowed to fund pension obligations to avoid its current financial crisis. This presumes that the borrowed funds would not constitute an obligation to be paid back as to principal and interest, but rather that it would assume the character of a cost-free "gift".

36 I note that Mackey, without the "laundry list" he indicates at paragraph 17 of his second affidavit, is unable to determine at paragraph 19 (for himself) whether Stelco was insolvent. Mackey was unable to avail himself of all available information in light of the Union's refusal to enter into a confidentiality agreement. He does not closely adhere to the BIA tests as they are defined. In the face of positive evidence about an applicant's financial position by an experienced person with expertise, it is not sufficient to displace this evidence by filing evidence which goes no further than raising questions: see *Anvil Range Mining Corp.*, *supra* at p. 162.

37 The Union referred me to one of my decisions *Standard Trustco Ltd. (Trustee of) v. Standard Trust Co.* (1993), 13 O.R. (3d) 7 (Ont. Gen. Div.) where I stated as to the MacGirr affidavit:

The Trustee's cause of action is premised on MacGirr's opinion that STC was insolvent as at August 3, 1990 and therefore the STC common shares and promissory note received by Trustco in return for the Injection had no value at the time the Injection was made. Further, MacGirr ascribed no value to the opportunity which the Injection gave to Trustco to restore STC and salvage its thought to be existing \$74 million investment. In stating his opinion MacGirr defined solvency as:

- (a) the ability to meet liabilities as they fall due; and
- (b) that assets exceed liabilities.

On cross-examination MacGirr testified that in his opinion on either test STC was insolvent as at August 3, 1990 since as to (a) STC was experiencing then a negative cash flow and as to (b) the STC financial statements incorrectly reflected values. As far as (a) is concerned, I would comment that while I concur with MacGirr that at some time in the long run a company that is experiencing a negative cash flow will eventually not be able to meet liabilities as they fall due but that is not the test (which is a "present exercise"). On that current basis STC was meeting its liabilities on a timely basis.

38 As will be seen from that expanded quote, MacGirr gave his own definitions of insolvency which are not the same as the s. 2 BIA tests (a), (b) and (c) but only a very loose paraphrase of (a) and (c) and an omission of (b). Nor was I referred to the *King Petroleum Ltd.* or *Proulx* cases *supra*. Further, it is obvious from the context that "*sometime in the long run . . . eventually*" is not a finite time in the foreseeable future.

39 I have not given any benefit to the \$313 - \$363 million of improvements referred to in the affidavit of William Vaughan at paragraph 115 as those appear to be capital expenditures which will have to be accommodated within a plan of arrangement or after emergence.

40 It seems to me that if the BIA (a) test is restrictively dealt with (as per my question to Union counsel as to how far in the future should one look on a prospective basis being answered "24 hours") then Stelco would not be insolvent under that test. However, I am of the view that that would be unduly restrictive and a proper contextual and purposive interpretation to be given when it is being used for a restructuring purpose even under BIA would be to see whether there is a reasonably foreseeable (at the time of filing) expectation that there is a looming liquidity condition or crisis which will result in the applicant running out of "cash" to pay its debts as they generally become due in the future without the benefit of the stay and ancillary protection and procedure by court authorization pursuant to an order. I think this is the more appropriate interpretation of BIA (a) test in the context of a reorganization or "rescue" as opposed to a threshold to bankruptcy consideration or a fraudulent preferences proceeding. On that basis, I would find Stelco insolvent from the date of filing. Even if one were not to give the latter interpretation to the BIA (a) test, clearly for the above reasons and analysis, if one looks at the

meaning of "insolvent" within the context of a CCAA reorganization or rescue solely, then of necessity, the time horizon must be such that the liquidity crisis would occur in the sense of running out of "cash" but for the grant of the CCAA order. On that basis Stelco is certainly insolvent given its limited cash resources unused, its need for a cushion, its rate of cash burn recently experienced and anticipated.

41 What about the BIA (c) test which may be roughly referred to as an assets compared with obligations test. See *New Quebec Raglan Mines Ltd. v. Blok-Andersen*, [1993] O.J. No. 727 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) as to fair value and fair market valuation. The Union observed that there was no intention by Stelco to wind itself up or proceed with a sale of some or all of its assets and undertaking and therefore some of the liabilities which Stelco and Stephen took into account would not crystallize. However, as I discussed at the time of the hearing, the (c) test is what one might reasonably call or describe as an "artificial" or notional/hypothetical test. It presumes certain things which are in fact not necessarily contemplated to take place or to be involved. In that respect, I appreciate that it may be difficult to get one's mind around that concept and down the right avenue of that (c) test. See my views at trial in *Olympia & York Developments Ltd. (Trustee of) v. Olympia & York Realty Corp.*, [2001] O.J. No. 3394 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at paragraphs 13, 21 and 33; affirmed [2003] O.J. No. 5242 (Ont. C.A.). At paragraph 33, I observed in closing:

33 . . . They (and their expert witnesses) all had to contend with dealing with rambling and complicated facts and, in Section 100 BIA, a section which is difficult to administer when fmV [fair market value] in a notational or hypothetical market involves ignoring what would often be regarded as self evidence truths but at the same time appreciating that this notational or hypothetical market requires that the objects being sold have to have realistic true to life attributes recognized.

42 The Court of Appeal stated at paragraphs 24-25 as follows:

24. Nor are the appellants correct to argue that the trial judge also assumed an imprudent vendor in arriving at his conclusion about the fair market value of the OYSF note would have to know that in order to realize value from the note any purchaser would immediately put OYSF and thus OYDL itself into bankruptcy to pre-empt a subsequent triggering event in favour of EIB. While this was so, and the trial judge clearly understood it, the error in this submission is that it seeks to inject into the analysis factors subjected to the circumstances of OYDL as vendor and not intrinsic to the value of the OYSF note. The calculation of fair market value does not permit this but rather must assume an unconstrained vendor.

25. The Applicants further argue that the trial judge erred in determining the fair market value of the OYSF note by reference to a transaction which was entirely speculative because it was never considered by OYDL nor would have it been since it would have resulted in OYDL's own bankruptcy. I disagree. The transaction hypothesized by the trial judge was one between a notational, willing, prudent and informed vendor and purchaser based on factors relevant to the OYSF note itself rather than the particular circumstances of OYDL as the seller of the note. This is an entirely appropriate way to determine the fair market value of the OYSF note.

43 Test (c) deems a person to be insolvent if "the aggregate of [its] property is not, at a fair valuation, sufficient, or of disposed at a fairly conducted sale under legal process would not be sufficient to enable payment of all [its] obligations, due and accruing due." The origins of this legislative test appear to be the decision of Spragge V-C in *Davidson v. Douglas* (1868), 15 Gr. 347 (Ont. Ch.) at p. 351 where he stated with respect to the

solvency or insolvency of a debtor, the proper course is:

to see and examine whether all his property, real and personal, be sufficient if presently realized for the payment of his debts, and in this view we must estimate his land, as well as his chattel property, not at what his neighbours or others may consider to be its value, but at what it would bring in the market at a forced sale, or a sale where the seller cannot await his opportunities, but must sell.

44 In *Clarkson v. Sterling* (1887), 14 O.R. 460 (Ont. C.P.) at p. 463, Rose J. indicted that the sale must be fair and reasonable, but that the determination of fairness and reasonableness would depend on the facts of each case.

45 The Union essentially relied on garnishment cases. Because of the provisions relating as to which debts may or may not be garnished, these authorities are of somewhat limited value when dealing with the test (c) question. However I would refer to one of the Union's cases *Bank of Montreal v. I.M. Krisp Foods Ltd.*, [1996] S.J. No. 655 (Sask. C.A.) where it is stated at paragraph 11:

11. Few phrases have been as problematic to define as "debt due or accruing due". The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 3rd ed. defines "accruing" as "arising in due course", but an examination of English and Canadian authority reveals that not all debts "arising in due course" are permitted to be garnisheed. (See Professor Dunlop's extensive research for his British Columbia Law Reform Commission's Report on Attachment of Debts Act, 1978 at 17 to 29 and its text *Creditor-Debtor Law in Canada*, 2nd ed. at 374 to 385.)

46 In *Barsi v. Farcas* (1923), [1924] 1 D.L.R. 1154 (Sask. C.A.), Lamont J.A. was cited for his statement at p. 522 of *Webb v. Stenton* (1883), 11 Q.B.D. 518 (Eng. C.A.) that: "an accruing debt, therefore, is a debt not yet actually payable, but a debt which is represented by an existing obligation."

47 Saunders J. noted in *633746 Ontario Inc. (Trustee of) v. Salvati* (1990), 79 C.B.R. (N.S.) 72 (Ont. S.C.) at p. 81 that a sale out of the ordinary course of business would have an adverse effect on that actually realized.

48 There was no suggestion by any of the parties that any of the assets and undertaking would have any enhanced value from that shown on the financial statements prepared according to GAAP.

49 In *King Petroleum Ltd.*, *supra* at p. 81 Steele J. observed:

To consider the question of insolvency under cl. (c) I must look to the aggregate property of the company and come to a conclusion as to whether or not it would be sufficient to enable payment of all obligations due and accruing due. There are two tests to be applied: First, its fair value and, secondly, its value if disposed of at a fairly conducted sale under legal process. The balance sheet is a starting point, but the evidence relating to the fair value of the assets and what they might realize if disposed of at a fairly conducted sale under legal process must be reviewed in interpreting it. In this case, I find no difficulty in accepting the obligations shown as liabilities because they are known. I have more difficulty with respect to the assets.

50 To my view the preferable interpretation to be given to "sufficient to enable payment of all his obligations, due and accruing due" is to be determined in the context of this test as a whole. What is being put up to satisfy those obligations is the debtor's assets and undertaking *in total*; in other words, the debtor in essence is

taken as having sold everything. There would be no residual assets and undertaking to pay off any obligations which would not be encompassed by the phrase "all of his obligations, due and accruing due". Surely, there cannot be "orphan" obligations which are left hanging unsatisfied. It seems to me that the intention of "due and accruing due" was to cover off all obligations of whatever nature or kind and leave nothing in limbo.

51 S. 121(1) and (2) of the BIA, which are incorporated by reference in s. 12 of the CCAA, provide in respect to provable claims:

S. 121(1) All debts and liabilities, present or future, to which the bankrupt is subject on the day on which the bankrupt becomes bankrupt or to which bankrupt may become subject before the bankrupt's discharge by reason of any obligation incurred before the day on which the bankrupt becomes bankrupt shall be deemed to be claims provable in proceedings under this Act.

(2) The determination whether a contingent or unliquidated claim is a provable claim and the valuation of such claim shall be made in accordance with s. 135.

52 *Houlden and Morawetz 2004 Annotated supra* at p. 537 (G28(3)) indicates:

The word "liability" is a very broad one. It includes all obligations to which the bankrupt is subject on the day on which he becomes bankrupt except for contingent and unliquidated claims which are dealt with in s. 121(2).

However contingent and unliquidated claims would be encompassed by the term "obligations".

53 In *Gardner v. Newton* (1916), 29 D.L.R. 276 (Man. K.B.), Mathers C.J.K.B. observed at p. 281 that "contingent claim, that is, a claim which may or may not ripen into a debt, according as some future event does or does not happen." See *A Debtor (No. 64 of 1992), Re*, [1993] 1 W.L.R. 264 (Eng. Ch. Div.) at p. 268 for the definition of a "liquidated sum" which is an amount which can be readily ascertained and hence by corollary an "unliquidated claim" would be one which is not easily ascertained, but will have to be valued. In *Gagnier, Re* (1950), 30 C.B.R. 74 (Ont. S.C.), there appears to be a conflation of not only the (a) test with the (c) test, but also the invocation of the judicial discretion not to grant the receiving order pursuant to a bankruptcy petition, notwithstanding that "[the judge was] unable to find the debtor is bankrupt". The debtor was able to survive the (a) test as he had the practice (accepted by all his suppliers) of providing them with post dated cheques. The (c) test was not a problem since the judge found that his assets should be valued at considerably more than his obligations. However, this case does illustrate that the application of the tests present some difficulties. These difficulties are magnified when one is dealing with something more significantly complex and a great deal larger than a haberdashery store - in the case before us, a giant corporation in which, amongst other things, is engaged in a very competitive history including competition from foreign sources which have recently restructured into more cost efficient structures, having shed certain of their obligations. As well, that is without taking into account that a sale would entail significant transaction costs. Even of greater significance would be the severance and termination payments to employees not continued by the new purchaser. Lastly, it was recognized by everyone at the hearing that Stelco's plants, especially the Hamilton-Hilton works, have extremely high environmental liabilities lurking in the woodwork. Stephen observed that these obligations would be substantial, although not quantified.

54 It is true that there are no appraisals of the plant and equipment nor of the assets and undertaking of Stelco. Given the circumstances of this case and the complexities of the market, one may realistically question whether or not the appraisals would be all that helpful or accurate.

55 I would further observe that in the notional or hypothetical exercise of a sale, then all the obligations which would be triggered by such sale would have to be taken into account.

56 All liabilities, contingent or unliquidated would have to be taken into account. See *King Petroleum Ltd.*, *supra* p. 81; *Salvati, supra* pp. 80-1; *Maybank Foods Inc. (Trustee of) v. Provisioners Maritimes Ltd.* (1989), 45 B.L.R. 14 (N.S. T.D.) at p. 29; *Challmie, Re* (1976), 22 C.B.R. (N.S.) 78 (B.C. S.C.), at pp. 81-2. In *Challmie* the debtor ought to have known that his guarantee was very much exposed given the perilous state of his company whose liabilities he had guaranteed. It is interesting to note what was stated in *Maybank Foods Inc. (Trustee of)*, even if it is rather patently obvious. Tidman J. said in respect of the branch of the company at p. 29:

Mr. MacAdam argues also that the \$4.8 million employees' severance obligation was not a liability on January 20, 1986. The *Bankruptcy Act* includes as obligations both those due and accruing due. Although the employees' severance obligation was not due and payable on January 20, 1986 it was an obligation "accruing due". The Toronto facility had experienced severe financial difficulties for some time; in fact, it was the major, if not the sole cause, of Maybank's financial difficulties. I believe it is reasonable to conclude that a reasonably astute perspective buyer of the company has a going concern would have considered that obligation on January 20, 1986 and that it would have substantially reduced the price offered by that perspective buyer. Therefore that obligation must be considered as an obligation of the company on January 20, 1986.

57 With the greatest of respect for my colleague, I disagree with the conclusion of Ground J. in *Enterprise Capital Management Inc.*, *supra* as to the approach to be taken to "due and accruing due" when he observed at pp. 139-140:

It therefore becomes necessary to determine whether the principle amount of the Notes constitutes an obligation "due or accruing due" as of the date of this application.

There is a paucity of helpful authority on the meaning of "accruing due" for purposes of a definition of insolvency. Historically, in 1933, in *P. Lyall & Sons Construction Co. v. Baker*, [1933] O.R. 286 (Ont. C.A.), the Ontario Court of Appeal, in determining a question of set-off under the *Dominion Winding-Up Act* had to determine whether the amount claimed as set-off was a debt due or accruing due to the company in liquidation for purposes of that Act. Marsten J. at pp. 292-293 quoted from Moss J.A. in *Mail Printing Co. v. Clarkson* (1898), 25 O.R. 1 (Ont. C.A.) at p. 8:

A debt is defined to be a sum of money which is certainly, and at all event, payable without regard to the fact whether it be payable now or at a future time. And an accruing debt is a debt not yet actually payable, but a debt which is represented by an existing obligation: Per Lindley L.J. in *Webb v. Stenton* (1883), 11 Q.D.D. at p. 529.

Whatever relevance such definition may have had for purposes of dealing with claims by and against companies in liquidation under the old winding-up legislation, it is apparent to me that it should not be applied to definitions of insolvency. To include every debt payable at some future date in "accruing due" for the purposes of insolvency tests would render numerous corporations, with long term debt due over a period of

years in the future and anticipated to be paid out of future income, "insolvent" for the purposes of the BIA and therefore the CCAA. For the same reason, I do not accept the statement quoted in the Enterprise factum from the decision of the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York in *Centennial Textiles Inc., Re*, 220 B.R. 165 (U.S.N.Y.D.C. 1998) that "if the present saleable value of assets are less than the amount required to pay existing debt as they mature, the debtor is insolvent". In my view, the obligations, which are to be measured against the fair valuation of a company's property as being obligations due and accruing due, must be limited to obligations currently payable or properly chargeable to the accounting period during which the test is being applied as, for example, a sinking fund payment due within the current year. Black's Law Dictionary defines "accrued liability" as "an obligation or debt which is properly chargeable in a given accounting period, but which is not yet paid or payable". The principal amount of the Notes is neither due nor accruing due in this sense.

58 There appears to be some confusion in this analysis as to "debts" and "obligations", the latter being much broader than debts. Please see above as to my views concerning the floodgates argument under the BIA and CCAA being addressed by judicially exercised discretion even if "otherwise warranted" applications were made. I pause to note that an insolvency test under general corporate litigation need not be and likely is not identical, or indeed similar to that under these insolvency statutes. As well, it is curious to note that the cut off date is the end of the current fiscal period which could have radically different results if there were a calendar fiscal year and the application was variously made in the first week of January, mid-summer or the last day of December. Lastly, see above and below as to my views concerning the proper interpretation of this question of "accruing due".

59 It seems to me that the phrase "accruing due" has been interpreted by the courts as broadly identifying obligations that will "become due". See *Viteway Natural Foods Ltd.* below at pp. 163-4 - at least at some point in the future. Again, I would refer to my conclusion above that *every obligation* of the corporation in the hypothetical or notional sale must be treated as "accruing due" to avoid orphan obligations. In that context, it matters not that a wind-up pension liability may be discharged over 15 years; in a test (c) situation, it is crystallized on the date of the test. See *Optical Recording Laboratories Inc. supra* at pp. 756-7; *Viteway Natural Foods Ltd., Re* (1986), 63 C.B.R. (N.S.) 157 (B.C. S.C.) at pp. 164-63-4; *Consolidated Seed Exports Ltd., Re* (1986), 62 C.B.R. (N.S.) 156 (B.C. S.C.) at p. 163. In *Consolidated Seed Exports Ltd.*, Spencer J. at pp. 162-3 stated:

In my opinion, a futures broker is not in that special position. The third definition of "insolvency" may apply to a futures trader at any time even though he has open long positions in the market. Even though Consolidated's long positions were not required to be closed on 10th December, the chance that they might show a profit by March 1981 or even on the following day and thus wipe out Consolidated's cash deficit cannot save it from a condition of insolvency on that day. The circumstances fit precisely within the third definition; if all Consolidated's assets had been sold on that day at a fair value, the proceeds would not have covered its obligations due and accruing due, including its obligations to pay in March 1981 for its long positions in rapeseed. The market prices from day to day establish a fair valuation. . . .

The contract to buy grain at a fixed price at a future time imposes a present obligation upon a trader taking a long position in the futures market to take delivery in exchange for payment at that future time. It is true that in the practice of the market, that obligation is nearly always washed out by buying an offsetting short contract, but until that is done the obligation stands. The trader does not know who will eventually be on the opposite side of his transaction if it is not offset but all transactions are treated as if the clearing house is on

the other side. It is a present obligation due at a future time. It is therefore an obligation accruing due within the meaning of the third definition of "insolvency".

60 The possibility of an expectancy of future profits or a change in the market is not sufficient; *Consolidated Seed Exports Ltd.* at p. 162 emphasizes that the test is to be done on that day, the day of filing in the case of an application for reorganization.

61 I see no objection to using Exhibit C to Stephen's affidavit as an aid to review the balance sheet approach to test (c). While Stephen may not have known who prepared Exhibit C, he addressed each of its components in the text of his affidavit and as such he could have mechanically prepared the exhibit himself. He was comfortable with and agreed with each of its components. Stelco's factum at paragraphs 70-1 submits as follows:

70. In Exhibit C to his Affidavit, Mr. Stephen addresses a variety of adjustments to the Shareholder's Equity of Stelco necessary to reflect the values of assets and liabilities as would be required to determine whether Stelco met the test of insolvency under Clause C. In cross examination of both Mr. Vaughan and Mr. Stephen only one of these adjustments was challenged - the "Possible Reductions in Capital Assets."

71. The basis of the challenge was that the comparative sales analysis was flawed. In the submission of Stelco, none of these challenges has any merit. Even if the entire adjustment relating to the value in capital assets is ignored, the remaining adjustments leave Stelco with assets worth over \$600 million less than the value of its obligations due and accruing due. This fundamental fact is not challenged.

62 Stelco went on at paragraphs 74-5 of its factum to submit:

74. The values relied upon by Mr. Stephen if anything, understate the extent of Stelco's insolvency. As Mr. Stephen has stated, and no one has challenged by affidavit evidence or on cross examination, in a fairly conducted sale under legal process, the value of Stelco's working capital and other assets would be further impaired by: (i) increased environmental liabilities not reflected on the financial statements, (ii) increased pension deficiencies that would be generated on a wind up of the pension plans, (iii) severance and termination claims and (iv) substantial liquidation costs that would be incurred in connection with such a sale.

75. No one on behalf of the USWA has presented any evidence that the capital assets of Stelco are in excess of book value on a stand alone basis. Certainly no one has suggested that these assets would be in excess of book value if the related environmental legacy costs and collective agreements could not be separated from the assets.

63 Before turning to that exercise, I would also observe that test (c) is also disjunctive. There is an insolvency condition if the total obligation of the debtor exceed either (i) a fair valuation of its assets or (ii) the proceeds of a sale fairly conducted under legal process of its assets.

64 As discussed above and confirmed by Stephen, if there were a sale under legal process, then it would be unlikely, especially in this circumstance that values would be enhanced; in all probability they would be depressed from book value. Stephen took the balance sheet GAAP calculated figure of equity at November 30,

2003 as \$804.2 million. From that, he deducted the loss for December 2003 - January 2004 of \$17 million to arrive at an equity position of \$787.2 million as at the date of filing.

65 From that, he deducted, reasonably in my view, those "booked" assets that would have no value in a test (c) sale namely: (a) \$294 million of future income tax recourse which would need taxable income in the future to realize; (b) \$57 million for a write-off of the Platemill which is presently hot idled (while Locker observed that it would not be prohibitive in cost to restart production, I note that neither Stephen nor Vaughn were cross examined as to the decision not to do so); and (c) the capitalized deferred debt issue expense of \$3.2 million which is being written off over time and therefore, truly is a "nothing". This totals \$354.2 million so that the excess of value over liabilities before reflecting obligations not included in the financials directly, but which are, substantiated as to category in the notes would be \$433 million.

66 On a windup basis, there would be a pension deficiency of \$1252 million; however, Stephen conservatively in my view looked at the Mercer actuary calculations on the basis of a going concern finding deficiency of \$656 million. If the \$1252 million windup figure had been taken, then the picture would have been even bleaker than it is as Stephen has calculated it for test (c) purposes. In addition, there are deferred pension costs of \$198.7 million which under GAAP accounting calculations is allowed so as to defer recognition of past bad investment experience, but this has no realizable value. Then there is the question of Employee Future Benefits. These have been calculated as at December 31, 2003 by the Mercer actuary as \$909.3 million but only \$684 million has been accrued and booked on the financial statements so that there has to be an increased provision of \$225.3 million. These off balance sheet adjustments total \$1080 million.

67 Taking that last adjustment into account would result in a *negative* equity of (\$433 million minus \$1080 million) or *negative* \$647 million. On that basis without taking into account possible reductions in capital assets as dealt with in the somewhat flawed Exhibit E nor environmental and other costs discussed above, Stelco is insolvent according to the test (c). With respect to Exhibit E, I have not relied on it in any way, but it is entirely likely that a properly calculated Exhibit E would provide comparators (also being sold in the U.S. under legal process in a fairly conducted process) which tend to require a further downward adjustment. Based on test (c), Stelco is significantly, not marginally, under water.

68 In reaching my conclusion as to the negative equity (and I find that Stephen approached that exercise fairly and constructively), please note my comments above regarding the possible assumption of pension obligations by the purchaser being offset by a reduction of the purchase price. The 35% adjustment advocated as to pension and employee benefits in this regard is speculation by the Union. Secondly, the Union emphasized cash flow as being important in evaluation, but it must be remembered that Stelco has been negative cash flow for some time which would make that analysis unreliable and to the detriment of the Union's position. The Union treated the \$773 million estimated contribution to the shortfall in the pension deficiency by the Pension Benefits Guarantee Fund as eliminating that as a Stelco obligation. That is not the case however as that Fund would be subrogated to the claims of the employees in that respect with a result that Stelco would remain liable for that \$773 million. Lastly, the Union indicated that there should be a \$155 million adjustment as to the negative equity in Sub Applicants when calculating Stelco's equity. While Stephen at Q. 181-2 acknowledged that there was no adjustment for that, I agree with him that there ought not to be since Stelco was being examined (and the calculations were based) on an unconsolidated basis, not on a consolidated basis.

69 In the end result, I have concluded on the balance of probabilities that Stelco is insolvent and therefore it is a "debtor company" as at the date of filing and entitled to apply for the CCAA initial order. My conclusion is

that (i) BIA test (c) strongly shows Stelco is insolvent; (ii) BIA test (a) demonstrates, to a less certain but sufficient basis, an insolvency and (iii) the "new" CCAA test again strongly supports the conclusion of insolvency. I am further of the opinion that I properly exercised my discretion in granting Stelco and the Sub Applicants the initial order on January 29, 2004 and I would confirm that as of the present date with effect on the date of filing. The Union's motion is therefore dismissed.

70 I appreciate that all the employees (union and non-union alike) and the Union and the International have a justifiable pride in their work and their workplace - and a human concern about what the future holds for them. The pensioners are in the same position. Their respective positions can only be improved by engaging in discussion, an exchange of views and information reasonably advanced and conscientiously listened to and digested, leading to mutual problem solving, ideas and negotiations. Negative attitudes can only lead to the detriment to all stakeholders. Unfortunately there has been some finger pointing on various sides; that should be put behind everyone so that participants in this process can concentrate on the future and not inappropriately dwell on the past. I understand that there have been some discussions and interchange over the past two weeks since the hearing and that is a positive start.

Motion dismissed.

Appendix

END OF DOCUMENT

TAB 2

1990 CarswellOnt 139, 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101, (sub nom. Elan Corp. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)) 1 O.R. (3d) 289, 41 O.A.C. 282



1990 CarswellOnt 139, 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101, (sub nom. Elan Corp. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)) 1 O.R. (3d) 289, 41 O.A.C. 282

Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)

ELAN CORPORATION et al. v. COMISKEY (TRUSTEE OF) et al.

Ontario Court of Appeal

Finlayson, Krever and Doherty JJ.A.

Heard: October 30 and 31, 1990

Judgment: November 2, 1990

Docket: Doc. Nos. CA 684/90 and CA 685/90

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Counsel: *F.J.C. Newbould, Q.C.*, and *G.B. Morawetz*, for appellant The Bank of Nova Scotia.

John Little, for respondents Elan Corporation and Nova Metal Products Inc.

Michael B. Rotsztain, for RoyNat Inc.

Kim Twohig and *Mel Olanow*, for Ontario Development Corp.

K.P. McElcheran, for monitor Ernst & Young.

Subject: Corporate and Commercial; Insolvency

Corporations --- Arrangements and compromises — Under Companies' Creditors Arrangements Act

Corporations — Arrangements and compromises — Court having discretion when ordering creditors' meeting under s. 5 of Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act to consider equities between debtor company and secured creditors and to consider possible success of plan of arrangement — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 5.

Corporations — Arrangements and compromises — Opposing commercial and legal interests requiring secured creditors to be in separate classes — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36.

Corporations — Arrangements and compromises — Where receiver-manager having been appointed, corporation not entitled to issue debentures and trust deeds or to bring application for relief under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 3.

The applicants were two related companies. The bank was the lender to the companies and was owed over \$2,300,000. R Inc. was also a secured creditor of the companies, and was owed approximately \$12 million. By agreement, the bank had a first registered charge on the companies' accounts receivable and inventory and a second registered charge on land, buildings and equipment, while R Inc. had a second registered charge on the accounts receivable and inventory and a first registered charge on the land, buildings and equipment. The security agreements with the bank prohibited the companies from encumbering their assets without the bank's consent. The bank also had s. 178 *Bank Act* security. The Ontario Development Corporation ("ODC") guaranteed part of the companies' debt to R. Inc. and held as security a debenture from one of the companies ranking third to the bank and R Inc. Two municipalities had first priority liens on the companies' lands for unpaid municipal taxes.

The bank demanded payment of its outstanding loans and on August 27, 1990, appointed a receiver-manager pursuant to the security agreements. When the companies refused to allow the receiver-manager access to the premises, the Court made an interim order authorizing the receiver-manager access to monitor the companies' business, and permitting the companies to remain in possession and carry on business in the ordinary course. The bank was restrained from selling the assets and from notifying account debtors to collect receivables, but could apply accounts receivable that were collected by the companies to the bank loans. On August 29, 1990, the companies each issued debentures to a friend and to the wife of the companies' principal, pursuant to trust deeds. The debentures conveyed personal property to a trustee as security. No consent was obtained from either the bank or the receiver-manager. It was conceded that the debentures were issued for the sole purpose of qualifying each company as a "debtor company" within the meaning of s. 3 of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, ("CCAA").

The companies applied under s. 5 of the CCAA for an order directing the meeting of secured creditors to vote on a plan of arrangement. The plan of arrangement filed provided that the companies would carry on business for 3 months, the secured creditors would be paid and could take no action on their security for 3 months, and the accounts receivable assigned to the bank could be utilized by the companies for their day-to-day operations. No compromise was proposed. At the hearing of the application, orders were granted which set dates for presenting the plan to the secured creditors and for holding the meeting of the secured creditors. The companies were permitted, for 3 months, to spend the accounts receivable collected in accordance with cash flow projections. Proceedings by the bank, acting on its security or paying down the loan from the accounts receivable were stayed. An order was granted that created two classes of creditors for purposes of voting at the meeting of secured creditors. The classes were: (a) the bank, R Inc., ODC and the municipalities; and (b) the principal's wife and friend, who had acquired the debentures to enable the companies to apply under the CCAA. The bank appealed.

Held:

The appeal was allowed, Doherty J.A. dissenting in part; the application was dismissed.

Per Finlayson J.A. (Krever J.A. concurring): — Since the CCAA was intended to provide a structured environment for the negotiation of compromises between the debtor company and its creditors for the benefit of both, which could have significant benefits for the company, its shareholders and employees, debtor corporations were entitled to a broad and liberal interpretation of the jurisdiction of the Court under the CCAA. However, it did not follow that in exercising its discretion to order a meeting of creditors under s. 5 of the CCAA, a Court should not consider the equities as they related to the debtor company and to its secured creditors. Any discretion exercised by the Judge in this instance was not reflected in his reasons. Therefore, the appellate Court could examine

the uncontested chronology of these proceedings and exercise its own discretion.

The significant date was August 27, 1990. The effect of the appointment of the receiver-manager was to disentitle the companies to issue the debentures and bring the application under the CCAA. Neither company had the power to create further indebtedness, and thus to interfere with the ability of the receiver-manager to manage the two companies. The interim order granting the receiver-manager access to the premises restricted its powers, but did not divest the receiver-manager of all its managerial powers. The issue of the debentures to the friend and wife was outside the companies' jurisdiction to carry on business in the ordinary course. Rather, the residual power to take such initiatives to gain relief under the CCAA rested with the receiver-manager. The issuance and registration of the trust deeds required a court order.

The probability of the meeting of secured creditors achieving some measure of success was another relevant consideration. Had there been a proper classification of creditors, the meeting would not have been productive. It was improper to create one class of creditors comprised of all secured creditors except the debenture creditors. There was no true community of interest among the former. The bank should have been classified in its own class. The companies had clearly intended to avoid having the bank designated as a separate class, because the companies knew that no plan of arrangement would succeed without the approval of the bank. The bank and R Inc. had opposing interests. It was in the commercial interest of the bank to collect and retain the accounts receivable while it was in R Inc.'s commercial interest to preserve the cash flow of the businesses and sell the businesses as going concerns. To have placed the bank and R Inc. in the same class would have enabled R Inc. to vote with the ODC to defeat the bank's prior claim.

There was no reason why the bank's legal interest in the receivables should be overridden by R Inc. as the second security holder in the receivables.

For the foregoing reasons, the application under the CCAA should be dismissed.

Per Doherty J.A. (dissenting in part): — The debentures and "instant" trust deeds sufficed to bring the companies within the requirements of s. 3 of the CCAA even if, in issuing those debentures, the companies breached a prior agreement with the bank. Section 3 merely required that at the time of an application by the debtor company, an outstanding debenture or bond be issued under a trust deed. However, where a bond or debenture did not reflect a transaction which actually occurred and did not create a real debt owed by the company, such bond or debenture would not suffice for the purposes of s. 3. The statute should only be used for the purpose of attempting a legitimate reorganization. Where the application was brought for an improper purpose or the company acted in bad faith, the Court had means available to it, entirely apart from s. 3 of the CCAA, to prevent misuse of the Act. The contravention of the security agreement in creating the debentures without the bank's consent did not affect the status of the debentures for the purposes of s. 3, but could play a role in the Court's determination of what additional orders should be made under the statute.

The interim order regarding the receiver-manager effectively rendered the receiver-manager a monitor with rights of access but no further authority. Therefore, in light of the terms of the interim order, the existence of the receiver-manager installed by the bank did not preclude the application under s. 3 of the CCAA.

The Judge properly exercised his discretion in directing that a meeting of creditors should be held pursuant to s. 5 of the CCAA. Even though the chances of a successful reorganization were not good, the benefits flowing from the s. 5 order exceeded the risk inherent in the order. However, the bank and R Inc., as the two principal creditors, should not have been placed in the same class of secured creditors for the purposes of ss. 5 and 6 of

1990 CarswellOnt 139, 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101, (sub nom. Elan Corp. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)) 1 O.R. (3d) 289, 41 O.A.C. 282

the statute. Their interests were not only different, but opposed. The classification scheme created by the Judge effectively denied the bank any control over any plan of reorganization.

Cases considered:

Per Finlayson J.A. (Krever J.A. concurring)

Alberta Treasury Branches v. Hat Development Ltd. (1988), 71 C.B.R. (N.S.) 264, 64 Alta. L.R. (2d) 17 (Q.B.), aff'd (1989), 65 Alta. L.R. (2d) 374 (C.A.) — *applied*

Northland Properties Ltd., Re (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 166, 31 B.C.L.R. (2d) 35 (S.C.), aff'd (16 September 1988), Doc. No. Vancouver CA009772, Taggart, Lambert and Locke J.J.A. (B.C. C.A.) — *considered*

Northland Properties Ltd., Re (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 175 (S.C.), aff'd 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 195, [1989] 3 W.W.R. 363, 34 B.C.L.R. (2d) 122 (C.A.) — *referred to*

NsC Diesel Power Inc., Re (1990), 79 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 97 N.S.R. (2d) 295, 258 A.P.R. 295 (T.D.) — *considered*

Sovereign Life Assurance Co. v. Dodd, [1892] 2 Q.B. 573, [1891-4] All E.R. 246 (C.A.) — *applied*

Wellington Building Corp., Re, [1934] O.R. 653, 16 C.B.R. 48, [1934] 4 D.L.R. 626, [1934] O.W.N. 562 (S.C.) — *applied*

Per Doherty J.A. (dissenting in part)

Alberta Treasury Branches v. Hat Development Ltd. (1988), 71 C.B.R. (N.S.) 264, 64 Alta. L.R. (2d) 17 (Q.B.), aff'd (1989), 65 Alta. L.R. (2d) 374 (C.A.) — *considered*

Avery Construction Co., Re, 24 C.B.R. 17, [1942] 4 D.L.R. 558 (Ont. S.C.) — *referred to*

Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd., [1991] 2 W.W.R. 136, 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 84 (C.A.) — *considered*

Icor Oil & Gas Co. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (1989), 102 A.R. 161 (Q.B.) — *referred to*

Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank; Meridian Developments Inc. v. Nu-West Ltd., 52 C.B.R. (N.S.) 109, [1984] 5 W.W.R. 215, 32 Alta. L.R. (2d) 150, 11 D.L.R. (4th) 576, 53 A.R. 39 (Q.B.) — *referred to*

Metals & Alloys Co., Re (16 February 1990), Houlden J.A. (Ont. C.A.) [unreported] — *considered*

Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd. (1988), 72 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 63 Alta. L.R. (2d) 361, 92 A.R. 81 (Q.B.) — *referred to*

Northland Properties Ltd., Re (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 175 (S.C.), aff'd 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 195, [1989] 3 W.W.R. 363, 34 B.C.L.R. (2d) 122 (C.A.) — *referred to*

Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp. (1990), 47 B.C.L.R. (2d) 193 (S.C.) — *referred to*

1990 CarswellOnt 139, 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101, (sub nom. Elan Corp. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)) 1 O.R. (3d) 289, 41 O.A.C. 282

Reference re Residential Tenancies Act (Ontario), [1981] 1 S.C.R. 714, 123 D.L.R. (3d) 554, 37 N.R. 158 — referred to

Stephanie's Fashions Ltd., Re (1990), 1 C.B.R. (3d) 248 (B.C.S.C.) — considered

United Maritime Fishermen Co-op., Re (1988), 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 44, 84 N.B.R. (2d) 415, 214 A.P.R. 415 (Q.B.), varied on reconsideration (1988), 68 C.B.R. (N.S.) 170, 87 N.B.R. (2d) 333, 221 A.P.R. 333 (Q.B.), rev'd (1988), 69 C.B.R. (N.S.) 161, 51 D.L.R. (4th) 618, 88 N.B.R. (2d) 253, 224 A.P.R. 253 (C.A.) — considered

Statutes considered:

Bank Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-1 —

s. 178, as am. R.S.C. 1985 (3d Supp.), c. 25, s. 26

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, S.C. 1932-33, c. 36 —

s. 3, en. as s. 2A, S.C. 1952-53, c. 3, s. 2

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 —

s. 3

s. 4

s. 5

s. 6

s. 6(a)

s. 11

s. 14(2)

Courts of Justice Act, 1984, S.O. 1984, c. 11 —

s. 144(1)

Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21 —

s. 12

Municipal Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 302 —

s. 369

APPEAL from order of Hoolihan J. dated September 11, 1990, allowing application under *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36.

FINLAYSON J.A. (KREVER J.A. concurring) (orally):

1 This is an appeal by the Bank of Nova Scotia (the "bank") from orders made by Mr. Justice Hoolihan [(11 September 1990), Doc. Nos. Toronto RE 1993/90 and RE 1994/90 (Ont. Gen. Div.)] as hereinafter described. The Bank of Nova Scotia was the lender to two related companies, namely, Elan Corporation ("Elan") and Nova Metal Products Inc. ("Nova"), which commenced proceedings under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 (the "CCAA"), for the purposes of having a plan of arrangement put to a meeting of secured creditors of those companies.

2 The orders appealed from are:

(i) An order of September 11, 1990, which directed a meeting of the secured creditors of Elan and Nova to consider the plan of arrangement filed, or other suitable plan. The order further provided that for 3 days until September 14, 1990, the bank be prevented from acting on any of its security or paying down any of its loans from accounts receivable collected by Elan and Nova, and that Elan and Nova could spend the accounts receivable assigned to the bank that would be received.

(ii) An order dated September 14, 1990, extending the terms of the order of September 11, 1990, to remain in effect until the plan of arrangement was presented to the Court no later than October 24, 1990. This order continued the stay against the bank and the power of Elan and Nova to spend the accounts receivable assigned to the bank. Further orders dated September 27, 1990, and October 18, 1990, have extended the stay, and the power of Elan and Nova to spend the accounts receivable that have been assigned to the bank. The date of the meetings of creditors has been extended to November 9, 1990. The application to sanction the plan of arrangement must be heard by November 14, 1990.

(iii) An order dated October 18, 1990, directing that there be two classes of secured creditors for the purposes of voting at the meeting of secured creditors. The first class is to be comprised of the bank, RoyNat Inc. ("RoyNat"), the Ontario Development Corporation ("O.D.C."), the city of Chatham and the village of Glencoe. The second class is to be comprised of persons related to Elan and Nova that acquired debentures to enable the companies to apply under the CCAA.

3 There is very little dispute about the facts in this matter, but the chronology of events is important and I am setting it out in some detail.

4 The bank has been the banker to Elan and Nova. At the time of the application in August 1990, it was owed approximately \$1,900,000. With interest and costs, including receivers' fees, it is now owed in excess of \$2,300,000. It has a first registered charge on the accounts receivable and inventory of Elan and Nova, and a second registered charge on the land, buildings and equipment. It also has security under s. 178 of the *Bank Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-1, as am. R.S.C. 1985 (3rd Supp.), c. 25, s. 26. The terms of credit between the bank and Elan as set out in a commitment agreement provide that Elan and Nova may not encumber their assets without the consent of the bank.

5 RoyNat is also a secured creditor of Elan and Nova, and it is owed approximately \$12 million. It holds a second registered charge on the accounts receivable and inventory of Elan and Nova, and a first registered charge on the land, buildings and equipment. The bank and RoyNat entered into a priority agreement to define with certainty the priority which each holds over the assets of Elan and Nova.

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6 The O.D.C. guaranteed payment of \$500,000 to RoyNat for that amount lent by RoyNat to Elan. The O.D.C. holds debenture security from Elan and secure the guarantee which it gave to RoyNat. That security ranks third to the bank and RoyNat. The O.D.C. has not been called upon by RoyNat to pay under its guarantee. O.D.C. has not lent any money directly to Elan or Nova.

7 Elan owes approximately \$77,000 to the City of Chatham for unpaid municipal taxes. Nova owes approximately \$18,000 to the Village of Glencoe for unpaid municipal taxes. Both municipalities have a lien on the real property of the respective companies in priority to every claim except the Crown under s. 369 of the *Municipal Act*, R.S.O. 1980, c. 302.

8 On May 8, 1990, the bank demanded payment of all outstanding loans owing by Elan and Nova to be made by June 1, 1990. Extensions of time were granted and negotiations directed to the settlement of the debt took place thereafter. On August 27, 1990, the bank appointed Coopers & Lybrand Limited as receiver and manager of the assets of Elan and Nova, and as agent under the bank's security to realize upon the security. Elan and Nova refused to allow the receiver and manager to have access to their premises, on the basis that insufficient notice had been provided by the bank before demanding payment.

9 Later on August 27, 1990, the bank brought a motion in an action against Elan and Nova (Court File No. 54033/90) for an order granting possession of the premises of Elan and Nova to Coopers & Lybrand. On the evening of August 27, 1990, at approximately 9 p.m., Mr. Justice Saunders made an order adjourning the motion on certain conditions. The order authorized Coopers & Lybrand access to the premises to monitor Elan's business, and permitted Elan to remain in possession and carry on its business in the ordinary course. The bank was restrained in the order, until the motion could be heard, from selling inventory, land, equipment or buildings or from notifying account debtors to collect receivables, but was not restrained from applying accounts receivable that were collected against outstanding bank loans.

10 On Wednesday, August 29, 1990, Elan and Nova each issued a debenture for \$10,000 to a friend of the principals of the companies, Joseph Comiskey, through his brother Michael Comiskey as trustee, pursuant to a trust deed executed the same day. The terms were not commercial and it does not appear that repayment was expected. It is conceded by counsel for Elan that the sole purpose of issuing the debentures was to qualify as a "debtor company" within the meaning of s. 3 of the CCAA. Section 3 reads as follows:

3. This Act does not apply in respect of a debtor company unless

(a) the debtor company has outstanding an issue of secured or unsecured bonds of the debtor company or of a predecessor in title of the debtor company issued under a trust deed or other instrument running in favour of a trustee; and

(b) the compromise or arrangement that is proposed under section 4 or 5 in respect of the debtor company includes a compromise or an arrangement between the debtor company and the holders of an issue referred to in paragraph (a).

11 The debentures conveyed the personal property of Elan and Nova as security to Michael Comiskey as trustee. No consent was obtained from the bank as required by the loan agreements, nor was any consent obtained from the receiver. Cheques for \$10,000 each, representing the loans secured in the debentures, were given to Elan and Nova on Wednesday, August 29, 1990, but not deposited until 6 days later on September 4, 1990,

after an interim order had been made by Mr. Justice Farley in favour of Elan and Nova staying the bank from taking proceedings.

12 On August 30, 1990 Elan and Nova applied under s. 5 of the CCAA for an order directing a meeting of secured creditors to vote on a plan of arrangement. Section 5 provides:

5. Where a compromise or an arrangement is proposed between a debtor company and its secured creditors or any class of them, the court may, on the application in a summary way of the company or of any such creditor or of the trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator of the company, order a meeting of the creditors or class of creditors, and, if the court so determines, of the shareholders of the company, to be summoned in such manner as the court directs.

13 The application was heard by Farley J. on Friday, August 31, 1990, at 8 a.m. Farley J. dismissed the application on the grounds that the CCAA required that there be more than one debenture issued by each company. Later on the same day, August 31, 1990, Elan and Nova each issued two debentures for \$500 to the wife of the principal of Elan through her sister as trustee. The debentures provided for payment of interest to commence on August 31, 1992. Cheques for \$500 were delivered that day to the companies but not deposited in the bank account until September 4, 1990. These debentures conveyed the personal property in the assets of Elan and Nova to the trustee as security. Once again it is conceded that the debentures were issued for the sole purpose of meeting the requirements of s. 3 of the CCAA. No consent was obtained from the bank as required by the loan terms, nor was any consent obtained from the receiver.

14 On August 31, 1990, following the creation of the trust deeds and the issuance of the debentures, Elan and Nova commenced new applications under the CCAA which were heard late in the day by Farley J. He adjourned the applications to September 10, 1990, on certain terms, including a stay preventing the bank from acting on its security and allowing Elan to spend up to \$321,000 from accounts receivable collected by it.

15 The plan of arrangement filed with the application provided that Elan and Nova would carry on business for 3 months, that secured creditors would not be paid and could take no action on their security for 3 months, and that the accounts receivable of Elan and Nova assigned to the bank could be utilized by Elan and Nova for purposes of its day-to-day operations. No compromise of any sort was proposed.

16 On September 11, 1990, Hoolihan J. ordered that a meeting of the secured creditors of Elan and Nova be held no later than October 22, 1990, to consider the plan of arrangement that had been filed, or other suitable plan. He ordered that the plan of arrangement be presented to the secured creditors no later than September 27, 1990. He made further orders effective for 3 days until September 14, 1990, including orders:

(i) that the companies could spend the accounts receivable assigned to the bank that would be collected in accordance with a cash flow forecast filed with the Court providing for \$1,387,000 to be spent by September 30, 1990; and

(ii) a stay of proceedings against the bank acting on any of its security or paying down any of its loans from accounts receivable collected by Elan and Nova.

17 On September 14, 1990, Hoolihan J. extended the terms of his order of September 11, 1990, to remain in effect until the plan of arrangement was presented to the Court no later than October 24, 1990 for final approval.

This order continued the power of Elan and Nova to spend up to \$1,387,000 of the accounts receivable assigned to the bank in accordance with the projected cash flow to September 30, 1990, and to spend a further amount to October 24, 1990, in accordance with a cash flow to be approved by Hoolihan J. prior to October 1, 1990. Further orders dated September 27 and October 18 have extended the power to spend the accounts receivable to November 14, 1990.

18 On September 14, 1990, the bank requested Hoolihan J. to restrict his order so that Elan and Nova could use the accounts receivable assigned to the bank only so long as they continued to operate within the borrowing guidelines contained in the terms of the loan agreements with the bank. These guidelines require a certain ratio to exist between bank loans and the book value of the accounts receivable and inventory assigned to the bank, and are designed in normal circumstances to ensure that there is sufficient value in the security assigned to the bank. Hoolihan J. refused to make the order.

19 On October 18, 1990, Hoolihan J. ordered that the composition of the classes of secured creditors for the purposes of voting at the meeting of secured creditors shall be as follows:

(a) The bank, RoyNat, O.D.C., the City of Chatham and the Village of Glencoe shall comprise one class.

(b) The parties related to the principal of Elan that acquired their debentures to enable the companies to apply under the CCAA shall comprise a second class.

20 On October 18, 1990, at the request of counsel for Elan and Nova, Hoolihan J. further ordered that the date for the meeting of creditors of Elan and Nova be extended to November 9, 1990, in order to allow a new plan of arrangement to be sent to all creditors, including unsecured creditors of those companies. Elan and Nova now plan to offer a plan of compromise or arrangement to the unsecured creditors of Elan and Nova as well as to the secured creditors.

21 There are five issues in this appeal.

(1) Are the debentures issued by Elan and Nova for the purpose of permitting the companies to qualify as applicants under the CCAA debentures within the meaning of s. 3 of the CCAA?

(2) Did the issue of the debentures contravene the provisions of the loan agreements between Elan and Nova and the bank? If so, what are the consequences for CCAA purposes?

(3) Did Elan and Nova have the power to issue the debentures and make application under the CCAA after the bank had appointed a receiver and after the order of Saunders J.?

(4) Did Hoolihan J. have the power under s. 11 of the CCAA to make the interim orders that he made with respect to the accounts receivable?

(5) Was Hoolihan J. correct in ordering that the bank vote on the proposed plan of arrangement in a class with RoyNat and the other secured creditors?

22 It is well established that the CCAA is intended to provide a structured environment for the negotiation of compromises between a debtor company and its creditors for the benefit of both. Such a resolution can have

significant benefits for the company, its shareholders and employees. For this reason the debtor companies, Elan and Nova, are entitled to a broad and liberal interpretation of the jurisdiction of the Court under the CCAA. Having said that, it does not follow that in exercising its discretion to order a meeting of creditors under s. 5 of the CCAA that the Court should not consider the equities in this case as they relate to these companies and to one of its principal secured creditors, the bank.

23 The issues before Hoolihan J. and this Court were argued on a technical basis. Hoolihan J. did not give effect to the argument that the debentures described above were a "sham" and could not be used for the purposes of asserting jurisdiction. Unfortunately, he did not address any of the other arguments presented to him on the threshold issue of the availability of the CCAA. He appears to have acted on the premise that if the CCAA can be made available, it should be utilized.

24 If Hoolihan J. did exercise any discretion overall, it is not reflected in his reasons. I believe, therefore, that we are in a position to look at the uncontested chronology of these proceedings and exercise our own discretion. To me, the significant date is August 27, 1990 when the bank appointed Coopers & Lybrand Limited as receiver and manager of the undertaking, property and assets mortgaged and charged under the demand debenture and of the collateral under the general security agreement, both dated June 20, 1979. On the same date, it appointed the same company as receiver and manager for Nova under a general security agreement dated December 5, 1988. The effect of this appointment is to divest the companies and their boards of directors of their power to deal with the property comprised in the appointment: Raymond Walton, *Kerr on the Law and Practice as to Receivers*, 16th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1983), p. 292. Neither Elan nor Nova had the power to create further indebtedness, and thus to interfere with the ability of the receiver to manage the two companies: *Alberta Treasury Branches v. Hat Development Ltd.* (1988), 71 C.B.R. (N.S.) 264, 64 Alta. L.R. (2d) 17 (Q.B.), aff'd (1989), 65 Alta. L.R. (2d) 374 (C.A.).

25 Counsel for the debtor companies submitted that the management powers of the receiver were stripped from the receiver by Saunders J. in his interim order, when he allowed the receiver access to the companies' properties but would not permit it to realize on the security of the bank until further order. He pointed out that the order also provided that the companies were entitled to remain in possession and "to carry on business in the ordinary course" until further order.

26 I do not agree with counsel's submission covering the effect of the order. It certainly restricted what the receiver could do on an interim basis, but it imposed restrictions on the companies as well. The issue of these disputed debentures in support of an application for relief as insolvent companies under the CCAA does not comply with the order of Saunders J. This is not carrying on business in the ordinary course. The residual power to take all of these initiatives for relief under the CCAA remained with the receiver, and if trust deeds were to be issued, an order of the Court in Action 54033/90 was required permitting their issuance and registration.

27 There is another feature which, in my opinion, affects the exercise of discretion, and that is the probability of the meeting achieving some measure of success. Hoolihan J. considered the calling of the meeting at one hearing, as he was asked to do, and determined the respective classes of creditors at another. This latter classification is necessary because of the provisions of s. 6(a) of the CCAA, which reads as follows:

6. Where a majority in number representing three-fourths in value of the creditors, or class of creditors, as the case may be, present and voting either in person or by proxy at the meeting or meetings thereof respectively held pursuant to sections 4 and 5, or either of those sections, agree to any compromise or arrangement

either as proposed or as altered or modified at the meeting or meetings, the compromise or arrangement may be sanctioned by the court, and if so sanctioned is binding

(a) on all the creditors or the class of creditors, as the case may be, and on any trustee for any such class of creditors, whether secured or unsecured, as the case may be, and on the company.

28 If both matters had been considered at the same time, as in my view they should have been, and if what I regard as a proper classification of the creditors had taken place, I think it is obvious that the meeting would not be a productive one. It was improper, in my opinion, to create one class of creditors made up of all the secured creditors save the so-called "sham" creditors. There is no true community of interest among them, and the motivation of Elan and Nova in striving to create a single class is clearly designed to avoid the classification of the bank as a separate class.

29 It is apparent that the only secured creditors with a significant interest in the proceeding under the CCAA are the bank and RoyNat. The two municipalities have total claims for arrears of taxes of less than \$100,000. They have first priority in the lands of the companies. They are in no jeopardy whatsoever. The O.D.C. has a potential liability in that it can be called upon by RoyNat under its guarantee to a maximum of \$500,000, and this will trigger default under its debentures with the companies, but its interests lie with RoyNat.

30 As to RoyNat, it is the largest creditor with a debt of some \$12 million. It will dominate any class it is in because, under s. 6 of the CCAA, the majority in a class must represent three-quarters in value of that class. It will always have a veto by reason of the size of its claim, but requires at least one creditor to vote for it to give it a majority in number (I am ignoring the municipalities). It needs the O.D.C.

31 I do not base my opinion solely on commercial self-interest, but also on the differences in legal interest. The bank has first priority on the receivables referred to as the "quick assets", and RoyNat ranks second in priority. RoyNat has first priority on the buildings and realty, the "fixed assets", and the bank has second priority.

32 It is in the commercial interests of the bank, with its smaller claim and more readily realizable assets, to collect and retain the accounts receivable. It is in the commercial interests of RoyNat to preserve the cash flow of the business and sell the enterprise as a going concern. It can only do that by overriding the prior claim of the bank to these receivables. If it can vote with the O.D.C. in the same class as the bank, it can achieve that goal and extinguish the prior claim of the bank to realize on the receivables. This it can do, despite having acknowledged its legal relationship to the bank in the priority agreement signed by the two. I can think of no reason why the legal interest of the bank as the holder of the first security on the receivables should be overridden by RoyNat as holder of the second security.

33 The classic statement on classes of creditors is that of Lord Esher M.R. in *Sovereign Life Assurance Co. v. Dodd*, [1892] 2 Q.B. 573, [1891-4] All E.R. 246 (C.A.), at pp. 579-580 [Q.B.]:

The Act [*Joint Stock Companies Arrangement Act, 1870*] says that the persons to be summoned to the meeting (all of whom, be it said in passing, are creditors) are persons who can be divided into different classes — classes which the Act of Parliament recognises, though it does not define them. This, therefore, must be done: they must be divided into different classes. What is the reason for such a course? It is because the creditors composing the different classes have different interests; and, therefore, if we find a different state of facts existing among different creditors which may differently affect their minds and their judgment, they

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must be divided into different classes.

34 The *Sovereign Life* case was quoted with approval by Kingstone J. in *Re Wellington Building Corp.*, [1934] O.R. 653, 16 C.B.R. 48, [1934] 4 D.L.R. 626, [1934] O.W.N. 562 (S.C.), at p. 659 [O.R.]. He also quoted another English authority at p. 658:

In *In re Alabama, New Orleans, Texas and Pacific Junction Ry. Co.*, [1891] 1 Ch. 213, a scheme and arrangement under the Joint Stock Companies Arrangement Act (1870), was submitted to the Court for approval. Lord Justice Bowen, at p. 243, says:

Now, I have no doubt at all that it would be improper for the Court to allow an arrangement to be forced on any class of creditors, if the arrangement cannot reasonably be supposed by sensible business people to be for the benefit of that class as such, otherwise the sanction of the Court would be a sanction to what would be a scheme of confiscation. The object of this section is not confiscation ... Its object is to enable compromises to be made which are for the common benefit of the creditors as creditors, or for the common benefit of some class of creditors as such.

35 Kingstone J. set aside a meeting where three classes of creditors were permitted to vote together. He said at p. 660:

It is clear that Parliament intended to give the three-fourths majority of any class power to bind that class, but I do not think the Statute should be construed so as to permit holders of subsequent mortgages power to vote and thereby destroy the priority rights and security of a first mortgagee.

36 We have been referred to more modern cases, including two decisions of Trainor J. of the British Columbia Supreme Court, both entitled *Re Northland Properties Ltd.* One case is reported in (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 166, 31 B.C.L.R. (2d) 35, and the other in the same volume at p. 175 [C.B.R.]. Trainor J. was upheld on appeal on both judgments. The first judgment of the British Columbia Court of Appeal is unreported (16 September, 1988) [Doc. No. Vancouver CA009772, Taggart, Lambert and Locke J.J.A.]. The judgment in the second appeal is reported at 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 195, [1989] 3 W.W.R. 363, 34 B.C.L.R. (2d) 122.

37 In the first *Northland* case, Trainor J. held that the difference in the terms of parties to and priority of different bonds meant that they should be placed in separate classes. He relied upon *Re Wellington Building Corp.*, supra. In the second *Northland* case, he dealt with 15 mortgagees who were equal in priority but held different parcels of land as security. Trainor J. held that their relative security positions were the same, notwithstanding that the mortgages were for the most part secured by charges against separate properties. The nature of the debt was the same, the nature of the security was the same, the remedies for default were the same, and in all cases they were corporate loans by sophisticated lenders. In specifically accepting the reasoning of Trainor J., the Court of Appeal held that the concern of the various mortgagees as to the quality of their individual securities was "a variable cause arising not by any difference in legal interests, but rather as a consequence of bad lending, or market values, or both" (p. 203).

38 In *Re NsC Diesel Power Inc.* (1990), 79 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 97 N.S.R. (2d) 295, 258 A.P.R. 295 (T.D.), the Court stressed that a class should be made up of persons "whose rights are not so dissimilar as to make it impossible for them to consult together with a view to their common interest" (p. 8 [of C.B.R.]).

39 My assessment of these secured creditors is that the bank should be in its own class. This being so, it is obvious that no plan of arrangement can succeed without its approval. There is no useful purpose to be served in putting a plan of arrangement to a meeting of creditors if it is known in advance that it cannot succeed. This is another cogent reason for the Court declining to exercise its discretion in favour of the debtor companies.

40 For all the reasons given above, the application under the CCAA should have been dismissed. I do not think that I have to give definitive answers to the individual issues numbered (1) and (2). They can be addressed in a later case, where the answers could be dispositive of an application under the CCAA. The answer to (3) is that the combined effect of the receivership and the order of Saunders J. disentitled the companies to issue the debentures and bring the application under the CCAA. It is not necessary to answer issue (4), and the answer to (5) is no.

41 Accordingly, I would allow the appeal, set aside the three orders of Hoolihan J., and, in their place, issue an order dismissing the application under the CCAA. The bank should receive its costs of this appeal, the applications for leave to appeal, and the proceedings before Farley and Hoolihan JJ., to be paid by Elan, Nova and RoyNat.

42 Ernst & Young were appointed monitor in the order of Hoolihan J. dated September 14, 1990, to monitor the operations of Elan and Nova and give effect to and supervise the terms and conditions of the stay of proceedings in accordance with Appendix "C" appended to the order. The monitor should be entitled to be paid for all services performed to date, including whatever is necessary to complete its reports for past work, as called for in Appendix "C".

DOHERTY J.A. (dissenting in part):

I Background

43 On November 2, 1990, this Court allowed the appeal brought by the Bank of Nova Scotia (the "bank") and vacated several orders made by Hoolihan J. Finlayson J.A. delivered oral reasons on behalf of the majority. At the same time, I delivered brief oral reasons dissenting in part from the conclusion reached by the majority and undertook to provide further written reasons. These are those reasons.

44 The events relevant to the disposition of this appeal are set out in some detail in the oral reasons of Finlayson J.A. I will not repeat that chronology, but will refer to certain additional background facts before turning to the legal issues.

45 Elan Corporation ("Elan") owns the shares of Nova Metal Products Inc. ("Nova Inc."). Both companies have been actively involved in the manufacture of automobile parts for a number of years. As of March 1990, the companies had total annual sales of about \$30 million, and employed some 220 people in plants located in Chatham and Glencoe, Ontario. The operation of these companies no doubt plays a significant role in the economy of these two small communities.

46 In the 4 years prior to 1989, the companies had operated at a profit ranging from \$287,000 (1987) to \$1,500,000 (1986). In 1989, several factors, including large capital expenditures and a downturn in the market, combined to produce an operational loss of about \$1,333,000. It is anticipated that the loss for the year ending June 30, 1990, will be about \$2.3 million. As of August 1, 1990, the companies continued in full operation, and

those in control anticipated that the financial picture would improve significantly later in 1990, when the companies would be busy filling several contracts which had been obtained earlier in 1990.

47 The bank has provided credit to the companies for several years. In January 1989, the bank extended an operating line of credit to the companies. The line of credit was by way of a demand loan that was secured in the manner described by Finlayson J.A. Beginning in May 1989, and from time to time after that, the companies were in default under the terms of the loan advanced by the bank. On each occasion, the bank and the companies managed to work out some agreement so that the bank continued as lender and the companies continued to operate their plants.

48 Late in 1989, the companies arranged for a \$500,000 operating loan from RoyNat Inc. It was hoped that this loan, combined with the operating line of \$2.5 million from the bank, would permit the company to weather its fiscal storm. In March 1990, the bank took the position that the companies were in breach of certain requirements under their loan agreements, and warned that if the difficulties were not rectified the bank would not continue as the company's lender. Mr. Patrick Johnson, the president of both companies, attempted to respond to these concerns in a detailed letter to the bank dated March 15, 1990. The response did not placate the bank. In May 1990, the bank called its loan and made a demand for immediate payment. Mr. Spencer, for the bank, wrote: "We consider your financial condition continues to be critical and we are not prepared to delay further making formal demand." He went on to indicate that, subject to further deterioration in the companies' fiscal position, the bank was prepared to delay acting on its security until June 1, 1990.

49 As of May 1990, Mr. Johnson, to the bank's knowledge, was actively seeking alternative funding to replace the bank. At the same time, he was trying to convince the union which represented the workers employed at both plants to assist in a co-operative effort to keep the plants operational during the hard times. The union had agreed to discuss amendment of the collective bargaining agreement to facilitate the continued operation of the companies.

50 The June 1, 1990 deadline set by the bank passed without incident. Mr. Johnson continued to search for new financing. A potential lender was introduced to Mr. Spencer of the bank on August 13, 1990, and it appeared that the bank, through Mr. Spencer, was favourably impressed with this potential lender. However, on August 27, 1990, the bank decided to take action to protect its position. Coopers & Lybrand was appointed by the bank as receiver-manager under the terms of the security agreements with the companies. The companies denied the receiver access to their plants. The bank then moved before the Honourable Mr. Justice E. Saunders for an order giving the receiver possession of the premises occupied by the companies. On August 27, 1990, after hearing argument from counsel for the bank and the companies, Mr. Justice Saunders refused to install the receivers and made the following interim order:

1. THIS COURT ORDERS that the receiver be allowed access to the property to monitor the operations of the defendants but shall not take steps to realize on the security of The Bank of Nova Scotia until further Order of the Court.
2. THIS COURT ORDERS that the defendants shall be entitled to remain in possession and to carry on business in the ordinary course until further Order of this Court.
3. THIS COURT ORDERS that until further order the Bank of Nova Scotia shall not take steps to notify account debtors of the defendants for the purpose of collecting outstanding accounts receivable. This Order does not restrict The Bank of Nova Scotia from dealing with accounts receivable of the defendants received

by it.

4. THIS COURT ORDERS that the motion is otherwise adjourned to a date to be fixed.

51 The notice of motion placed before Saunders J. by the bank referred to "an intended action" by the bank. It does not appear that the bank took any further steps in connection with this "intended action."

52 Having resisted the bank's efforts to assume control of the affairs of the companies on August 27, 1990, and realizing that their operations could cease within a matter of days, the companies turned to the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 (the "Act"), in an effort to hold the bank at bay while attempting to reorganize their finances. Finlayson J.A. has described the companies' efforts to qualify under that Act, the two appearances before the Honourable Mr. Justice Farley on August 31, 1990, and the appearances before the Honourable Mr. Justice Hoolihan in September and October 1990, which resulted in the orders challenged on this appeal.

II The Issues

53 The dispute between the bank and the companies when this application came before Hoolihan J. was a straightforward one. The bank had determined that its best interests would be served by the immediate execution of the rights it had under its various agreements with the companies. The bank's best interest was not met by the continued operation of the companies as going concerns. The companies and their other two substantial secured creditors considered that their interests required that the companies continue to operate, at least for a period which would enable the companies to place a plan of reorganization before its creditors.

54 All parties were pursuing what they perceived to be their commercial interests. To the bank, these interests entailed the "death" of the companies as operating entities. To the companies, these interests required "life support" for the companies through the provisions of the Act to permit a "last ditch" effort to save the companies and keep them in operation.

55 The issues raised on this appeal can be summarized as follows:

(i) Did Hoolihan J. err in holding that the companies were entitled to invoke the Act?

(ii) Did Hoolihan J. err in exercising his discretion in directing that a meeting of creditors should be held under the Act?

(iii) Did Hoolihan J. err in directing that the bank and RoyNat Inc. should be placed in the same class of creditors for the purposes of the Act?

(iv) Did Hoolihan J. err in the terms of the interim orders he made pending the meeting of creditors and the submission to the court of a plan of reorganization?

III The Purpose and Scheme of the Act

56 Before turning to these issues, it is necessary to understand the purpose of the Act, and the scheme established by the Act for achieving that purpose. The Act first appeared in the midst of the Great Depression (S.C. 1932-33, c. 36). The Act was intended to provide a means whereby insolvent companies could avoid bankruptcy and continue as ongoing concerns through a reorganization of their financial obligations. The reorganization

contemplated required the cooperation of the debtor companies' creditors and shareholders: *Re Avery Construction Co.*, 24 C.B.R. 17, [1942] 4 D.L.R. 558 (Ont. S.C.); Stanley E. Edwards, "Reorganizations under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act" (1947) 25 Can. Bar Rev. 587, at pp. 592-593; David H. Goldman, "Reorganizations Under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (Canada)" (1985) 55 C.B.R. (N.S.) 36, at pp. 37-39.

57 The legislation is remedial in the purest sense in that it provides a means whereby the devastating social and economic effects of bankruptcy- or creditor-initiated termination of ongoing business operations can be avoided while a court-supervised attempt to reorganize the financial affairs of the debtor company is made.

58 The purpose of the Act was artfully put by Gibbs J.A., speaking for the British Columbia Court of Appeal, in *Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.*, an unreported judgment released October 29, 1990 [Doc. No. Vancouver CA12944, Carrothers, Cumming and Gibbs J.J.A., now reported [1991] 2 W.W.R. 136, 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 84], at pp. 11 and 6 [unreported, pp. 91 and 88 B.C.L.R.]. In referring to the purpose for which the Act was initially proclaimed, he said:

Almost inevitably liquidation destroyed the shareholders' investment, yielded little by way of recovery to the creditors, and exacerbated the social evil of devastating levels of unemployment. The government of the day sought, through the C.C.A.A. [the Act], to create a regime whereby the principals of the company and the creditors could be brought together under the supervision of the court to attempt a reorganization or compromise or arrangement under which the company could continue in business.

59 In an earlier passage, His Lordship had said:

The purpose of the C.C.A.A. is to facilitate the making of a compromise or arrangement between an insolvent debtor company and its creditors to the end that the company is able to continue in business.

60 Gibbs J.A. also observed (at p. 13) that the Act was designed to serve a "broad constituency of investors, creditors and employees." Because of that "broad constituency", the Court must, when considering applications brought under the Act, have regard not only to the individuals and organizations directly affected by the application, but also to the wider public interest. That interest is generally, but not always, served by permitting an attempt at reorganization: see S.E. Edwards, "Reorganizations Under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act," at p. 593.

61 The Act must be given a wide and liberal construction so as to enable it to effectively serve this remedial purpose: *Interpretation Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21, s. 12; *Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.*, supra, at p. 14 [unreported, p. 92 B.C.L.R.].

62 The Act is available to all insolvent companies, provided the requirements of s. 3 of the Act are met. That section provides:

3. This Act does not apply in respect of a debtor company unless

(a) the debtor company has outstanding an issue of secured or unsecured bonds of the debtor company or of a predecessor in title of the debtor company issued under a trust deed or other instrument running in favour of a trustee; and

(b) the compromise or arrangement that is proposed under section 4 or 5 in respect of the debtor company includes a compromise or an arrangement between the debtor company and the holders of an issue referred

to in paragraph (a).

63 A debtor company, or a creditor of that company, invokes the Act by way of summary application to the Court under s. 4 or s. 5 of the Act. For present purposes, s. 5 is the relevant section:

5. Where a compromise or an arrangement is proposed between a debtor company and its secured creditors or any class of them, the court may, on the application in a summary way of the company or of any such creditor or of the trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator of the company, order a meeting of the creditors or class of creditors, and, if the court so determines, of the shareholders of the company, to be summoned in such manner as the court directs.

64 Section 5 does not require that the Court direct a meeting of creditors to consider a proposed plan. The Court's power to do so is discretionary. There will no doubt be cases where no order will be made, even though the debtor company qualifies under s. 3 of the Act.

65 If the Court determines that a meeting should be called, the creditors must be placed into classes for the purpose of that meeting. The significance of this classification process is made apparent by s. 6 of the Act:

6. Where a majority in number representing three-fourths in value of the creditors, or class of creditors, as the case may be, present and voting either in person or by proxy at the meeting or meetings thereof respectively held pursuant to sections 4 and 5, or either of those sections, agree to any compromise or arrangement either as proposed or as altered or modified at the meeting or meetings, the compromise or arrangement may be sanctioned by the court, and if so sanctioned is binding

(a) on all the creditors or the class of creditors, as the case may be, and on any trustee for any such class of creditors, whether secured or unsecured, as the case may be, and on the company; and

(b) in the case of a company that has made an authorized assignment or against which a receiving order has been made under the *Bankruptcy Act* or is in the course of being wound up under the *Winding-up Act*, on the trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator and contributories of the company.

66 If the plan of reorganization is approved by the creditors as required by s. 6, it must then be presented to the Court. Once again, the Court must exercise a discretion, and determine whether it will approve the plan of reorganization. In exercising that discretion, the Court is concerned not only with whether the appropriate majority has approved the plan at a meeting held in accordance with the Act and the order of the Court, but also with whether the plan is a fair and reasonable one: *Re Northland Properties Ltd.* (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 175 at 182-185 (S.C.), aff'd 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 195, [1989] 3 W.W.R. 363, 34 B.C.L.R. (2d) 122 (C.A.).

67 If the Court chooses to exercise its discretion in favour of calling a meeting of creditors for the purpose of considering a plan of reorganization, the Act provides that the rights and remedies available to creditors, the debtor company, and others during the period between the making of the initial order and the consideration of the proposed plan may be suspended or otherwise controlled by the Court.

68 Section 11 gives a court wide powers to make any interim orders:

11. Notwithstanding anything in the *Bankruptcy Act* or the *Winding-up Act*, whenever an application has been made under this Act in respect of any company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit,

- (a) make an order staying, until such time as the court may prescribe or until any further order, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under the *Bankruptcy Act* and the *Winding-up Act* or either of them;
- (b) restrain further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company on such terms as the court sees fit; and
- (c) make an order that no suit, action or other proceeding shall be proceeded with or commenced against the company except with the leave of the court and subject to such terms as the court imposes.

69 Viewed in its totality, the Act gives the Court control over the initial decision to put the reorganization plan before the creditors, the classification of creditors for the purpose of considering the plan, conduct affecting the debtor company pending consideration of that plan, and the ultimate acceptability of any plan agreed upon by the creditors. The Act envisions that the rights and remedies of individual creditors, the debtor company and others may be sacrificed, at least temporarily, in an effort to serve the greater good by arriving at some acceptable reorganization which allows the debtor company to continue in operation: *Icor Oil & Gas Co. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce* (1989), 102 A.R. 161 at p. 165 (Q.B.).

IV Did Hoolihan J. Err in Holding that the Debtor Companies were Entitled to Invoke the Act?

70 The appellant advances three arguments in support of its contention that Elan and Nova Inc. were not entitled to seek relief under the Act. It argues first that the debentures issued by the companies after August 27, 1990, were "shams" and did not fulfil the requirements of s. 3 of the Act. The appellant next contends that the issuing of the debentures by the companies contravened their agreements with the bank, in which they undertook not to further encumber the assets of the companies without the consent of the bank. Lastly, the appellant maintains that once the bank had appointed a receiver-manager over the affairs of the companies on August 27, 1990, the companies had no power to create further indebtedness by way of debentures or to bring an application on behalf of the companies under the Act.

(i) Section 3 and "Instant" Trust Deeds

71 The debentures issued in August 1990, after the bank had moved to install a receiver-manager, were issued solely and expressly for the purpose of meeting the requirements of s. 3 of the Act. Indeed, it took the companies two attempts to meet those requirements. The debentures had no commercial purpose. The transactions did, however, involve true loans in the sense that moneys were advanced and debt was created. Appropriate and valid trust deeds were also issued.

72 In my view, it is inappropriate to refer to these transactions as "shams." They are neither false nor counterfeit, but rather are exactly what they appear to be, transactions made to meet jurisdictional requirements of the Act so as to permit an application for reorganization under the Act. Such transactions are apparently well known to the commercial Bar: B. O'Leary, "A Review of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act" (1987) 4 Nat. Insolvency Rev. 38, at p. 39; C. Ham, " 'Instant' Trust Deeds Under the C.C.A.A." (1988) 2 Commercial Insolvency Reporter 25; G.B. Morawetz, "Emerging Trends in the Use of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act" (1990) Proceedings, First Annual General Meeting and Conference of the Insolvency Institute of Canada.

73 Mr. Ham writes, at pp. 25 and 30:

Consequently, some companies have recently sought to bring themselves within the ambit of the C.C.A.A. by creating 'instant' trust deeds, i.e., trust deeds which are created solely for the purpose of enabling them to take advantage of the C.C.A.A.

74 Applications under the Act involving the use of "instant" trust deeds have been before the Courts on a number of occasions. In no case has any court held that a company cannot gain access to the Act by creating a debt which meets the requirements of s. 3 for the express purpose of qualifying under the Act. In most cases, the use of these "instant" trust deeds has been acknowledged without comment.

75 The decision of Chief Justice Richard in *Re United Maritime Fishermen Co-op.* (1988), 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 44, 84 N.B.R. (2d) 415, 214 A.P.R. 415 (Q.B.), varied on reconsideration (1988), 68 C.B.R. (N.S.) 170, 87 N.B.R. (2d) 333, 221 A.P.R. 333 (Q.B.), at 55-56 [67 C.B.R.], speaks directly to the use of "instant" trust deeds. The Chief Justice refused to read any words into s. 3 of the Act which would limit the availability of the Act depending on the point at which, or the purpose for which, the debenture or bond and accompanying trust deed were created. He accepted [at p. 56 C.B.R.] the debtor company's argument that the Act:

does not impose any time restraints on the creation of the conditions as set out in s. 3 of the Act, nor does it contain any prohibition against the creation of the conditions set out in s. 3 for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction.

76 It should, however, be noted that in *Re United Maritime Fishermen Co-op.*, supra, the debt itself was not created for the purpose of qualifying under the Act. The bond and the trust deed, however, were created for that purpose. The case is therefore factually distinguishable from the case at Bar.

77 The Court of Appeal reversed the ruling of the Chief Justice ((1988), 69 C.B.R. (N.S.) 161, 51 D.L.R. (4th) 618, 88 N.B.R. (2d) 253, 224 A.P.R. 253) on the basis that the bonds required by s. 3 of the Act had not been issued when the application was made, so that on a precise reading of the words of s. 3 the company did not qualify. The Court did not go on to consider whether, had the bonds been properly issued, the company would have been entitled to invoke the Act. Hoyt J.A., for the majority, did, however, observe without comment that the trust deeds had been created specifically for the purpose of bringing an application under the Act.

78 The judgment of MacKinnon J. in *Re Stephanie's Fashions Ltd.*, unreported, Doc. No. Vancouver A893427, released January 24, 1990 (B.C. S.C.) [now reported 1 C.B.R. (3d) 248], is factually on all fours with the present case. In that case, as in this one, it was acknowledged that the sole purpose for creating the debt was to effect compliance with s. 3 of the Act. After considering the judgment of Chief Justice Richard in *Re United Maritime Fishermen Co-op.*, supra, MacKinnon J. held, at p. 251:

The reason for creating the trust deed is not for the usual purposes of securing a debt but, when one reads it, on its face, it does that. I find that it is a genuine trust deed and not a fraud, and that the petitioners have complied with s. 3 of the statute.

79 *Re Metals & Alloys Co.* (16 February 1990) is a recent example of a case in this jurisdiction in which "instant" trust deeds were successfully used to bring a company within the Act. The company issued debentures for the purpose of permitting the company to qualify under the Act, so as to provide it with an opportunity to prepare and submit a reorganization plan. The company then applied for an order, seeking, inter alia, a declaration that the debtor company was a corporation within the meaning of the Act. Houlden J.A., hearing the matter at first instance, granted the declaration request in an order dated February 16, 1990. No reasons were given. It

does not appear that the company's qualifications were challenged before Houlden J.A.; however, the nature of the debentures issued and the purpose for their issue was fully disclosed in the material before him. The requirements of s. 3 of the Act are jurisdictional in nature, and the consent of the parties cannot vest a court with jurisdiction it does not have. One must conclude that Houlden J.A. was satisfied that "instant" trust deeds suffice for the purposes of s. 3 of the Act.

80 A similar conclusion is implicit in the reasons of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in *Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.*. In that case, a debt of \$50, with an accompanying debenture and trust deed, was created specifically to enable the company to make application under the Act. The Court noted that the debt was created solely for that purpose in an effort to forestall an attempt by the bank to liquidate the assets of the debtor company. The Court went on to deal with the merits, and to dismiss an appeal from an order granting a stay pending a reorganization meeting. The Court could not have reached the merits without first concluding that the \$50 debt created by the company met the requirements of s. 3 of the Act.

81 The weight of authority is against the appellant. Counsel for the appellant attempts to counter that authority by reference to the remarks of the Minister of Justice when s. 3 was introduced as an amendment to the Act in the 1952-53 sittings of Parliament (House of Commons Debates, 1-2 Eliz. II (1952-53), vol. II, pp. 1268-1269). The interpretation of words found in a statute, by reference to speeches made in Parliament at the time legislation is introduced, has never found favour in our Courts: *Reference Re Residential Tenancies Act (Ontario)*, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 714, 123 D.L.R. (3d) 554, 37 N.R. 138, at 721 [S.C.R.], 561 [D.L.R.]. Nor, with respect to Mr. Newbould's able argument, do I find the words of the Minister of Justice at the time the present s. 3 was introduced to be particularly illuminating. He indicated that the amendment to the Act left companies with complex financial structures free to resort to the Act, but that it excluded companies which had only unsecured mercantile creditors. The Minister does not comment on the intended effect of the amendment on the myriad situations between those two extremes. This case is one such situation. These debtor companies had complex secured debt structures, but those debts were not, prior to the issuing of the debentures in August 1990, in the form contemplated by s. 3 of the Act. Like Richard C.J.Q.B. in *Re United Maritime Fishermen Co-op.*, supra, at pp. 52-53, I am not persuaded that the comments of the Minister of Justice assist in interpreting s. 3 of the Act in this situation.

82 The words of s. 3 are straightforward. They require that the debtor company have, at the time an application is made, an outstanding debenture or bond issued under a trust deed. No more is needed. Attempts to qualify those words are not only contrary to the wide reading the Act deserves, but can raise intractable problems as to what qualifications or modifications should be read into the Act. Where there is a legitimate debt which fits the criteria set out in s. 3, I see no purpose in denying a debtor company resort to the Act because the debt and the accompanying documentation was created for the specific purpose of bringing the application. It must be remembered that qualification under s. 3 entitles the debtor company to nothing more than consideration under the Act. Qualification under s. 3 does not mean that relief under the Act will be granted. The circumstances surrounding the creation of the debt needed to meet the s. 3 requirement may well have a bearing on how a court exercises its discretion at various stages of the application, but they do not alone interdict resort to the Act.

83 In holding that "instant" trust deeds can satisfy the requirements of s. 3 of the Act, I should not be taken as concluding that debentures or bonds which are truly shams, in that they do not reflect a transaction which actually occurred and do not create a real debt owed by the company, will suffice. Clearly, they will not. I do not, however, equate the two. One is a tactical device used to gain the potential advantages of the Act. The other is a fraud.

84 Nor does my conclusion that "instant" trust deeds can bring a debtor company within the Act exclude considerations of the good faith of the debtor company in seeking the protection of the Act. A debtor company should not be allowed to use the Act for any purpose other than to attempt a legitimate reorganization. If the purpose of the application is to advantage one creditor over another, to defeat the legitimate interests of creditors, to delay the inevitable failure of the debtor company, or for some other improper purpose, the Court has the means available to it, apart entirely from s. 3 of the Act, to prevent misuse of the Act. In cases where the debtor company acts in bad faith, the Court may refuse to order a meeting of creditors, it may deny interim protection, it may vary interim protection initially given when the bad faith is shown, or it may refuse to sanction any plan which emanates from the meeting of the creditors: see Lawrence J. Crozier, "Good Faith and the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act" (1989) 15 Can. Bus. L.J. 89.

(ii) Section 3 and the Prior Agreement with the Bank Limiting Creation of New Debt

85 The appellant also argues that the debentures did not meet the requirements of s. 3 of the Act because they were issued in contravention of a security agreement made between the companies and the bank. Assuming that the debentures were issued in contravention of that agreement, I do not understand how that contravention affects the status of the debentures for the purposes of s. 3 of the Act. The bank may well have an action against the debtor company for issuing the debentures, and it may have remedies against the holders of the debentures if they attempted to collect on their debt or enforce their security. Neither possibility, however, negates the existence of the debentures and the related trust deeds. Section 3 does not contemplate an inquiry into the effectiveness or enforceability of the s. 3 debentures, as against other creditors, as a condition precedent to qualification under the Act. Such inquiries may play a role in a judge's determination as to what orders, if any, should be made under the Act.

(iii) Section 3 and the Appointment of a Receiver-Manager

86 The third argument made by the bank relies on its installation of a receiver-manager in both companies prior to the issue of the debentures. I agree with Finlayson J.A. that the placement of a receiver, either by operation of the terms of an agreement or by court order, effectively removes those formerly in control of the company from that position, and vests that control in the receiver-manager: *Alberta Treasury Branches v. Hat Development Ltd.* (1988), 71 C.B.R. (N.S.) 264, 64 Alta. L.R. (2d) 17 (Q.B.), aff'd without deciding this point (1989), 65 Alta. L.R. (2d) 374 (C.A.). I cannot, however, agree with his interpretation of the order of Saunders J. I read that order as effectively turning the receiver into a monitor with rights of access, but with no authority beyond that. The operation of the business is specifically returned to the companies. The situation created by the order of Saunders J. can usefully be compared to that which existed when the application was made in *Hat Development Ltd.* Forsyth J., at p. 268 C.B.R., states:

The receiver-manager in this case and indeed in almost all cases is charged by the court with the responsibility of managing the affairs of a corporation. It is true that it is appointed pursuant, in this case, to the existence of secured indebtedness and at the behest of a secured creditor to realize on its security and retire the indebtedness. Nonetheless, this receiver-manager was court-appointed and not by virtue of an instrument. As a court-appointed receiver it owed the obligation and the duty to the court to account from time to time and to come before the court for the purposes of having some of its decisions ratified or for receiving advice and direction. *It is empowered by the court to manage the affairs of the company and it is completely inconsistent with that function to suggest that some residual power lies in the hands of the directors of the company to create further indebtedness of the company and thus interfere, however slightly, with the receiver-*

manager's ability to manage.

[Emphasis added.]

87 After the order of Saunders J., the receiver-manager in this case was not obligated to manage the companies. Indeed, it was forbidden from doing so. The creation of the "instant" trust deeds and the application under the Act did not interfere in any way with any power or authority the receiver-manager had after the order of Saunders J. was made.

88 I also find it somewhat artificial to suggest that the presence of a receiver-manager served to vitiate the orders of Hoolihan J. Unlike many applications under s. 5 of the Act, the proceedings before Hoolihan J. were not ex parte and he was fully aware of the existence of the receiver-manager, the order of Saunders J., and the arguments based on the presence of the receiver-manager. Clearly, Hoolihan J. considered it appropriate to proceed with a plan of reorganization despite the presence of the receiver-manager and the order of Saunders J. Indeed, in his initial order he provided that the order of Saunders J. "remains extant." Hoolihan J. did not, as I do not, see that order as an impediment to the application or the granting of relief under the Act. Had he considered that the receiver-manager was in control of the affairs of the company, he could have varied the order of Saunders J. to permit the applications under the Act to be made by the companies: *Hat Development Ltd.*, at pp. 268-269 C.B.R. It is clear to me that he would have done so had he felt it necessary. If the installation of the receiver-manager is to be viewed as a bar to an application under this Act, and if the orders of Hoolihan J. were otherwise appropriate, I would order that the order of Saunders J. should be varied to permit the creation of the debentures and the trust deeds and the bringing of this application by the companies. I take this power to exist by the combined effect of s. 14(2) of the Act and s. 144(1) of the *Courts of Justice Act*, 1984, S.O. 1984, c. 11.

89 In my opinion, the debentures and "instant" trust deeds created in August 1990 sufficed to bring the company within the requirements of s. 3 of the Act, even if in issuing those debentures the companies breached a prior agreement with the bank. I am also satisfied that, given the terms of the order of Saunders J., the existence of a receiver-manager installed by the bank did not preclude the application under s. 3 of the Act.

V Did Hoolihan J. Err in Exercising his Discretion in Favour of Directing that a Creditors' Meeting be Held to Consider the Proposed Plan of Reorganization?

90 As indicated earlier, the Act provides a number of points at which the Court must exercise its discretion. I am concerned with the initial exercise of discretion contemplated by s. 5 of the Act, by which the Court may order a meeting of creditors for purposes of considering a plan of reorganization. Hoolihan J. exercised that discretion in favour of the debtor companies. The factors relevant to the exercise of that discretion are as variable as the fact situations which may give rise to the application. Finlayson J.A. has concentrated on one such factor, the chance that the plan, if put before a properly constituted meeting of the creditors, could gain the required approval. I agree that the feasibility of the plan is a relevant and significant factor to be considered in determining whether to order a meeting of creditors: S.E. Edwards, "Reorganizations Under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act," at pp. 594-595. I would not, however, impose a heavy burden on the debtor company to establish the likelihood of ultimate success from the outset. As the Act will often be the last refuge for failing companies, it is to be expected that many of the proposed plans of reorganization will involve variables and contingencies which will make the plan's ultimate acceptability to the creditors and the Court very uncertain at the time the initial application is made.

91 On the facts before Hoolihan J., there were several factors which supported the exercise of his discretion

in favour of directing a meeting of the creditors. These included the apparent support of two of the three substantial secured creditors, the companies' continued operation, and the prospect (disputed by the bank) that the companies' fortunes would take a turn for the better in the near future, the companies' ongoing efforts — that eventually met with some success — to find alternate financing, and the number of people depending on the operation of the company for their livelihood. There were also a number of factors pointing in the other direction, the most significant of which was the likelihood that a plan of reorganization acceptable to the bank could not be developed.

92 I see the situation which presented itself to Hoolihan J. as capable of a relatively straightforward risk-benefit analysis. If the s. 5 order had been refused by Hoolihan J., it was virtually certain that the operation of the companies would have ceased immediately. There would have been immediate economic and social damage to those who worked at the plants, and those who depended on those who worked at the plants for their well-being. This kind of damage cannot be ignored, especially when it occurs in small communities like those in which these plants are located. A refusal to grant the application would also have put the investments of the various creditors, with the exception of the bank, at substantial risk. Finally, there would have been obvious financial damage to the owner of the companies. Balanced against these costs inherent in refusing the order would be the benefit to the bank, which would then have been in a position to realize on its security in accordance with its agreements with the companies.

93 The granting of the s. 5 order was not without its costs. It has denied the bank the rights it had bargained for as part of its agreement to lend substantial amounts of money to the companies. Further, according to the bank, the order has put the bank at risk of having its loans become undersecured because of the diminishing value of the accounts receivable and inventory which it holds as security and because of the ever-increasing size of the companies' debt to the bank. These costs must be measured against the potential benefit to all concerned if a successful plan of reorganization could be developed and implemented.

94 As I see it, the key to this analysis rests in the measurement of the risk to the bank inherent in the granting of the s. 5 order. If there was a real risk that the loan made by the bank would become undersecured during the operative period of the s. 5 order, I would be inclined to hold that the bank should not have that risk forced on it by the Court. However, I am unable to see that the bank is in any real jeopardy. The value of the security held by the bank appears to be well in excess of the size of its loan on the initial application. In his affidavit, Mr. Gibbons of Coopers & Lybrand asserted that the companies had overstated their cash flow projections, that the value of the inventory could diminish if customers of the companies looked to alternate sources for their product, and that the value of the accounts receivable could decrease if customers began to claim set-offs against those receivables. On the record before me, these appear to be no more than speculative possibilities. The bank has had access to all of the companies' financial data on an ongoing basis since the order of Hoolihan J. was made almost 2 months ago. Nothing was placed before this Court to suggest that any of the possibilities described above had come to pass.

95 Even allowing for some overestimation by the companies of the value of the security held by the bank, it would appear that the bank holds security valued at approximately \$4 million for a loan that was, as of the hearing of this appeal, about \$2.3 million. The order of Hoolihan J. was to terminate no later than November 14, 1990. I am not satisfied that the bank ran any real risk of having the amount of the loan exceed the value of the security by that date. It is also worth noting that the order under appeal provided that any party could apply to terminate the order at any point prior to November 14. This provision provided further protection for the bank in the event that it wished to make the case that its loan was at risk because of the deteriorating value of its secur-

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ity.

96 Even though the chances of a successful reorganization were not good, I am satisfied that the benefits flowing from the making of the s. 5 order exceeded the risk inherent in that order. In my view, Hoolihan J. properly exercised his discretion in directing that a meeting of creditors should be held pursuant to s. 5 of the Act.

VI Did Hoolihan J. Err in Directing that the Bank and RoyNat Inc. Should be Placed in the Same Class for the Purposes of the Act?

97 I agree with Finlayson J.A. that the bank and RoyNat Inc., the two principal creditors, should not have been placed in the same class of secured creditors for the purposes of ss. 5 and 6 of the Act. Their interests are not only different, they are opposed. The classification scheme created by Hoolihan J. effectively denied the bank any control over any plan of reorganization.

98 To accord with the principles found in the cases cited by Finlayson J.A., the secured creditors should have been grouped as follows:

— Class 1 — The City of Chatham and the Village of Glencoe

— Class 2 — The Bank of Nova Scotia

— Class 3 — RoyNat Inc., Ontario Development Corporation, and those holding debentures issued by the company on August 29 and 31, 1990.

VII Did Hoolihan J. Err in Making the Interim Orders He Made?

99 Hoolihan J. made a number of orders designed to control the conduct of all of the parties, pending the creditors' meeting and the placing of a plan of reorganization before the Court. The first order was made on September 11, 1990, and was to expire on or before October 24, 1990. Subsequent orders varied the terms of the initial order somewhat, and extended its effective date until November 14, 1990.

100 These orders imposed the following conditions pending the meeting:

- (a) all proceedings with respect to the debtor companies should be stayed, including any action by the bank to realize on its security;
- (b) the bank could not reduce its loan by applying incoming receipts to those debts;
- (c) the bank was to be the sole banker for the companies;
- (d) the companies could carry on business in the normal course, subject to certain very specific restrictions;
- (e) a licensed trustee was to be appointed to monitor the business operations of the companies and to report to the creditors on a regular basis; and
- (f) any party could apply to terminate the interim orders, and the orders would be terminated automatically if the companies defaulted on any of the obligations imposed on them by the interim orders.

101 The orders placed significant restrictions on the bank for a 2-month period, but balanced those restric-

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tions with provisions limiting the debtor companies' activities, and giving the bank ongoing access to up-to-date financial information concerning the companies. The bank was also at liberty to return to the Court to request any variation in the interim orders which changes in financial circumstances might merit.

102 These orders were made under the wide authority granted to the court by s. 11 of the Act. L.W. Houlden and C.H. Morawetz, in *Bankruptcy Law of Canada*, 3d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1989), at pp. 2-102 to 2-103, describe the purpose of the section:

The legislation is intended to have wide scope and allows a judge to make orders which will effectively maintain the status quo for a period while the insolvent company attempts to gain the approval of its creditors for a proposed arrangement which will enable the company to remain in operation for what is, hopefully, the future benefit of both the company and its creditors. This aim is facilitated by s. 11 of the Act, which enables the court to restrain further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company upon such terms as the court sees fit.

103 A similar sentiment appears in *Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.*, Gibbs J.A., in discussing the scope of s. 11, said at p. 7 [unreported, pp. 88-89 B.C.L.R.]:

When a company has recourse to the C.C.A.A. the court is called upon to play a kind of supervisory role to preserve the status quo and to move the process along to the point where a compromise or arrangement is approved or it is evident that the attempt is doomed to failure. Obviously time is critical. Equally obviously, if the attempt at compromise or arrangement is to have any prospect of success, there must be a means of holding the creditors at bay, hence the powers vested in the court under s. 11.

104 Similar views of the scope of the power to make interim orders covering the period when reorganization is being attempted are found in *Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank*; *Meridian Developments Inc. v. Nu-West Ltd.*, 52 C.B.R. (N.S.) 109, [1984] 5 W.W.R. 215, 32 Alta. L.R. (2d) 150, 11 D.L.R. (4th) 576, 53 A.R. 39 (Q.B.) at 114-118 [C.B.R.]; *Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd.* (1988), 72 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 63 Alta. L.R. (2d) 361, 92 A.R. 81 (Q.B.) at 12-15 [C.B.R.]; *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.*, an unreported judgment of Thackray J., released June 18, 1990 [since reported (1990), 47 B.C.L.R. (2d) 193 (S.C.)], at pp. 5-9 [pp. 196-198 B.C.L.R.]; and B. O'Leary, "A Review of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act," at p. 41.

105 The interim orders made by Hoolihan J. are all within the wide authority created by s. 11 of the Act. The orders were crafted to give the company the opportunity to continue in operation, pending its attempt to reorganize, while at the same time providing safeguards to the creditors, including the bank, during that same period. I find no error in the interim relief granted by Hoolihan J.

VIII Conclusion

106 In the result, I would allow the appeal in part, vacate the order of Hoolihan J. of October 18, 1990, insofar as it purports to settle the class of creditors for the purpose of the Act, and I would substitute an order establishing the three classes referred to in Part VI of these reasons. I would not disturb any of the other orders made by Hoolihan J.

Appeal allowed.

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TAB 3

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1993 CarswellOnt 183, 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24, 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275, 37 A.C.W.S. (3d) 847

Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re

Re Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36; Re Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C-43; Re plan of compromise in respect of LEHNDORFF GENERAL PARTNER LTD. (in its own capacity and in its capacity as general partner of LEHNDORFF UNITED PROPERTIES (CANADA), LEHNDORFF PROPERTIES (CANADA) and LEHNDORFF PROPERTIES (CANADA) II) and in respect of certain of their nominees LEHNDORFF UNITED PROPERTIES (CANADA) LTD., LEHNDORFF CANADIAN HOLDINGS LTD., LEHNDORFF CANADIAN HOLDINGS II LTD., BAYTEMP PROPERTIES LIMITED and 102 BLOOR STREET WEST LIMITED and in respect of THG LEHNDORFF VERMÖGENSVERWALTUNG GmbH (in its capacity as limited partner of LEHNDORFF UNITED PROPERTIES (CANADA))

Ontario Court of Justice (General Division — Commercial List)

Farley J.

Heard: December 24, 1992

Judgment: January 6, 1993

Docket: Doc. B366/92

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Counsel: *Alfred Apps, Robert Harrison and Melissa J. Kennedy*, for applicants.

L. Crozier, for Royal Bank of Canada.

R.C. Heintzman, for Bank of Montreal.

J. Hodgson, Susan Lundy and James Hilton, for Canada Trustco Mortgage Corporation.

Jay Schwartz, for Citibank Canada.

Stephen Golick, for Peat Marwick Thorne[FN*] Inc., proposed monitor.

John Teolis, for Fuji Bank Canada.

Robert Thorton, for certain of the advisory boards.

Subject: Corporate and Commercial; Insolvency

Corporations --- Arrangements and compromises — Under Companies' Creditors Arrangements Act — Arrange-

ments — Effect of arrangement — Stay of proceedings

Corporations — Arrangements and compromises — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Stay of proceedings — Stay being granted even where it would affect non-applicants that were not companies within meaning of Act — Business operations of applicants and non-applicants being so intertwined as to make stay appropriate.

The applicant companies were involved in property development and management and sought the protection of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* ("CCAA") in order that they could present a plan of compromise. They also sought a stay of all proceedings against the individual company applicants either in their own capacities or because of their interest in a larger group of companies. Each of the applicant companies was insolvent and had outstanding debentures issued under trust deeds. They proposed a plan of compromise among themselves and the holders of the debentures as well as those others of their secured and unsecured creditors deemed appropriate in the circumstances.

A question arose as to whether the court had the power to grant a stay of proceedings against non-applicants that were not companies and, therefore, not within the express provisions of the CCAA.

Held:

The application was allowed.

It was appropriate, given the significant financial intertwining of the applicant companies, that a consolidated plan be approved. Further, each of the applicant companies had a realistic possibility of being able to continue operating even though each was currently unable to meet all of its expenses. This was precisely the sort of situation in which all of the creditors would likely benefit from the application of the CCAA and in which it was appropriate to grant an order staying proceedings.

The inherent power of the court to grant stays can be used to supplement s. 11 of the CCAA when it is just and reasonable to do so. Clearly, the court had the jurisdiction to grant a stay in respect of any of the applicants that were companies fitting the criteria in the CCAA. However, the stay requested also involved limited partnerships where (1) the applicant companies acted on behalf of the limited partnerships, or (2) the stay would be effective against any proceedings taken by any party against the property assets and undertakings of the limited partnerships in which they held a direct interest. The business operations of the applicant companies were so intertwined with the limited partnerships that it would be impossible for a stay to be granted to the applicant companies that would affect their business without affecting the undivided interest of the limited partnerships in the business. As a result, it was just and reasonable to supplement s. 11 and grant the stay.

While the provisions of the CCAA allow for a cramdown of a creditor's claim, as well as the interest of any other person, anyone wishing to start or continue proceedings against the applicant companies could use the comeback clause in the order to persuade the court that it would not be just and reasonable to maintain the stay. In such a motion, the onus would be on the applicant companies to show that it was appropriate in the circumstances to continue the stay.

Cases considered:

Amirault Fish Co., Re, 32 C.B.R. 186, [1951] 4 D.L.R. 203 (N.S. T.D.) — referred to

Associated Investors of Canada Ltd., Re, 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 237, Alta. L.R. (2d) 259, [1988] 2 W.W.R. 211,

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38 B.L.R. 148, (sub nom. *Re First Investors Corp.*) 46 D.L.R. (4th) 669 (Q.B.) , reversed (1988), 71 C.B.R. 71, 60 Alta. L.R. (2d) 242, 89 A.R. 344 (C.A.) — referred to

Campeau v. Olympia & York Developments Ltd. (1992), 14 C.B.R. (3d) 303 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — referred to

Canada Systems Group (EST) v. Allen-Dale Mutual Insurance Co. (1982), 29 C.P.C. 60, 137 D.L.R. (3d) 287 (Ont. H.C.) [affirmed (1983), 41 O.R. (2d) 135, 33 C.P.C. 210, 145 D.L.R. (3d) 266 (C.A.)] — referred to

Empire-Universal Films Ltd. v. Rank, [1947] O.R. 775 [H.C.] — referred to

Feifer v. Frame Manufacturing Corp., Re, 28 C.B.R. 124, [1947] Que. K.B. 348 (C.A.) — referred to

Fine's Flowers Ltd. v. Fine's Flowers (Creditors of) (1992), 10 C.B.R. (3d) 87, 4 B.L.R. (2d) 293, 87 D.L.R. (4th) 391, 7 O.R. (3d) 193 (Gen. Div.) — referred to

Gaz Métropolitain v. Wynden Canada Inc. (1982), 44 C.B.R. (N.S.) 285 (Que. S.C.) [affirmed (1982), 45 C.B.R. (N.S.) 11 (Que. C.A.)] — referred to

Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd. (1990), 4 C.B.R. (3d) 311, 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 84, [1991] 2 W.W.R. 136 (C.A.) — referred to

Inducon Development Corp. Re (1992), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 306 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — referred to

International Donut Corp. v. 050863 N.B. Ltd. (1992), 127 N.B.R. (2d) 290, 319 A.P.R. 290 (Q.B.) — considered

Keppoch Development Ltd., Re (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 95 (N.S. T.D.) — referred to

Langley's Ltd., Re, [1938] O.R. 123, [1938] 3 D.L.R. 230 (C.A.) — referred to

McCordic v. Bosanquet (1974), 5 O.R. (2d) 53 (H.C.) — referred to

Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto Dominion Bank, 52 C.B.R. (N.S.) 109, [1984] 5 W.W.R. 215, 32 Alta. L.R. (2d) 150, 53 A.R. 39, 11 D.L.R. (4th) 576 (Q.B.) — referred to

Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd. (1988), 72 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 63 Alta. L.R. (2d) 361, 92 A.R. 1 (Q.B.) — referred to

Northland Properties Ltd., Re (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 141 (B.C. S.C.) — referred to

Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of) (1990), 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101, (sub nom. *Elan Corp. v. Comiskey*) 41 O.A.C. 282, 1 O.R. (3d) 289 (C.A.) — referred to

Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp. (1990), 2 C.B.R. (3d) 303, 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 105 (C.A.) , affirming (1990), 2 C.B.R. (3d) 291, 47 B.C.L.R. (2d) 193 (S.C.) , leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 164 (note), 55 B.C.L.R. (2d) xxxiii (note), 135 N.R. 317 (note) — referred to

Reference re Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (Canada), [1934] S.C.R. 659, 16 C.B.R. 1, [1934] 4

1993 CarswellOnt 183, 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24, 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275, 37 A.C.W.S. (3d) 847

D.L.R. 75 — *referred to*

Seven Mile Dam Contractors v. R. (1979), 13 B.C.L.R. 137, 104 D.L.R. (3d) 274 (S.C.) , affirmed (1980), 25 B.C.L.R. 183 (C.A.) — *referred to*

Sklar-Peppler Furniture Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 312, 86 D.L.R. (4th) 621 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — *referred to*

Slavik, Re (1992), 12 C.B.R. (3d) 157 (B.C. S.C.) — *considered*

Stephanie's Fashions Ltd., Re (1990), 1 C.B.R. (3d) 248 (B.C. S.C.) — *referred to*

Ultracare Management Inc. v. Zevenberger (Trustee of) (1990), 3 C.B.R. (3d) 151, (sub nom. *Ultracare Management Inc. v. Gammon*) 1 O.R. (3d) 321 (Gen. Div.) — *referred to*

United Maritime Fishermen Co-operative, Re (1988), 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 44, 84 N.B.R. (2d) 415, 214 A.P.R. 415 (Q.B.) , varied on reconsideration (1988), 68 C.B.R. (N.S.) 170, 87 N.B.R. (2d) 333, 221 A.P.R. 333 (Q.B.) , reversed (1988), 69 C.B.R. (N.S.) 161, 88 N.B.R. (2d) 253, 224 A.P.R. 253, (sub nom. *Cdn. Co-op. Leasing Services v. United Maritime Fishermen Co-op.*) 51 D.L.R. (4th) 618 (C.A.) — *referred to*

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 —

s. 85

s. 142

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 — preamble

s. 2

s. 3

s. 4

s. 5

s. 6

s. 7

s. 8

s. 11

Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43.

Judicature Act, The, R.S.O. 1937, c. 100.

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Limited Partnerships Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.16 —

s. 2(2)

s. 3(1)

s. 8

s. 9

s. 11

s. 12(1)

s. 13

s. 15(2)

s. 24

Partnership Act, R.S.A. 1980, c.P-2 — Pt. 2

s. 75

Rules considered:

Ontario, Rules of Civil Procedure —

r. 8.01

r. 8.02

Application under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act to file consolidated plan of compromise and for stay of proceedings.

Farley J.:

1 These are my written reasons relating to the relief granted the applicants on December 24, 1992 pursuant to their application under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 ("CCAA") and the *Courts of Justice Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 ("CJA"). The relief sought was as follows:

- (a) short service of the notice of application;
- (b) a declaration that the applicants were companies to which the CCAA applies;
- (c) authorization for the applicants to file a consolidated plan of compromise;
- (d) authorization for the applicants to call meetings of their secured and unsecured creditors to approve the consolidated plan of compromise;

(e) a stay of all proceedings taken or that might be taken either in respect of the applicants in their own capacity or on account of their interest in Lehndorff United Properties (Canada) ("LUPC"), Lehndorff Properties (Canada) ("LPC") and Lehndorff Properties (Canada) II ("LPC II") and collectively (the "Limited Partnerships") whether as limited partner, as general partner or as registered titleholder to certain of their assets as bare trustee and nominee; and

(f) certain other ancillary relief.

2 The applicants are a number of companies within the larger Lehndorff group ("Group") which operates in Canada and elsewhere. The group appears to have suffered in the same way that a number of other property developers and managers which have also sought protection under the CCAA in recent years. The applicants are insolvent; they each have outstanding debentures issues under trust deeds; and they propose a plan of compromise among themselves and the holders of these debentures as well as those others of their secured and unsecured creditors as they deemed appropriate in the circumstances. Each applicant except THG Lehndorff Vermögensverwaltung GmbH ("GmbH") is an Ontario corporation. GmbH is a company incorporated under the laws of Germany. Each of the applicants has assets or does business in Canada. Therefore each is a "company" within the definition of s. 2 of the CCAA. The applicant Lehndorff General Partner Ltd. ("General Partner Company") is the sole general partner of the Limited Partnerships. The General Partner Company has sole control over the property and businesses of the Limited Partnerships. All major decisions concerning the applicants (and the Limited Partnerships) are made by management operating out of the Lehndorff Toronto Office. The applicants aside from the General Partner Company have as their sole purpose the holding of title to properties as bare trustee or nominee on behalf of the Limited Partnerships. LUPC is a limited partnership registered under the *Limited Partnership Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.16 ("Ontario LPA"). LPC and LPC II are limited partnerships registered under Part 2 of the *Partnership Act*, R.S.A. 1980, c. P-2 ("Alberta PA") and each is registered in Ontario as an extra provincial limited partnership. LUPC has over 2,000 beneficial limited partners, LPC over 500 and LPC II over 250, most of whom are residents of Germany. As at March 31, 1992 LUPC had outstanding indebtedness of approximately \$370 million, LPC \$45 million and LPC II \$7 million. Not all of the members of the Group are making an application under the CCAA. Taken together the Group's indebtedness as to Canadian matters (including that of the applicants) was approximately \$543 million. In the summer of 1992 various creditors (Canada Trustco Mortgage Company, Bank of Montreal, Royal Bank of Canada, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce and the Bank of Tokyo Canada) made demands for repayment of their loans. On November 6, 1992 Funtanua Investments Limited, a minor secured lender also made a demand. An interim standstill agreement was worked out following a meeting of July 7, 1992. In conjunction with Peat Marwick Thorne Inc. which has been acting as an informal monitor to date and Fasken Campbell Godfrey the applicants have held multiple meetings with their senior secured creditors over the past half year and worked on a restructuring plan. The business affairs of the applicants (and the Limited Partnerships) are significantly intertwined as there are multiple instances of intercorporate debt, cross-default provisions and guarantees and they operated a centralized cash management system.

3 This process has now evolved to a point where management has developed a consolidated restructuring plan which plan addresses the following issues:

- (a) The compromise of existing conventional, term and operating indebtedness, both secured and unsecured.
- (b) The restructuring of existing project financing commitments.

- (c) New financing, by way of equity or subordinated debt.
- (d) Elimination or reduction of certain overhead.
- (e) Viability of existing businesses of entities in the Lehndorff Group.
- (f) Restructuring of income flows from the limited partnerships.
- (g) Disposition of further real property assets aside from those disposed of earlier in the process.
- (h) Consolidation of entities in the Group; and
- (i) Rationalization of the existing debt and security structure in the continuing entities in the Group.

Formal meetings of the beneficial limited partners of the Limited Partnerships are scheduled for January 20 and 21, 1993 in Germany and an information circular has been prepared and at the time of hearing was being translated into German. This application was brought on for hearing at this time for two general reasons: (a) it had now ripened to the stage of proceeding with what had been distilled out of the strategic and consultative meetings; and (b) there were creditors other than senior secured lenders who were in a position to enforce their rights against assets of some of the applicants (and Limited Partnerships) which if such enforcement did take place would result in an undermining of the overall plan. Notice of this hearing was given to various creditors: Barclays Bank of Canada, Barclays Bank PLC, Bank of Montreal, Citibank Canada, Canada Trustco Mortgage Corporation, Royal Trust Corporation of Canada, Royal Bank of Canada, the Bank of Tokyo Canada, Funtauna Investments Limited, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, Fuji Bank Canada and First City Trust Company. In this respect the applicants have recognized that although the initial application under the CCAA may be made on an ex parte basis (s. 11 of the CCAA; *Re Langley's Ltd.*, [1938] O.R. 123, [1938] 3 D.L.R. 230 (C.A.) ; *Re Keppoch Development Ltd.* (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 95 (N.S. T.D.) . The court will be concerned when major creditors have not been alerted even in the most minimal fashion (*Re Inducon Development Corp.* (1992), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 306 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at p. 310). The application was either supported or not opposed.

4 "Instant" debentures are now well recognized and respected by the courts: see *Re United Maritime Fishermen Co-operative* (1988), 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 44 (N.B. Q.B.) , at pp. 55-56, varied on reconsideration (1988), 68 C.B.R. (N.S.) 170 (N.B. Q.B.) , reversed on different grounds (1988), 69 C.B.R. (N.S.) 161 (N.B. C.A.) , at pp. 165-166; *Re Stephanie's Fashions Ltd.* (1990), 1 C.B.R. (3d) 248 (B.C. S.C.) at pp. 250-251; *Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of) (sub nom. Elan Corp. v. Comiskey)* (1990), 1 O.R. (3d) 289, 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101 (C.A.) per Doherty J.A., dissenting on another point, at pp. 306-310 (O.R.); *Ultracare Management Inc. v. Zevenberger (Trustee of) (sub nom. Ultracare Management Inc. v. Gammon)* (1990), 1 O.R. (3d) 321 (Gen. Div.) at p. 327. The applicants would appear to me to have met the technical hurdle of s. 3 and as defined s. 2) of the CCAA in that they are debtor companies since they are insolvent, they have outstanding an issue of debentures under a trust deed and the compromise or arrangement that is proposed includes that compromise between the applicants and the holders of those trust deed debentures. I am also satisfied that because of the significant intertwining of the applicants it would be appropriate to have a consolidated plan. I would also understand that this court (Ontario Court of Justice (General Division)) is the appropriate court to hear this application since all the applicants except GmbH have their head office or their chief place of business in Ontario and GmbH, although it does not have a place of business within Canada, does have assets located within Ontario.

5 The CCAA is intended to facilitate compromises and arrangements between companies and their creditors

as an alternative to bankruptcy and, as such, is remedial legislation entitled to a liberal interpretation. It seems to me that the purpose of the statute is to enable insolvent companies to carry on business in the ordinary course or otherwise deal with their assets so as to enable plan of compromise or arrangement to be prepared, filed and considered by their creditors and the court. In the interim, a judge has great discretion under the CCAA to make order so as to effectively maintain the status quo in respect of an insolvent company while it attempts to gain the approval of its creditors for the proposed compromise or arrangement which will be to the benefit of both the company and its creditors. See the preamble to and sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 11 of the CCAA; *Reference re Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, [1934] S.C.R. 659 at p. 661, 16 C.B.R. 1, [1934] 4 D.L.R. 75; *Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto Dominion Bank*, [1984] 5 W.W.R. 215 (Alta. Q.B.) at pp. 219-220; *Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleum Ltd.* (1988), 72 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 63 Alta. L.R. (2d) 361 (Q.B.), at pp. 12-13 (C.B.R.); *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.* (1990), 2 C.B.R. (3d) 303 (B.C. C.A.), at pp. 310-311, affirming (1990), 2 C.B.R. (3d) 291, 47 B.C.L.R. (2d) 193 (S.C.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. dismissed (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 164 (S.C.C.); *Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)*, supra, at p. 307 (O.R.); *Fine's Flowers v. Fine's Flowers (Creditors of)* (1992), 7 O.R. (3d) 193 (Gen. Div.), at p. 199 and "Reorganizations Under The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act", Stanley E. Edwards (1947) 25 Can. Bar Rev. 587 at p. 592.

6 The CCAA is intended to provide a structured environment for the negotiation of compromises between a debtor company and its creditors for the benefit of both. Where a debtor company realistically plans to continue operating or to otherwise deal with its assets but it requires the protection of the court in order to do so and it is otherwise too early for the court to determine whether the debtor company will succeed, relief should be granted under the CCAA. see *Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)*, supra at pp. 297 and 316; *Re Stephanie's Fashions Ltd.*, supra, at pp. 251-252 and *Ultracare Management Inc. v. Zevenberger (Trustee of)*, supra, at p. 328 and p. 330. It has been held that the intention of the CCAA is to prevent any manoeuvres for positioning among the creditors during the period required to develop a plan and obtain approval of creditors. Such manoeuvres could give an aggressive creditor an advantage to the prejudice of others who are less aggressive and would undermine the company's financial position making it even less likely that the plan will succeed: see *Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto Dominion Bank*, supra, at p. 220 (W.W.R.). The possibility that one or more creditors may be prejudiced should not affect the court's exercise of its authority to grant a stay of proceedings under the CCAA because this affect is offset by the benefit to all creditors and to the company of facilitating a reorganization. The court's primary concerns under the CCAA must be for the debtor and *all* of the creditors: see *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.*, supra, at pp. 108-110; *Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.* (1990), 4 C.B.R. (3d) 311, 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 84 (C.A.), at pp. 315-318 (C.B.R.) and *Re Stephanie's Fashions Ltd.*, supra, at pp. 251-252.

7 One of the purposes of the CCAA is to facilitate ongoing operations of a business where its assets have a greater value as part of an integrated system than individually. The CCAA facilitates reorganization of a company where the alternative, sale of the property piecemeal, is likely to yield far less satisfaction to the creditors. Unlike the *Bankruptcy Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, before the amendments effective November 30, 1992 to transform it into the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* ("BIA"), it is possible under the CCAA to bind secured creditors it has been generally speculated that the CCAA will be resorted to by companies that are generally larger and have a more complicated capital structure and that those companies which make an application under the BIA will be generally smaller and have a less complicated structure. Reorganization may include partial liquidation where it is intended as part of the process of a return to long term viability and profitability. See *Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.*, supra, at p. 318 and *Re Associated Investors of Canada Ltd.* (1987), 67

C.B.R. (N.S.) 237 (Alta. Q.B.) at pp. 245, reversed on other grounds at (1988), 71 C.B.R. (N.S.) 71 (Alta. C.A.). It appears to me that the purpose of the CCAA is also to protect the interests of creditors and to enable an orderly distribution of the debtor company's affairs. This may involve a winding-up or liquidation of a company or simply a substantial downsizing of its business operations, provided the same is proposed in the best interests of the creditors generally. See *Re Associated Investors of Canada Ltd.*, supra, at p. 318; *Re Amirault Fish Co.*, 32 C.B.R. 186, [1951] 4 D.L.R. 203 (N.S. T.D.) at pp. 187-188 (C.B.R.).

8 It strikes me that each of the applicants in this case has a realistic possibility of being able to continue operating, although each is currently unable to meet all of its expenses albeit on a reduced scale. This is precisely the sort of circumstance in which all of the creditors are likely to benefit from the application of the CCAA and in which it is appropriate to grant an order staying proceedings so as to allow the applicant to finalize preparation of and file a plan of compromise and arrangement.

9 Let me now review the aspect of the stay of proceedings. Section 11 of the CCAA provides as follows:

11. Notwithstanding anything in the *Bankruptcy Act* or the *Winding-up Act*, whenever an application has been made under this Act in respect of any company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit,

(a) make an order staying, until such time as the court may prescribe or until any further order, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under the *Bankruptcy Act* and the *Winding-up Act* or either of them;

(b) restrain further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company on such terms as the court sees fit; and

(c) make an order that no suit, action or other proceeding shall be proceeded with or commenced against the company except with the leave of the court and subject to such terms as the court imposes.

10 The power to grant a stay of proceeding should be construed broadly in order to permit the CCAA to accomplish its legislative purpose and in particular to enable continuance of the company seeking CCAA protection. The power to grant a stay therefore extends to a stay which affected the position not only of the company's secured and unsecured creditors, but also all non-creditors and other parties who could potentially jeopardize the success of the plan and thereby the continuance of the company. See *Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd.*, supra, at pp. 12-17 (C.B.R.) and *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.*, supra, at pp. 296-298 (B.C. S.C.) and pp. 312-314 (B.C. C.A.) and *Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto Dominion Bank*, supra, at pp. 219 ff. Further the court has the power to order a stay that is effective in respect of the rights arising in favour of secured creditors under all forms of commercial security: see *Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.*, supra, at p. 320 where Gibbs J.A. for the court stated:

The trend which emerges from this sampling will be given effect here by holding that where the word "security" occurs in the C.C.A.A., it includes s. 178 security and, where the word creditor occurs, it includes a bank holding s. 178 security. To the extent that there may be conflict between the two statutes, therefore, the broad scope of the C.C.A.A. prevails.

11 The power to grant a stay may also extend to preventing persons seeking to terminate or cancel execut-

ory contracts, including, without limitation agreements with the applying companies for the supply of goods or services, from doing so: see *Gaz Métropolitain v. Wynden Canada Inc.* (1982), 44 C.B.R. (N.S.) 285 (Que. S.C.) at pp. 290-291 and *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.*, supra, at pp. 311-312 (B.C. C.A.). The stay may also extend to prevent a mortgagee from proceeding with foreclosure proceedings (see *Re Northland Properties Ltd.* (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 141 (B.C. S.C.) or to prevent landlords from terminating leases, or otherwise enforcing their rights thereunder (see *Feifer v. Frame Manufacturing Corp.* (1947), 28 C.B.R. 124 (Que. C.A.)). Amounts owing to landlords in respect of arrears of rent or unpaid rent for the unexpired portion of lease terms are properly dealt with in a plan of compromise or arrangement: see *Sklar-Peppler Furniture Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia* (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 312 (Ont. Gen. Div.) especially at p. 318. The jurisdiction of the court to make orders under the CCAA in the interest of protecting the debtor company so as to enable it to prepare and file a plan is effective notwithstanding the terms of any contract or instrument to which the debtor company is a party. Section 8 of the CCAA provides:

8. This Act extends and does not limit the provisions of any instrument now or hereafter existing that governs the rights of creditors or any class of them and has full force and effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in that instrument.

The power to grant a stay may also extend to prevent persons from exercising any right of set off in respect of the amounts owed by such a person to the debtor company, irrespective of whether the debtor company has commenced any action in respect of which the defense of set off might be formally asserted: see *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.*, supra, at pp. 312-314 (B.C.C.A.).

12 It was submitted by the applicants that the power to grant a stay of proceedings may also extend to a stay of proceedings against non-applicants who are not companies and accordingly do not come within the express provisions of the CCAA. In support thereof they cited a CCAA order which was granted staying proceedings against individuals who guaranteed the obligations of a debtor-applicant which was a qualifying company under the terms of the CCAA: see *Re Slavik*, unreported, [1992] B.C.J. No. 341 [now reported at 12 C.B.R. (3d) 157 (B.C. S.C.)]. However in the *Slavik* situation the individual guarantors were officers and shareholders of two companies which had sought and obtained CCAA protection. Vickers J. in that case indicated that the facts of that case included the following unexplained and unamplified fact [at p. 159]:

5. The order provided further that all creditors of Norvik Timber Inc. be enjoined from making demand for payment upon that firm or upon any guarantor of an obligation of the firm until further order of the court.

The CCAA reorganization plan involved an assignment of the claims of the creditors to "Newco" in exchange for cash and shares. However the basis of the stay order originally granted was not set forth in this decision.

13 It appears to me that Dickson J. in *International Donut Corp. v. 050863 N.D. Ltd.*, unreported, [1992] N.B.J. No. 339 (N.B. Q.B.) [now reported at 127 N.B.R. (2d) 290, 319 A.P.R. 290] was focusing only on the stay arrangements of the CCAA when concerning a limited partnership situation he indicated [at p. 295 N.B.R.]:

In August 1991 the limited partnership, through its general partner the plaintiff, applied to the Court under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C., c. C-36 for an order delaying the assertion of claims by creditors until an opportunity could be gained to work out with the numerous and sizable creditors a com-

promise of their claims. An order was obtained but it in due course expired without success having been achieved in arranging with creditors a compromise. *That effort may have been wasted, because it seems questionable that the federal Act could have any application to a limited partnership in circumstances such as these* . (Emphasis added.)

14 I am not persuaded that the words of s. 11 which are quite specific as relating as to a *company* can be enlarged to encompass something other than that. However it appears to me that Blair J. was clearly in the right channel in his analysis in *Campeau v. Olympia & York Developments Ltd.* unreported, [1992] O.J. No. 1946 [now reported at 14 C.B.R. (3d) 303 (Ont. Gen. Div.)] at pp. 4-7 [at pp. 308-310 C.B.R.].

The Power to Stay

The court has always had an inherent jurisdiction to grant a stay of proceedings whenever it is just and convenient to do so, in order to control its process or prevent an abuse of that process: see *Canada Systems Group (EST) Ltd. v. Allendale Mutual Insurance Co.* (1982), 29 C.P.C. 60, 137 D.L.R. (3d) 287 (Ont. H.C.) , and cases referred to therein. In the civil context, this general power is also embodied in the very broad terms of s. 106 of the *Courts of Justice Act* , R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, which provides as follows:

106. A court, on its own initiative or on motion by any person, whether or not a party, may stay any proceeding in the court on such terms as are considered just.

Recently, Mr. Justice O'Connell has observed that this discretionary power is "highly dependent on the facts of each particular case": *Arab Monetary Fund v. Hashim* (unreported) [(June 25, 1992), Doc. 24127/88 (Ont. Gen. Div.)], [1992] O.J. No. 1330.

Apart from this inherent and general jurisdiction to stay proceedings, there are many instances where the court is specifically granted the power to stay in a particular context, by virtue of statute or under the *Rules of Civil Procedure* . The authority to prevent multiplicity of proceedings in the same court, under r. 6.01(1), is an example of the latter. The power to stay judicial and extra-judicial proceedings under s. 11 of the C.C.A.A., is an example of the former. Section 11 of the C.C.A.A. provides as follows.

The Power to Stay in the Context of C.C.A.A. Proceedings

By its formal title the C.C.A.A. is known as "An Act to facilitate compromises and arrangements between companies and their creditors". To ensure the effective nature of such a "facilitative" process it is essential that the debtor company be afforded a respite from the litigious and other rights being exercised by creditors, while it attempts to carry on as a going concern and to negotiate an acceptable corporate restructuring arrangement with such creditors.

In this respect it has been observed that the C.C.A.A. is "to be used as a practical and effective way of restructuring corporate indebtedness.": see the case comment following the report of *Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd.* (1988), 72 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 63 Alta. L.R. (2d) 361, 92 A.R. 81 (Q.B.) , and the approval of that remark as "a perceptive observation about the attitude of the courts" by Gibbs J.A. in *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.* (1990), 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 105 (C.A.) at p. 113 [B.C.L.R.].

Gibbs J.A. continued with this comment:

To the extent that a general principle can be extracted from the few cases directly on point, and the others in which there is persuasive obiter, it would appear to be that the courts have concluded that under s. 11 there is a *discretionary power to restrain judicial or extra-judicial conduct* against the debtor company *the effect of which is, or would be, seriously to impair the ability of the debtor company to continue in business during the compromise or arrangement negotiating period*.

(emphasis added)

I agree with those sentiments and would simply add that, in my view, the restraining power extends as well to conduct which could seriously impair the debtor's ability to focus and concentrate its efforts on the business purpose of negotiating the compromise or arrangement. [In this respect, see also *Sairex GmbH v. Prudential Steel Ltd.* (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 62 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at p. 77.]

I must have regard to these foregoing factors while I consider, as well, the general principles which have historically governed the court's exercise of its power to stay proceedings. These principles were reviewed by Mr. Justice Montgomery in *Canada Systems Group (EST) Ltd. v. Allendale Mutual Insurance*, supra (a "Mississauga Derailment" case), at pp. 65-66 [C.P.C.]. The balance of convenience must weigh significantly in favour of granting the stay, as a party's right to have access to the courts must not be lightly interfered with. The court must be satisfied that a continuance of the proceeding would serve as an injustice to the party seeking the stay, in the sense that it would be oppressive or vexatious or an abuse of the process of the court in some other way. The stay must not cause an injustice to the plaintiff.

It is quite clear from *Empire-Universal Films Limited v. Rank*, [1947] O.R. 775 (H.C.) that McRuer C.J.H.C. considered that *The Judicature Act* [R.S.O. 1937, c. 100] then [and now the CJA] merely confirmed a statutory right that previously had been considered inherent in the jurisdiction of the court with respect to its authority to grant a stay of proceedings. See also *McCordic v. Bosanquet* (1974), 5 O.R. (2d) 53 (H.C.) and *Canada Systems Group (EST) Ltd. v. Allen-Dale Mutual Insurance Co.* (1982), 29 C.P.C. 60 (H.C.) at pp. 65-66.

15 Montgomery J. in *Canada Systems*, supra, at pp. 65-66 indicated:

Goodman J. (as he then was) in *McCordic v. Bosanquet* (1974), 5 O.R. (2d) 53 in granting a stay reviewed the authorities and concluded that the inherent jurisdiction of the Court to grant a stay of proceedings may be made whenever it is just and reasonable to do so. "This court has ample jurisdiction to grant a stay whenever it is just and reasonable to do so." (Per Lord Denning M.R. in *Edmeades v. Thames Board Mills Ltd.*, [1969] 2 Q.B. 67 at 71, [1969] 2 All E.R. 127 (C.A.)). Lord Denning's decision in *Edmeades* was approved by Lord Justice Davies in *Lane v. Willis; Lane v. Beach (Executor of Estate of George William Willis)*, [1972] 1 All E.R. 430, (sub nom. *Lane v. Willis; Lane v. Beach*) [1972] 1 W.L.R. 326 (C.A.).

.....

In *Weight Watchers Int. Inc. v. Weight Watchers of Ont. Ltd.* (1972), 25 D.L.R. (3d) 419, 5 C.P.R. (2d) 122, appeal allowed by consent without costs (sub nom. *Weight Watchers of Ont. Ltd. v. Weight Watchers Inc.*) 42 D.L.R. (3d) 320n, 10 C.P.R. (2d) 96n (Fed. C.A.), Mr. Justice Heald on an application for stay said at p. 426 [25 D.L.R.]:

The principles which must govern in these matters are clearly stated in the case of *Empire Universal Films Ltd. et al. v. Rank et al.*, [1947] O.R. 775 at p. 779, as follows [quoting *St. Pierre et al. v. South*

American Stores (Gath & Chaves), Ltd. et al., [1936] 1 K.B. 382 at p. 398]:

(1.) A mere balance of convenience is not a sufficient ground for depriving a plaintiff of the advantages of prosecuting his action in an English Court if it is otherwise properly brought. The right of access to the King's Court must not be lightly refused. (2.) In order to justify a stay two conditions must be satisfied, one positive and the other negative: (a) the defendant must satisfy the Court that the continuance of the action would work an injustice because it would be oppressive or vexatious to him or would be an abuse of the process of the Court in some other way; and (b) the stay must not cause an injustice to the plaintiff. On both the burden of proof is on the defendant.

16 Thus it appears to me that the inherent power of this court to grant stays can be used to supplement s. 11 of the CCAA when it is just and reasonable to do so. Is it appropriate to do so in the circumstances? Clearly there is jurisdiction under s. 11 of the CCAA to grant a stay in respect of any of the applicants which are all companies which fit the criteria of the CCAA. However the stay requested also involved the limited partnerships to some degree either (i) with respect to the applicants acting on behalf of the Limited Partnerships or (ii) the stays being effective vis-à-vis any proceedings taken by any party against the property assets and undertaking of the Limited Partnerships in respect of which they hold a direct interest (collectively the "Property") as set out in the terms of the stay provisions of the order paragraphs 4 through 18 inclusive attached as an appendix to these reasons. [Appendix omitted.] I believe that an analysis of the operations of a limited partnership in this context would be beneficial to an understanding of how there is a close inter-relationship to the applicants involved in this CCAA proceedings and how the Limited Partnerships and their Property are an integral part of the operations previously conducted and the proposed restructuring.

17 A limited partnership is a creation of statute, consisting of one or more general partners and one or more limited partners. The limited partnership is an investment vehicle for passive investment by limited partners. It in essence combines the flow through concept of tax depreciation or credits available to "ordinary" partners under general partnership law with limited liability available to shareholders under corporate law. See Ontario LPA sections 2(2) and 3(1) and Lyle R. Hepburn, *Limited Partnerships*, (Toronto: De Boo, 1991), at p. 1-2 and p. 1-12. I would note here that the limited partnership provisions of the Alberta PA are roughly equivalent to those found in the Ontario LPA with the interesting side aspect that the Alberta legislation in s. 75 does allow for judgment against a limited partner to be charged against the limited partner's interest in the limited partnership. A general partner has all the rights and powers and is subject to all the restrictions and liabilities of a partner in a partnership. In particular a general partner is fully liable to each creditor of the business of the limited partnership. The general partner has sole control over the property and business of the limited partnership: see Ontario LPA ss. 8 and 13. Limited partners have no liability to the creditors of the limited partnership's business; the limited partners' financial exposure is limited to their contribution. The limited partners do not have any "independent" ownership rights in the property of the limited partnership. The entitlement of the limited partners is limited to their contribution plus any profits thereon, after satisfaction of claims of the creditors. See Ontario LPA sections 9, 11, 12(1), 13, 15(2) and 24. The process of debtor and creditor relationships associated with the limited partnership's business are between the general partner and the creditors of the business. In the event of the creditors collecting on debt and enforcing security, the creditors can only look to the assets of the limited partnership together with the assets of the general partner including the general partner's interest in the limited partnership. This relationship is recognized under the *Bankruptcy Act* (now the BIA) sections 85 and 142.

18 A general partner is responsible to defend proceedings against the limited partnership in the firm name, so in procedural law and in practical effect, a proceeding against a limited partnership is a proceeding against the general partner. See Ontario *Rules of Civil Procedure*, O. Reg. 560/84, Rules 8.01 and 8.02.

19 It appears that the preponderance of case law supports the contention that a partnership including a limited partnership is not a separate legal entity. See *Lindley on Partnership*, 15th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1984), at pp. 33-35; *Seven Mile Dam Contractors v. R.* (1979), 13 B.C.L.R. 137 (S.C.), affirmed (1980), 25 B.C.L.R. 183 (C.A.) and "Extra-Provincial Liability of the Limited Partner", Brad A. Milne, (1985) 23 Alta. L. Rev. 345, at pp. 350-351. Milne in that article made the following observations:

The preponderance of case law therefore supports the contention that a limited partnership is not a separate legal entity. It appears, nevertheless, that the distinction made in *Re Thorne* between partnerships and trade unions could not be applied to limited partnerships which, like trade unions, must rely on statute for their validity. The mere fact that limited partnerships owe their existence to the statutory provision is probably not sufficient to endow the limited partnership with the attribute of legal personality as suggested in *Ruzicks* unless it appeared that the Legislature clearly intended that the limited partnership should have a separate legal existence. A review of the various provincial statutes does not reveal any procedural advantages, rights or powers that are fundamentally different from those advantages enjoyed by ordinary partnerships. The legislation does not contain any provision resembling section 15 of the *Canada Business Corporation Act* [S.C. 1974-75, c. 33, as am.] which expressly states that a corporation has the capacity, both in and outside of Canada, of a natural person. It is therefore difficult to imagine that the Legislature intended to create a new category of legal entity.

20 It appears to me that the operations of a limited partnership in the ordinary course are that the limited partners take a completely passive role (they must or they will otherwise lose their limited liability protection which would have been their sole reason for choosing a limited partnership vehicle as opposed to an "ordinary" partnership vehicle). For a lively discussion of the question of "control" in a limited partnership as contrasted with shareholders in a corporation, see R. Flannigan, "The Control Test of Investor Liability in Limited Partnerships" (1983) 21 Alta. L. Rev. 303; E. Apps, "Limited Partnerships and the 'Control' Prohibition: Assessing the Liability of Limited Partners" (1991) 70 Can. Bar Rev. 611; R. Flannigan, "Limited Partner Liability: A Response" (1992) 71 Can. Bar Rev. 552. The limited partners leave the running of the business to the general partner and in that respect the care, custody and the maintenance of the property, assets and undertaking of the limited partnership in which the limited partners and the general partner hold an interest. The ownership of this limited partnership property, assets and undertaking is an undivided interest which cannot be segregated for the purpose of legal process. It seems to me that there must be afforded a protection of the whole since the applicants' individual interest therein cannot be segregated without in effect dissolving the partnership arrangement. The limited partners have two courses of action to take if they are dissatisfied with the general partner or the operation of the limited partnership as carried on by the general partner — the limited partners can vote to (a) remove the general partner and replace it with another or (b) dissolve the limited partnership. However Flannigan strongly argues that an unfettered right to remove the general partner would attach general liability for the limited partners (and especially as to the question of continued enjoyment of favourable tax deductions) so that it is prudent to provide this as a conditional right: *Control Test*, (1992), supra, at pp. 524-525. Since the applicants are being afforded the protection of a stay of proceedings in respect to allowing them time to advance a reorganization plan and complete it if the plan finds favour, there should be a stay of proceedings (vis-à-vis any action which the limited partners may wish to take as to replacement or dissolution) through the period of allowing the

limited partners to vote on the reorganization plan itself.

21 It seems to me that using the inherent jurisdiction of this court to supplement the statutory stay provisions of s. 11 of the CCAA would be appropriate in the circumstances; it would be just and reasonable to do so. The business operations of the applicants are so intertwined with the limited partnerships that it would be impossible for relief as to a stay to be granted to the applicants which would affect their business without at the same time extending that stay to the undivided interests of the limited partners in such. It also appears that the applicants are well on their way to presenting a reorganization plan for consideration and a vote; this is scheduled to happen within the month so there would not appear to be any significant time inconvenience to any person interested in pursuing proceedings. While it is true that the provisions of the CCAA allow for a cramdown of a creditor's claim (as well as an interest of any other person), those who wish to be able to initiate or continue proceedings against the applicants may utilize the comeback clause in the order to persuade the court that it would not be just and reasonable to maintain that particular stay. It seems to me that in such a comeback motion the onus would be upon the applicants to show that in the circumstances it was appropriate to continue the stay.

22 The order is therefore granted as to the relief requested including the proposed stay provisions.

Application allowed.

FN* As amended by the court.

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TAB 4

2013 CarswellOnt 733, 2013 SCC 6, D.T.E. 2013T-97, J.E. 2013-185, 96 C.B.R. (5th) 171, 354 D.L.R. (4th) 581, 223 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1049, 2 C.C.P.B. (2nd) 1, [2013] W.D.F.L. 1591, [2013] W.D.F.L. 1592, 20 P.P.S.A.C. (3d) 1, 439 N.R. 235, 301 O.A.C. 1, 8 B.L.R. (5th) 1

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2013 CarswellOnt 733, 2013 SCC 6, D.T.E. 2013T-97, J.E. 2013-185, 96 C.B.R. (5th) 171, 354 D.L.R. (4th) 581, 223 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1049, 2 C.C.P.B. (2nd) 1, [2013] W.D.F.L. 1591, [2013] W.D.F.L. 1592, 20 P.P.S.A.C. (3d) 1, 439 N.R. 235, 301 O.A.C. 1, 8 B.L.R. (5th) 1

Indalex Ltd., Re

Sun Indalex Finance, LLC (Appellant) and United Steelworkers, Keith Carruthers, Leon Kozierok, Richard Benson, John Faveri, Ken Waldron, John (Jack) W. Rooney, Bertram McBride, Max Degen, Eugene D'Iorio, Neil Fraser, Richard Smith, Robert Leckie and Fred Granville (Respondents)

George L. Miller, the Chapter 7 Trustee of the Bankruptcy Estates of the U.S. Indalex Debtors (Appellant) and United Steelworkers, Keith Carruthers, Leon Kozierok, Richard Benson, John Faveri, Ken Waldron, John (Jack) W. Rooney, Bertram McBride, Max Degen, Eugene D'Iorio, Neil Fraser, Richard Smith, Robert Leckie and Fred Granville (Respondents)

FTI Consulting Canada ULC, in its capacity as court-appointed monitor of Indalex Limited, on behalf of Indalex Limited (Appellant) and United Steelworkers, Keith Carruthers, Leon Kozierok, Richard Benson, John Faveri, Ken Waldron, John (Jack) W. Rooney, Bertram McBride, Max Degen, Eugene D'Iorio, Neil Fraser, Richard Smith, Robert Leckie and Fred Granville (Respondents)

United Steelworkers (Appellant) and Morneau Shepell Ltd. (formerly known as Morneau Sobeco Limited Partnership) and Superintendent of Financial Services (Respondents) and Superintendent of Financial Services, Insolvency Institute of Canada, Canadian Labour Congress, Canadian Federation of Pensioners, Canadian Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Professionals and Canadian Bankers Association (Interveners)

Supreme Court of Canada

McLachlin C.J.C., LeBel, Deschamps, Abella, Rothstein, Cromwell, Moldaver JJ.

Heard: June 5, 2012

Judgment: February 1, 2013

Docket: 34308

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Proceedings: reversing *Indalex Ltd., Re* (2011), 89 C.C.P.B. 39, 276 O.A.C. 347, 331 D.L.R. (4th) 352, 17 P.P.S.A.C. (3d) 194, 75 C.B.R. (5th) 19, 104 O.R. (3d) 641, 2011 C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8433, 2011 ONCA 265, 2011 CarswellOnt 2458 (Ont. C.A.); reversing *Indalex Ltd., Re* (2010), 79 C.C.P.B. 301, 2010 ONSC 1114, 2010 CarswellOnt 893 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]); and reversing in part *Indalex Ltd., Re* (2011), 81 C.B.R. (5th) 165, 92 C.C.P.B. 277, 2011 ONCA 578, 2011 CarswellOnt 9077 (Ont. C.A.); additional reasons to *Indalex Ltd., Re* (2011), 89 C.C.P.B. 39, 276 O.A.C. 347, 331 D.L.R. (4th) 352, 17 P.P.S.A.C. (3d) 194, 75 C.B.R. (5th) 19, 104 O.R. (3d) 641, 2011 C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8433, 2011 ONCA 265, 2011 CarswellOnt 2458 (Ont. C.A.)

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Darrell L. Brown, for Appellant / Respondent, United Steelworkers

Andrew J. Hatnay, Demetrios Yiokaris, for Respondents, Keith Carruthers, et al.

Hugh O'Reilly, Amanda Darrach, for Respondent, Morneau Shepell Ltd. (formerly known as Morneau Sobeco Limited Partnership)

Mark Bailey, Leonard Marsello, William MacLarkey, for Respondent / Intervener, Superintendent of Financial Services

Robert I. Thornton, D.J. Miller, for Intervener, Insolvency Institute of Canada

Steven Barrett, Ethan Poskanzer, for Intervener, Canadian Labour Congress

Kenneth T. Rosenberg, Andrew K. Lokan, Massimo Starnino, for Intervener, Canadian Federation of Pensioners

Éric Vallières, Alexandre Forest, Yoine Goldstein, for Intervener, Canadian Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Professionals

Mahmud Jamal, Jeremy Dacks, Tony Devir, for Intervener, Canadian Bankers Association

Subject: Insolvency; Estates and Trusts; Family; Property; Corporate and Commercial; Employment; Civil Practice and Procedure; Constitutional; International

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Property of bankrupt — Trust property — Miscellaneous

Pensions — I Ltd. was part of group of companies that became insolvent — Bankruptcy protection was sought — I Ltd. was administrator of two registered pension plans — Salaried plan was in process of being wound up when Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act proceedings began — Executive plan was closed but not wound up — Amended initial order was obtained, authorizing I Ltd. to borrow from debtor-in-possession ("DIP") lenders and granting them priority over all other creditors — Pension plan members brought unsuccessful motions for declaration that deemed trust equal to unfunded pension liability was enforceable against proceeds of sale of assets of I Ltd. — In allowing plan members' appeal, Court of Appeal ordered distribution from reserve fund in order to pay amount of each plan's deficiency — I Ltd., monitor, secured creditor, and trustee in bankruptcy appealed order — Appeal allowed — With respect to salaried plan, I Ltd. was deemed to hold in trust amount necessary to satisfy wind-up deficiency — Deemed trust did not apply to wind-up deficiency with respect to executive plan — As result of application of doctrine of federal paramountcy, DIP charge superseded deemed trust.

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Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Property of bankrupt — Pension funds

Trusts — I Ltd. was part of group of companies that became insolvent — Bankruptcy protection was sought — I Ltd. was administrator of two registered pension plans — Salaried plan was in process of being wound up when Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act proceedings began — Executive plan was closed but not wound up — Amended initial order was obtained, authorizing I Ltd. to borrow from debtor-in-possession ("DIP") lenders and granting them priority over all other creditors — Pension plan members brought unsuccessful motions for declaration that deemed trust equal to unfunded pension liability was enforceable against proceeds of sale of assets of I Ltd. — In allowing plan members' appeal, Court of Appeal ordered distribution from reserve fund in order to pay amount of each plan's deficiency — I Ltd., monitor, secured creditor, and trustee in bankruptcy appealed order — Appeal allowed — With respect to salaried plan, I Ltd. was deemed to hold in trust amount necessary to satisfy wind-up deficiency — Deemed trust did not apply to wind-up deficiency with respect to executive plan — As result of application of doctrine of federal paramountcy, DIP charge superseded deemed trust.

Pensions --- Administration of pension plans — Administrators, trustees and custodians — Fiduciary duties — Miscellaneous

I Ltd. was part of group of companies that became insolvent — Bankruptcy protection was sought — I Ltd. was administrator of two registered pension plans — Salaried plan was in process of being wound up when Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act proceedings began — Executive plan was closed but not wound up — Amended initial order was obtained, authorizing I Ltd. to borrow from debtor-in-possession ("DIP") lenders and granting them priority over all other creditors — Pension plan members brought unsuccessful motions for declaration that deemed trust equal to unfunded pension liability was enforceable against proceeds of sale of assets of I Ltd. — In allowing plan members' appeal, Court of Appeal ordered distribution from reserve fund in order to pay amount of each plan's deficiency — I Ltd., monitor, secured creditor, and trustee in bankruptcy appealed order — Appeal allowed — I Ltd.'s fiduciary obligations as plan administrator conflicted with management decisions that needed to be taken in best interests of corporation — I Ltd. should have taken steps to ensure that interests of plan members were protected, but did not do so — With respect to salaried plan, I Ltd. was deemed to hold in trust amount necessary to satisfy wind-up deficiency, but DIP charge superseded deemed trust by application of doctrine of federal paramountcy.

Pensions --- Administration of pension plans — Administrators, trustees and custodians — Fiduciary duties — Liabilities for breach

I Ltd. was part of group of companies that became insolvent — Bankruptcy protection was sought — I Ltd. was administrator of two registered pension plans — Salaried plan was in process of being wound up when Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act proceedings began — Executive plan was closed but not wound up — Amended initial order was obtained, authorizing I Ltd. to borrow from debtor-in-possession ("DIP") lenders and granting them priority over all other creditors — Pension plan members brought unsuccessful motions for declaration that deemed trust equal to unfunded pension liability was enforceable against proceeds of sale of assets of I Ltd. — In allowing plan members' appeal, Court of Appeal ordered distribution from reserve fund in order to pay amount of each plan's deficiency — I Ltd., monitor, secured creditor, and trustee in bankruptcy appealed order — Appeal allowed — I Ltd.'s fiduciary obligations as plan administrator conflicted with management decisions that needed to be taken in best interests of corporation — I Ltd. should have taken steps to ensure that interests of plan members were protected, but did not do so — Constructive trust remedy was not available, as required condition was not met — With respect to salaried plan, I Ltd. was deemed to hold in trust amount necessary to

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satisfy wind-up deficiency, but DIP charge superseded deemed trust by application of doctrine of federal paramountcy.

Pensions --- Administration of pension plans — Administrators, trustees and custodians — Miscellaneous

I Ltd. was part of group of companies that became insolvent — Bankruptcy protection was sought — I Ltd. was administrator of two registered pension plans — Salaried plan was in process of being wound up when Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act proceedings began — Executive plan was closed but not wound up — Amended initial order was obtained, authorizing I Ltd. to borrow from debtor-in-possession ("DIP") lenders and granting them priority over all other creditors — Pension plan members brought unsuccessful motions for declaration that deemed trust equal to unfunded pension liability was enforceable against proceeds of sale of assets of I Ltd. — In allowing plan members' appeal, Court of Appeal ordered distribution from reserve fund in order to pay amount of each plan's deficiency — I Ltd., monitor, secured creditor, and trustee in bankruptcy appealed order — Appeal allowed — I Ltd.'s fiduciary obligations as plan administrator conflicted with management decisions that needed to be taken in best interests of corporation — I Ltd. should have taken steps to ensure that interests of plan members were protected, but did not do so — With respect to salaried plan, I Ltd. was deemed to hold in trust amount necessary to satisfy wind-up deficiency, but DIP charge superseded deemed trust by application of doctrine of federal paramountcy.

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Practice and procedure in courts — Appeals — Miscellaneous

Collateral attack doctrine — I Ltd. was part of group of companies that became insolvent — Bankruptcy protection was sought — I Ltd. was administrator of two registered pension plans — Salaried plan was in process of being wound up when Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act proceedings began — Executive plan was closed but not wound up — Amended initial order was obtained, authorizing I Ltd. to borrow from debtor-in-possession ("DIP") lenders and granting them priority over all other creditors — Pension plan members brought unsuccessful motions for declaration that deemed trust equal to unfunded pension liability was enforceable against proceeds of sale of assets of I Ltd. — In allowing plan members' appeal, Court of Appeal ordered distribution from reserve fund in order to pay amount of each plan's deficiency — I Ltd., monitor, secured creditor, and trustee in bankruptcy appealed order — Appeal allowed — It could not be argued that plan members were barred from defending their interests by collateral attack doctrine — Argument that plan members should have appealed amended initial order authorizing DIP charge, and were precluded from subsequently arguing that their claim ranked in priority to that of DIP lenders, was not convincing — With respect to salaried plan, I Ltd. was deemed to hold in trust amount necessary to satisfy wind-up deficiency, but DIP charge superseded deemed trust by application of doctrine of federal paramountcy.

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Administration of estate — Sale of assets — Miscellaneous

Distribution of proceeds — I Ltd. was part of group of companies that became insolvent — Bankruptcy protection was sought — I Ltd. was administrator of two registered pension plans — Salaried plan was in process of being wound up when Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act proceedings began — Executive plan was closed but not wound up — Amended initial order was obtained, authorizing I Ltd. to borrow from debtor-in-possession ("DIP") lenders and granting them priority over all other creditors — Pension plan members brought unsuccessful motions for declaration that deemed trust equal to unfunded pension liability was enforceable against proceeds of sale of assets of I Ltd. — In allowing plan members' appeal, Court of Appeal ordered distribution from reserve fund in order to pay amount of each plan's deficiency — I Ltd., monitor, secured cred-

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itor, and trustee in bankruptcy appealed order — Appeal allowed — With respect to salaried plan, I Ltd. was deemed to hold in trust amount necessary to satisfy wind-up deficiency — Deemed trust did not apply to wind-up deficiency with respect to executive plan — As result of application of doctrine of federal paramountcy, DIP charge superseded deemed trust.

Personal property security --- Priority of security interest — Security interests versus other interests — Under provincial law — Statutory and deemed trusts

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — I Ltd. was part of group of companies that became insolvent — Bankruptcy protection was sought — I Ltd. was administrator of two registered pension plans — Salaried plan was in process of being wound up when Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act proceedings began — Executive plan was closed but not wound up — Amended initial order was obtained, authorizing I Ltd. to borrow from debtor-in-possession ("DIP") lenders and granting them priority over all other creditors — Pension plan members brought unsuccessful motions for declaration that deemed trust equal to unfunded pension liability was enforceable against proceeds of sale of assets of I Ltd. — In allowing plan members' appeal, Court of Appeal ordered distribution from reserve fund in order to pay amount of each plan's deficiency — I Ltd., monitor, secured creditor, and trustee in bankruptcy appealed order — Appeal allowed — With respect to salaried plan, I Ltd. was deemed to hold in trust amount necessary to satisfy wind-up deficiency — Deemed trust did not apply to wind-up deficiency with respect to executive plan — As result of application of doctrine of federal paramountcy, DIP charge superseded deemed trust.

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Priorities of claims — Preferred claims — Wages and salaries of employees — Creation of statutory trust

Pension plans — I Ltd. was part of group of companies that became insolvent — Bankruptcy protection was sought — I Ltd. was administrator of two registered pension plans — Salaried plan was in process of being wound up when Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act proceedings began — Executive plan was closed but not wound up — Amended initial order was obtained, authorizing I Ltd. to borrow from debtor-in-possession ("DIP") lenders and granting them priority over all other creditors — Pension plan members brought unsuccessful motions for declaration that deemed trust equal to unfunded pension liability was enforceable against proceeds of sale of assets of I Ltd. — In allowing plan members' appeal, Court of Appeal ordered distribution from reserve fund in order to pay amount of each plan's deficiency — I Ltd., monitor, secured creditor, and trustee in bankruptcy appealed order — Appeal allowed — With respect to salaried plan, I Ltd. was deemed to hold in trust amount necessary to satisfy wind-up deficiency — Deemed trust did not apply to wind-up deficiency with respect to executive plan — As result of application of doctrine of federal paramountcy, DIP charge superseded deemed trust.

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Bankruptcy and insolvency jurisdiction — Constitutional jurisdiction of Federal government and provinces — Paramountcy of Federal legislation

I Ltd. was part of group of companies that became insolvent — Bankruptcy protection was sought — I Ltd. was administrator of two registered pension plans — Salaried plan was in process of being wound up when Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("CCAA") proceedings began — Executive plan was closed but not wound up — Amended initial order was obtained, authorizing I Ltd. to borrow from debtor-in-possession ("DIP") lenders and granting them priority over all other creditors — Pension plan members brought unsuccessful motions for declaration that deemed trust equal to unfunded pension liability was enforceable against proceeds of sale of assets

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of I Ltd. — In allowing plan members' appeal, Court of Appeal ordered distribution from reserve fund in order to pay amount of each plan's deficiency — I Ltd., monitor, secured creditor, and trustee in bankruptcy appealed order — Appeal allowed — With respect to salaried plan, I Ltd. was deemed to hold in trust amount necessary to satisfy wind-up deficiency, but DIP charge superseded deemed trust by application of doctrine of federal paramountcy — Federal and provincial laws were inconsistent, as they gave rise to different, and conflicting, orders of priority — Section 30(7) of Personal Property Security Act required part of proceeds from asset sale to be paid to plan's administrator before other secured creditors were paid — However, amended initial order provided that DIP charge ranked in priority to all other security interests, trusts, liens, charges and encumbrances, statutory or otherwise — This court-ordered priority based on CCAA had same effect as statutory priority.

Estates and trusts --- Trusts — Constructive trust — Gains by fiduciaries

Breach of fiduciary duty — I Ltd. was part of group of companies that became insolvent — Bankruptcy protection was sought — I Ltd. was administrator of two registered pension plans — Salaried plan was in process of being wound up when Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act proceedings began — Executive plan was closed but not wound up — Amended initial order was obtained, authorizing I Ltd. to borrow from debtor-in-possession ("DIP") lenders and granting them priority over all other creditors — Pension plan members brought unsuccessful motions for declaration that deemed trust equal to unfunded pension liability was enforceable against proceeds of sale of assets of I Ltd. — In allowing plan members' appeal, Court of Appeal ordered distribution from reserve fund in order to pay amount of each plan's deficiency — I Ltd., monitor, secured creditor, and trustee in bankruptcy appealed order — Appeal allowed — I Ltd.'s fiduciary obligations as plan administrator conflicted with management decisions that needed to be taken in best interests of corporation — I Ltd. should have taken steps to ensure that interests of plan members were protected, but did not do so — Constructive trust remedy was not available, as required condition was not met — With respect to salaried plan, I Ltd. was deemed to hold in trust amount necessary to satisfy wind-up deficiency, but DIP charge superseded deemed trust by application of doctrine of federal paramountcy.

Constitutional law --- Distribution of legislative powers — Relation between federal and provincial powers — Paramountcy of federal legislation — Miscellaneous

I Ltd. was part of group of companies that became insolvent — Bankruptcy protection was sought — I Ltd. was administrator of two registered pension plans — Salaried plan was in process of being wound up when Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("CCAA") proceedings began — Executive plan was closed but not wound up — Amended initial order was obtained, authorizing I Ltd. to borrow from debtor-in-possession ("DIP") lenders and granting them priority over all other creditors — Pension plan members brought unsuccessful motions for declaration that deemed trust equal to unfunded pension liability was enforceable against proceeds of sale of assets of I Ltd. — In allowing plan members' appeal, Court of Appeal ordered distribution from reserve fund in order to pay amount of each plan's deficiency — I Ltd., monitor, secured creditor, and trustee in bankruptcy appealed order — Appeal allowed — With respect to salaried plan, I Ltd. was deemed to hold in trust amount necessary to satisfy wind-up deficiency, but DIP charge superseded deemed trust by application of doctrine of federal paramountcy — Federal and provincial laws were inconsistent, as they gave rise to different, and conflicting, orders of priority — Section 30(7) of Personal Property Security Act required part of proceeds from asset sale to be paid to plan's administrator before other secured creditors were paid — However, amended initial order provided that DIP charge ranked in priority to all other security interests, trusts, liens, charges and encumbrances, statutory or otherwise — This court-ordered priority based on CCAA had same effect as statutory priority.

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Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Practice and procedure in courts — Costs — Miscellaneous

I Ltd. was part of group of companies that became insolvent — Bankruptcy protection was sought — I Ltd. was administrator of two registered pension plans — Salaried plan was in process of being wound up when Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act proceedings began — Executive plan was closed but not wound up — Amended initial order was obtained, authorizing I Ltd. to borrow from debtor-in-possession lenders and granting them priority over all other creditors — Pension plan members brought unsuccessful motions for declaration that deemed trust equal to unfunded pension liability was enforceable against proceeds of sale of assets of I Ltd. — In allowing plan members' appeal, Court of Appeal ordered distribution from reserve fund in order to pay amount of each plan's deficiency — Court also issued costs endorsement that approved payment of costs of executive plan's members from that plan's fund, but declined to order payment of costs to union from fund of salaried plan — I Ltd., monitor, secured creditor, and trustee in bankruptcy appealed order, and union appealed costs endorsement — Appeal from order allowed; appeal from costs endorsement dismissed; Court of Appeal's orders with respect to costs of that appeal set aside, and all parties to bear their own costs in Court of Appeal and present appeal — There was no error in principle in Court of Appeal's refusal to order union costs to be paid out of pension fund, particularly in light of disposition of present appeal — Union's submissions as to costs were largely based on inaccurate reading of Court of Appeal's costs endorsement.

Pensions --- Practice in pension actions — Costs

I Ltd. was part of group of companies that became insolvent — Bankruptcy protection was sought — I Ltd. was administrator of two registered pension plans — Salaried plan was in process of being wound up when Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act proceedings began — Executive plan was closed but not wound up — Amended initial order was obtained, authorizing I Ltd. to borrow from debtor-in-possession lenders and granting them priority over all other creditors — Pension plan members brought unsuccessful motions for declaration that deemed trust equal to unfunded pension liability was enforceable against proceeds of sale of assets of I Ltd. — In allowing plan members' appeal, Court of Appeal ordered distribution from reserve fund in order to pay amount of each plan's deficiency — Court also issued costs endorsement that approved payment of costs of executive plan's members from that plan's fund, but declined to order payment of costs to union from fund of salaried plan — I Ltd., monitor, secured creditor, and trustee in bankruptcy appealed order, and union appealed costs endorsement — Appeal from order allowed; appeal from costs endorsement dismissed; Court of Appeal's orders with respect to costs of that appeal set aside, and all parties to bear their own costs in Court of Appeal and present appeal — There was no error in principle in Court of Appeal's refusal to order union costs to be paid out of pension fund, particularly in light of disposition of present appeal — Union's submissions as to costs were largely based on inaccurate reading of Court of Appeal's costs endorsement.

Pensions --- Payment of pension — Bankruptcy or insolvency of employer — Registered plans

Deficiency in plans' funding.

Pensions --- Administration of pension plans — Valuation and funding of plans — Deficiency

Insolvency of employer.

Civil practice and procedure --- Costs — Costs of appeals — Miscellaneous

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Faillite et insolvabilité --- Biens du failli — Biens détenus en fiducie — Divers

Régimes de retraite — I Ltd. faisait partie d'un groupe de sociétés qui est devenu insolvable — Mesures de protection offertes en matière de faillite ont été déclenchées — I Ltd. administrait deux régimes de retraite enregistrés — Régime des salariés était en cours de liquidation lorsque les procédures sous le régime de la Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies ont été engagées — Régime des cadres n'acceptait plus de participants, mais il n'était pas liquidé — Ordonnance initiale modifiée a été rendue autorisant I Ltd. à emprunter aux prêteurs au débiteur-exploitant (« DE ») et accordant à ces derniers une priorité sur tous les autres créanciers — Participants des régimes ont déposé des requêtes en vue d'obtenir un jugement déclaratoire portant que le produit de la vente des actifs de I Ltd. était grevé d'une fiducie présumée d'un montant équivalent au passif non capitalisé au titre des pensions — En accueillant l'appel interjeté par les participants, la Cour d'appel a ordonné de combler le déficit de chacun des régimes par prélèvement sur le fonds de réserve — I Ltd., le contrôleur, un créancier garanti et le syndic de faillite ont formé un pourvoi à l'encontre de l'ordonnance — Pourvoi accueilli — En ce qui concernait le régime des salariés, I Ltd. était présumée détenir en fiducie le montant nécessaire pour combler le déficit de liquidation — Fiducie présumée ne s'appliquait pas à un déficit de liquidation relativement au régime des cadres — Application de la doctrine de la prépondérance fédérale faisait en sorte que la sûreté accordée aux prêteurs DE avait priorité sur la fiducie présumée.

Faillite et insolvabilité --- Biens du failli — Fonds de pension

Fiducies — I Ltd. faisait partie d'un groupe de sociétés qui est devenu insolvable — Mesures de protection offertes en matière de faillite ont été déclenchées — I Ltd. administrait deux régimes de retraite enregistrés — Régime des salariés était en cours de liquidation lorsque les procédures sous le régime de la Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies ont été engagées — Régime des cadres n'acceptait plus de participants, mais il n'était pas liquidé — Ordonnance initiale modifiée a été rendue autorisant I Ltd. à emprunter aux prêteurs au débiteur-exploitant (« DE ») et accordant à ces derniers une priorité sur tous les autres créanciers — Participants des régimes ont déposé des requêtes en vue d'obtenir un jugement déclaratoire portant que le produit de la vente des actifs de I Ltd. était grevé d'une fiducie présumée d'un montant équivalent au passif non capitalisé au titre des pensions — En accueillant l'appel interjeté par les participants, la Cour d'appel a ordonné de combler le déficit de chacun des régimes par prélèvement sur le fonds de réserve — I Ltd., le contrôleur, un créancier garanti et le syndic de faillite ont formé un pourvoi à l'encontre de l'ordonnance — Pourvoi accueilli — En ce qui concernait le régime des salariés, I Ltd. était présumée détenir en fiducie le montant nécessaire pour combler le déficit de liquidation — Fiducie présumée ne s'appliquait pas à un déficit de liquidation relativement au régime des cadres — Application de la doctrine de la prépondérance fédérale faisait en sorte que la sûreté accordée aux prêteurs DE avait priorité sur la fiducie présumée.

Régimes de retraite --- Administration des régimes de retraite — Administrateurs, fiduciaires et dépositaires — Obligations fiduciaires — Divers

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des actifs de I Ltd. était grevé d'une fiducie présumée d'un montant équivalent au passif non capitalisé au titre des pensions — En accueillant l'appel interjeté par les participants, la Cour d'appel a ordonné de combler le déficit de chacun des régimes par prélèvement sur le fonds de réserve — I Ltd., le contrôleur, un créancier garanti et le syndic de faillite ont formé un pourvoi à l'encontre de l'ordonnance — Pourvoi accueilli — Il y avait un conflit entre les obligations fiduciaires qui incombait à I Ltd. en sa qualité d'administrateur des régimes et les décisions de gestion qu'elle devait prendre dans le meilleur intérêt de la société — I Ltd. aurait dû prendre des mesures pour assurer la protection des intérêts des participants au régime, mais ne l'a pas fait — En ce qui concernait le régime des salariés, I Ltd. était présumée détenir en fiducie le montant nécessaire pour combler le déficit de liquidation, mais en raison de la doctrine de la prépondérance fédérale, la sûreté accordée aux prêteurs DE avait priorité sur la fiducie présumée.

Régimes de retraite --- Administration des régimes de retraite — Administrateurs, fiduciaires et dépositaires — Obligations fiduciaires — Responsabilité découlant de la violation

I Ltd. faisait partie d'un groupe de sociétés qui est devenu insolvable — Mesures de protection offertes en matière de faillite ont été déclenchées — I Ltd. administrait deux régimes de retraite enregistrés — Régime des salariés était en cours de liquidation lorsque les procédures sous le régime de la Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies ont été engagées — Régime des cadres n'acceptait plus de participants, mais il n'était pas liquidé — Ordonnance initiale modifiée a été rendue autorisant I Ltd. à emprunter aux prêteurs au débiteur-exploitant (« DE ») et accordant à ces derniers une priorité sur tous les autres créanciers — Participants des régimes ont déposé des requêtes en vue d'obtenir un jugement déclaratoire portant que le produit de la vente des actifs de I Ltd. était grevé d'une fiducie présumée d'un montant équivalent au passif non capitalisé au titre des pensions — En accueillant l'appel interjeté par les participants, la Cour d'appel a ordonné de combler le déficit de chacun des régimes par prélèvement sur le fonds de réserve — I Ltd., le contrôleur, un créancier garanti et le syndic de faillite ont formé un pourvoi à l'encontre de l'ordonnance — Pourvoi accueilli — Il y avait un conflit entre les obligations fiduciaires qui incombait à I Ltd. en sa qualité d'administrateur des régimes et les décisions de gestion qu'elle devait prendre dans le meilleur intérêt de la société — I Ltd. aurait dû prendre des mesures pour assurer la protection des intérêts des participants au régime, mais ne l'a pas fait — Exigences permettant de reconnaître l'application d'une fiducie par interprétation à titre de mesure réparatrice n'étaient pas satisfaites — En ce qui concernait le régime des salariés, I Ltd. était présumée détenir en fiducie le montant nécessaire pour combler le déficit de liquidation, mais en raison de la doctrine de la prépondérance fédérale, la sûreté accordée aux prêteurs DE avait priorité sur la fiducie présumée.

Régimes de retraite --- Administration des régimes de retraite — Administrateurs, fiduciaires et dépositaires — Divers

I Ltd. faisait partie d'un groupe de sociétés qui est devenu insolvable — Mesures de protection offertes en matière de faillite ont été déclenchées — I Ltd. administrait deux régimes de retraite enregistrés — Régime des salariés était en cours de liquidation lorsque les procédures sous le régime de la Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies ont été engagées — Régime des cadres n'acceptait plus de participants, mais il n'était pas liquidé — Ordonnance initiale modifiée a été rendue autorisant I Ltd. à emprunter aux prêteurs au débiteur-exploitant (« DE ») et accordant à ces derniers une priorité sur tous les autres créanciers — Participants des régimes ont déposé des requêtes en vue d'obtenir un jugement déclaratoire portant que le produit de la vente des actifs de I Ltd. était grevé d'une fiducie présumée d'un montant équivalent au passif non capitalisé au titre des pensions — En accueillant l'appel interjeté par les participants, la Cour d'appel a ordonné de combler le déficit de chacun des régimes par prélèvement sur le fonds de réserve — I Ltd., le contrôleur, un créancier

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garanti et le syndic de faillite ont formé un pourvoi à l'encontre de l'ordonnance — Pourvoi accueilli — Il y avait un conflit entre les obligations fiduciaires qui incombait à I Ltd. en sa qualité d'administrateur des régimes et les décisions de gestion qu'elle devait prendre dans le meilleur intérêt de la société — I Ltd. aurait dû prendre des mesures pour assurer la protection des intérêts des participants au régime, mais ne l'a pas fait — En ce qui concernait le régime des salariés, I Ltd. était présumée détenir en fiducie le montant nécessaire pour combler le déficit de liquidation, mais en raison de la doctrine de la prépondérance fédérale, la sûreté accordée aux prêteurs DE avait priorité sur la fiducie présumée.

Faillite et insolvabilité --- Procédure devant les tribunaux — Appels — Divers

Règle interdisant les contestations indirectes — I Ltd. faisait partie d'un groupe de sociétés qui est devenu insolvable — Mesures de protection offertes en matière de faillite ont été déclenchées — I Ltd. administrait deux régimes de retraite enregistrés — Régime des salariés était en cours de liquidation lorsque les procédures sous le régime de la Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies ont été engagées — Régime des cadres n'acceptait plus de participants, mais il n'était pas liquidé — Ordonnance initiale modifiée a été rendue autorisant I Ltd. à emprunter aux prêteurs au débiteur-exploitant (« DE ») et accordant à ces derniers une priorité sur tous les autres créanciers — Participants des régimes ont déposé des requêtes en vue d'obtenir un jugement déclaratoire portant que le produit de la vente des actifs de I Ltd. était grevé d'une fiducie présumée d'un montant équivalent au passif non capitalisé au titre des pensions — En accueillant l'appel interjeté par les participants, la Cour d'appel a ordonné de combler le déficit de chacun des régimes par prélèvement sur le fonds de réserve — I Ltd., le contrôleur, un créancier garanti et le syndic de faillite ont formé un pourvoi à l'encontre de l'ordonnance — Pourvoi accueilli — On ne pouvait pas affirmer que les participants au régime ne pouvaient pas défendre leurs intérêts en raison de la règle interdisant les contestations indirectes — Prétention selon laquelle les participants auraient dû interjeter appel de l'ordonnance initiale modifiée autorisant la charge DE et qu'ils ne devaient pas être admis à prétendre plus tard que leur créance avait priorité sur celle des prêteurs DE n'était pas convaincante — En ce qui concernait le régime des salariés, I Ltd. était présumée détenir en fiducie le montant nécessaire pour combler le déficit de liquidation, mais en raison de la doctrine de la prépondérance fédérale, la sûreté accordée aux prêteurs DE avait priorité sur la fiducie présumée.

Faillite et insolvabilité --- Administration de l'actif — Vente des actifs — Divers

Partage du produit de la vente — I Ltd. faisait partie d'un groupe de sociétés qui est devenu insolvable — Mesures de protection offertes en matière de faillite ont été déclenchées — I Ltd. administrait deux régimes de retraite enregistrés — Régime des salariés était en cours de liquidation lorsque les procédures sous le régime de la Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies ont été engagées — Régime des cadres n'acceptait plus de participants, mais il n'était pas liquidé — Ordonnance initiale modifiée a été rendue autorisant I Ltd. à emprunter aux prêteurs au débiteur-exploitant (« DE ») et accordant à ces derniers une priorité sur tous les autres créanciers — Participants des régimes ont déposé des requêtes en vue d'obtenir un jugement déclaratoire portant que le produit de la vente des actifs de I Ltd. était grevé d'une fiducie présumée d'un montant équivalent au passif non capitalisé au titre des pensions — En accueillant l'appel interjeté par les participants, la Cour d'appel a ordonné de combler le déficit de chacun des régimes par prélèvement sur le fonds de réserve — I Ltd., le contrôleur, un créancier garanti et le syndic de faillite ont formé un pourvoi à l'encontre de l'ordonnance — Pourvoi accueilli — En ce qui concernait le régime des salariés, I Ltd. était présumée détenir en fiducie le montant nécessaire pour combler le déficit de liquidation — Fiducie présumée ne s'appliquait pas à un déficit de liquidation relativement au régime des cadres — Application de la doctrine de la prépondérance fédérale faisait en sorte que la sûreté accordée aux prêteurs DE avait priorité sur la fiducie présumée.

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Sûretés mobilières --- Ordre de priorité de la sûreté — Sûreté par rapport à d'autres intérêts — En vertu de la législation provinciale — Fiducies d'origine législative et présumées

Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies — I Ltd. faisait partie d'un groupe de sociétés qui est devenu insolvable — Mesures de protection offertes en matière de faillite ont été déclenchées — I Ltd. administrait deux régimes de retraite enregistrés — Régime des salariés était en cours de liquidation lorsque les procédures sous le régime de la Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies ont été engagées — Régime des cadres n'acceptait plus de participants, mais il n'était pas liquidé — Ordonnance initiale modifiée a été rendue autorisant I Ltd. à emprunter aux prêteurs au débiteur-exploitant (« DE ») et accordant à ces derniers une priorité sur tous les autres créanciers — Participants des régimes ont déposé des requêtes en vue d'obtenir un jugement déclaratoire portant que le produit de la vente des actifs de I Ltd. était grevé d'une fiducie présumée d'un montant équivalent au passif non capitalisé au titre des pensions — En accueillant l'appel interjeté par les participants, la Cour d'appel a ordonné de combler le déficit de chacun des régimes par prélèvement sur le fonds de réserve — I Ltd., le contrôleur, un créancier garanti et le syndic de faillite ont formé un pourvoi à l'encontre de l'ordonnance — Pourvoi accueilli — En ce qui concernait le régime des salariés, I Ltd. était présumée détenir en fiducie le montant nécessaire pour combler le déficit de liquidation — Fiducie présumée ne s'appliquait pas à un déficit de liquidation relativement au régime des cadres — Application de la doctrine de la prépondérance fédérale faisait en sorte que la sûreté accordée aux prêteurs DE avait priorité sur la fiducie présumée.

Faillite et insolvabilité --- Priorité des créances — Réclamations privilégiées — Traitements et salaires des employés — Création d'une fiducie par la loi

Régimes de retraite — I Ltd. faisait partie d'un groupe de sociétés qui est devenu insolvable — Mesures de protection offertes en matière de faillite ont été déclenchées — I Ltd. administrait deux régimes de retraite enregistrés — Régime des salariés était en cours de liquidation lorsque les procédures sous le régime de la Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies ont été engagées — Régime des cadres n'acceptait plus de participants, mais il n'était pas liquidé — Ordonnance initiale modifiée a été rendue autorisant I Ltd. à emprunter aux prêteurs au débiteur-exploitant (« DE ») et accordant à ces derniers une priorité sur tous les autres créanciers — Participants des régimes ont déposé des requêtes en vue d'obtenir un jugement déclaratoire portant que le produit de la vente des actifs de I Ltd. était grevé d'une fiducie présumée d'un montant équivalent au passif non capitalisé au titre des pensions — En accueillant l'appel interjeté par les participants, la Cour d'appel a ordonné de combler le déficit de chacun des régimes par prélèvement sur le fonds de réserve — I Ltd., le contrôleur, un créancier garanti et le syndic de faillite ont formé un pourvoi à l'encontre de l'ordonnance — Pourvoi accueilli — En ce qui concernait le régime des salariés, I Ltd. était présumée détenir en fiducie le montant nécessaire pour combler le déficit de liquidation — Fiducie présumée ne s'appliquait pas à un déficit de liquidation relativement au régime des cadres — Application de la doctrine de la prépondérance fédérale faisait en sorte que la sûreté accordée aux prêteurs DE avait priorité sur la fiducie présumée.

Faillite et insolvabilité --- Compétence en matière de faillite et d'insolvabilité — Compétence constitutionnelle du gouvernement fédéral et des provinces — Prépondérance de la compétence fédérale

I Ltd. faisait partie d'un groupe de sociétés qui est devenu insolvable — Mesures de protection offertes en matière de faillite ont été déclenchées — I Ltd. administrait deux régimes de retraite enregistrés — Régime des salariés était en cours de liquidation lorsque les procédures sous le régime de la Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers de compagnies (« LACC ») ont été engagées — Régime des cadres n'acceptait plus de participants, mais il n'était pas liquidé — Ordonnance initiale modifiée a été rendue autorisant I Ltd. à emprunter aux

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Successions et fiducies --- Fiducies — Fiducie par interprétation — Profits des fiduciaires

Manquement à l'obligation fiduciaire — I Ltd. faisait partie d'un groupe de sociétés qui est devenu insolvable — Mesures de protection offertes en matière de faillite ont été déclenchées — I Ltd. administrait deux régimes de retraite enregistrés — Régime des salariés était en cours de liquidation lorsque les procédures sous le régime de la Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers de compagnies ont été engagées — Régime des cadres n'acceptait plus de participants, mais il n'était pas liquidé — Ordonnance initiale modifiée a été rendue autorisant I Ltd. à emprunter aux prêteurs au débiteur-exploitant (« DE ») et accordant à ces derniers une priorité sur tous les autres créanciers — Participants des régimes ont déposé des requêtes en vue d'obtenir un jugement déclaratoire portant que le produit de la vente des actifs de I Ltd. était grevé d'une fiducie présumée d'un montant équivalent au passif non capitalisé au titre des pensions — En accueillant l'appel interjeté par les participants, la Cour d'appel a ordonné de combler le déficit de chacun des régimes par prélèvement sur le fonds de réserve — I Ltd., le contrôleur, un créancier garanti et le syndic de faillite ont formé un pourvoi à l'encontre de l'ordonnance — Pourvoi accueilli — Il y avait un conflit entre les obligations fiduciaires qui incombaient à I Ltd. en sa qualité d'administrateur des régimes et les décisions de gestion qu'elle devait prendre dans le meilleur intérêt de la société — I Ltd. aurait dû prendre des mesures pour assurer la protection des intérêts des participants au régime, mais ne l'a pas fait — Exigences permettant de reconnaître l'application d'une fiducie par interprétation à titre de mesure réparatrice n'étaient pas satisfaites — En ce qui concernait le régime des salariés, I Ltd. était présumée détenir en fiducie le montant nécessaire pour combler le déficit de liquidation, mais en raison de la doctrine de la prépondérance fédérale, la sûreté accordée aux prêteurs DE avait priorité sur la fiducie présumée.

Droit constitutionnel --- Partage des compétences législatives — Rapport entre les compétences fédérales et compétences provinciales — Prépondérance des lois fédérales — Divers

I Ltd. faisait partie d'un groupe de sociétés qui est devenu insolvable — Mesures de protection offertes en matière de faillite ont été déclenchées — I Ltd. administrait deux régimes de retraite enregistrés — Régime des salariés était en cours de liquidation lorsque les procédures sous le régime de la Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers de compagnies (« LACC ») ont été engagées — Régime des cadres n'acceptait plus de participants, mais il n'était pas liquidé — Ordonnance initiale modifiée a été rendue autorisant I Ltd. à emprunter aux prêteurs au débiteur-exploitant (« DE ») et accordant à ces derniers une priorité sur tous les autres créanciers —

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Participants des régimes ont déposé des requêtes en vue d'obtenir un jugement déclaratoire portant que le produit de la vente des actifs de I Ltd. était grevé d'une fiducie présumée d'un montant équivalent au passif non capitalisé au titre des pensions — En accueillant l'appel interjeté par les participants, la Cour d'appel a ordonné de combler le déficit de chacun des régimes par prélèvement sur le fonds de réserve — I Ltd., le contrôleur, un créancier garanti et le syndic de faillite ont formé un pourvoi à l'encontre de l'ordonnance — Pourvoi accueilli — En ce qui concernait le régime des salariés, I Ltd. était présumée détenir en fiducie le montant nécessaire pour combler le déficit de liquidation, mais en raison de la doctrine de la prépondérance fédérale, la sûreté accordée aux prêteurs DE avait priorité sur la fiducie présumée — Dispositions fédérales et provinciales étaient inconciliables, car elles produisaient des ordres de priorité différents et conflictuels — Article 30(7) de la Loi sur les sûretés mobilières exigeait qu'une partie du produit de la vente soit versée à l'administrateur du régime de retraite par priorité sur les paiements aux autres créanciers garantis — Or, l'ordonnance initiale amendée prévoyait que la sûreté accordée aux prêteurs DE prenait rang devant toutes les autres sûretés, y compris les fiducies, privilèges, charges et grèvements, d'origine législative ou autre — Cette priorité d'origine judiciaire fondée sur la LACC avait le même effet qu'une priorité d'origine législative.

Faillite et insolvabilité --- Procédure devant les tribunaux — Frais — Divers

I Ltd. faisait partie d'un groupe de sociétés qui est devenu insolvable — Mesures de protection offertes en matière de faillite ont été déclenchées — I Ltd. administrait deux régimes de retraite enregistrés — Régime des salariés était en cours de liquidation lorsque les procédures sous le régime de la Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers de compagnies ont été engagées — Régime des cadres n'acceptait plus de participants, mais il n'était pas liquidé — Ordonnance initiale modifiée a été rendue autorisant I Ltd. à emprunter aux prêteurs au débiteur-exploitant et accordant à ces derniers une priorité sur tous les autres créanciers — Participants des régimes ont déposé des requêtes en vue d'obtenir un jugement déclaratoire portant que le produit de la vente des actifs de I Ltd. était grevé d'une fiducie présumée d'un montant équivalent au passif non capitalisé au titre des pensions — En accueillant l'appel interjeté par les participants, la Cour d'appel a ordonné de combler le déficit de chacun des régimes par prélèvement sur le fonds de réserve — Cour a également rendu une décision concernant les frais qui approuvait le paiement des dépens des participants au régime des cadres sur leur caisse de retraite, mais a refusé d'ordonner que les dépens du syndicat soient acquittés sur la caisse de retraite du régime des salariés — I Ltd., le contrôleur, un créancier garanti et le syndic de faillite ont formé un pourvoi à l'encontre de l'ordonnance, et le syndicat a interjeté appel à l'encontre de la décision concernant les frais — Pourvoi à l'encontre de l'ordonnance accueilli; pourvoi à l'encontre de l'adjudication des dépens rejeté; ordonnances de la Cour d'appel relatives aux dépens afférents aux appels interjetés devant elle annulées, et il a été ordonné que chacune des parties paie ses propres dépens devant la Cour d'appel et devant la Cour suprême du Canada — Décision de la Cour d'appel de refuser d'ordonner que les frais du syndicat soient acquittés sur la caisse de retraite n'était entachée d'aucune erreur de principe, surtout considérant l'issue du présent pourvoi — Prétentions du syndicat relativement aux frais reposaient en grande partie sur une interprétation erronée de la décision de la Cour d'appel concernant les frais.

Régimes de retraite --- Procédure dans le cadre d'actions concernant des régimes de retraite — Frais

I Ltd. faisait partie d'un groupe de sociétés qui est devenu insolvable — Mesures de protection offertes en matière de faillite ont été déclenchées — I Ltd. administrait deux régimes de retraite enregistrés — Régime des salariés était en cours de liquidation lorsque les procédures sous le régime de la Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers de compagnies (« LACC ») ont été engagées — Régime des cadres n'acceptait plus de participants, mais il n'était pas liquidé — Ordonnance initiale modifiée a été rendue autorisant I Ltd. à emprunter aux

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prêteurs au débiteur-exploitant et accordant à ces derniers une priorité sur tous les autres créanciers — Participants des régimes ont déposé des requêtes en vue d'obtenir un jugement déclaratoire portant que le produit de la vente des actifs de I Ltd. était grevé d'une fiducie présumée d'un montant équivalent au passif non capitalisé au titre des pensions — En accueillant l'appel interjeté par les participants, la Cour d'appel a ordonné de combler le déficit de chacun des régimes par prélèvement sur le fonds de réserve — Cour a également rendu une décision concernant les frais qui approuvait le paiement des dépens des participants au régime des cadres sur leur caisse de retraite mais a refusé d'ordonner que les dépens du syndicat soient acquittés sur la caisse de retraite du régime des salariés — I Ltd., le contrôleur, un créancier garanti et le syndic de faillite ont formé un pourvoi à l'encontre de l'ordonnance, et le syndicat a interjeté appel à l'encontre de la décision concernant les frais — Pourvoi à l'encontre de l'ordonnance accueilli; pourvoi à l'encontre de l'adjudication des dépens rejeté; ordonnances de la Cour d'appel relatives aux dépens afférents aux appels interjetés devant elle annulées, et il a été ordonné que chacune des parties paie ses propres dépens devant la Cour d'appel et devant la Cour suprême du Canada — Décision de la Cour d'appel de refuser d'ordonner que les frais du syndicat soient acquittés sur la caisse de retraite n'était entachée d'aucune erreur de principe, surtout considérant l'issue du présent pourvoi — Prétentions du syndicat relativement aux frais reposaient en grande partie sur une interprétation erronée de la décision de la Cour d'appel concernant les frais.

Régimes de retraite --- Paiement de la rente — Faillite ou insolvabilité de l'employeur — Régimes enregistrés

Déficit dans le financement des régimes.

Régimes de retraite --- Administration des régimes de retraite — Évaluation et financement des régimes — Déficit

Insolvabilité de l'employeur.

Procédure civile --- Frais — Frais d'appel — Divers

I Ltd. was a Canadian subsidiary of I Corp. U.S. The I Ltd. group became insolvent. I Corp. U.S. sought bankruptcy protection. I Ltd. obtained a stay under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("CCAA"). I Ltd. was the administrator of two registered pension plans. The salaried plan was in the process of being wound up when the CCAA proceedings began. The executive plan was closed but not wound up. Protection under the CCAA was obtained, and both plans faced funding deficiencies. An amended initial order was obtained, authorizing I Ltd. to borrow from debtor-in-possession ("DIP") lenders and granting them priority over all other creditors. I Ltd. sold its assets. Plan members brought motions for a declaration that a deemed trust equal in amount to the unfunded pension liability was enforceable against the proceeds of sale.

In dismissing the motions, the court found that the deemed trust did not apply to the wind-up deficiencies, because the associated payments were not "due" or "accruing due" as of the date of the wind-up. The court found that the executive plan did not have a wind-up deficiency, since it had not yet been wound up. The plan members appealed successfully. The Court of Appeal found that the deemed trust created by s. 57(4) of the Pension Benefits Act ("PBA") applied to all amounts due with respect to plan wind-up deficiencies. The Court of Appeal found that executive plan members had a claim arising from I Ltd.'s breach of fiduciary obligations in failing to adequately protect plan members' interests. The Court of Appeal found that imposing a constructive trust over the reserved fund in favour of plan members was an appropriate remedy. The Court of Appeal found that the deemed trust had priority over the DIP charge because the issue of federal paramountcy had not been raised when the amended initial order was issued, and that I Ltd. had stated that it intended to comply with any deemed

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trust requirements. The Court of appeal ordered the court-appointed monitor to make a distribution from the reserve fund in order to pay the amount of each plan's deficiency. It also issued a costs endorsement that approved payment of the costs of the executive plan's members from that plan's fund, but declined to order the payment of costs to the union from the fund of the salaried plan. I Ltd., the monitor, a secured creditor, and I Corp. U.S.'s trustee in bankruptcy appealed the main order, and the union appealed the costs endorsement.

Held: The appeal of the main order was allowed, and the union's appeal of the costs endorsement was dismissed. The Court of Appeal's orders with respect to the costs of appeal before that court were set aside, and it was ordered that all parties bear their own costs in the Court of Appeal and in the Supreme Court of Canada.

Per Deschamps J. (Moldaver J. concurring): The Court of Appeal correctly held with respect to the salaried plan, which had been wound up, that I Ltd. was deemed to hold in trust the amount necessary to satisfy the wind-up deficiency. The relevant provisions, legislative history and purpose were all consistent with inclusion of the wind-up deficiency in the protection afforded to members with respect to employer contributions upon the wind up of their pension plan. The deemed trust did not apply to the employer's wind-up deficiency with respect to the executive plan. Unlike s. 57(3) of the PBA, which provides that the deemed trust protecting employer contributions exists while a plan is ongoing, s. 57(4) provides that the wind-up deemed trust comes into existence only when the plan is wound up.

As a result of the application of the doctrine of federal paramountcy, the DIP charge superseded the deemed trust. Subject to the application of the rules on the admissibility of new evidence, the doctrine of paramountcy could be raised even if it was not invoked in an initial proceeding. The federal and provincial laws in this case were inconsistent, as they gave rise to different, and conflicting, orders of priority. Section 30(7) of the (provincial) Personal Property Security Act required a part of the proceeds from the sale to be paid to the plan's administrator before other secured creditors were paid. However, the amended initial order provided that the DIP charge ranked in priority to all other security interests, trusts, liens, charges and encumbrances, statutory or otherwise. This court-ordered priority based on the (federal) CCAA had the same effect as a statutory priority.

I Ltd.'s fiduciary obligations as plan administrator conflicted with management decisions that needed to be taken in the best interests of the corporation. The fact that I Ltd., as plan administrator, might have to claim accrued contributions from itself meant that it would have to simultaneously adopt conflicting positions on whether contributions had accrued as of the date of liquidation and whether a deemed trust had arisen in respect of wind-up deficiencies. This was indicative of a clear conflict between I Ltd.'s interests and those of the plan members. I Ltd. should have taken steps to ensure that the interests of the plan members were protected, but did not do so. On the contrary, it contested the position that the plan members advanced.

It could not be argued that the plan members were barred from defending their interests by the collateral attack doctrine. The argument that the plan members should have appealed the amended initial order authorizing the DIP charge, and were precluded from subsequently arguing that their claim ranked in priority to that of the DIP lenders, was not convincing. Among other things, the plan members did not receive notice of the motion to approve the DIP financing.

Even though I Ltd. breached its fiduciary duty to notify the plan members of the motion that resulted in the amended initial order, their claim remained subordinate to that of I Corp. U.S. (subrogated, as I Corp. U.S. was, to the DIP lenders' priority). In terms of an equitable remedy, there was no evidence that the lenders committed a wrong or that they engaged in inequitable conduct. The constructive trust remedy was not available, because

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proprietary remedies are generally awarded only with respect to property that is directly related to a wrong or that can be traced to such property. There was agreement with Cromwell J. that this condition was not met. It was unreasonable for the Court of Appeal to re-order the priorities in this case. It was difficult to see what gains the plan members would have secured had they received notice of the motion that resulted in the amended initial order. The plan members were allowed to fully argue their case.

There was agreement with Cromwell J. on the appeal from the costs endorsement.

Per Cromwell J. (concurring in the result) (McLachlin C.J.C., Rothstein J. concurring): The deemed trust did not apply to the disputed funds. The Court of Appeal erred in finding that the s. 57(4) (PBA) deemed trust applied to the wind-up deficiency. There could be no deemed trust for the executive plan, because the plan had not been wound up at the relevant date. At issue was the salaried plan. The most plausible grammatical and ordinary sense of the words "accrued to the date of the wind-up" was that the amounts referred to were precisely ascertained immediately before the effective date of the plan's wind-up. The wind-up deficiency only arose upon wind-up and it was neither ascertained nor ascertainable on the date fixed for wind-up. The broader statutory context reinforced this view: the language of the deemed trusts in s. 57(3) and (4) was virtually exactly repeated in s. 75(1)(a), suggesting that both deemed trusts referred to the liability on wind-up referred to in s. 75(1)(a) and not to the further and distinct wind-up deficiency liability created under s. 75(1)(b). The legislative evolution and history of these provisions showed that the legislature never intended to include the wind-up deficiency in a statutory deemed trust. There was disagreement with Deschamps J.'s position that the wind-up deficiency could be said to have accrued to the date of wind-up.

The corporation failed in its duty to the plan beneficiaries as their administrator, and the beneficiaries ought to have been afforded more procedural protections in the CCAA proceedings. The Court of Appeal took too expansive a view of the fiduciary duties owed by I Ltd. as plan administrator. The only breach of fiduciary duty occurred when, upon insolvency, I Ltd.'s corporate interests were in obvious conflict with its fiduciary duty as plan administrator to ensure that all contributions were made to the plans when due. The breach was not in failing to avoid this conflict — the conflict itself was unavoidable. The breach was in failing to address the conflict to ensure that the plan beneficiaries had the opportunity to have representation in the CCAA proceedings as if there were independent plan administrators.

The Court of Appeal erred in using the equitable remedy of constructive trust to defeat the super priority ordered by the CCAA judge. The Court of Appeal erred in principle in finding that the asset in this case resulted from the breach of fiduciary duty such that it would be unjust for the party in breach to retain it. I Ltd.'s failure to meaningfully address conflicts of interest that arose during the CCAA proceedings did not result in any such asset. Imposing a constructive trust was wholly disproportionate to I Ltd.'s breach of fiduciary duty.

Although there was disagreement with Deschamps J. with respect to the scope of the s. 57(4) deemed trust, there was agreement that if there was a deemed trust in this case, it would have been superseded by the DIP loan because of the operation of the doctrine of federal paramountcy.

The union's submissions as to costs were largely based on an inaccurate reading of the Court of Appeal's costs endorsement. The Court of Appeal did not require the consent of plan beneficiaries as a prerequisite to ordering payment of costs from the fund. It was not correct to suggest that the costs endorsement would restrict recovery of beneficiary costs to instances when there is a surplus in the pension trust fund or preclude financing of beneficiary action when a fund was in deficit. The costs endorsement did not lay down a rule that a union representing

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pension beneficiaries cannot recover costs from the fund because the union itself is not a beneficiary. The litigation raised novel points of law with all of the uncertainty and risk inherent in such an undertaking. The failure of that litigation left no basis to impose the costs consequences of taking the risk on all of the plan members of an already underfunded plan. The union's apparent premise that if the executive plan members had their costs paid out of the fund, so too should the salaried plan members, was not an accurate statement of the order made with respect to the executive plan. The Court of Appeal did not apply what the union referred to as the "costs payment test" to the executive plan because the costs order was the product of an agreement and did not order payment of costs out of the fund as a whole. In the case of the union request, there was no such agreement and no such limitation of risk to the supporters of the litigation. There was no error in principle in the Court of Appeal's refusal to order the union costs to be paid out of the pension fund, particularly in light of the disposition of the present appeal.

Per LeBel J. (dissenting) (Abella J. concurring): There was agreement that no deemed trust could arise under s. 57(4) of the PBA in the case of the executive plan because that plan had not been wound up when the CCAA proceedings were initiated. In the case of the salaried plan, there was agreement with Deschamps J. that a deemed trust arose in respect of the wind-up deficiency, but also that the DIP super-priority prevailed because of the federal paramountcy doctrine.

However, the remedy of a constructive trust was available and it was appropriate to impose it in the circumstances of this case. A view different from that of the majority in the present decision was taken with regard to the nature and extent of the fiduciary duties of an employer who elects to act as administrator of a pension plan governed by the PBA. This dual status did not entitle the employer to greater leniency in the determination and exercise of its fiduciary duties or excuse wrongful actions. I Ltd. not only neglected its obligations towards the beneficiaries, but took a course of action that was actively inimical to their interests. The seriousness of these breaches amply justified the decision of the Court of Appeal to impose a constructive trust. The conditions that generally justify the imposition of a constructive trust were met. The imposition of the trust did not disregard the different corporate personalities of I Ltd. and I Corp. U.S. It properly acknowledged the close relationship between the two companies, the second in effect controlling the first. This relationship needed to be taken into consideration.

I Ltd. était une filiale canadienne de la société I É.-U. Le groupe I Ltd. est devenu insolvable. I É.-U. s'est placée sous la protection des règles applicables en matière de faillite. I Ltd. a obtenu une ordonnance de suspension sous le régime de la Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies (« LACC »). I Ltd. administrait deux régimes de retraite enregistrés. Le régime des salariés était en cours de liquidation lorsque les procédures sous le régime de la LACC ont été engagées. Le régime des cadres n'acceptait plus de participants, mais il n'était pas liquidé. La protection du régime de la LACC a été accordée, et les deux régimes de retraite accusaient un déficit de capitalisation. Une ordonnance initiale modifiée a été rendue autorisant I Ltd. à emprunter aux prêteurs au débiteur-exploitant (« DE ») et accordant à ces derniers une priorité sur tous les autres créanciers. I Ltd. a vendu tous ses actifs. Les participants des régimes ont déposé des requêtes en vue d'obtenir un jugement déclaratoire portant que le produit de la vente était grevé d'une fiducie présumée d'un montant équivalent au passif non capitalisé au titre des pensions.

En rejetant les requêtes, le tribunal a conclu que la fiducie présumée ne s'appliquait pas aux déficits de liquidation parce que les paiements afférents n'étaient pas [TRANSLATION] « échus » ou « à échoir » à la date de la liquidation. Le tribunal a conclu que l'on ne pouvait pas parler de déficit de liquidation relativement au régime des cadres puisqu'il n'était pas encore liquidé. Les participants des régimes ont interjeté appel avec succès. La Cour

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d'appel a conclu que la fiducie présumée créée à l'art. 57(4) de la Loi sur les régimes de retraite (« LRR ») s'appliquait à toutes les sommes dues au titre des déficits de liquidation des régimes. La Cour d'appel a conclu que les participants au régime des cadres pouvaient faire valoir une réclamation contre I Ltd. pour manquement à son obligation fiduciaire de protéger adéquatement leurs intérêts. La Cour d'appel a jugé que d'imposer une fiducie par interprétation grevant le fonds de réserve au profit des participants était une réparation appropriée. La Cour d'appel a conclu que la fiducie présumée avait priorité sur la charge DE parce que la question de la prépondérance fédérale n'avait pas été invoquée lorsque l'ordonnance initiale modifiée a été rendue et qu'I Ltd. avait déclaré qu'elle allait se conformer à toutes les exigences d'une fiducie présumée. La Cour d'appel a ordonné au contrôleur désigné par le tribunal de combler le déficit de chacun des régimes par prélèvement sur le fonds de réserve. Dans sa décision relative à l'adjudication des dépens, elle a également approuvé le paiement des dépens des participants au régime des cadres sur leur caisse de retraite, mais elle a refusé d'ordonner que les dépens du syndicat soient acquittés sur la caisse de retraite du régime des salariés. I Ltd., le contrôleur, un créancier garanti et le syndic de faillite d'I É.-U. ont formé un pourvoi à l'encontre de l'ordonnance principale et le syndicat a formé un pourvoi à l'encontre de l'adjudication des dépens.

Arrêt: Le pourvoi à l'encontre de l'ordonnance principale a été accueillie et le pourvoi du syndicat à l'encontre de l'adjudication des dépens a été rejeté. Les ordonnances de la Cour d'appel relatives aux dépens afférents aux appels interjetés devant elle ont été annulées et il a été ordonné que chacune des parties paie ses propres dépens devant la Cour d'appel et devant la Cour suprême du Canada.

Deschamps, J. (Moldaver, J., souscrivant à son opinion) : C'était à bon droit que la Cour d'appel a jugé qu'I Ltd. était présumée détenir en fiducie le montant nécessaire pour combler le déficit de liquidation du régime des salariés, dont la liquidation avait pris effet. Le texte, l'historique législatif et l'objet des dispositions pertinentes concordaient tous avec l'inclusion du déficit de liquidation dans la protection offerte aux participants à l'égard des cotisations de l'employeur à la liquidation des régimes. La fiducie présumée ne s'appliquait pas au déficit de liquidation de l'employeur relativement au régime des cadres. Contrairement à l'art. 57(3) de la LRR, selon lequel la fiducie présumée protégeant les cotisations de l'employeur existe pendant que le régime est en vigueur, l'art. 57(4) prévoit que la fiducie présumée en cas de liquidation ne prend naissance qu'à la liquidation du régime.

L'application de la doctrine de la prépondérance fédérale donnait à la charge DE priorité sur la fiducie présumée. Sous réserve de l'application des règles régissant l'admissibilité de nouveaux éléments de preuve, la doctrine de la prépondérance fédérale pouvait être soulevée même si elle n'avait pas été invoquée dans une procédure initiale. En l'espèce, les dispositions fédérales et provinciales étaient inconciliables, car elles produisaient des ordres de priorité différents et conflictuels. L'article 30(7) de la Loi sur les sûretés mobilières (provinciale) exigeait qu'une partie du produit de la vente soit versée à l'administrateur du régime de retraite par priorité sur les paiements aux autres créanciers garantis. Toutefois, l'ordonnance initiale modifiée accordait à la charge DE priorité sur toutes les autres sûretés, y compris les fiducies, privilèges, charges et grèvements, d'origine législative ou autre. Cette priorité d'origine judiciaire fondée sur la LACC (fédérale) avait le même effet qu'une priorité d'origine législative.

Il y avait un conflit entre les obligations fiduciaires qui incombaient à I Ltd. en sa qualité d'administrateur des régimes et les décisions de gestion qu'elle devait prendre dans le meilleur intérêt de la société. Le fait qu'I Ltd. pouvait, en sa qualité d'administrateur des régimes de retraite, avoir à se réclamer à elle-même les cotisations accumulées l'amènerait à devoir adopter simultanément des positions opposées quant à savoir si des cotisations s'étaient accumulées à la date de la liquidation et si les déficits de capitalisation étaient protégés par une fiducie

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présumée. Cet exemple démontrait qu'il existait manifestement un conflit entre les intérêts d'I Ltd. et ceux des participants au régime. I Ltd. aurait dû prendre des mesures pour assurer la protection des intérêts des participants au régime, mais ne l'a pas fait. Elle a, au contraire, contesté la position défendue par les participants au régime.

La règle interdisant les contestations indirectes ne pouvait donc être invoquée pour empêcher les participants de défendre leurs intérêts. La prétention selon laquelle les participants auraient dû interjeter appel de l'ordonnance initiale modifiée autorisant la charge DE et qu'ils ne devaient pas être admis à prétendre plus tard que leur créance avait priorité sur celle des prêteurs DE n'était pas convaincante. Entre autres choses, les participants n'ont pas reçu avis de la requête demandant au tribunal d'autoriser le financement DE.

Bien qu'I Ltd. ait manqué à son obligation fiduciaire d'informer les participants de la requête en modification de l'ordonnance initiale, leur créance demeurait subordonnée à celle d'I É.-U. (I É.-U. étant subrogée aux prêteurs DE en conséquence de la priorité). À propos d'une réparation en equity, la preuve ne révélait aucune inconduite ni injustice de la part des prêteurs. La fiducie par interprétation n'était pas une réparation que l'on pouvait imposer, car la réparation de la nature d'un droit de propriété n'était généralement accordée qu'à l'égard d'un bien ayant un lien direct avec un acte fautif ou d'un bien qui pouvait être rattaché à un tel bien. On partageait l'avis du juge Cromwell que cette condition n'était pas remplie. Il était déraisonnable pour la Cour d'appel de modifier l'ordre de priorité en l'espèce. Il était difficile de voir comment les participants auraient pu améliorer leur position même s'ils avaient reçu avis de la requête en modification de l'ordonnance initiale. Les participants ont pu faire valoir pleinement leur position.

On convenait avec le juge Cromwell au sujet de l'adjudication des dépens.

Cromwell, J. (souscrivant au résultat des juges majoritaires) (McLachlin, J.C.C., Rothstein, J., souscrivant à son opinion) : La fiducie présumée ne visait pas les fonds en cause. La Cour d'appel a commis une erreur en concluant que la fiducie présumée prévue à l'art. 57(4) de la LRR s'appliquait au déficit de liquidation. Il ne pouvait y avoir de fiducie présumée au bénéfice du régime des cadres, car celui-ci n'avait pas encore été liquidé à la date considérée. Le litige ne portait que sur le régime des salariés. Suivant son sens ordinaire et grammatical le plus plausible, l'expression « accumulées à la date de la liquidation » renvoyait aux sommes déterminées de façon précise immédiatement avant la date de prise d'effet de la liquidation du régime. Le déficit de liquidation n'était constaté qu'à l'issue de la liquidation, et il n'était ni déterminé ni déterminable à la date de liquidation prévue. Le contexte législatif général confortait ce point de vue. Le texte de l'art. 57(3) et (4) qui dispose qu'il y a fiducie présumée est repris presque en tous points à l'art. 75(1)a), ce qui permettait de conclure que, dans les deux cas de fiducie présumée, le législateur renvoyait à l'obligation qui existait à la liquidation suivant l'art. 75(1)a) et non à celle, supplémentaire et distincte, qui était liée au déficit de liquidation et qui découlait de l'art. 75(1)b). L'évolution et l'historique de ces dispositions laissaient croire que le législateur n'a jamais voulu que le déficit de liquidation fasse l'objet d'une fiducie présumée d'origine législative. On ne partageait pas l'opinion de la juge Deschamps selon laquelle on pouvait considérer que le déficit de liquidation était accumulé à la date de la liquidation.

La société a manqué à ses obligations d'administrateur des régimes, et les bénéficiaires auraient dû obtenir de meilleures garanties procédurales dans le cadre de la procédure fondée sur la LACC. La Cour d'appel a conféré une portée excessive aux obligations fiduciaires d'I Ltd. en tant qu'administrateur des régimes. I Ltd. a seulement manqué à son obligation fiduciaire lorsque, une fois devenue insolvable, ses intérêts sont clairement entrés en conflit avec son obligation fiduciaire d'administrateur d'assurer le versement aux régimes de toutes les cotisa-

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tions devenues exigibles. Son manquement résidait dans l'omission non pas d'éviter ce conflit, qui était en soi inévitable, mais de pallier le problème en veillant à ce que les bénéficiaires des régimes puissent être représentés dans le cadre de la procédure fondée sur la LACC comme si l'administrateur des régimes avait été indépendant.

La Cour d'appel a eu tort de recourir à la fiducie par interprétation, une réparation en equity, pour écarter la superpriorité accordée par le tribunal saisi sur le fondement de la LACC. La Cour d'appel a commis une erreur de principe lorsqu'elle a conclu que l'actif convoité résultait du manquement à l'obligation fiduciaire, de sorte qu'il serait injuste que la partie fautive se l'approprie. L'omission d'I Ltd. de véritablement pallier les conflits d'intérêts auxquels donnait lieu la procédure fondée sur la LACC n'a pas donné lieu à un tel actif. L'imposition d'une fiducie par interprétation était clairement une mesure disproportionnée par rapport au manquement d'I Ltd. à son obligation fiduciaire.

Bien que l'on ne partageait pas l'opinion de la juge Deschamps concernant la portée de la fiducie présumée prévue à l'art. 57(4), on s'accordait avec elle pour affirmer que si l'on devait conclure à l'existence d'une fiducie présumée dans le présent dossier, elle devait prendre rang avant la créance DE en application de la doctrine de la prépondérance fédérale.

Les prétentions du syndicat au sujet des frais reposaient en grande partie sur une interprétation erronée de la décision de la Cour d'appel à cet égard. La Cour d'appel ne considérait pas que le consentement des bénéficiaires du régime était une condition préalable au paiement des dépens à partir de la caisse de retraite. Il était erroné de laisser entendre que la décision relative aux dépens faisait en sorte que les bénéficiaires ne pouvaient être indemnisés des dépens que lorsqu'il existait un surplus dans la caisse de retraite en fiducie ou qu'ils ne pouvaient financer l'exercice d'un recours lorsque la caisse était déficitaire. La décision de la Cour d'appel relativement aux frais n'établissait pas la règle qu'un syndicat représentant les bénéficiaires d'une caisse de retraite ne pouvait être indemnisé de ses dépens par la caisse de retraite parce qu'il n'était pas lui-même bénéficiaire. Comme l'instance engagée en l'espèce portait sur des points de droit nouveaux, il était entendu que son issue était incertaine. L'échec du recours ne saurait justifier que tous les participants d'un régime déjà sous-capitalisé subissent les conséquences pécuniaires du risque couru. L'argument du syndicat reposait apparemment sur la prémisse que les participants du régime des salariés devraient obtenir paiement de leurs dépens à partir de leur caisse de retraite puisque c'est ce à quoi les participants au régime des cadres avaient droit. Or, telle n'était pas la teneur exacte de l'ordonnance de la Cour d'appel relative au régime des cadres. La Cour d'appel n'appliquait pas au régime des cadres le critère qui, selon le syndicat, vaudrait pour le paiement des dépens, car l'ordonnance relative aux dépens découlait d'un accord et elle ne prévoyait pas le paiement des dépens par prélèvement sur la caisse de retraite dans sa globalité. S'agissant de la demande du syndicat, nul accord n'était intervenu au même effet, et ce n'était pas seulement les participants derrière le recours qui s'exposaient au risque lié à l'issue de celui-ci. Il n'y avait aucune erreur de principe dans le refus de la Cour d'appel d'ordonner que les dépens du syndicat soient payés à partir de la caisse de retraite, étant donné surtout l'issue du présent appel.

LeBel, J. (dissident) (Abella, J., souscrivant à son opinion) : On s'accordait à dire que le régime des cadres ne pouvait être protégé par aucune fiducie présumée résultant de l'application de l'art. 57(4) de la LRR, puisque ce régime n'avait pas été liquidé lorsque la procédure fondée sur la LACC a été enclenchée. On partageait l'opinion de la juge Deschamps, laquelle reconnaissait l'existence d'une fiducie présumée dans le cas du déficit de liquidation du régime des salariés mais aussi que la créance des prêteurs DE avait priorité sur toutes les autres créances, par application du principe de la prépondérance fédérale.

Toutefois, la fiducie par interprétation pouvait s'appliquer aux présentes circonstances et devrait être imposée en

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l'espèce. On a adopté un point de vue différent de celui des juges majoritaires en ce qui a trait à la nature et la portée des obligations fiduciaires d'un employeur qui choisit d'administrer un régime de retraite régi par la LRR. Sa double fonction n'autorisait pas l'employeur à faire preuve de laxisme dans la définition et l'exercice de ses obligations fiduciaires, ni ne justifiait ses actes répréhensibles. I Ltd. a non seulement manqué à ses obligations envers les bénéficiaires, mais a adopté en fait une démarche qui allait à l'encontre de leurs intérêts. La gravité de ces manquements justifiait amplement la décision de la Cour d'appel d'imposer une fiducie par interprétation. Les conditions qui justifient généralement l'imposition d'une fiducie par interprétation étaient satisfaites. En imposant la fiducie, la Cour n'a pas négligé le fait qu'I Ltd. et I É.-U. constituaient des personnes morales distinctes. Elle a tenu compte à juste titre de leurs rapports étroits, la seconde contrôlant dans les faits la première. Il fallait prendre ces rapports en compte.

Cases considered by Deschamps J.:

Burke v. Hudson's Bay Co. (2010), 406 N.R. 109, 324 D.L.R. (4th) 498, 2010 SCC 34, 2010 CarswellOnt 7450, 2010 CarswellOnt 7451, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 273, 84 C.C.P.B. 1, 60 E.T.R. (3d) 1, 2010 C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8408, D.T.E. 2010T-674, 268 O.A.C. 1 (S.C.C.) — considered

Canada (Attorney General) v. Law Society (British Columbia) (1982), [1982] 2 S.C.R. 307, 37 B.C.L.R. 145, [1982] 5 W.W.R. 289, 19 B.L.R. 234, 43 N.R. 451, 137 D.L.R. (3d) 1, 66 C.P.R. (2d) 1, 1982 CarswellBC 133, 1982 CarswellBC 743 (S.C.C.) — followed

Canada Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Canadian Commercial Bank (1992), 5 Alta. L.R. (3d) 193, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 558, 16 C.B.R. (3d) 154, 7 B.L.R. (2d) 113, (sub nom. *Canada Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Canadian Commercial Bank (No. 3)*) 131 A.R. 321, (sub nom. *Canada Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Canadian Commercial Bank (No. 3)*) 25 W.A.C. 321, 1992 CarswellAlta 790, 97 D.L.R. (4th) 385, (sub nom. *Canada Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Canadian Commercial Bank (No. 3)*) 143 N.R. 321, 1992 CarswellAlta 298 (S.C.C.) — referred to

Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Ontario (Minister of Revenue) (1998), (sub nom. *Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. M.N.R.*) 41 O.R. (3d) 606, 99 D.T.C. 5286, [2000] 2 C.T.C. 331, 1998 CarswellOnt 3537, 114 O.A.C. 217 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta (2007), [2007] I.L.R. I-4622, 281 D.L.R. (4th) 125, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3, 409 A.R. 207, 402 W.A.C. 207, 49 C.C.L.I. (4th) 1, 2007 SCC 22, 2007 CarswellAlta 702, 2007 CarswellAlta 703, 362 N.R. 111, 75 Alta. L.R. (4th) 1, [2007] 8 W.W.R. 1 (S.C.C.) — followed

Crystalline Investments Ltd. v. Domgroup Ltd. (2004), 2004 SCC 3, 2004 CarswellOnt 219, 2004 CarswellOnt 220, 184 O.A.C. 33, 16 R.P.R. (4th) 1, 43 B.L.R. (3d) 1, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 60, 70 O.R. (3d) 254 (note), 46 C.B.R. (4th) 35, 234 D.L.R. (4th) 513, 316 N.R. 1 (S.C.C.) — referred to

Husky Oil Operations Ltd. v. Minister of National Revenue (1995), 1995 CarswellSask 739, 1995 CarswellSask 740, 188 N.R. 1, 24 C.L.R. (2d) 131, 35 C.B.R. (3d) 1, 128 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 137 Sask. R. 81, 107 W.A.C. 81, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 453, [1995] 10 W.W.R. 161 (S.C.C.) — considered

Indalex Ltd., Re (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 1998, 52 C.B.R. (5th) 61 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Indalex Ltd., Re (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 4263 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to

2013 CarswellOnt 733, 2013 SCC 6, D.T.E. 2013T-97, J.E. 2013-185, 96 C.B.R. (5th) 171, 354 D.L.R. (4th) 581, 223 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1049, 2 C.C.P.B. (2nd) 1, [2013] W.D.F.L. 1591, [2013] W.D.F.L. 1592, 20 P.P.S.A.C. (3d) 1, 439 N.R. 235, 301 O.A.C. 1, 8 B.L.R. (5th) 1

Ontario Hydro-Electric Power Commission v. Albright (1922), 1922 CarswellOnt 134, 64 S.C.R. 306, [1923] 2 D.L.R. 578 (S.C.C.) — followed

Ted Leroy Trucking Ltd., Re (2010), (sub nom. *Century Services Inc. v. Canada (A.G.)*) [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379, [2010] G.S.T.C. 186, 12 B.C.L.R. (5th) 1, (sub nom. *Century Services Inc. v. A.G. of Canada*) 2011 G.T.C. 2006 (Eng.), (sub nom. *Century Services Inc. v. A.G. of Canada*) 2011 D.T.C. 5006 (Eng.), (sub nom. *Leroy (Ted) Trucking Ltd., Re*) 503 W.A.C. 1, (sub nom. *Leroy (Ted) Trucking Ltd., Re*) 296 B.C.A.C. 1, 2010 SCC 60, 2010 CarswellBC 3419, 2010 CarswellBC 3420, 409 N.R. 201, (sub nom. *Ted LeRoy Trucking Ltd., Re*) 326 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 72 C.B.R. (5th) 170, [2011] 2 W.W.R. 383 (S.C.C.) — considered

Cases considered by *Cromwell J.*:

AbitibiBowater Inc., Re (2009), 2009 QCCS 6459, 2009 CarswellQue 14194 (Que. S.C.) — considered

Algoma Steel Inc., Re (2001), 25 C.B.R. (4th) 194, 147 O.A.C. 291, 2001 CarswellOnt 1742 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

B. (K.L.) v. British Columbia (2003), 2003 CarswellBC 2405, 2003 CarswellBC 2406, 2003 SCC 51, 309 N.R. 306, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 403, 18 B.C.L.R. (4th) 1, 44 R.F.L. (5th) 245, 187 B.C.A.C. 42, 307 W.A.C. 42, 38 C.P.C. (5th) 199, [2003] R.R.A. 1065, 230 D.L.R. (4th) 513, [2003] 11 W.W.R. 203, 19 C.C.L.T. (3d) 66, 2004 C.L.L.C. 210-014 (S.C.C.) — referred to

BCE Inc., Re (2008), (sub nom. *Aegon Capital Management Inc. v. BCE Inc.*) 383 N.R. 119, 71 C.P.R. (4th) 303, 52 B.L.R. (4th) 1, (sub nom. *Aegon Capital Management Inc. v. BCE Inc.*) 301 D.L.R. (4th) 80, 2008 SCC 69, (sub nom. *BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders*) [2008] 3 S.C.R. 560, 2008 CarswellQue 12595, 2008 CarswellQue 12596 (S.C.C.) — considered

Bell ExpressVu Ltd. Partnership v. Rex (2002), 212 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 287 N.R. 248, [2002] 5 W.W.R. 1, 166 B.C.A.C. 1, 271 W.A.C. 1, 18 C.P.R. (4th) 289, 100 B.C.L.R. (3d) 1, 2002 SCC 42, 2002 CarswellBC 851, 2002 CarswellBC 852, 93 C.R.R. (2d) 189, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559 (S.C.C.) — followed

Burke v. Hudson's Bay Co. (2008), 2008 C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8294, 40 E.T.R. (3d) 157, 236 O.A.C. 140, 67 C.C.P.B. 1, 2008 CarswellOnt 2801, 2008 ONCA 394 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

Burke v. Hudson's Bay Co. (2010), 406 N.R. 109, 324 D.L.R. (4th) 498, 2010 SCC 34, 2010 CarswellOnt 7450, 2010 CarswellOnt 7451, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 273, 84 C.C.P.B. 1, 60 E.T.R. (3d) 1, 2010 C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8408, D.T.E. 2010T-674, 268 O.A.C. 1 (S.C.C.) — considered

Canada (Attorney General) v. Mowat (2011), 93 C.C.E.L. (3d) 1, D.T.E. 2011T-708, 337 D.L.R. (4th) 385, 26 Admin. L.R. (5th) 1, 2011 CarswellNat 4190, 2011 CarswellNat 4191, 2011 SCC 53, 422 N.R. 248, (sub nom. *C.H.R.C. v. Canada (A.G.)*) 2011 C.L.L.C. 230-043, (sub nom. *Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v. Canada (Attorney General)*) [2011] 3 S.C.R. 471 (S.C.C.) — considered

Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Ontario (Minister of Revenue) (1998), (sub nom. *Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. M.N.R.*) 41 O.R. (3d) 606, 99 D.T.C. 5286, [2000] 2 C.T.C. 331, 1998 CarswellOnt 3537, 114 O.A.C. 217 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

Donkin v. Bugoy (1985), 1985 CarswellSask 869, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 85, [1985] 6 W.W.R. 97, 21 D.L.R. (4th)

2013 CarswellOnt 733, 2013 SCC 6, D.T.E. 2013T-97, J.E. 2013-185, 96 C.B.R. (5th) 171, 354 D.L.R. (4th) 581, 223 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1049, 2 C.C.P.B. (2nd) 1, [2013] W.D.F.L. 1591, [2013] W.D.F.L. 1592, 20 P.P.S.A.C. (3d) 1, 439 N.R. 235, 301 O.A.C. 1, 8 B.L.R. (5th) 1

327, 61 N.R. 172, 44 Sask. R. 178, 20 E.T.R. 225, 47 R.F.L. (2d) 113, 1985 CarswellSask 213 (S.C.C.) — considered

Elder Advocates of Alberta Society v. Alberta (2011), [2011] 6 W.W.R. 191, 81 C.C.L.T. (3d) 1, 416 N.R. 198, 331 D.L.R. (4th) 257, 499 A.R. 345, 514 W.A.C. 345, (sub nom. *Alberta v. Elder Advocates of Alberta Society*) [2011] 2 S.C.R. 261, 2011 CarswellAlta 763, 2011 CarswellAlta 764, 2011 SCC 24, 2 C.P.C. (7th) 1, 41 Alta. L.R. (5th) 1 (S.C.C.) — considered

First Leaside Wealth Management Inc., Re (2012), 2012 CarswellOnt 2559, 2012 ONSC 1299 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Hamilton v. Open Window Bakery Ltd. (2003), 2004 SCC 9, 316 N.R. 265, 235 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 2003 CarswellOnt 5591, 2003 CarswellOnt 5592, 2004 C.L.L.C. 210-025, 184 O.A.C. 209, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 303, 70 O.R. (3d) 255 (note), 40 B.L.R. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.) — followed

Indalex Ltd., Re (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 1998, 52 C.B.R. (5th) 61 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Indalex Ltd., Re (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 4263 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to

Indalex Ltd., Re (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 4262, 79 C.C.P.B. 101 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

International Corona Resources Ltd. v. LAC Minerals Ltd. (1989), 44 B.L.R. 1, 35 E.T.R. 1, (sub nom. *LAC Minerals Ltd. v. International Corona Resources Ltd.*) 69 O.R. (2d) 287, (sub nom. *LAC Minerals Ltd. v. International Corona Resources Ltd.*) 61 D.L.R. (4th) 14, 101 N.R. 239, 36 O.A.C. 57, (sub nom. *LAC Minerals Ltd. v. International Corona Resources Ltd.*) [1989] 2 S.C.R. 574, 6 R.P.R. (2d) 1, (sub nom. *LAC Minerals Ltd. v. International Corona Resources Ltd.*) 26 C.P.R. (3d) 97, 1989 CarswellOnt 126, 1989 CarswellOnt 965 (S.C.C.) — followed

Kerry (Canada) Inc. v. Ontario (Superintendent of Financial Services) (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 4494, 2009 CarswellOnt 4495, 2009 SCC 39, (sub nom. *Nolan v. Ontario (Superintendent of Financial Services)*) 253 O.A.C. 256, 49 E.T.R. (3d) 159, 76 C.C.E.L. (3d) 55, 76 C.C.P.B. 1, (sub nom. *Kerry (Canada) Inc. v. DCA Employees Pension Committee*) 102 O.R. (3d) 319, (sub nom. *Nolan v. Kerry (Canada) Inc.*) [2009] 2 S.C.R. 678, (sub nom. *Nolan v. Ontario (Superintendent of Financial Services)*) 391 N.R. 234, 92 Admin. L.R. (4th) 203, (sub nom. *DCA Employees Pension Committee v. Ontario (Superintendent of Financial Services)*) 309 D.L.R. (4th) 513 (S.C.C.) — followed

Marine Drive Properties Ltd., Re (2009), 2009 BCSC 145, 2009 CarswellBC 285, 52 C.B.R. (5th) 47 (B.C. S.C.) — considered

Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Ontario (Superintendent of Financial Services) (2004), 45 B.L.R. (3d) 161, 41 C.C.P.B. 106, 2004 C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8112, 242 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 324 N.R. 259, 189 O.A.C. 201, 17 Admin. L.R. (4th) 1, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 152, 75 O.R. (3d) 479 (note), 2004 CarswellOnt 3172, 2004 CarswellOnt 3173, 2004 SCC 54 (S.C.C.) — considered

Nortel Networks Corp., Re (2009), 53 C.B.R. (5th) 196, 75 C.C.P.B. 206, 2009 CarswellOnt 3028 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

2013 CarswellOnt 733, 2013 SCC 6, D.T.E. 2013T-97, J.E. 2013-185, 96 C.B.R. (5th) 171, 354 D.L.R. (4th) 581, 223 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1049, 2 C.C.P.B. (2nd) 1, [2013] W.D.F.L. 1591, [2013] W.D.F.L. 1592, 20 P.P.S.A.C. (3d) 1, 439 N.R. 235, 301 O.A.C. 1, 8 B.L.R. (5th) 1

Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of) (1990), 1990 CarswellOnt 139, 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101, (sub nom. *Elan Corp. v. Comiskey*) 1 O.R. (3d) 289, (sub nom. *Elan Corp. v. Comiskey*) 41 O.A.C. 282 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

Ontario Hydro-Electric Power Commission v. Albright (1922), 1922 CarswellOnt 134, 64 S.C.R. 306, [1923] 2 D.L.R. 578 (S.C.C.) — considered

Perez v. Galambos (2009), 97 B.C.L.R. (4th) 1, [2009] 12 W.W.R. 193, (sub nom. *Galambos v. Perez*) [2009] 3 S.C.R. 247, 394 N.R. 209, 70 C.C.L.T. (3d) 167, 312 D.L.R. (4th) 220, 276 B.C.A.C. 272, 468 W.A.C. 272, 2009 CarswellBC 2787, 2009 CarswellBC 2788, 2009 SCC 48 (S.C.C.) — referred to

Peter v. Beblow (1993), [1993] 3 W.W.R. 337, 23 B.C.A.C. 81, 39 W.A.C. 81, 101 D.L.R. (4th) 621, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 980, 150 N.R. 1, 48 E.T.R. 1, 77 B.C.L.R. (2d) 1, 44 R.F.L. (3d) 329, [1993] R.D.F. 369, 1993 CarswellBC 44, 1993 CarswellBC 1258 (S.C.C.) — followed

R. v. Neil (2002), 317 A.R. 73, 284 W.A.C. 73, 168 C.C.C. (3d) 321, 6 Alta. L.R. (4th) 1, 6 C.R. (6th) 1, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 631, 2002 CarswellAlta 1301, 2002 CarswellAlta 1302, 2002 SCC 70, (sub nom. *Neil v. R.*) 218 D.L.R. (4th) 671, [2003] 2 W.W.R. 591, 294 N.R. 201 (S.C.C.) — followed

Royal Oak Mines Inc., Re (1999), 1999 CarswellOnt 625, 6 C.B.R. (4th) 314, 96 O.T.C. 272 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Ryan v. Moore (2005), 254 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 334 N.R. 355, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 53, 2005 SCC 38, 2005 CarswellNfld 157, 2005 CarswellNfld 158, 247 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 286, 735 A.P.R. 286, 25 C.C.L.I. (4th) 1, 32 C.C.L.T. (3d) 1, [2005] R.R.A. 694, 18 E.T.R. (3d) 163 (S.C.C.) — considered

Sharbern Holding Inc. v. Vancouver Airport Centre Ltd. (2011), 5 R.P.R. (5th) 1, 331 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 416 N.R. 1, 18 B.C.L.R. (5th) 1, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 175, 306 B.C.A.C. 1, 316 W.A.C. 1, 2011 SCC 23, 2011 CarswellBC 1102, 2011 CarswellBC 1103, [2011] 7 W.W.R. 1, 81 B.L.R. (4th) 1, 82 C.C.L.T. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.) — referred to

Soulos v. Korkontzilas (1997), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 217, 212 N.R. 1, 1997 CarswellOnt 1490, 1997 CarswellOnt 1489, 9 R.P.R. (3d) 1, 46 C.B.R. (3d) 1, 17 E.T.R. (2d) 89, 32 O.R. (3d) 716 (headnote only), 146 D.L.R. (4th) 214, 100 O.A.C. 241 (S.C.C.) — considered

Ted Leroy Trucking Ltd., Re (2010), (sub nom. *Century Services Inc. v. Canada (A.G.)*) [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379, [2010] G.S.T.C. 186, 12 B.C.L.R. (5th) 1, (sub nom. *Century Services Inc. v. A.G. of Canada*) 2011 G.T.C. 2006 (Eng.), (sub nom. *Century Services Inc. v. A.G. of Canada*) 2011 D.T.C. 5006 (Eng.), (sub nom. *Leroy (Ted) Trucking Ltd., Re*) 503 W.A.C. 1, (sub nom. *Leroy (Ted) Trucking Ltd., Re*) 296 B.C.A.C. 1, 2010 SCC 60, 2010 CarswellBC 3419, 2010 CarswellBC 3420, 409 N.R. 201, (sub nom. *Ted LeRoy Trucking Ltd., Re*) 326 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 72 C.B.R. (5th) 170, [2011] 2 W.W.R. 383 (S.C.C.) — considered

Timminco Ltd., Re (2012), 2012 ONSC 506, 95 C.C.P.B. 48, 2012 CarswellOnt 1263, 85 C.B.R. (5th) 169 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

3464920 Canada Inc. v. Strother (2007), (sub nom. *Strother v. 3464920 Canada Inc.*) 2007 D.T.C. 5273 (Eng.), (sub nom. *Strother v. 3464920 Canada Inc.*) 2007 D.T.C. 5301 (Fr.), 363 N.R. 123, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 177, [2007] 7 W.W.R. 381, [2007] 4 C.T.C. 172, 29 B.L.R. (4th) 175, 399 W.A.C. 108, 241 B.C.A.C. 108,

2013 CarswellOnt 733, 2013 SCC 6, D.T.E. 2013T-97, J.E. 2013-185, 96 C.B.R. (5th) 171, 354 D.L.R. (4th) 581, 223 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1049, 2 C.C.P.B. (2nd) 1, [2013] W.D.F.L. 1591, [2013] W.D.F.L. 1592, 20 P.P.S.A.C. (3d) 1, 439 N.R. 235, 301 O.A.C. 1, 8 B.L.R. (5th) 1

281 D.L.R. (4th) 640, 2007 SCC 24, 2007 CarswellBC 1201, 2007 CarswellBC 1202, 67 B.C.L.R. (4th) 1, 48 C.C.L.T. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.) — followed

Cases considered by *LeBel J.* (dissenting):

Canson Enterprises Ltd. v. Boughton & Co. (1991), [1992] 1 W.W.R. 245, 9 C.C.L.T. (2d) 1, 39 C.P.R. (3d) 449, 131 N.R. 321, 85 D.L.R. (4th) 129, 61 B.C.L.R. (2d) 1, 6 B.C.A.C. 1, 13 W.A.C. 1, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 534, 43 E.T.R. 201, 1991 CarswellBC 269, 1991 CarswellBC 925 (S.C.C.) — considered in a minority or dissenting opinion

Elder Advocates of Alberta Society v. Alberta (2011), [2011] 6 W.W.R. 191, 81 C.C.L.T. (3d) 1, 416 N.R. 198, 331 D.L.R. (4th) 257, 499 A.R. 345, 514 W.A.C. 345, (sub nom. *Alberta v. Elder Advocates of Alberta Society*) [2011] 2 S.C.R. 261, 2011 CarswellAlta 763, 2011 CarswellAlta 764, 2011 SCC 24, 2 C.P.C. (7th) 1, 41 Alta. L.R. (5th) 1 (S.C.C.) — considered in a minority or dissenting opinion

Perez v. Galambos (2009), 97 B.C.L.R. (4th) 1, [2009] 12 W.W.R. 193, (sub nom. *Galambos v. Perez*) [2009] 3 S.C.R. 247, 394 N.R. 209, 70 C.C.L.T. (3d) 167, 312 D.L.R. (4th) 220, 276 B.C.A.C. 272, 468 W.A.C. 272, 2009 CarswellBC 2787, 2009 CarswellBC 2788, 2009 SCC 48 (S.C.C.) — considered in a minority or dissenting opinion

Royal Oak Mines Inc., Re (1999), 1999 CarswellOnt 792, 7 C.B.R. (4th) 293 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to in a minority or dissenting opinion

Soulos v. Korkontzilas (1997), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 217, 212 N.R. 1, 1997 CarswellOnt 1490, 1997 CarswellOnt 1489, 9 R.P.R. (3d) 1, 46 C.B.R. (3d) 1, 17 E.T.R. (2d) 89, 32 O.R. (3d) 716 (headnote only), 146 D.L.R. (4th) 214, 100 O.A.C. 241 (S.C.C.) — considered in a minority or dissenting opinion

Statutes considered by *Deschamps J.*:

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3

Generally — referred to

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, the Wage Earner Protection Program Act and chapter 47 of the Statutes of Canada, 2005, Act to amend the, S.C. 2007, c. 36

Generally — referred to

Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.

Chapter 7 — referred to

Chapter 11 — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

s. 2(1) "secured creditor" — considered

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Pension Benefits Act, 1965, S.O. 1965, c. 96

s. 22(2) — considered

s. 23a [en. 1973, c. 113, s. 6] — considered

Pension Benefits Act, 1987, S.O. 1987, c. 35

Generally — referred to

Pension Benefits Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 373

s. 23(4)(a) [en. 1983, c. 2, s. 3] — considered

s. 23(4)(b) [en. 1983, c. 2, s. 3] — considered

Pension Benefits Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.8

Generally — referred to

s. 1(1) "administrator" — considered

s. 8(1)(a) — considered

s. 22(4) — considered

s. 56(1) — considered

s. 56(2) — considered

s. 57(3) — considered

s. 57(4) — considered

s. 59 — considered

s. 69(1) — considered

s. 69(1)(d) — considered

s. 75(1)(a) — considered

s. 75(1)(b) — considered

s. 75(1)(b)(i) — considered

s. 75(1)(b)(ii) — considered

s. 75(1)(b)(iii) — considered

Pension Benefits Amendment Act, 1980, S.O. 1980, c. 80

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Generally — referred to

Personal Property Security Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.10

s. 30(7) — considered

Statutes considered by *Cromwell J.*:

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3

Generally — referred to

Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.

Chapter 11 — referred to

Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44

s. 122(1)(a) — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

s. 11(1) — considered

Pension Benefits Act, 1965, S.O. 1965, c. 96

s. 23a(1) [en. 1973, c. 113, s. 6] — considered

s. 23a(3) [en. 1973, c. 113, s. 6] — considered

Pension Benefits Act, 1987, S.O. 1987, c. 35

Generally — referred to

s. 23(4)(a) — considered

s. 23(4)(b) — considered

Pension Benefits Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 373

Generally — referred to

s. 21(2) — considered

s. 21(2)(a) — considered

s. 23(3) — considered

s. 23(4) [en. 1983, c. 2, s. 3] — considered

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s. 23(4)(a)(i) [en. 1983, c. 2, s. 3] — considered

s. 23(4)(a)(ii) [en. 1983, c. 2, s. 3] — considered

s. 23(4)(b) [en. 1983, c. 2, s. 3] — considered

s. 23(5) [en. 1983, c. 2, s. 3] — considered

s. 32 — considered

s. 32(2) — considered

Pension Benefits Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.8

Generally — referred to

s. 1(1) "wind up" — considered

s. 8(1)(a) — considered

s. 9 — referred to

s. 10(1) ¶ 12 — referred to

s. 12 — referred to

s. 19 — referred to

s. 20 — referred to

s. 22(1) — considered

s. 22(2) — considered

s. 22(4) — considered

s. 25 — referred to

s. 26 — referred to

s. 42 — referred to

s. 56 — considered

s. 57 — considered

s. 57(3) — considered

s. 57(4) — considered

s. 58(1) — considered

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s. 58(3) — considered

s. 58(4) — considered

s. 59 — referred to

s. 68(2)(c) — considered

s. 70 — referred to

s. 70(1) — considered

s. 70(6) — considered

s. 73 — referred to

s. 74 — considered

s. 75 — considered

s. 75(1) — considered

s. 75(1)(a) — considered

s. 75(1)(b) — considered

Pension Benefits Amendment Act, S.O. 1973, c. 113

Generally — referred to

Pension Benefits Amendment Act, 1980, S.O. 1980, c. 80

Generally — referred to

Pension Benefits Amendment Act, 1983, S.O. 1983, c. 2

Generally — referred to

Statutes considered by *LeBel J.* (dissenting):

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

s. 9 — considered

Pension Benefits Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.8

Generally — referred to

s. 22(4) — considered

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s. 57(4) — considered

Regulations considered by *Deschamps J.*:

Pension Benefits Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.8

General, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 909

s. 31 — considered

Regulations considered by *Cromwell J.*:

Pension Benefits Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.8

General, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 909

s. 4(4) ¶ 3 — considered

s. 5(1)(b) — considered

s. 5(1)(e) — considered

s. 29 — referred to

s. 31 — considered

s. 31(2) — considered

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amount of money equal to employer contributions accrued to the date of the wind up but not yet due un-

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der the plan or regulations

[Per Deschamps J. (Moldaver J. concurring):] Since both the amount with respect to payments (s. 75(1)(a)) [*Pension Benefits Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.8] and the one ascertained by subtracting the assets from the liabilities accrued as of the date of the wind up (s. 75(1)(b)) are to be paid upon wind up as employer contributions, they are both included in the ordinary meaning of the words of s. 57(4) of the *PBA*: "amount of money equal to employer contributions accrued to the date of the wind up but not yet due under the plan or regulations". . . .

.....

[A] contribution has "accrued" when the liabilities are completely constituted, even if the payment itself will not fall due until a later date. If this principle is applied to the facts of this case, the liabilities related to contributions to the fund allocated for payment of the pension benefits contemplated in s. 75(1)(b) are completely constituted at the time of the wind up, because no pension entitlements arise after that date. In other words, no new liabilities accrue at the time of or after the wind up. Even the portion of the contributions that is related to the elections plan members may make upon wind up has "accrued to the date of the wind up", because it is based on rights employees earned before the wind-up date.

The fact that the precise amount of the contribution is not determined as of the time of the wind up does not make it a contingent contribution that cannot have accrued for accounting purposes (*Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Ontario (Minister of Revenue)* (1998), 41 O.R. (3d) 606 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 621). The use of the word "accrued" does not limit liabilities to amounts that can be determined with precision. As a result, the words "contributions accrued" can encompass the contributions mandated by s. 75(1)(b) of the *PBA*.

accrued to the date of the wind up

[Per Cromwell J. (concurring in the result) (McLachlin C.J.C. and Rothstein J. concurring):] [T]he most plausible grammatical and ordinary sense of the words "accrued to the date of the wind up" is that the amounts referred to are precisely ascertained immediately before the effective date of the plan's wind-up. The wind-up deficiency only arises upon wind-up and it is neither ascertained nor ascertainable on the date fixed for wind-up. . . . the broader statutory context reinforces this view: the language of the deemed trusts in s. 57(3) and (4) [*Pension Benefits Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.8] is virtually exactly repeated in s. 75(1)(a), suggesting that both deemed trusts refer to the liability on wind-up referred to in s. 75(1)(a) and not to the further and distinct wind-up deficiency liability created under s. 75(1)(b). . . . the legislative evolution and history of these provisions show, in my view, that the legislature never intended to include the wind-up deficiency in a statutory deemed trust.

.....

In my view, the most plausible grammatical and ordinary sense of the phrase "accrued to the date of the wind up" in s. 57(4) is that it refers to the sums that are ascertained immediately before the effective wind-up date of the plan.

In the context of s. 57(4), the grammatical and ordinary sense of the term "accrued" is that the amount of the obligation is "fully constituted" and "ascertained" although it may not yet be payable. The amount of the wind-up deficiency is not fully constituted or ascertained (or even ascertainable) before or even on the date fixed for wind up and therefore cannot fall under s. 57(4).

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Of course, the meaning of the word "accrued" may vary with context. In general, when the term "accrued" is used in relation to legal rights, its common meaning is that the right has become fully constituted even though the monetary implications of its enforcement are not yet known or knowable. Thus, we speak of the "accrual" of a cause of action in tort when all of the elements of the cause of action come into existence, even though the extent of the damage may well not be known or knowable at that time: see, e.g., *Ryan v. Moore*, 2005 SCC 38, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 53 (S.C.C.). However, when the term is used in relation to a sum of money, it will generally refer to an amount that is at the present time either quantified or exactly quantifiable but which may or may not be due.

.....

In other contexts, an amount which has accrued may not yet be due. For example, we speak of "accrued interest" meaning a precise, quantified amount of interest that has been earned but may not yet be payable. The term "accrual" is used in the same way in "accrual accounting". In accrual method accounting, "transactions that give rise to revenue or costs are recognized in the accounts when they are earned and incurred respectively": B. J. Arnold, *Timing and Income Taxation: The Principles of Income Measurement for Tax Purposes* (1983), at p. 44. Revenue is earned when the recipient "substantially completes performance of everything he or she is required to do as long as the amount due is ascertainable and there is no uncertainty about its collection": P. W. Hogg, J. E. Magee and J. Li, *Principles of Canadian Income Tax Law* (7th ed., 2010), at s. 6.5(b); see also Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants, *CICA Handbook — Accounting*, Part II, s. 1000, at paras. 41-44. In this context, the amount must be ascertained at the time of accrual.

.....

I turn next to the ordinary and grammatical sense of the words "to the date of the wind up" in s. 57(4). In my view, these words indicate that only those contributions that accrue before the date of wind up, and not those amounts the liability for which arises only on the day of wind up — that is, the wind-up deficiency — are included.

Where the legislature intends to include the date of wind up, it has used suitable language to effect that purpose. For example, the English version of a provision amending the *PBA* in 2010 (c. 24, s. 21(2)), s. 68(2)(c), indicates which trade unions are entitled to notice of the wind up:

(2) If the employer or the administrator, as the case may be, intends to wind up the pension plan, the administrator shall give written notice of the intended wind up to,

.....

(c) each trade union that represents members of the pension plan or that, on the date of the wind up, represented the members, former members or retired members of the pension plan;

In contrast to the phrase "to the date of wind up", "on the date of wind up" clearly includes the date of wind up. (The French version does not indicate a different intention.) Similarly, s. 70(6), which formed part of the *PBA* until 2012 (rep. S.O. 2010, c. 9, s. 52(5)), read as follows:

(6) On the partial wind up of a pension plan, members, former members and other persons entitled to benefits under the pension plan shall have rights and benefits that are not less than the rights and benefits they would

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have on a full wind up of the pension plan on the effective date of the partial wind up.

The words "on the effective date of the partial wind up" indicate that the members are entitled to those benefits from the date of the partial wind up, in the sense that members can claim their benefits beginning on the date of the wind up itself. This is how the legislature expresses itself when it wants to speak of a period of time including a specific date. By comparison, "to the date of the wind up" is devoid of language that would include the actual date of wind up.

To sum up with respect to the ordinary and grammatical meaning of the phrase "accrued to the date of the wind up", the most plausible ordinary and grammatical meaning is that such amounts are fully constituted and precisely ascertained immediately before the date fixed as the date of wind up. Thus, according to the ordinary and grammatical meaning of the words, the wind-up deficiency obligation set out in s. 75(1)(b) has not "accrued to the date of the wind up" as required by s. 57(4). Moreover, the liability for the wind-up deficiency arises where a pension plan is wound up (s. 75(1)(b)) and so it cannot be a liability that "accrued to the date of the wind up" (s. 57(4)).

fiduciary relationship

[Per LeBel J. (dissenting) (Abella J. concurring):] A fiduciary relationship is a relationship, grounded in fact and law, between a vulnerable beneficiary and a fiduciary who holds and may exercise power over the beneficiary in situations recognized by law.

Termes et locutions cités:

montant égal aux cotisations de l'employeur qui sont accumulées à la date de la liquidation, mais qui ne sont pas encore dues aux termes du régime ou des règlements

[Deschamps, J. (Moldaver, J., souscrivant à son opinion):] Puisque le montant des paiements (al. 75(1)a) [*Loi sur les régimes de retraite*, L.R.O. 1990, ch. P.8] et le montant établi en soustrayant l'actif du passif accumulé à la date de la liquidation (al. 75(1)b)) doivent tous les deux être versés à la liquidation à titre de cotisations de l'employeur, ils entrent tous les deux dans le sens ordinaire des mots employés au par. 57(4) de la *LRR*: **montant égal aux cotisations de l'employeur qui sont accumulées à la date de la liquidation, mais qui ne sont pas encore dues aux termes du régime ou des règlements** ». . . .

.....

[U]ne cotisation est « accumulée » lorsque le passif est entièrement constitué, même si le paiement lui-même ne devient exigible que plus tard. Cela signifie en l'espèce que le passif au titre des cotisations à la caisse destinée au paiement des prestations de retraite visées à l'al. 75(1)b) est entièrement constitué lorsque la liquidation a lieu, parce qu'aucun droit au titre de la pension ne prend naissance après cette date. Autrement dit, aucun passif ne s'accumule pendant ni après la liquidation. Même la portion des cotisations afférente aux options que les participants peuvent exercer lorsqu'il y a liquidation est « accumulé[e] à la date de la liquidation » parce qu'elle est fondée sur des droits que les employés ont acquis avant la date de la liquidation.

Le fait que le montant précis des cotisations n'est pas établi au moment de la liquidation ne confère pas aux cotisations un caractère éventuel qui ferait en sorte qu'elles ne seraient pas accumulées d'un point de vue comptable (*Canadian Pacific Ltd. c. M.N.R.* (1998), 41 O.R. (3d) 606 (C.A.), p. 621). L'emploi du mot « accumulé » ne

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limite pas le passif aux seuls montants qui peuvent être établis avec précision. On peut donc considérer que le passif « accumulé » englobe les cotisations exigées au par. 75(1)b) de la *LRR*.

accumulées à la date de la liquidation

[Cromwell, J. (souscrivant au résultat des juges majoritaires) (McLachlin, J.C.C., Rothstein, J., souscrivant à son opinion):] [S]uivant son sens ordinaire et grammatical le plus plausible, l'expression « accumulées à la date de la liquidation » renvoie aux sommes déterminées de façon précise immédiatement avant la date de prise d'effet de la liquidation du régime. Le déficit de liquidation n'est constaté qu'à l'issue de la liquidation, et il n'est ni déterminé ni déterminable à la date de liquidation prévue. . . . [L]e contexte législatif général me conforte dans ce point de vue. Le texte des par. 57(3) et (4) [*Loi sur les régimes de retraite*, L.R.O. 1990, ch. P.8] qui dispose qu'il y a fiducie réputée est repris presque en tous points à l'al. 75(1)a), ce qui permet de conclure que, dans les deux cas de fiducie réputée, le législateur renvoie à l'obligation qui existe à la liquidation suivant l'al. 75(1)a) et non à celle, supplémentaire et distincte, qui est liée au déficit de liquidation et qui découle de l'al. 75(1)b). . . . [I]l appert à mon sens de l'évolution et de l'historique de ces dispositions que le législateur n'a jamais voulu que le déficit de liquidation fasse l'objet d'une fiducie réputée d'origine législative.

.....

À mon avis, suivant son sens ordinaire et grammatical le plus plausible, l'expression « accumulées à la date de la liquidation » employée au par. 57(4) renvoie aux sommes déterminées immédiatement avant la date de prise d'effet de la liquidation du régime.

Dans le contexte du par. 57(4), le sens ordinaire et grammatical d'« accumulées » veut que l'obligation soit « entièrement constituée » et que son montant soit « déterminé », même si elle peut ne pas être encore payable. Le déficit de liquidation n'est pas entièrement constitué ni son montant déterminé (ou déterminable) avant la date prévue pour la liquidation, ou le jour même, et ne peut donc pas être visé au par. 57(4).

Certes, le sens du terme « accumulées » [et plus encore celui de son équivalent anglais « accrued »] peut varier selon le contexte. En général, lorsque ce terme est employé de pair avec des droits légaux, son sens courant veut que le droit soit entièrement constitué, même si les répercussions financières de son exécution ne sont pas encore connues et ne peuvent l'être. Ainsi, en responsabilité délictuelle, on parle d'accumulation (au sens d'acquisition ou de naissance) de la cause d'action lorsque tous ses éléments sont réunis, même lorsque l'étendue du préjudice n'est pas encore connue ou ne peut l'être (voir, p. ex., *Ryan c. Moore*, 2005 CSC 38, [2005] 2 R.C.S. 53 (S.C.C.)). Toutefois, lorsque le terme qualifie une somme, il renvoie généralement à un élément dont la valeur est actuellement mesurée ou mesurable, mais qui peut ou non être dû.

.....

Dans d'autres cas, la somme qui s'est accumulée [en anglais, « accrued »] peut ne pas être encore exigible. Par exemple, on parle d'« intérêts accumulés » [« accrued interests »] au sens du montant précis des intérêts qui sont courus, mais qui ne sont pas encore exigibles. En anglais, accrual est utilisé dans le même sens dans l'expression « accrual accounting » (en français, comptabilité d'exercice). Suivant cette méthode, les [traduction] « opérations qui génèrent des revenus ou occasionnent des dépenses sont comptabilisées lorsque les revenus sont gagnés ou que les dépenses sont engagées » (B. J. Arnold, *Timing and Income Taxation: The Principles of Income Measurement for Tax Purposes* (1983), à la p. 44). Le revenu est gagné lorsque le bénéficiaire [traduction] « a essentiellement accompli tout ce qu'il devait accomplir, à condition que la somme due puisse être déterminée »

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et que sa perception ne fasse l'objet d'aucune incertitude » (P. W. Hogg, J. E. Magee et J. Li, *Principles of Canadian Income Tax Law* (7e éd. 2010), à l'al. 6.5b); voir également le Manuel de l'Institut canadien des comptables agréés, *Manuel de l'ICCA - Comptabilité*, partie II, ch. 1000, aux par. 41 à 44). La somme en cause doit alors être déterminée au moment où le droit de la toucher est acquis [« accrued »].

.....

J'examine maintenant le sens ordinaire et grammatical des mots « à la date de la liquidation » (en anglais, « to the date of the wind up ») employés au par. 57(4). À mon avis, cette expression fait en sorte que seules sont visées les cotisations accumulées avant la date de la liquidation, et non les sommes qui font l'objet d'une obligation qui ne prend naissance que le jour de la liquidation (en anglais, « on the date of the wind up ») et qui correspondent au déficit de liquidation.

Si l'intention du législateur avait été d'englober la date de la liquidation, il aurait employé le libellé voulu. Par exemple, l'al. 68(2)c) de la *LRR*, modifié en 2010 (ch. 24, par. 21(2)), précise dans sa version anglaise quels syndicats doivent recevoir avis de la liquidation:

(2) If the employer or the administrator, as the case may be, intends to wind up the pension plan, the administrator shall give written notice of the intended wind up to,

.....

(c) each trade union that represents members of the pension plan or that, on the date of the wind up [à la date de la liquidation], represented the members, former members or retired members of the pension plan;

Contrairement à la formule « to the date of wind up », l'expression « on the date of wind up » englobe clairement la date de la liquidation. (La version française ne se prête pas à une autre interprétation.) De même, le par. 70(6), qui figurait dans la *LRR* jusqu'en 2012 (abr. L.O. 2010, ch. 9, par. 52(5)), énonce ce qui suit:

(6) À la liquidation partielle d'un régime de retraite, les participants, les anciens participants et les autres personnes qui ont droit à des prestations en vertu du régime de retraite ont des droits et prestations qui ne sont pas inférieurs aux droits et prestations qu'ils auraient à la liquidation totale du régime de retraite à la date de prise d'effet de la liquidation partielle [on the effective date of the partial wind up].

Il appert de l'expression anglaise « on the effective date of the partial wind up » que les participants ont droit aux prestations à compter de la date de la liquidation partielle, c'est-à-dire qu'ils peuvent les réclamer à compter de la liquidation elle-même. Le législateur s'exprime ainsi lorsqu'il veut qu'une période englobe une date précise. À l'opposé, lorsqu'il dit en anglais « to the date of the wind up » (en français, à la date de la liquidation), il n'entend pas englober la date où survient la liquidation.

Bref, le sens ordinaire et grammatical le plus plausible d'« accumulées à la date [to the date] de la liquidation » veut que soient visées les sommes entièrement constituées et déterminées immédiatement avant la date prévue de liquidation. Ainsi, l'obligation liée au déficit de liquidation visé à l'al. 75(1)b) n'est donc pas « accumul[é] à la date [to the date] de la liquidation » comme l'exige le par. 57(4). De plus, comme cette obligation naît lorsque le régime de retraite est liquidé (al. 75(1)b)), son objet ne peut donc pas être « accumul[é] à la date de la liquidation » (par. 57(4)).

relation fiduciaire

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[LeBel, J. (dissident) (Abella, J., souscrivant à son opinion):] Une relation fiduciaire s'entend de la relation factuelle et juridique entre un bénéficiaire vulnérable et un fiduciaire qui détient et peut exercer un pouvoir sur le bénéficiaire dans les situations prévues par la loi.

APPEAL by company, monitor, secured creditor, and trustee in bankruptcy from judgment reported at *Indalex Ltd., Re* (2011), 89 C.C.P.B. 39, 276 O.A.C. 347, 331 D.L.R. (4th) 352, 17 P.P.S.A.C. (3d) 194, 75 C.B.R. (5th) 19, 104 O.R. (3d) 641, 2011 C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8433, 2011 ONCA 265, 2011 CarswellOnt 2458 (Ont. C.A.), ordering distribution from reserve fund to pay amount of pension plan deficiencies; APPEAL by union from judgment reported at *Indalex Ltd., Re* (2011), 81 C.B.R. (5th) 165, 92 C.C.P.B. 277, 2011 ONCA 578, 2011 CarswellOnt 9077 (Ont. C.A.), issuing costs endorsement.

POURVOI formé par une société, un contrôleur, un créancier garanti et un syndic de faillite à l'encontre d'une décision publiée à *Indalex Ltd., Re* (2011), 89 C.C.P.B. 39, 276 O.A.C. 347, 331 D.L.R. (4th) 352, 17 P.P.S.A.C. (3d) 194, 75 C.B.R. (5th) 19, 104 O.R. (3d) 641, 2011 C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8433, 2011 ONCA 265, 2011 CarswellOnt 2458 (Ont. C.A.), ayant ordonné de combler le déficit des régimes par prélèvement sur le fonds de réserve; POURVOI formé par un syndicat à l'encontre d'un jugement publié à *Indalex Ltd., Re* (2011), 81 C.B.R. (5th) 165, 92 C.C.P.B. 277, 2011 ONCA 578, 2011 CarswellOnt 9077 (Ont. C.A.), ayant adjugé les dépens.

Deschamps J.:

1 Insolvency can trigger catastrophic consequences. Often, large claims of ordinary creditors are left unpaid. In insolvency situations, the promise of defined benefits made to employees during their employment is put at risk. These appeals illustrate the materialization of such a risk. Although the employer in this case breached a fiduciary duty, the harm suffered by the pension plans' beneficiaries results not from that breach, but from the employer's insolvency. For the following reasons, I would allow the appeals of the appellants Sun Indalex Finance, LLC; George L. Miller, Indalex U.S.'s trustee in bankruptcy and FTI Consulting Canada ULC.

2 To improve the prospect of pensioners receiving their full benefits after a pension plan is wound up, the Ontario legislature has protected contributions to the pension fund that have accrued but are not yet due at the time of the wind up by providing for a deemed trust that supersedes all other provincial priorities over certain assets of the plan sponsor (s. 57(4) of the *Pension Benefits Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.8 ("PBA"), and s. 30(7) of the *Personal Property Security Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.10 ("PPSA")). The parties disagree on the scope of the deemed trust. In my view, the relevant provisions and the context lead to the conclusion that it extends to contributions the employer must make to ensure that the pension fund is sufficient to cover liabilities upon wind up. In the instant case, however, the deemed trust is superseded by the security granted to the creditor that loaned money to the employer, Indalex Limited ("Indalex"), during the insolvency proceedings. In addition, although the employer, as plan administrator, may have put itself in a position of conflict of interest by failing to give the plan's members proper notice of a motion requesting financing of its operations during a restructuring process, there was no realistic possibility that, had the members received notice and had the CCAA court found that they were secured creditors, it would have ordered the priorities differently. Consequently, it would not be appropriate to order an equitable remedy such as the constructive trust ordered by the Court of Appeal.

I. Facts

3 Indalex is a wholly owned Canadian subsidiary of a U.S. company, Indalex Holding Corp. ("Indalex U.S."). Indalex and its related companies formed a corporate group (the "Indalex Group") that manufactured aluminum extrusions. The U.S. and Canadian operations were closely linked.

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4 In 2009, a combination of high commodity prices and the economic recession's impact on the end-user market for aluminum extrusions plunged the Indalex Group into insolvency. On March 20, 2009, Indalex U.S. filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in Delaware. On April 3, 2009, Indalex applied for a stay under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 ("*CCAA*"), and Morawetz J. granted the stay in an initial order. He also appointed FTI Consulting Canada ULC (the "Monitor") to act as monitor.

5 At that time, Indalex was the administrator of two registered pension plans. One was for its salaried employees (the "Salaried Plan"), the other for its executives (the "Executive Plan"). Members of the Salaried Plan included seven employees for whom the United Steelworkers ("USW") acted as bargaining agent. The Salaried Plan was in the process of being wound up when the *CCAA* proceedings began. The effective date of the wind up was December 31, 2006. The Executive Plan had been closed but not wound up. Overall, the deficiencies of the pension plans' funds concern 49 persons (members of the Salaried Plan and the Executive Plan are referred to collectively as the "Plan Members").

6 Pursuant to the initial order made by Morawetz J. on April 3, 2009, Indalex obtained protection under the *CCAA*. Both plans faced funding deficiencies when Indalex filed for the *CCAA* stay. The wind-up deficiency of the Salaried Plan was estimated at \$1.8 million as of December 31, 2008. The funding deficiency of the Executive Plan was estimated at \$3.0 million on a wind-up basis as of January 1, 2008.

7 From the beginning of the insolvency proceedings, the Indalex Group's reorganization strategy was to sell both Indalex and Indalex U.S. as a going concern while they were under *CCAA* and Chapter 11 protection. To this end, Indalex and Indalex U.S. sought to enter into a common agreement for debtor-in-possession ("DIP") financing under which the two companies could draw from joint credit facilities and would guarantee each other's liabilities.

8 Indalex's financial distress threatened the interests of all the Plan Members. If the reorganization failed and Indalex were liquidated under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 ("*BIA*"), they would not have recovered any of their claims against Indalex for the underfunded pension liabilities, because the priority created by the provincial statute would not be recognized under the federal legislation: *Husky Oil Operations Ltd. v. Minister of National Revenue*, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 453 (S.C.C.). Although the priority was not rendered ineffective by the *CCAA*, the Plan Members' position was uncertain.

9 The Indalex Group solicited terms from a variety of possible DIP lenders. In the end, it negotiated an agreement with a syndicate consisting of the pre-filing senior secured creditors. On April 8, 2009, the *CCAA* court issued an Amended and Restated Initial Order ("Amended Initial Order") authorizing Indalex to borrow US\$24.4 million from the DIP lenders and grant them priority over all other creditors ("DIP charge") in that amount. In his endorsement of the order, Morawetz J. made a finding that Indalex would be unable to achieve a going-concern solution without DIP financing. Such financing was necessary to support Indalex's business until the sale could be completed.

10 The Plan Members did not participate in the initial proceedings. The initial stay had been granted *ex parte*. The *CCAA* judge ordered Indalex to serve a copy of the stay order on every creditor owed \$5,000 or more within 10 days of the initial order of April 3. As of April 8, when the motion to amend the initial order was heard, none of the Executive Plan's members had been served with that order; nor did any of them receive notice of the motion to amend it. The USW did receive short notice, but chose not to attend. Morawetz J. authorized Indalex to proceed on the basis of an abridged time for service. The Plan Members were given notice of all sub-

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sequent proceedings. None of the Plan Members appealed the Amended Initial Order to contest the DIP charge.

11 On June 12, 2009, Indalex applied for authorization to increase the DIP loan amount to US\$29.5 million. At the hearing, the Executive Plan's members initially opposed the motion, seeking to reserve their rights. After it was confirmed that the motion was merely to increase the amount of the DIP charge (without changing the terms of the loan), they withdrew their opposition and the court granted the motion.

12 On April 22, 2009, the court extended the stay of proceedings and approved a marketing process for the sale of Indalex's assets. The Plan Members did not oppose the application to approve the marketing process. Under the approved bidding procedure, the Indalex Group solicited a wide variety of potential buyers.

13 Indalex received a bid from SAPA Holding AB ("SAPA"). It was for approximately US\$30 million, and SAPA did not assume responsibility for the pension plans' wind-up deficiencies. According to the Monitor's estimate, the liquidation value of Indalex's assets was US\$44.7 million. Indalex brought an application for an order approving a bidding procedure for a competitive auction and deeming SAPA's bid to be a qualifying bid. The Executive Plan's members opposed the application, expressing concern that the pension liabilities would not be assumed. Morawetz J. nevertheless issued the order on July 2, 2009; in it, he approved the bidding procedure for sale, noting that the Executive Plan's members could raise their objections at the time of approval of the final bid.

14 The bidding procedure did not trigger any competing bids. On July 20, 2009, Indalex and Indalex U.S. brought motions before their respective courts to approve the sale of substantially all their assets under the terms of SAPA's bid. Indalex also moved for approval of an interim distribution of the sale proceeds to the DIP lenders. The Plan Members opposed Indalex's motion. First, they argued that it was estimated that a forced liquidation would produce greater proceeds than SAPA's bid. Second, they contended that their claims had priority over that of the DIP lenders because the unfunded pension liabilities were subject to a statutory deemed trust under the *PBA*. They also contended that Indalex had breached its fiduciary obligations by failing to meet its obligations as a plan administrator throughout the insolvency proceedings.

15 The court dismissed the Plan Members' first objection, holding that there was no evidence supporting the argument that a forced liquidation would be more beneficial to suppliers, customers and the 950 employees. It approved the sale on July 20, 2009. The order in which it did so directed the Monitor to make a distribution to the DIP lenders. With respect to the second objection, however, Campbell J. ordered the Monitor to hold a reserve in an amount to be determined by the Monitor, leaving the Plan Members' arguments based on their right to the proceeds of the sale open for determination at a later date.

16 The sale to SAPA closed on July 31, 2009. The Monitor collected \$30.9 million in proceeds. It distributed US\$17 million to the DIP lenders, paid certain fees, withheld a portion to cover various costs and retained \$6.75 million in reserve pending determination of the Plan Members' rights. At the closing, Indalex owed US\$27 million to the DIP lenders. The payment of US\$17 million left a US\$10 million shortfall in the amount owed to these lenders. The DIP lenders called on Indalex U.S. to cover this shortfall under the guarantee contained in the DIP lending agreement. Indalex U.S. paid the amount of the shortfall. Since Indalex U.S. was, as a term of the guarantee, subrogated to the DIP lenders' priority, it became the highest ranking creditor of Indalex, with a claim for US\$10 million.

17 Following the sale of Indalex's assets, its directors resigned. Indalex U.S., a part of Indalex Group, took over the management of Indalex, whose assets were limited to the sale proceeds held by the Monitor. A Unanim-

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ous Shareholder Declaration was executed on August 12, 2009; in it, Mr. Keith Cooper was appointed to manage Indalex's affairs. Mr. Cooper was an employee of FTI Consulting Inc.

18 In accordance with the right reserved by the court on July 20, 2009, the Plan Members brought motions on August 28, 2009 for a declaration that a deemed trust equal in amount to the unfunded pension liability was enforceable against the proceeds of the sale. They contended that they had priority over the secured creditors pursuant to s. 57(4) of the PBA and s. 30(7) of the PPSA. Indalex, in turn, brought a motion for an assignment in bankruptcy to secure the priority regime it argued for in opposing the Plan Members' motions.

19 On October 14, 2009, while judgment was pending, Indalex U.S. converted the Chapter 11 restructuring proceeding in the U.S. into a Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding. On November 5, 2009, the Superintendent of Financial Services ("Superintendent") appointed the actuarial firm of Morneau Sobeco Limited Partnership ("Morneau") to replace Indalex as administrator of the plans.

20 On February 18, 2010, Campbell J. dismissed the Plan Members' motions, concluding that the deemed trust did not apply to the wind-up deficiencies, because the associated payments were not "due" or "accruing due" as of the date of the wind up. He found that the Executive Plan did not have a wind-up deficiency, since it had not yet been wound up. He thus found it unnecessary to rule on Indalex's motion for an assignment in bankruptcy (2010 ONSC 1114, 79 C.C.P.B. 301 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List])). The Plan Members appealed the dismissal of their motions.

21 The Ontario Court of Appeal allowed the Plan Members' appeals. It found that the deemed trust created by s. 57(4) of the PBA applies to all amounts due with respect to plan wind-up deficiencies. Although the court noted that it was likely that no deemed trust existed for the Executive Plan on the plain meaning of the provision, it declined to address this question, because it found that the Executive Plan's members had a claim arising from Indalex's breach of its fiduciary obligations in failing to adequately protect the Plan Members' interests (2011 ONCA 265, 104 O.R. (3d) 641 (Ont. C.A.)).

22 The Court of Appeal concluded that a constructive trust was an appropriate remedy for Indalex's breach of its fiduciary obligations. The court was of the view that this remedy did not harm the DIP lenders, but affected only Indalex U.S. It imposed a constructive trust over the reserved fund in favour of the Plan Members. Turning to the question of distribution, it also found that the deemed trust had priority over the DIP charge because the issue of federal paramountcy had not been raised when the Amended Initial Order was issued, and that Indalex had stated that it intended to comply with any deemed trust requirements. The Court of Appeal found that there was nothing in the record to suggest that not applying the paramountcy doctrine would frustrate Indalex's ability to restructure.

23 The Court of Appeal ordered the Monitor to make a distribution from the reserve fund in order to pay the amount of each plan's deficiency. It also issued a costs endorsement that approved payment of the costs of the Executive Plan's members from that plan's fund, but declined to order the payment of costs to the USW from the fund of the Salaried Plan (2011 ONCA 578, 81 C.B.R. (5th) 165 (Ont. C.A.)).

24 The Monitor, together with Sun Indalex, a secured creditor of Indalex U.S., and George L. Miller, Indalex U.S.'s trustee in bankruptcy, appeals the Court of Appeal's order. Both the Superintendent and Morneau support the Plan Members' position as respondents. A number of stakeholders are also participating in the appeals to this Court. In addition, USW appeals the costs endorsement. As I agree with my colleague Cromwell J. on the appeal from the costs endorsement, I will not deal with it in these reasons.

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II. Issues

25 The appeals raise four issues:

1. Does the deemed trust provided for in s. 57(4) of the *PBA* apply to wind-up deficiencies?
2. If so, does the deemed trust supersede the DIP charge?
3. Did Indalex have any fiduciary obligations to the Plan Members when making decisions in the context of the insolvency proceedings?
4. Did the Court of Appeal properly exercise its discretion in imposing a constructive trust to remedy the breaches of fiduciary duties?

III. Analysis

A. Does the Deemed Trust Provided for in Section 57(4) of the PBA Apply to Windup Deficiencies?

26 The first issue is whether the statutory deemed trust provided for in s. 57(4) of the *PBA* extends to wind-up deficiencies. This question is one of statutory interpretation, which requires examination of both the wording and context of the relevant provisions of the *PBA*. Section 57(4) of the *PBA* affords protection to members of a pension plan with respect to their employer's contributions upon wind up of the plan. The provision reads:

57. . . .

(4) Where a pension plan is wound up in whole or in part, an employer who is required to pay contributions to the pension fund shall be deemed to hold in trust for the beneficiaries of the pension plan an amount of money equal to employer contributions accrued to the date of the wind up but not yet due under the plan or regulations.

27 The most obvious interpretation is that where a plan is wound up, this provision protects all contributions that have accrued but are not yet due. The words used appear to include the contribution the employer is to make where a plan being wound up is in a deficit position. This quite straightforward interpretation, which is consistent with both the historical broadening of the protection and the remedial purpose of the provision, is being challenged on the basis of a narrow definition of the word "accrued". I do not find that this argument justifies limiting the protection afforded to plan members by the Ontario legislature.

28 The *PBA* sets out the rules for the operation of funded contributory defined benefit pension plans in Ontario. In an ongoing plan, an employer must pay into a fund all contributions it withholds from its employees' salaries. In addition, while the plan is ongoing, the employer must make two kinds of payments. One relates to current service contributions — the employer's own regular contributions to the pension fund as required by the plan. The other ensures that the fund is sufficient to meet the plan's liabilities. The employees' interest in having the contributions made while the plan is ongoing is protected by a deemed trust provided for in s. 57(3) of the *PBA*.

29 The *PBA* also establishes a comprehensive scheme for winding up a pension plan. Section 75(1)(a) imposes on the employer the obligation to "pay" an amount equal to the total of all "payments" that are due or that have accrued and have not been paid into the fund. In addition, s. 75(1)(b) sets out a formula for calculating the

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amount that must be paid to ensure that the fund is sufficient to cover all liabilities upon wind up. Within six months after the effective date of the wind up, the plan administrator must file a wind-up report that lists the plan's assets and liabilities as of the date of the wind up. If the wind-up report shows an actuarial deficit, the employer must make wind-up deficiency payments. Consequently, s. 75(1)(a) and (b) jointly determine the amount of the contributions owed when a plan is wound up.

30 It is common ground that the contributions provided for in s. 75(1)(a) are covered by the wind-up deemed trust. The only question is whether it also applies to the deficiency payments required by s. 75(1)(b). I would answer this question in the affirmative in view of the provision's wording, context and purpose.

31 It is readily apparent that the wind-up deemed trust provision (s. 57(4) PBA) does not place an express limit on the "employer contributions accrued to the date of the wind up but not yet due", and I find no reason to exclude contributions paid under s. 75(1)(b). Section 75(1)(a) explicitly refers to "an amount equal to the total of all payments" that have *accrued*, even those that were not yet due as of the date of the wind up, whereas s. 75(1)(b) contemplates an "amount" that is calculated on the basis of the value of assets and of liabilities that have *accrued* when the plan is wound up. Section 75(1) reads as follows:

75. (1) Where a pension plan is wound up, the employer shall pay into the pension fund,

(a) an amount equal to the total of all payments that, under this Act, the regulations and the pension plan, are due or that have accrued and that have not been paid into the pension fund; and

(b) an amount equal to the amount by which,

(i) the value of the pension benefits under the pension plan that would be guaranteed by the Guarantee Fund under this Act and the regulations if the Superintendent declares that the Guarantee Fund applies to the pension plan,

(ii) the value of the pension benefits accrued with respect to employment in Ontario vested under the pension plan, and

(iii) the value of benefits accrued with respect to employment in Ontario resulting from the application of subsection 39 (3) (50 per cent rule) and section 74,

exceed the value of the assets of the pension fund allocated as prescribed for payment of pension benefits accrued with respect to employment in Ontario.

32 Since both the amount with respect to payments (s. 75(1)(a)) and the one ascertained by subtracting the assets from the liabilities accrued as of the date of the wind up (s. 75(1)(b)) are to be paid upon wind up as employer contributions, they are both included in the ordinary meaning of the words of s. 57(4) of the PBA: "amount of money equal to employer contributions accrued to the date of the wind up but not yet due under the plan or regulations". As I mentioned above, this reasoning is challenged in respect of s. 75(1)(b), not of s. 75(1)(a).

33 The appellant Sun Indalex argues that since the deficiency is not finally quantified until well after the effective date of the wind up, the liability of the employer cannot be said to have accrued. The Monitor adds that the payments the employer must make to satisfy its wind-up obligations may change over the five-year period within which s. 31 of the PBA Regulations, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 909, requires that they be made. These parties il-

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illustrate their argument by referring to what occurred to the Salaried Plan's fund in the case at bar. In 2007-8, Indalex paid down the vast majority of the \$1.6 million wind-up deficiency associated with the Salaried Plan as estimated in 2006. By the end of 2008, however, this deficiency had risen back up to \$1.8 million as a result of a decline in the fund's asset value. According to this argument, the amount could not have accrued as of the date of the wind up, because it could not be calculated with certainty.

34 Unlike my colleague Cromwell J., I find this argument unconvincing. I instead agree with the Court of Appeal on this point. The wind-up deemed trust concerns "employer contributions accrued to the date of the wind up but not yet due under the plan or regulations". Since the employees cease to accumulate entitlements when the plan is wound up, the entitlements that are used to calculate the contributions have all been accumulated before the wind-up date. Thus the liabilities of the employer are complete — have accrued — before the wind up. The distinction between my approach and the one Cromwell J. takes is that he requires that it be possible to perform the calculation before the date of the wind up, whereas I am of the view that the time when the calculation is actually made is not relevant as long as the liabilities are assessed as of the date of the wind up. The date at which the liabilities are *reported* or the employer's *option* to spread its contributions as allowed by the regulations does not change the legal nature of the contributions.

35 In *Ontario Hydro-Electric Power Commission v. Albright* (1922), 64 S.C.R. 306 (S.C.C.), Duff J. considered the meaning of the word "accrued" in interpreting the scope of a covenant. He found that

the word "accrued" according to well recognized usage has, as applied to rights or liabilities the meaning simply of completely constituted — and it may have this meaning although it appears from the context that the right completely constituted or the liability completely constituted is one which is only exercisable or enforceable *in futuro* — a debt for example which is *debitum in praesenti solvendum in futuro*.

[Emphasis added; pp. 312-13.]

36 Thus, a contribution has "accrued" when the liabilities are completely constituted, even if the payment itself will not fall due until a later date. If this principle is applied to the facts of this case, the liabilities related to contributions to the fund allocated for payment of the pension benefits contemplated in s. 75(1)(b) are completely constituted at the time of the wind up, because no pension entitlements arise after that date. In other words, no new liabilities accrue at the time of or after the wind up. Even the portion of the contributions that is related to the elections plan members may make upon wind up has "accrued to the date of the wind up", because it is based on rights employees earned before the wind-up date.

37 The fact that the precise amount of the contribution is not determined as of the time of the wind up does not make it a contingent contribution that cannot have accrued for accounting purposes (*Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Ontario (Minister of Revenue)* (1998), 41 O.R. (3d) 606 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 621). The use of the word "accrued" does not limit liabilities to amounts that can be determined with precision. As a result, the words "contributions accrued" can encompass the contributions mandated by s. 75(1)(b) of the *PBA*.

38 The legislative history supports my conclusion that wind-up deficiency contributions are protected by the deemed trust provision. The Ontario legislature has consistently expanded the protection afforded in respect of pension plan contributions. I cannot therefore accept an interpretation that would represent a drawback from the protection extended to employees. I will not reproduce the relevant provisions, since my colleague Cromwell J. quotes them.

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39 The original statute provided solely for the employer's obligation to pay all amounts required to be paid to meet the test for solvency (*The Pension Benefits Act, 1965*, S.O. 1965, c. 96, s. 22(2)), but the legislature subsequently afforded employees the protection of a deemed trust on the employer's assets in an amount equal to the sums withheld from employees as contributions and sums due from the employer as service contributions (s. 23a, added by *The Pension Benefits Amendment Act, 1973*, S.O. 1973, c. 113, s. 6). In a later version, it protected not only contributions that were due, but also those that had accrued, with the amounts being calculated as if the plan had been wound up (*The Pension Benefits Amendment Act, 1980*, S.O. 1980, c. 80).

40 Whereas *all* employer contributions were originally covered by a single provision, the legislature crafted a separate provision in 1980 that specifically imposed on the employer the obligation to fund the wind-up deficiency. At the time, it was clear from the words used in the provision that the amount related to the wind-up deficiency was excluded from the deemed trust protection (*The Pension Benefits Amendment Act, 1980*). In 1983, the legislature made a distinction between the deemed trust for ongoing employer contributions and the one for certain payments to be made upon wind up (ss. 23(4)(a) and 23(4)(b), added by *Pension Benefits Amendment Act, 1983*, S.O. 1983, c. 2, s. 3). In that version, the wind-up deficiency payments were still excluded from the deemed trust. However, the legislature once again made changes to the protection in 1987. The 1987 version is, in substance, the one that applies in the case at bar. In the *Pension Benefits Act, 1987*, S.O. 1987, c. 35, a specific wind-up deemed trust was maintained, but the wind up deficiency payments were no longer excluded from it, because the limitation that had been imposed until then with respect to payments that were due or had accrued while the plan was ongoing had been eliminated. My comments to the effect that the previous versions excluded the wind-up deficiency payments do not therefore apply to the 1987 statute, since it was materially different.

41 Whereas it is clear from the 1983 amendments that the deemed trust provided for in s. 23(4)(b) was intended to include only current service costs and special payments, this is less clear from the subsequent versions of the *PBA*. To give meaning to the 1987 amendment, I have to conclude that the words refer to a deemed trust in respect of *all* "employer contributions accrued to the date of the wind up but not yet due under the plan or regulations".

42 The employer's liability upon wind up is now set out in a single section which elegantly parallels the wind-up deemed trust provision. It can be seen from the legislative history that the protection has expanded from (1) only the service contributions that were due, to (2) amounts payable calculated as if the plan had been wound up, to (3) amounts that were due and had accrued upon wind up but excluding the wind-up deficiency payments, to (4) all amounts due and accrued upon wind up.

43 Therefore, in my view, the legislative history leads to the conclusion that adopting a narrow interpretation that would dissociate the employer's payment provided for in s. 75(1)(b) of the *PBA* from the one provided for in s. 75(1)(a) would be contrary to the Ontario legislature's trend toward broadening the protection. Since the provision respecting wind-up payments sets out the amounts that are owed upon wind up, I see no historical, legal or logical reason to conclude that the wind-up deemed trust provision does not encompass all of them.

44 Thus, I am of the view that the words and context of s. 57(4) lend themselves easily to an interpretation that includes the wind-up deficiency payments, and I find additional support for this in the purpose of the provision. The deemed trust provision is a remedial one. Its purpose is to protect the interests of plan members. This purpose militates against adopting the limited scope proposed by Indalex and some of the interveners. In the case of competing priorities between creditors, the remedial purpose favours an approach that includes all wind-up payments in the value of the deemed trust in order to achieve a broad protection.

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45 In sum, the relevant provisions, the legislative history and the purpose are all consistent with inclusion of the wind-up deficiency in the protection afforded to members with respect to employer contributions upon the wind up of their pension plan. I therefore find that the Court of Appeal correctly held with respect to the Salaried Plan, which had been wound up as of December 31, 2006, that Indalex was deemed to hold in trust the amount necessary to satisfy the wind-up deficiency.

46 The situation is different with respect to the Executive Plan. Unlike s. 57(3), which provides that the deemed trust protecting employer contributions exists while a plan is ongoing, s. 57(4) provides that the wind-up deemed trust comes into existence only when the plan is wound up. This is a choice made by the Ontario legislature. I would not interfere with it. Thus, the deemed trust entitlement arises only once the condition precedent of the plan being wound up has been fulfilled. This is true even if it is certain that the plan will be wound up in the future. At the time of the sale, the Executive Plan was in the process of being, but had not yet been, wound up. Consequently, the deemed trust provision does not apply to the employer's wind-up deficiency payments in respect of that plan.

47 The Court of Appeal declined to decide whether a deemed trust arose in relation to the Executive Plan, stating that it was unnecessary to decide this issue. However, the court expressed concern that a reasoning that deprived the Executive Plan's members of the benefit of a deemed trust would mean that a company under CCAA protection could avoid the priority of the PBA deemed trust simply by not winding up an underfunded pension plan. The fear was that Indalex could have relied on its own inaction to avoid the consequences that flow from a wind up. I am not convinced that the Court of Appeal's concern has any impact on the question whether a deemed trust exists, and I doubt that an employer could avoid the consequences of such a security interest simply by refusing to wind up a pension plan. The Superintendent may take a number of steps, including ordering the wind up of a pension plan under s. 69(1) of the PBA in a variety of circumstances (see s. 69(1)(d), PBA). The Superintendent did not choose to order that the plan be wound up in this case.

B. Does the Deemed Trust Supersede the DIP Charge?

48 The finding that the interests of the Salaried Plan's members in all the employer's wind-up contributions to the Salaried Plan are protected by a deemed trust does not mean that part of the money reserved by the Monitor from the sale proceeds must be remitted to the Salaried Plan's fund. This will be the case only if the provincial priorities provided for in s. 30(7) of the PPSA ensure that the claim of the Salaried Plan's members has priority over the DIP charge. Section 30(7) reads as follows:

(7) A security interest in an account or inventory and its proceeds is subordinate to the interest of a person who is the beneficiary of a deemed trust arising under the *Employment Standards Act* or under the *Pension Benefits Act*.

The effect of s. 30(7) is to enable the Salaried Plan's members to recover from the reserve fund, insofar as it relates to an account or inventory and its proceeds in Ontario, ahead of all other secured creditors.

49 The Appellants argue that any provincial deemed trust is subordinate to the DIP charge authorized by the CCAA order. They put forward two central arguments to support their contention. First, they submit that the PBA deemed trust does not apply in CCAA proceedings because the relevant priorities are those of the federal insolvency scheme, which do not include provincial deemed trusts. Second, they argue that by virtue of the doctrine of federal paramountcy the DIP charge supersedes the PBA deemed trust.

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50 The Appellants' first argument would expand the holding of *Ted Leroy Trucking Ltd., Re*, 2010 SCC 60, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379 (S.C.C.), so as to apply federal bankruptcy priorities to CCAA proceedings, with the effect that claims would be treated similarly under the CCAA and the BIA. In *Century Services*, the Court noted that there are points at which the two schemes converge:

Another point of convergence of the CCAA and the BIA relates to priorities. Because the CCAA is silent about what happens if reorganization fails, the BIA scheme of liquidation and distribution necessarily supplies the backdrop for what will happen if a CCAA reorganization is ultimately unsuccessful. [para. 23]

51 In order to avoid a race to liquidation under the BIA, courts will favour an interpretation of the CCAA that affords creditors analogous entitlements. Yet this does not mean that courts may read bankruptcy priorities into the CCAA at will. Provincial legislation defines the priorities to which creditors are entitled until that legislation is ousted by Parliament. Parliament did not expressly apply all bankruptcy priorities either to CCAA proceedings or to proposals under the BIA. Although the creditors of a corporation that is attempting to reorganize may bargain in the shadow of their bankruptcy entitlements, those entitlements remain only shadows until bankruptcy occurs. At the outset of the insolvency proceedings, Indalex opted for a process governed by the CCAA, leaving no doubt that although it wanted to protect its employees' jobs, it would not survive as their employer. This was not a case in which a failed arrangement forced a company into liquidation under the BIA. Indalex achieved the goal it was pursuing. It chose to sell its assets under the CCAA, not the BIA.

52 The provincial deemed trust under the PBA continues to apply in CCAA proceedings, subject to the doctrine of federal paramountcy (*Crystalline Investments Ltd. v. Domgroup Ltd.*, 2004 SCC 3, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 60 (S.C.C.), at para. 43). The Court of Appeal therefore did not err in finding that at the end of a CCAA liquidation proceeding, priorities may be determined by the PPSA's scheme rather than the federal scheme set out in the BIA.

53 The Appellants' second argument is that an order granting priority to the plan's members on the basis of the deemed trust provided for by the Ontario legislature would be unconstitutional in that it would conflict with the order granting priority to the DIP lenders that was made under the CCAA. They argue that the doctrine of paramountcy resolves this conflict, as it would render the provincial law inoperative to the extent that it is incompatible with the federal law.

54 There is a preliminary question that must be addressed before determining whether the doctrine of paramountcy applies in this context. This question arises because the Court of Appeal found that although the CCAA court had the power to authorize a DIP charge that would supersede the deemed trust, the order in this case did not have such an effect because paramountcy had not been invoked. As a result, the priority of the deemed trust over secured creditors by virtue of s. 30(7) of the PPSA remained in effect, and the Plan Members' claim ranked in priority to the claim of the DIP lenders established in the CCAA order.

55 With respect, I cannot accept this approach to the doctrine of federal paramountcy. This doctrine resolves conflicts in the application of overlapping valid provincial and federal legislation (*Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta*, 2007 SCC 22, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.), at paras. 32 and 69). Paramountcy is a question of law. As a result, subject to the application of the rules on the admissibility of new evidence, it can be raised even if it was not invoked in an initial proceeding.

56 A party relying on paramountcy must "demonstrate that the federal and provincial laws are in fact incompatible by establishing either that it is impossible to comply with both laws or that to apply the provincial

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law would frustrate the purpose of the federal law" (*Canadian Western Bank*, at para. 75). This Court has in fact applied the doctrine of paramountcy in the area of bankruptcy and insolvency to come to the conclusion that a provincial legislature cannot, through measures such as a deemed trust, affect priorities granted under federal legislation (*Husky Oil*).

57 None of the parties question the validity of either the federal provision that enables a *CCAA* court to make an order authorizing a DIP charge or the provincial provision that establishes the priority of the deemed trust. However, in considering whether the *CCAA* court has, in exercising its discretion to assess a claim, validly affected a provincial priority, the reviewing court should remind itself of the rule of interpretation stated in *Canada (Attorney General) v. Law Society (British Columbia)*, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 307 (S.C.C.) (at p. 356), and reproduced in *Canadian Western Bank* (at para. 75):

When a federal statute can be properly interpreted so as not to interfere with a provincial statute, such an interpretation is to be applied in preference to another applicable construction which would bring about a conflict between the two statutes.

58 In the instant case, the *CCAA* judge, in authorizing the DIP charge, did not consider the fact that the Salaried Plan's members had a claim that was protected by a deemed trust, nor did he explicitly note that ordinary creditors, such as the Executive Plan's members, had not received notice of the DIP loan motion. However, he did consider factors that were relevant to the remedial objective of the *CCAA* and found that Indalex had in fact demonstrated that the *CCAA*'s purpose would be frustrated without the DIP charge. It will be helpful to quote the reasons he gave on April 17, 2009 in authorizing the DIP charge ((2009), 52 C.B.R. (5th) 61 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List])):

- (a) the Applicants are in need of the additional financing in order to support operations during the period of a going concern restructuring;
- (b) there is a benefit to the breathing space that would be afforded by the DIP Financing that will permit the Applicants to identify a going concern solution;
- (c) there is no other alternative available to the Applicants for a going concern solution;
- (d) a stand-alone solution is impractical given the integrated nature of the business of Indalex Canada and Indalex U.S.;
- (e) given the collateral base of Indalex U.S., the Monitor is satisfied that it is unlikely that the Post-Filing Guarantee with respect to the U.S. Additional Advances will ever be called and the Monitor is also satisfied that the benefits to stakeholders far outweighs the risk associated with this aspect of the Post-Filing Guarantee;
- (f) the benefit to stakeholders and creditors of the DIP Financing outweighs any potential prejudice to unsecured creditors that may arise as a result of the granting of super-priority secured financing against the assets of the Applicants;
- (g) the Pre-Filing Security has been reviewed by counsel to the Monitor and it appears that the unsecured creditors of the Canadian debtors will be in no worse position as a result of the Post-Filing Guarantee than they were otherwise, prior to the *CCAA* filing, as a result of the limitation of the Canadian

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guarantee set forth in the draft Amended and Restated Initial Order ...; and

(h) the balancing of the prejudice weighs in favour of the approval of the DIP Financing. [para. 9]

59 Given that there was no alternative for a going-concern solution, it is difficult to accept the Court of Appeal's sweeping intimation that the DIP lenders would have accepted that their claim ranked below claims resulting from the deemed trust. There is no evidence in the record that gives credence to this suggestion. Not only is it contradicted by the *CCAA* judge's findings of fact, but case after case has shown that "the priming of the DIP facility is a key aspect of the debtor's ability to attempt a workout" (J. P. Sarra, *Rescue! The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (2007), at p. 97). The harsh reality is that lending is governed by the commercial imperatives of the lenders, not by the interests of the plan members or the policy considerations that lead provincial governments to legislate in favour of pension fund beneficiaries. The reasons given by Morawetz J. in response to the first attempt of the Executive Plan's members to reserve their rights on June 12, 2009 are instructive. He indicated that any uncertainty as to whether the lenders would withhold advances or whether they would have priority if advances were made did "not represent a positive development". He found that, in the absence of any alternative, the relief sought was "necessary and appropriate" (2009 CanLII 37906 [2009 CarswellOnt 4263 (Ont. S.C.J.)], at paras. 7 and 8).

60 In this case, compliance with the provincial law necessarily entails defiance of the order made under federal law. On the one hand, s. 30(7) of the *PPSA* required a part of the proceeds from the sale related to assets described in the provincial statute to be paid to the plan's administrator before other secured creditors were paid. On the other hand, the Amended Initial Order provided that the DIP charge ranked in priority to "all other security interests, trusts, liens, charges and encumbrances, statutory or otherwise" (para. 45). Granting priority to the DIP lenders subordinates the claims of other stakeholders, including the Plan Members. This court-ordered priority based on the *CCAA* has the same effect as a statutory priority. The federal and provincial laws are inconsistent, as they give rise to different, and conflicting, orders of priority. As a result of the application of the doctrine of federal paramountcy, the DIP charge supersedes the deemed trust.

C. Did Indalex Have Fiduciary Obligations to the Plan Members?

61 The fact that the DIP financing charge supersedes the deemed trust or that the interests of the Executive Plan's members are not protected by the deemed trust does not mean that Plan Members have no right to receive money out of the reserve fund. What remains to be considered is whether an equitable remedy, which could override all priorities, can and should be granted for a breach by Indalex of a fiduciary duty.

62 The first stage of a fiduciary duty analysis is to determine whether and when fiduciary obligations arise. The Court has recognized that there are circumstances in which a pension plan administrator has fiduciary obligations to plan members both at common law and under statute (*Burke v. Hudson's Bay Co.*, 2010 SCC 34, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 273 (S.C.C.), at para. 41). It is clear that the indicia of a fiduciary relationship attach in this case between the Plan Members and Indalex as plan administrator. Sun Indalex and the Monitor do not dispute this proposition.

63 However, Sun Indalex and the Monitor argue that the employer has a fiduciary duty only when it acts as plan administrator — when it is wearing its administrator's "hat". They contend that, outside the plan administration context, when directors make decisions in the best interests of the corporation, the employer is wearing solely its "corporate hat". On this view, decisions made by the employer in its corporate capacity are not

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burdened by the corporation's fiduciary obligations to its pension plan members and, consequently, cannot be found to conflict with plan members' interests. This is not the correct approach to take in determining the scope of the fiduciary obligations of an employer acting as plan administrator.

64 Only persons or entities authorized by the *PBA* can act as plan administrators (ss. 1(1) and 8(1)(a)). The employer is one of them. A corporate employer that chooses to act as plan administrator accepts the fiduciary obligations attached to that function. Since the directors of a corporation also have a fiduciary duty to the corporation, the fact that the corporate employer can act as administrator of a pension plan means that s. 8(1)(a) of the *PBA* is based on the assumption that not all decisions taken by directors in managing a corporation will result in conflict with the corporation's duties to the plan's members. However, the corporate employer must be prepared to resolve conflicts where they arise. Reorganization proceedings place considerable burdens on any debtor, but these burdens do not release an employer that acts as plan administrator from its fiduciary obligations.

65 Section 22(4) of the *PBA* explicitly provides that a plan administrator must not permit its own interest to conflict with its duties in respect of the pension fund. Thus, where an employer's own interests do not converge with those of the plan's members, it must ask itself whether there is a potential conflict and, if so, what can be done to resolve the conflict. Where interests do conflict, I do not find the two hats metaphor helpful. The solution is not to determine whether a given decision can be classified as being related to either the management of the corporation or the administration of the pension plan. The employer may well take a sound management decision, and yet do something that harms the interests of the plan's members. An employer acting as a plan administrator is not permitted to disregard its fiduciary obligations to plan members and favour the competing interests of the corporation on the basis that it is wearing a "corporate hat". What is important is to consider the consequences of the decision, not its nature.

66 When the interests the employer seeks to advance on behalf of the corporation conflict with interests the employer has a duty to preserve as plan administrator, a solution must be found to ensure that the plan members' interests are taken care of. This may mean that the corporation puts the members on notice, or that it finds a replacement administrator, appoints representative counsel or finds some other means to resolve the conflict. The solution has to fit the problem, and the same solution may not be appropriate in every case.

67 In the instant case, Indalex's fiduciary obligations as plan administrator did in fact conflict with management decisions that needed to be taken in the best interests of the corporation. Indalex had a number of responsibilities as plan administrator. For example, s. 56(1) of the *PBA* required it to ensure that contributions were paid when due. Section 56(2) required that it notify the Superintendent if contributions were not paid when due. It was also up to Indalex under s. 59 to commence proceedings to obtain payment of contributions that were due but not paid. Indalex, as an employer, paid all the contributions that were due. However, its insolvency put contributions that had accrued to the date of the wind up at risk. In an insolvency context, the administrator's claim for contributions that have accrued is a provable claim.

68 In the context of this case, the fact that Indalex, as plan administrator, might have to claim accrued contributions from itself means that it would have to simultaneously adopt conflicting positions on whether contributions had accrued as of the date of liquidation and whether a deemed trust had arisen in respect of wind-up deficiencies. This is indicative of a clear conflict between Indalex's interests and those of the Plan Members. As soon as it saw, or ought to have seen, a potential for conflict, Indalex should have taken steps to ensure that the interests of the Plan Members were protected. It did not do so. On the contrary, it contested the position the Plan Members advanced. At the very least, Indalex breached its duty to avoid conflicts of interest (s. 22(4), *PBA*).

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69 Since the Plan Members seek an equitable remedy, it is important to identify the point at which Indalex should have moved to ensure that their interests were safeguarded. Before doing so, I would stress that factual contexts are needed to analyse conflicts between interests, and that it is neither necessary nor useful to attempt to map out all the situations in which conflicts may arise.

70 As I mentioned above, insolvency puts the employer's contributions at risk. This does not mean that the decision to commence insolvency proceedings entails on its own a breach of a fiduciary obligation. The commencement of insolvency proceedings in this case on April 3, 2009 in an emergency situation was explained by Timothy R. J. Stubbs, the then-president of Indalex. The company was in default to its lender, it faced legal proceedings for unpaid bills, it had received a termination notice effective April 6 from its insurers, and suppliers had stopped supplying on credit. These circumstances called for urgent action by Indalex lest a creditor start bankruptcy proceedings and in so doing jeopardize ongoing operations and jobs. Several facts lead me to conclude that the stay sought in this case did not, in and of itself, put Indalex in a conflict of interest.

71 First, a stay operates only to freeze the parties' rights. In most cases, stays are obtained *ex parte*. One of the reasons for refraining from giving notice of the initial stay motion is to avert a situation in which creditors race to court to secure benefits that they would not enjoy in insolvency. Subjecting as many creditors as possible to a single process is seen as a way to treat all of them more equitably. In this context, plan members are placed on the same footing as the other creditors and have no special entitlement to notice. Second, one of the conclusions of the order Indalex sought was that it was to be served on all creditors, with a few exceptions, within 10 days. The notice allowed any interested party to apply to vary the order. Third, Indalex was permitted to pay all pension benefits. Although the order excluded special solvency payments, no ruling was made at that point on the merits of the creditors' competing claims, and a stay gave the Plan Members the possibility of presenting their arguments on the deemed trust rather than losing it altogether as a result of a bankruptcy proceeding, which was the alternative.

72 Whereas the stay itself did not put Indalex in a conflict of interest, the proceedings that followed had adverse consequences. On April 8, 2009, Indalex brought a motion to amend and restate the initial order in order to apply for DIP financing. This motion had been foreseen. Mr. Stubbs had mentioned in the affidavit he signed in support of the initial order that the lenders had agreed to extend their financing, but that Indalex would be in need of authorization in order to secure financing to continue its operations. However, the initial order had not yet been served on the Plan Members as of April 8. Short notice of the motion was given to the USW rather than to all the individual Plan Members, but the USW did not appear. The Plan Members were quite simply not represented on the motion to amend the initial stay order requesting authorization to grant the DIP charge.

73 In seeking to have a court approve a form of financing by which one creditor was granted priority over all other creditors, Indalex was asking the CCAA court to override the Plan Members' priority. This was a case in which Indalex's directors permitted the corporation's best interests to be put ahead of those of the Plan Members. The directors may have fulfilled their fiduciary duty to Indalex, but they placed Indalex in the position of failing to fulfil its obligations as plan administrator. The corporation's interest was to seek the best possible avenue to survive in an insolvency context. The pursuit of this interest was not compatible with the plan administrator's duty to the Plan Members to ensure that all contributions were paid into the funds. In the context of this case, the plan administrator's duty to the Plan Members meant, in particular, that it should at least have given them the opportunity to present their arguments. This duty meant, at the very least, that they were entitled to reasonable notice of the DIP financing motion. The terms of that motion, presented without appropriate notice, conflicted with the interests of the Plan Members. Because Indalex supported the motion asking that a priority be granted

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to its lender, it could not at the same time argue for a priority based on the deemed trust.

74 The Court of Appeal found a number of other breaches. I agree with Cromwell J. that none of the subsequent proceedings had a negative impact on the Plan Members' rights. The events that occurred, in particular the second DIP financing motion and the sale process, were predictable and, in a way, typical of reorganizations. Notice was given in all cases. The Plan Members were represented by able counsel. More importantly, the court ordered that funds be reserved and that a full hearing be held to argue the issues.

75 The Monitor and George Miller, Indalex U.S.'s trustee in bankruptcy, argue that the Plan Members should have appealed the Amended Initial Order authorizing the DIP charge, and were precluded from subsequently arguing that their claim ranked in priority to that of the DIP lenders. They take the position that the collateral attack doctrine bars the Plan Members from challenging the DIP financing order. This argument is not convincing. The Plan Members did not receive notice of the motion to approve the DIP financing. Counsel for the Executive Plan's members presented the argument of that plan's members at the first opportunity and repeated it each time he had an occasion to do so. The only time he withdrew their opposition was at the hearing of the motion for authorization to increase the DIP loan amount after being told that the only purpose of the motion was to increase the amount of the authorized loan. The CCAA judge set a hearing date for the very purpose of presenting the arguments that Indalex, as plan administrator, could have presented when it requested the amendment to the initial order. It cannot now be argued, therefore, that the Plan Members are barred from defending their interests by the collateral attack doctrine.

D. Would an Equitable Remedy Be Appropriate in the Circumstances?

76 The definition of "secured creditor" in s. 2 of the CCAA includes a trust in respect of the debtor's property. The Amended Initial Order (at para. 45) provided that the DIP lenders' claims ranked in priority to all trusts, "statutory or otherwise". Indalex U.S. was subrogated to the DIP lenders' claim by operation of the guarantee in the DIP lending agreement.

77 Counsel for the Executive Plan's members argues that the doctrine of equitable subordination should apply to subordinate Indalex U.S.'s subrogated claim to those of the Plan Members. This Court discussed the doctrine of equitable subordination in *Canada Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Canadian Commercial Bank*, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 558 (S.C.C.), but did not endorse it, leaving it for future determination (p. 609). I do not need to endorse it here either. Suffice to say that there is no evidence that the lenders committed a wrong or that they engaged in inequitable conduct, and no party has contested the validity of Indalex U.S.'s payment of the US\$10 million shortfall.

78 This leaves the constructive trust remedy ordered by the Court of Appeal. It is settled law that proprietary remedies are generally awarded only with respect to property that is directly related to a wrong or that can be traced to such property. I agree with my colleague Cromwell J. that this condition is not met in the case at bar. I adopt his reasoning on this issue.

79 Moreover, I am of the view that it was unreasonable for the Court of Appeal to reorder the priorities in this case. The breach of fiduciary duty identified in this case is, in substance, the lack of notice. Since the Plan Members were allowed to fully argue their case at a hearing specifically held to adjudicate their rights, the CCAA court was in a position to fully appreciate the parties' positions.

80 It is difficult to see what gains the Plan Members would have secured had they received notice of the

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motion that resulted in the Amended Initial Order. The CCAA judge made it clear, and his finding is supported by logic, that there was no alternative to the DIP loan that would allow for the sale of the assets on a going-concern basis. The Plan Members presented no evidence to the contrary. They rely on conjecture alone. The Plan Members invoke other cases in which notice was given to plan members and in which the members were able to fully argue their positions. However, in none of those cases were plan members able to secure any additional benefits. Furthermore, the Plan Members were allowed to fully argue their case. As a result, even though Indalex breached its fiduciary duty to notify the Plan Members of the motion that resulted in the Amended Initial Order, their claim remains subordinate to that of Indalex U.S.

IV. Conclusion

81 There are good reasons for giving special protection to members of pension plans in insolvency proceedings. Parliament considered doing so before enacting the most recent amendments to the CCAA, but chose not to (*An Act to amend the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, the Wage Earner Protection Program Act and chapter 47 of the Statutes of Canada, 2005*, S.C. 2007, c. 36, in force September 18, 2009, SI/2009-68; see also Bill C-501, *An Act to amend the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and other Acts (pension protection)*, 3rd Sess., 40th Parl., March 24, 2010 (subsequently amended by the Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology, March 1, 2011)). A report of the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce gave the following reasons for this choice:

Although the Committee recognizes the vulnerability of current pensioners, we do not believe that changes to the BIA regarding pension claims should be made at this time. Current pensioners can also access retirement benefits from the Canada/Quebec Pension Plan, and the Old Age Security and Guaranteed Income Supplement programs, and may have private savings and Registered Retirement Savings Plans that can provide income for them in retirement. The desire expressed by some of our witnesses for greater protection for pensioners and for employees currently participating in an occupational pension plan must be balanced against the interests of others. As we noted earlier, insolvency — at its essence — is characterized by insufficient assets to satisfy everyone, and choices must be made.

The Committee believes that granting the pension protection sought by some of the witnesses would be sufficiently unfair to other stakeholders that we cannot recommend the changes requested. For example, we feel that super priority status could unnecessarily reduce the moneys available for distribution to creditors. In turn, credit availability and the cost of credit could be negatively affected, and all those seeking credit in Canada would be disadvantaged. *Debtors and Creditors Sharing the Burden: A Review of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (2003), at p. 98; see also p. 88.)

82 In an insolvency process, a CCAA court must consider the employer's fiduciary obligations to plan members as their plan administrator. It must grant a remedy where appropriate. However, courts should not use equity to do what they wish Parliament had done through legislation.

83 In view of the fact that the Plan Members were successful on the deemed trust and fiduciary duty issues, I would not order costs against them either in the Court of Appeal or in this Court.

84 I would therefore allow the main appeals without costs in this Court, set aside the orders made by the Court of Appeal, except with respect to orders contained in paras. 9 and 10 of the judgment of the Court of Appeal in the former executive members' appeal and restore the orders of Campbell J. dated February 18, 2010. I would dismiss USW's costs appeal without costs.

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Cromwell J.:

I. Introduction

85 When a business becomes insolvent, many interests are at risk. Creditors may not be able to recover their debts, investors may lose their investments and employees may lose their jobs. If the business is the sponsor of an employee pension plan, the benefits promised by the plan are not immune from that risk. The circumstances leading to these appeals show how that risk can materialize. Pension plans and creditors find themselves in a zero-sum game with not enough money to go around. At a very general level, this case raises the issue of how the law balances the interests of pension plan beneficiaries with those of other creditors.

86 Indalex Limited, the sponsor and administrator of employee pension plans, became insolvent and sought protection from its creditors under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 ("CCAA"). Although all current contributions were up to date, the company's pension plans did not have sufficient assets to fulfill the pension promises made to their members. In a series of court-sanctioned steps, which were judged to be in the best interests of all stakeholders, the company borrowed a great deal of money to allow it to continue to operate. The parties injecting the operating money were given a super priority over the claims by other creditors. When the business was sold, thereby preserving hundreds of jobs, there was a shortfall between the sale proceeds and the debt. The pension plan beneficiaries thus found themselves in a dispute about the priority of their claims. The appellant, Sun Indalex Finance LLC, claimed it had priority by virtue of the super priority granted in the CCAA proceedings. The trustee in bankruptcy of the U.S. Debtors (George Miller) and the Monitor (FTI Consulting) joined in the appeal. The plan beneficiaries claimed that they had priority by virtue of a statutory deemed trust under the *Pension Benefits Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.8 ("PBA"), and a constructive trust arising from the company's alleged breaches of fiduciary duty.

87 The Ontario Court of Appeal sided with the plan beneficiaries and Sun Indalex, the trustee in bankruptcy and the Monitor all appeal. The specific legal points in issue are:

- A. Did the Court of Appeal err in finding that the statutory deemed trust provided for in s. 57(4) of the PBA applied to the salaried plan's wind-up deficiency?
- B. Did the Court of Appeal err in finding that Indalex breached the fiduciary duties it owed to the pension plan beneficiaries as the plans' administrator and in imposing a constructive trust as a remedy?
- C. Did the Court of Appeal err in concluding that the super priority granted in the CCAA proceedings did not have priority by virtue of the doctrine of federal paramountcy?
- D. Did the Court of Appeal err in its cost endorsement respecting the United Steelworkers ("USW")?

88 My view is that the deemed trust does not apply to the disputed funds, and even if it did, the super priority would override it. I conclude that the corporation failed in its duty to the plan beneficiaries as their administrator and that the beneficiaries ought to have been afforded more procedural protections in the CCAA proceedings. However, I also conclude that the Court of Appeal erred in using the equitable remedy of a constructive trust to defeat the super priority ordered by the CCAA judge. I would therefore allow the main appeals.

II. Facts and Proceedings Below

A. Overview

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89 These appeals concern claims by pension fund members for amounts owed to them by the plans' sponsor and administrator which became insolvent.

90 Indalex Limited is the parent company of three non-operating Canadian companies. I will refer to both Indalex Limited individually and to the group of companies collectively as "Indalex", unless the context requires further clarity. Indalex Limited is the wholly owned subsidiary of its U.S. parent, Indalex Holding Corp. which owned and conducted related operations in the U.S. through its U.S. subsidiaries which I will refer to as the "U.S. debtors".

91 In late March and early April of 2009, Indalex and the U.S. debtors were insolvent and sought protection from their creditors, the former under the Canadian *CCAA*, and the latter under the United States Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C., Chapter 11. The dispute giving rise to these appeals concern the priority granted to lenders in the *CCAA* process for funds advanced to Indalex and whether that priority overrides the claims of two of Indalex's pension plans for funds owed to them.

92 Indalex was the sponsor and administrator of two registered pension plans relevant to these proceedings, one for salaried employees and the other for executive employees. At the time of seeking *CCAA* protection, the salaried plan was being wound up (with a wind-up date of December 31, 2006) and was estimated to have a wind-up deficiency (as of the end of 2007) of roughly \$2.252 million. The executive plan, while it was not being wound up, had been closed to new members since 2005. It was estimated to have a deficiency of roughly \$2.996 million on wind up. At the time the *CCAA* proceedings were started, all regular current service contributions had been made to both plans.

93 Shortly after Indalex received *CCAA* protection, the *CCAA* judge authorized the company to enter into debtor in possession ("DIP") financing in order to allow it to continue to operate. The court granted the DIP lenders, a syndicate of banks, a "super priority" over "all other security interests, trusts, liens, charges and encumbrances, statutory or otherwise": initial order, at para. 35 (joint A.R., vol. I, at pp. 123-24). Repayment of these amounts was guaranteed by the U.S. debtors.

94 Ultimately, with the approval of the *CCAA* court, Indalex sold its business; the purchaser did not assume pension liabilities. A reserve fund was established by the *CCAA* Monitor to answer any outstanding claims. The proceeds of the sale were not sufficient to pay back the DIP lenders and so the U.S. debtors, as guarantors, paid the shortfall and stepped into the shoes of the DIP lenders in terms of priority.

95 The appellant Sun Indalex is a pre-*CCAA* secured creditor of both Indalex and the U.S. debtors. It claims the reserve fund on the basis that the US\$10.75 million paid by the guarantors would otherwise have been available to Sun Indalex as a secured creditor of the U.S. debtors in the U.S. bankruptcy proceedings. The respondent plan beneficiaries claim the reserve fund on the basis that they have a wind-up deficiency which is covered by a deemed trust created by s. 57(4) of the *PBA*. This deemed trust includes "an amount of money equal to employer contributions *accrued to the date of the wind up but not yet due* under the plan or regulations" (s. 57(4)). They also claim the reserve fund on the basis of a constructive trust arising from Indalex's failure to live up to its fiduciary duties as plan administrator.

96 The reserve fund is not sufficient to pay back both Sun Indalex and the pension plans and so the main question on the main appeals is which of the creditors is entitled to priority for their respective claims.

97 The judge at first instance rejected the plan beneficiaries' deemed trust arguments and held that, with re-

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spect to the wind-up deficiency, the plan beneficiaries were unsecured creditors, ranking behind those benefiting from the "super priority" and secured creditors (2010 ONSC 1114, 79 C.C.P.B. 301 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List])). The Court of Appeal reversed this ruling and held that pension plan deficiencies were subject to deemed and constructive trusts which had priority over the DIP financing and over other secured creditors (2011 ONCA 265, 104 O.R. (3d) 641 (Ont. C.A.)). Sun Indalex, the trustee in bankruptcy and the Monitor appeal.

B. Indalex's CCAA Proceedings

(1) The Initial Order (Joint A.R., vol. I, at p. 112)

98 As noted earlier, Indalex was in financial trouble and, on April 3, 2009, sought and obtained protection from its creditors under the *CCAA*. The order (which I will refer to as the initial order) also contained directions for service on creditors and others: paras. 39-41. The order also contained a so-called "comeback clause" allowing any interested party to apply for a variation of the order, provided that that party served notice on any other party likely to be affected by any such variation: para. 46. It is common ground that the plan beneficiaries did not receive notice of the application for the initial order but the *CCAA* court nevertheless approved the method of and time for service. Full particulars of the deficiencies in the pension plans were before the court in the motion material and the initial order addressed payment of the employer's current service pension contributions.

(2) The DIP Order (Joint A.R., vol. I, at p. 129)

99 On April 8, 2009, in what I will refer to as the DIP order, the *CCAA* judge, Morawetz J., authorized Indalex to borrow funds pursuant to a DIP credit agreement. The judge ordered among many other things, the following:

- He approved abridged notice: para. 1;
- He allowed Indalex to continue making current service contributions to the pension plans, but not special payments: paras. 7(a) and 9(b);
- He barred all proceedings against Indalex, except by consent of Indalex and the Monitor or leave of the court, until May 1, 2009: para. 15;
- He granted the DIP lenders a so-called super priority:

THIS COURT ORDERS that each of the Administration Charge, the Directors' Charge and the DIP Lenders Charge (all as constituted and defined herein) shall constitute a charge on the Property and such Charges shall rank in priority to all other security interests, trust, liens, charges and encumbrances, statutory or otherwise (collectively, "Encumbrances") in favour of any Person. [Emphasis added; para. 45.]

- He required Indalex to send notice of the order to all known creditors, other than employees and creditors to which Indalex owed less than \$5,000 and stated that Indalex and the Monitor were "at liberty" to serve the Initial Order to interested parties: paras. 49-50.

100 In his endorsement for the DIP order, Morawetz J. found that "there is no other alternative available to the Applicants [Indalex] for a going concern solution" and that DIP financing was necessary: (2009), 52 C.B.R.

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(5th) 61 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), at para. 9(c). He noted that the Monitor in its report was of the view that approval of the DIP agreement was both necessary and in the best interests of Indalex and its stakeholders, including its creditors, employees, suppliers and customers: paras. 14-16.

101 The USW, which represented some of the members of the salaried plan, was served with notice of the motion that led to the DIP order, but did not appear. Morawetz J. specifically ordered as follows with regard to service:

THIS COURT ORDERS that the time for service of the Notice of Application and the Application Record is hereby abridged so that this Application is properly returnable today and hereby dispenses with further service thereof. [DIP order, at para. 1]

(3) *The DIP Extension Order (Joint A.R., vol. I, at p. 156)*

102 On June 12, 2009, Morawetz J. heard and granted an application by Indalex to allow them to borrow approximately \$5 million more from the DIP lenders, thus raising the allowed total to US\$29.5 million.

103 Counsel for the former executives received the motion material the night before. Counsel for USW was also served with notice. At the motion, the former executives (along with second priority secured noteholders) sought to "reserve their rights with respect to the relief sought": 2009 CanLII 37906 [2009 CarswellOnt 4263 (Ont. S.C.J.)], at para. 4. Morawetz J. wrote that any "reservation of rights" would create uncertainty for the DIP lenders with regard to priority, and may prevent them from extending further advances. Moreover, the parties had presented no alternative to increased DIP financing, which was both "necessary and appropriate" and would, it was to be hoped, "improve the position of the stakeholders": paras. 5-9.

(4) *The Bidding Order ((2009), 79 C.C.P.B. 101 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]))*

104 On July 2, 2009, Indalex brought a motion for approval of proposed bidding procedures for Indalex's assets. Morawetz J. decided that a stalking horse bid by SAPA Holding AB ("SAPA") for Indalex's assets could count as a qualifying bid. Counsel on behalf of the members of the executive plan appeared, with the concern that "their position and views have not been considered in this process": para. 8. In his decision, Morawetz J. decided that these arguments could be dealt with later, at a sale approval motion: para. 10. The judge said:

The position facing the retirees is unfortunate. The retirees are currently not receiving what they bargained for. However, reality cannot be ignored and the nature of the Applicants' insolvency is such that there are insufficient assets to meet its liabilities. The retirees are not alone in this respect. The objective of these proceedings is to achieve the best possible outcome for the stakeholders.

[Emphasis added; para. 9.]

(5) *The Sale Approval Order (Joint A.R., vol. I, at p. 166)*

105 On July 20, 2009, Indalex brought two motions before Campbell J.

106 The first motion sought approval for the sale of Indalex's assets as a going concern to SAPA. SAPA was not to assume any pension liabilities. Campbell J. granted an order approving this sale.

107 The second motion sought approval for an interim distribution of the sale proceeds to the DIP lenders.

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Counsel on behalf of the executive plan members and the USW, representing some of the salaried employees, objected to the planned distribution of the sale proceeds on grounds that a statutory deemed trust applied to the deficiencies in their plans and that Indalex had breached fiduciary duties that it owed to them. Campbell J. ordered the Monitor to pay the DIP agent from the sale proceeds, but also ordered the Monitor to set up a reserve fund in an amount sufficient to answer, among other things, the claims of the plan beneficiaries pending resolution of those matters. Campbell J. ordered that the U.S. debtors be subrogated to the DIP lenders to the extent that the U.S. debtors were required under the guarantee to satisfy the DIP lenders' claims: para. 14.

(6) The Sale and Distribution of Funds

108 SAPA bought Indalex's assets on July 31, 2009. Taking the reserve fund into account, the sale did not produce sufficient funds to repay the DIP lenders in full and so the U.S. debtors paid US\$10,751,247 as guarantor to the DIP lenders: C.A. reasons, at para. 65.

(7) The Order Under Appeal

109 On August 28, 2009, Campbell J. heard claims by the USW (appearing on behalf of some members of the salaried plan) and counsel appearing on behalf of the executive plan members that the wind-up deficiency was subject to a deemed trust. He rejected these claims in a written decision on February 18, 2010. He decided that the s. 57(4) PBA deemed trust did not apply to wind-up deficiencies. The executive plan had not been wound up, and therefore there was no wind-up deficiency to be the subject of the deemed trust. As for the salaried plan, Campbell J. held that the windup deficiency was not an obligation that had "accrued to the date of the wind up" and as a result did not fall within the terms of the s. 57(4) deemed trust.

110 Indalex had asked for the stay granted under the initial order to be lifted so that it could assign itself into bankruptcy. Because he did not find a deemed trust, Campbell J. did not feel that he needed to decide on the motion to lift the stay.

(8) The Decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal

111 The Ontario Court of Appeal allowed an appeal from the decision of Campbell J.

112 Writing for a unanimous panel, Gillese J.A. decided that the s. 57(4) deemed trust is applicable to wind-up deficiencies. She took the view that s. 57(4)'s reference to "employer contributions accrued to the date of the wind up but not yet due" included all amounts that the employer owed on the wind-up of its pension plan: para. 101. In particular, she concluded that the deemed trust applied to the wind-up deficiency in the salaried plan. Gillese J.A. declined, however, to decide whether the deemed trust also applied to deficiencies in the executive plan, which had not been wound up by the relevant date: paras. 110-12. A decision on this latter point was unnecessary given her finding on the applicability of a constructive trust in this case.

113 Gillese J.A. found that the super priority provided for in the DIP order did not trump the deemed trust over the salaried plan's wind-up deficiency. Morawetz J. had not "invoked" the issue of paramountcy or made an explicit finding that the requirements of federal law required that the provincially created deemed trust must be overridden: paras. 178-79. Gillese J.A. also took the view that this Court's decision in *Ted Leroy Trucking Ltd., Re*, 2010 SCC 60, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379 (S.C.C.), did not mean that provincially created priorities that would be ineffective under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 ("BIA"), were also ineffective under the *CCAA*: paras. 185-96. The deemed trust therefore ranked ahead of the DIP security.

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114 In addition to her findings regarding deemed trusts, Gillese J.A. granted the plan beneficiaries a constructive trust over the amount of the reserve fund on the ground that Indalex, as pension plan administrator, had breached fiduciary duties that it owed to the plan beneficiaries during the *CCAA* proceedings.

115 She held that as a plan administrator who was also an employer, Indalex had fiduciary duties both to the plan beneficiaries and to the corporation: para. 129. In her view, Indalex was subject to both sets of duties throughout the *CCAA* proceedings and it had breached its duties to the plan beneficiaries in several ways. While Indalex had the right to initiate *CCAA* proceedings, this action made the plan beneficiaries vulnerable and therefore triggered its fiduciary obligations as plan administrator: paras. 132-33. Gillese J.A. enumerated the many ways in which she thought Indalex subsequently failed as plan administrator: it did nothing in the *CCAA* proceedings to fund the deficit in the underfunded plans; it applied for *CCAA* protection without notice to the beneficiaries; it obtained DIP financing on the condition that DIP lenders be granted a super priority over "statutory trusts"; it obtained this financing without notice to the plan beneficiaries; it sold its assets knowing the purchaser was not taking over the plans; and it attempted to enter into voluntary bankruptcy, which would defeat any deemed trust claims the beneficiaries might have asserted: para. 139. Gillese J.A. also noted that throughout the *CCAA* proceedings Indalex was in a conflict of interest because it was acting for both the corporation and the beneficiaries.

116 Indalex's failure to live up to its fiduciary duties meant that the plan beneficiaries were entitled to a constructive trust over the amount of the reserve fund: para. 204. Since the beneficiaries had been wronged by Indalex, and the U.S. debtors were not, with respect to Indalex, an "arm's length innocent third party" the appropriate response was to grant the beneficiaries a constructive trust: para. 204. Her conclusion on this point applied equally to the salaried and executive plans.

III. Analysis

A. First Issue: Did the Court of Appeal Err in Finding That the Deemed Statutory Trust Provided for in Section 57(4) of the PBA Applied to the Salaried Plan's Wind-up Deficiency?

(1) Introduction

117 The main issue addressed here concerns whether the statutory deemed trust provided for in s. 57(4) of the *PBA* applies to wind-up deficiencies, the payment of which is provided for in s. 75(1)(b).

118 The deemed trust created by s. 57(4) applies to "employer contributions accrued to the date of the wind-up but not yet due under the plan or regulations". Thus, to be subject to the deemed trust, the pension plan must be wound up and the amounts in question must meet three requirements. They must be (1) "employer contributions", (2) "accrued to the date of the wind-up" and (3) "not yet due". A wind-up deficiency arises "[w]here a pension plan is wound up": s. 75(1). I agree with my colleagues that there can be no deemed trust for the executive plan, because that plan had not been wound up at the relevant date. What follows, therefore, is relevant only to the salaried plan.

119 The wind-up deficiency payments are "employer contributions" which are "not yet due" as of the date of wind-up within the meaning of the *PBA*. The main issue before us, therefore, boils down to the narrow interpretative question of whether the wind-up deficiency described in s. 75(1)(b) is "accrued to the date of the wind-up".

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120 Campbell J. at first instance found that it was not, while the Court of Appeal reached the opposite conclusion. In essence, the Court of Appeal reasoned that the deemed trust in s. 57(4) "applies to all employer contributions that are required to be made pursuant to s. 75", that is, to "all amounts owed by the employer on the wind-up of its pension plan": para. 101.

121 I respectfully disagree with the Court of Appeal's conclusion for three main reasons. First, the most plausible grammatical and ordinary sense of the words "accrued to the date of the wind up" is that the amounts referred to are precisely ascertained immediately before the effective date of the plan's wind-up. The wind-up deficiency only arises upon wind-up and it is neither ascertained nor ascertainable on the date fixed for wind-up. Second, the broader statutory context reinforces this view: the language of the deemed trusts in s. 57(3) and (4) is virtually exactly repeated in s. 75(1)(a), suggesting that both deemed trusts refer to the liability on wind-up referred to in s. 75(1)(a) and not to the further and distinct wind-up deficiency liability created under s. 75(1)(b). Finally, the legislative evolution and history of these provisions show, in my view, that the legislature never intended to include the wind-up deficiency in a statutory deemed trust.

122 Before turning to the precise interpretative issue, it will be helpful to provide some context about the employer's wind-up obligations and the deemed trust provisions that are the subject of this dispute.

(2) Employer Obligations on Wind Up

123 A "wind up" means that the plan is terminated and the plan assets are distributed: see *PBA*, s. 1(1), definition of "wind up". The employer's liability on wind-up consists of two main components. The first is provided for in s. 75(1)(a) and includes "an amount equal to the total of all payments that, under this Act, the regulations and the pension plan, are due or that have accrued and that have not been paid into the pension fund". This liability applies to contributions that were due as at the wind-up date but does *not* include payments required by s. 75(1)(b) that arise as a result of the wind up: A. N. Kaplan, *Pension Law* (2006), at pp. 541-42. This second liability is known as the wind-up deficiency amount. The employer must pay all additional sums to the extent that the assets of the pension fund are insufficient to cover the value of all immediately vested and accelerated benefits and grow-in benefits: Kaplan, at p. 542. Without going into detail, there are certain statutory benefits that may arise only on wind-up, such as certain benefit enhancements and the potential for acceleration of pension entitlements. Thus, wind-up will usually result in additional employer liabilities over and above those arising from the obligation to pay all benefits provided for in the plan itself: see, e.g., ss. 73 and 74; Kaplan, at p. 542. As the Court of Appeal concluded, the payments provided for under s. 75(1)(a) are those which the employer had to make while the plan was ongoing, while s. 75(1)(b) refers to the employer's obligation to make up for any wind-up deficiency: paras. 90-91.

124 For convenience, the provision as it then stood is set out here.

75. (1) Where a pension plan is wound up in whole or in part, the employer shall pay into the pension fund,

(a) an amount equal to the total of all payments that, under this Act, the regulations and the pension plan, are due or that have accrued and that have not been paid into the pension fund; and

(b) an amount equal to the amount by which,

(i) the value of the pension benefits under the pension plan that would be guaranteed by the Guarantee Fund under this Act and the regulations if the Superintendent declares that the Guarantee

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Fund applies to the pension plan,

(ii) the value of the pension benefits accrued with respect to employment in Ontario vested under the pension plan, and

(iii) the value of benefits accrued with respect to employment in Ontario resulting from the application of subsection 39 (3) (50 per cent rule) and section 74,

exceed the value of the assets of the pension fund allocated as prescribed for payment of pension benefits accrued with respect to employment in Ontario.

125 While a wind up is effective as of a fixed date, a wind up is nonetheless best thought of not simply as a moment or a single event, but as a process. It begins by a triggering event and continues until all of the plan assets have been distributed. To oversimplify somewhat, the wind-up process involves the following components.

126 The assets and liabilities of the plan as of the wind-up date must be determined. As noted earlier, the precise extent of the liability, while *fixed as of that date*, will not be ascertained or ascertainable *on that date*. The extent of the liability may depend on choices open to plan beneficiaries under the plan and on the exercise by them of certain statutory rights beyond the options that would otherwise have been available under the plan itself. The plan members must be notified of the wind-up and have their entitlements and options set out for them and given an opportunity to make their choices. The plan administrator must file a wind-up report which includes a statement of the plan's assets and liabilities, the benefits payable under the terms of the plan, and the method of allocating and distributing the assets including the priorities for the payment of benefits: *PBA*, s. 70(1), and R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 909, s. 29 (the "*PBA Regulations*").

127 Benefits to members may take the form of "cash refunds, immediate or deferred annuities, transfers to registered retirement saving plans, [etc.] ... In principle, the value of these benefits is the present value of the benefits accrued to the date of plan termination": *The Mercer Pension Manual* (loose-leaf), vol. 1, at p. 10-41. That present value is an actuarial calculation performed on the basis of various assumptions including assumptions about investment return, mortality and so forth.

128 If, when the assets and liabilities are calculated, the assets are insufficient to satisfy the liabilities, the employer (i.e. the plan sponsor) must make up for any wind-up deficiency: *PBA*, s. 75(1)(b). An employer can elect to space these payments out over the course of five years: *PBA Regulations*, s. 31(2). Because these payments are based on the extent to which there is a deficit between assets in the pension plan and the benefits owed to beneficiaries, their amount varies with the market and other assumed elements of the calculation over the course of the permitted five years.

129 To take the salaried plan as an example, at the time of wind-up, all regular current service contributions had been made: C.A. reasons, at para. 33. The wind-up deficiency was initially estimated to be \$1,655,200. Indalex made special wind-up payments of \$709,013 in 2007 and \$875,313 in 2008, but as of December 31, 2008, the wind-up deficiency was \$1,795,600 — i.e. higher than it had been two years before, notwithstanding that payments of roughly \$1.6 million had been made: C.A. reasons, at para. 32. Indalex made another payment of \$601,000 in April 2009: C.A. reasons, at para. 32.

(3) *The Deemed Trust Provisions*

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130 The *PBA* contains provisions whose purpose is to exempt money owing to a pension plan, and which is held or owing by the employer, from being seized or attached by the employer's other creditors: Kaplan, at p. 395. This is accomplished by creating a "deemed trust" with respect to certain pension contributions such that these amounts are held by the employer in trust for the employees or pension beneficiaries.

131 There are two deemed trusts that we must examine here, one relating to employer contributions that are *due but have not been paid* and another relating to employer contributions *accrued but not due*. This second deemed trust is the one in issue here, but it is important to understand how the two fit together.

132 The deemed trust relating to employer contributions "due and not paid" is found in s. 57(3). The *PBA* and *PBA* regulations contain many provisions relating to contributions required by employers, the due dates for which are specified. Briefly, the required contributions are these.

133 When a pension is ongoing, employers need to make regular current service cost contributions. These are made monthly, within 30 days after the month to which they relate: *PBA* Regulations, s. 4(4)3. There are also special payments, which relate to deficiencies between a pension plan's assets and liabilities. There are "going-concern" deficiencies and "solvency" deficiencies, the distinction between which is unimportant for the purposes of these appeals. A plan administrator must regularly file actuarial reports, which may disclose deficiencies: *PBA* Regulations, s. 14. Where there is a going-concern deficiency the employer must make equal monthly payments over a 15-year period to rectify it: *PBA* Regulations, s. 5(1)(b). Where there is a solvency deficiency, the employer must make equal monthly payments over a five-year period to rectify it: *PBA* Regulations, s. 5(1)(e). Once these regular or special payments become due but have not been paid, they are subject to the s. 57(3) deemed trust.

134 I turn next to the s. 57(4) deemed trust, which gives rise to the question before us. The subsection provides that "[w]here a pension plan is wound up ... an employer who is required to pay contributions to the pension fund shall be deemed to hold in trust for the beneficiaries of the pension plan *an amount of money equal to employer contributions accrued to the date of the wind up but not yet due* under the plan or regulations."

135 When a pension plan is wound up there will be an interrupted monthly payment period, which is sometimes referred to as the stub period. During this stub period regular and special liabilities will have accrued but not yet become due. Section 58(1) provides that money that an employer is required to pay "accrues on a daily basis". Because the amounts referred to in s. 57(4) are not yet due, they are not covered by the s. 57(3) deemed trust, which applies only to payments that are *due*. The two provisions, then, operate in tandem to create a trust over an employer's unfulfilled obligations, which are "due and not paid" as well as those which have "accrued to the date of the wind up but [are] not yet due".

(4) *The Interpretative Approach*

136 The issue we confront is one of statutory interpretation and the well-settled approach is that "the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament": E. A. Driedger, *Construction of Statutes* (2nd ed. 1983), at p. 87; *Bell ExpressVu Ltd. Partnership v. Rex*, 2002 SCC 42, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559 (S.C.C.), at para. 26. Taking this approach it is clear to me that the sponsor's obligation to pay a wind-up deficiency is not covered by the statutory deemed trust provided for in s. 57(4) of the *PBA*. In my view, the deficiency neither "accrued", nor did it arise within the period referred to by the words "to the date of the wind up".

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(a) Grammatical and Ordinary Sense of the Words "Accrued" and "to the Date of the Wind Up"

137 The Court of Appeal failed to take sufficient account of the ordinary and grammatical meaning of the text of the provisions. It held that "the deemed trust in s. 57(4) applies to *all employer contributions that are required to be made pursuant to s. 75*": para. 101 (emphasis added). However, the plain words of the section show that this conclusion is erroneous. Section 75(1)(a) refers to liability for employer contributions that "*are due ... and that have not been paid*". These amounts are thus *not* included in the s. 57(4) deemed trust, because it addresses only amounts that have "accrued to the date of the wind up *but [are] not yet due*". Amounts "due" are covered by the s. 57(3) deemed trust and not, as the Court of Appeal concluded by the deemed trust created by s. 57(4). The Court of Appeal therefore erred in finding, in effect, that amounts which "are due" could be included in a deemed trust covering amounts "not yet due".

138 In my view, the most plausible grammatical and ordinary sense of the phrase "accrued to the date of the wind up" in s. 57(4) is that it refers to the sums that are ascertained immediately before the effective wind-up date of the plan.

139 In the context of s. 57(4), the grammatical and ordinary sense of the term "accrued" is that the amount of the obligation is "fully constituted" and "ascertained" although it may not yet be payable. The amount of the wind-up deficiency is not fully constituted or ascertained (or even ascertainable) before or even on the date fixed for wind up and therefore cannot fall under s. 57(4).

140 Of course, the meaning of the word "accrued" may vary with context. In general, when the term "accrued" is used in relation to legal rights, its common meaning is that the right has become fully constituted even though the monetary implications of its enforcement are not yet known or knowable. Thus, we speak of the "accrual" of a cause of action in tort when all of the elements of the cause of action come into existence, even though the extent of the damage may well not be known or knowable at that time: see, e.g., *Ryan v. Moore*, 2005 SCC 38, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 53 (S.C.C.). However, when the term is used in relation to a sum of money, it will generally refer to an amount that is at the present time either quantified or exactly quantifiable but which may or may not be due.

141 In some contexts, a liability is said to accrue when it becomes due. An accrued liability is said to be "properly chargeable" or "owing on a given day" or "completely constituted": see, e.g., *Black's Law Dictionary* (9th ed. 2009), at p. 997, "accrued liability"; D.A. Dukelow, *The Dictionary of Canadian Law* (4th ed. 2011), at p. 13, "accrued liability"; *Ontario Hydro-Electric Power Commission v. Albright* (1922), 64 S.C.R. 306 (S.C.C.).

142 In other contexts, an amount which has accrued may not yet be due. For example, we speak of "accrued interest" meaning a precise, quantified amount of interest that has been earned but may not yet be payable. The term "accrual" is used in the same way in "accrual accounting". In accrual method accounting, "transactions that give rise to revenue or costs are recognized in the accounts when they are earned and incurred respectively": B. J. Arnold, *Timing and Income Taxation: The Principles of Income Measurement for Tax Purposes* (1983), at p. 44. Revenue is earned when the recipient "substantially completes performance of everything he or she is required to do as long as the amount due is ascertainable and there is no uncertainty about its collection": P. W. Hogg, J. E. Magee and J. Li, *Principles of Canadian Income Tax Law* (7th ed., 2010), at s. 6.5(b); see also Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants, *CICA Handbook — Accounting*, Part II, s. 1000, at paras. 41-44. In this context, the amount must be ascertained at the time of accrual.

143 The *Hydro-Electric Power Commission* case offers a helpful definition of the word "accrued" in this

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sense. On a sale of shares, the vendor undertook to provide on completion "a sum estimated by him to be equal to sinking fund payments [on the bonds and debentures] *which shall have accrued but shall not be due* at the time for completion": p. 344 (emphasis added). The bonds and debentures required the company to pay on July 1 of each year a fixed sum for each electrical horsepower sold and paid for during the preceding calendar year. A dispute arose as to what amounts were payable in this respect on completion. Duff J. held that in this context accrued meant "completely constituted", referring to this as a "well recognized usage": p. 312. He went on:

Where ... a lump sum is made payable on a specified date and where, having regard to the purposes of the payment or to the terms of the instrument, this sum must be considered to be made up of an accumulation of sums in respect of which the right to receive payment is completely constituted before the date fixed for payment, then it is quite within the settled usage of lawyers to describe each of such accumulated parts as a sum accrued or accrued due before the date of payment: p. 316.

Thus, at every point at which a liability to pay a fixed sum arose under the terms of the contract, that liability accrued. It was fully constituted even though not yet due because the obligation to make the payment was in the future. In reaching this conclusion, Duff J. noted that the bonds and debentures used the word "accrued" in contrast to "due" and that this strengthened the interpretation of "accrued" as an obligation fully constituted but not yet payable. Similarly in s. 57(4), the word "accrued" is used in contrast to the word "due".

144 Given my understanding of the ordinary meaning of the word "accrued", I must respectfully disagree with my colleague, Justice Deschamps' position that the wind-up deficiency can be said to have "accrued" to the date of wind up. In her view, "[s]ince the employees cease to accumulate entitlements when the plan is wound up, the entitlements that are used to calculate the contributions have all been accumulated before the wind-up date" (para. 34) and "no new liabilities accrue at the time of or after the wind up" (para. 36). My colleague maintains that "[t]he fact that the precise amount of the contribution is not determined as of the time of the wind up does not make it a contingent contribution that cannot have accrued for accounting purposes" (para. 37 referring to *Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Ontario (Minister of Revenue)* (1998), 41 O.R. (3d) 606 (Ont. C.A.)).

145 I cannot agree that no new liability accrues on or after the wind up. As discussed in more detail earlier, the wind-up deficiency in s. 75(1)(b) is made up of the difference between the plan's assets and liabilities calculated as of the date of wind up. On wind up, the *PBA* accords statutory entitlements and protections to employees that would not otherwise be available: Kaplan, at p. 532. Wind up therefore gives rise to new liabilities. In particular, on wind up, and only on wind up, plan beneficiaries are entitled, under s. 74, to make elections regarding the payment of their benefits. The plan's liabilities cannot be determined until those elections are made. Contrary to what my colleague Justice Deschamps suggests, the extent of the wind-up deficiency depends on employee rights that arise only upon wind up and with respect to which employees make elections only after wind up.

146 Moreover, the wind-up deficiency will vary after wind up because the amount of money necessary to provide for the payment of the plan sponsor's liabilities will vary with the market. Section 31 of the *PBA* Regulations allows s. 75 payments to be spaced out over the course of five years. As we have seen, the amount of the wind-up deficiency will fluctuate over this period (I set out earlier how this amount in fact fluctuated markedly in the case of the salaried plan in issue here). Thus, while estimates are periodically made and reported after the wind up to determine how much the employer needs to pay, the precise amount of the wind-up deficiency is not ascertained or ascertainable on the date of the wind up.

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147 I turn next to the ordinary and grammatical sense of the words "to the date of the wind up" in s. 57(4). In my view, these words indicate that only those contributions that accrue before the date of wind up, and not those amounts the liability for which arises only on the day of wind up — that is, the wind-up deficiency — are included.

148 Where the legislature intends to include the date of wind up, it has used suitable language to effect that purpose. For example, the English version of a provision amending the *PBA* in 2010 (c. 24, s. 21(2)), s. 68(2)(c), indicates which trade unions are entitled to notice of the wind up:

(2) If the employer or the administrator, as the case may be, intends to wind up the pension plan, the administrator shall give written notice of the intended wind up to,

.....

(c) each trade union that represents members of the pension plan or that, on the date of the wind up, represented the members, former members or retired members of the pension plan;

In contrast to the phrase "to the date of wind up", "on the date of wind up" clearly includes the date of wind up. (The French version does not indicate a different intention.) Similarly, s. 70(6), which formed part of the *PBA* until 2012 (rep. S.O. 2010, c. 9, s. 52(5)), read as follows:

(6) On the partial wind up of a pension plan, members, former members and other persons entitled to benefits under the pension plan shall have rights and benefits that are not less than the rights and benefits they would have on a full wind up of the pension plan on the effective date of the partial wind up.

The words "on the effective date of the partial wind up" indicate that the members are entitled to those benefits from the date of the partial wind up, in the sense that members can claim their benefits beginning on the date of the wind up itself. This is how the legislature expresses itself when it wants to speak of a period of time including a specific date. By comparison, "to the date of the wind up" is devoid of language that would include the actual date of wind up. This conclusion is further supported by the structure of the *PBA* and its legislative history and evolution, to which I will turn shortly.

149 To sum up with respect to the ordinary and grammatical meaning of the phrase "accrued to the date of the wind up", the most plausible ordinary and grammatical meaning is that such amounts are fully constituted and precisely ascertained immediately before the date fixed as the date of wind up. Thus, according to the ordinary and grammatical meaning of the words, the wind-up deficiency obligation set out in s. 75(1)(b) has not "*accrued to the date of the wind up*" as required by s. 57(4). Moreover, the liability for the wind-up deficiency arises where a pension plan is wound up (s. 75(1)(b)) and so it cannot be a liability that "*accrued to the date of the wind up*" (s. 57(4)).

(b) The Scheme of the Act

150 As discussed earlier, s. 57 establishes deemed trusts over funds which must be contributed to a pension plan, including the one in s. 57(4), which is at issue here. It is helpful to consider these deemed trusts in the context of the obligations to pay funds which give rise to them. Specifically, the relationship between the deemed trust provisions in s. 57(3) and (4), on one hand, and s. 75(1), which sets out liabilities on wind up on the other. According to my colleague Justice Deschamps, s. 75(1) "elegantly parallels the wind-up deemed trust provision"

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(para. 42) such that the deemed trusts must include the wind-up deficiency. I disagree. In my view, the deemed trusts parallel only s. 75(1)(a), which does not relate to the wind-up deficiency. The correspondence between the deemed trusts and s. 75(1)(a), and the absence of any such correspondence with s. 75(1)(b), makes it clear that the wind-up deficiency is not covered by the deemed trust provisions.

151 I would recall here the difference between the deemed trusts created by s. 57(3) and (4). While a plan is ongoing, there may be payments which the employer is required to, but has failed to make. The s. 57(3) trust applies to these payments because they are "*due and not paid*". When a plan is wound up, however, there will be payments that are outstanding in the sense that they are fully constituted, but not yet due. This occurs with respect to the so-called stub period referred to earlier. During this stub period, regular and special liabilities will accrue on a daily basis, as provided for in s. 58(1), but may not be due at the time of wind up. While s. 57(3) cannot apply to these payments because they are not yet due, the deemed trust under s. 57(4) applies to these payments because liability for them has "accrued to the date of the wind up" and they are "*not yet due*".

152 The important point is how these two deemed trust provisions relate to the wind-up liabilities as described in ss. 75(1)(a) and 75(1)(b). The two paragraphs refer to sums of money that are different in kind: while s. 75(1)(a) refers to liabilities that accrue before wind up and that are created elsewhere in the Act, s. 75(1)(b) creates a completely new liability that comes into existence only once the plan is wound up. There is no dispute, as I understand it, that these two paragraphs refer to different liabilities and that it is the liability described in s. 75(1)(b) that is the wind-up deficiency in issue here. The parties do not dispute that s. 75(1)(a) does *not* include wind-up deficiency payments.

153 It is striking how closely the text of s. 75(1)(a) — which does not relate to the wind-up deficiency — tracks the language of the deemed trust provisions in s. 57(3) and (4). As noted, s. 57(3) deals with "employer contributions due and not paid", while s. 57(4) deals with "employer contributions accrued to the date of the wind up but not yet due." Section 75(1)(a) includes both of these types of employer contributions. It refers to "payments that ... are due ... and that have not been paid" (i.e. subject to the deemed trust under s. 57(3)) or that have "accrued and that have not been paid" (i.e. subject to the deemed trust under s. 57(4) to the extent that these payments accrued to the date of wind up). This very close tracking of the language between s. 57(3) and (4) on the one hand and s. 75(1)(a) on the other, and the absence of any correspondence between the language of these deemed trust provisions with s. 75(1)(b), suggests that the s. 57(3) and (4) deemed trusts refer to the liability described in s. 75(1)(a) and not to the wind-up deficiency created by s. 75(1)(b). It is difficult to understand why, if the intention had been for s. 57(4) to capture the windup deficiency liability under s. 75(1)(b), the legislature would have so closely tracked the language of s. 75(1)(a) alone in creating the deemed trusts. Thus, in my respectful view, the elegant parallel to which my colleague, Justice Deschamps refers exists only between the deemed trust and s. 75(1)(a), and not between the deemed trust and the wind-up deficiency.

154 I conclude that the scheme of the *PBA* reinforces my conclusion that the ordinary grammatical sense of the words in s. 57(4) does not extend to the wind-up deficiency provided for in s. 75(1)(b).

(c) Legislative History and Evolution

155 Legislative history and evolution may form an important part of the overall context within which a provision should be interpreted. Legislative evolution refers to the various formulations of the provision while legislative history refers to evidence about the provision's conception, preparation and enactment: see, e.g., *Canada (Attorney General) v. Mowat*, 2011 SCC 53, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 471 (S.C.C.), at para. 43.

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156 Both the legislative evolution and history of the *PBA* show that it was never the legislature's intention to include the wind-up deficiency in the deemed trust. The evolution and history of the *PBA* are rather intricate and sometimes difficult to follow so I will review them briefly here before delving into a more detailed analysis.

157 The deemed trust was first introduced into the *PBA* in 1973. At that time, it covered employee contributions held by the employer and employer contributions that were due but not paid. In 1980, the *PBA* was amended so that the deemed trust was expanded to include employer contributions whether they were due or not. Also, new provisions were added allowing for employee elections and requiring additional payments by the employer where a plan was wound up. The 1980 amendments gave rise to confusion on two fronts: first, it was unclear whether the payments that were required on wind up were subject to the deemed trust; second, it was unclear whether a lien over some employer contributions covered the same amount as the deemed trust. In 1983, both these points were clarified. The sections were reworded and rearranged to make it clear that the wind-up deficiency was distinct from the amounts covered by the deemed trust, and that the lien and the deemed trust covered the same amount. A statement by the responsible Minister in 1982 confirms that *the deemed trusts were never intended to cover the wind-up deficiency*.

158 My colleague, Justice Deschamps maintains that this history suggests an evolution in the intention of the legislature from protecting "only the service contributions that were due ... to all amounts due and accrued upon wind up" (para. 42). I respectfully disagree. In my view, the history and evolution of the *PBA* leading up to and including 1983 show that the legislature never intended to include the windup deficiency in the deemed trust. Moreover, legislative evolution after 1983 confirms that this intention did not change.

(i) *The Pension Benefits Amendment Act, 1973, S.O. 1973, c. 113*

159 So far as I can determine, statutory deemed trusts were first introduced into the *PBA* by *The Pension Benefits Amendment Act, 1973, S.O. 1973, c. 113, s. 6*. Those amendments created deemed trusts over two amounts: employee pension contributions received by employers (s. 23a(1), similar to the deemed trust in the current s. 57(1)) and employer contributions that had fallen due under the plan (s. 23a(3), similar to the current s. 57(3) deemed trust for employer contributions "due and not paid"). The full text of these provisions and those referred to below, up to the current version of the 1990 Act, are found in the Appendix.

(ii) *The Pension Benefits Amendment Act, 1980, S.O. 1980, c. 80*

160 Ontario undertook significant pension reform leading to *The Pension Benefits Amendment Act, 1980, S.O. 1980, c. 80*; see Kaplan at pp. 54-56. I will concentrate on the deemed trust provisions and how they related to the liabilities on wind up and, for ease of reference, I will refer to the sections as they were renumbered in the 1980 consolidation: R.S.O. 1980, c. 373. The 1980 legislation expanded the deemed trust relating to employer contributions. Although far from clear, the new provisions appear to have created a deemed trust and lien over the employer contributions whether otherwise payable or not and calculated as if the plan had been wound up on the relevant date.

161 It was unclear after the reforms of 1980 whether the deemed trust applied to all employer contributions that arose on wind up. According to s. 23(4), on any given date, the trust extended to an amount to be determined "as if the plan had been wound up on that date". However, the provisions of the 1980 version of the Act did not explicitly state what such a calculation would include. Under s. 21(2) of the 1980 statute, the employer was obligated to pay on wind up "all amounts that would otherwise have been required to be paid to meet the tests for solvency ..., up to the date of such termination or winding up". Under s. 32, however, the employer had to

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make a payment on wind up that was to be "[i]n addition" to that due under s. 21(2). Whether the legislature intended that the trust should cover this latter payment was left unclear.

162 It was also unclear whether the lien applied to a different amount than was subject to the deemed trust. According to s. 23(3), "the members have a lien upon the assets of the employer in such amount that in the ordinary course of business would be entered into the books of account whether so entered or not". This comes in the middle of two portions of the provision which explicitly refer to the deemed trust, but it is not clear whether the legislature intended to refer to the same amount throughout the provision.

(iii) The Pension Benefits Amendment Act, 1983, S.O. 1983, c. 2

163 The 1983 amendments substantially clarified the scope of the deemed trust and lien for employer contributions. They make clear that neither the deemed trust nor the lien applied to the wind-up deficiency; the responsible Minister confirmed that this was the intention of the amendments.

164 The new provision was amended by s. 3 of the 1983 amendments and is found in s. 23(4) which provided:

(4) An employer who is required by a pension plan to contribute to the pension plan shall be deemed to hold in trust for the members of the pension plan an amount of money equal to the total of,

(a) all moneys that the employer is required to pay into the pension plan to meet,

(i) the current service cost, and

(ii) the special payments prescribed by the regulations,

that are due under the pension plan or the regulations and have not been paid into the pension plan; and

(b) where the pension plan is terminated or wound up, any other money that the employer is liable to pay under clause 21 (2) (a).

Section 21(2)(a) provides that on wind up, the employers must pay an amount equal to *the current service cost and the special payments* that "have accrued to and including the date of the termination winding up but, under the terms of the pension plan or the regulations, are not due on that date"; the provision adds that these amounts shall be deemed to accrue on a daily basis. These provisions make it clear that the s. 23(4) deemed trust applies only to the special payments and current service costs that have accrued, on a daily basis, up to and including the date of wind up. The deemed trust clearly does not extend to the wind-up deficiency.

165 The provision referring to the additional payments required on wind up also makes clear that those payments are not within the scope of the deemed trust. These additional liabilities were described by s. 32, a provision very similar to s. 75(1)(b). These amounts are first, the amount guaranteed by the Guarantee Fund and, second, the value of pension benefits vested under the plan that exceed the value of the assets of the plan. Section 32(2) specifies that these amounts are "*in addition* to the amounts that the employer is liable to pay under subsection 21(2)" (which are the payments comparable to the current s. 75(1)(a) payments) and that *only the latter* fall within the deemed trust. The inevitable conclusion is that, in 1983, the wind-up deficiency was not included in the scope of the deemed trust.

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166 The 1983 amendments also clarified the scope of the lien. They indicated that the scope of the lien was identical to the scope of the deemed trust. Section 23(5) specified that the lien extended only to the amounts that were deemed to be held in trust under s. 23(4) (i.e. the *current service costs and special payments that had accrued to and including the date of the wind up but are not yet due*).

167 This makes two things clear: that the lien covers the same amounts as the deemed trust, and that neither covers the wind-up deficiency.

168 A brief, but significant piece of legislative history seems to me to dispel any possible doubt. In speaking at first reading of the 1983 amendments, the Minister responsible, the Honourable Robert Elgie said this:

The first group of today's amendments makes up the housekeeping changes needed for us to do what we set out to do in late 1980; that is, to guarantee pension benefits following the windup of a defined pension benefit plan. These amendments will clarify the ways in which we can attain that goal.

In Bill 214 [i.e. the 1980 amendments] the employees were given a lien on the employer's assets for employee contributions to a pension plan collected by the employer, as well as accrued employer contributions....

Unfortunately, this protection has resulted in different legal interpretations on the extent of the lien. An argument has been advanced that the amount of the lien includes an employer's potential future liability on the windup of a pension plan. This was never intended and is not necessary to provide the required protection. The amendment to section 23 clarified the intent of Bill 214. [Emphasis added.]

(*Legislature of Ontario Debates: Official Report (Hansard)*, No. 99, 2nd Sess., 32nd Parl., July 7, 1982, p. 3568)

The 1983 amendments made the scope of the lien correspond precisely to the scope of the deemed trust over the employer's accrued contributions. It is thus clear from this statement that it was never the legislative intention that either should apply to "an employer's potential future liability" on wind up (i.e. the wind-up deficiency). In 1983, there is therefore, in my view, virtually irrefutable evidence of legislative intent to do exactly the opposite of what the Court of Appeal held in this case had been done.

169 Subsequent legislative evolution shows no change in this legislative intent. In fact, subsequent amendments demonstrate a clear legislative intent to exclude from the deemed trust employer liabilities that arise only upon wind up of the plan.

(iv) Pension Benefits Act, 1987, S.O. 1987, c. 35

170 Amendments to the PBA in 1987 resulted in it being substantially in its current form. With those amendments, the extent of the deemed trusts was further clarified. The provision in the 1983 version of the Act combined within a single subsection a deemed trust for employer contributions that were due and not paid (s. 23(4)(a)) and employer contributions that had accrued to and including the date of wind up but which were not yet due (s. 23(4)(b), referring to s. 21(2)(a)). In the 1987 amendments, these two trusts were each given their own subsection and their scope was further clarified. Moreover, after the 1987 revision, one no longer had to refer to a separate provision (formerly s. 21(2)(a)) to determine the scope of the trust covering payments that were accrued but not yet due. Thus, while the substance of the provisions did not change in 1987, their form was

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simplified.

171 The new s. 58(3) (which is exactly the same as the current s. 57(3)) replaced the former s. 23(4)(a). This created a trust for employer contributions due and not paid. Section 58(4) (which is exactly the same as s. 57(4) stood at the time) replaced the former s. 23(4)(b) and part of s. 21(2)(a) and created a trust that arises on wind up and covers "employer contributions accrued *to the date of the wind up* but not yet due".

172 The 1987 amendment also shows that the legislature adverted to the difference between "to the date of the wind up" and "to and including" the date of wind up and chose the former. This is reflected in a small but significant change in the wording of the relevant provisions. The former provision, s. 23(4)(b), by referring to s. 21(2)(a) captured current service costs and special payments that "have *accrued to and including* the date of the termination or winding up." The new version in s. 58(4) deletes the words "and including", putting the section in its present form. This deletion, to my way of thinking, reinforces the legislative intent to *exclude* from the deemed trust liabilities that arise only *on* the date of wind up. Respectfully, the legislative record does not support Deschamps J.'s view that there was a legislative evolution towards a more expanded deemed trust. Quite the opposite.

173 To sum up, I draw the following conclusions from this review of the legislative evolution and history. The legislation differentiates between two types of employer liability relevant to this case. The first is the contributions required to cover current service costs and any other payments that are either due or have accrued on a daily basis up to the relevant time. These are the payments referred to in the current s. 75(1)(a), that is, payments due or accrued but not paid. The second relates to additional contributions required when a plan is wound up which I have referred to as the wind-up deficiency. These payments are addressed in s. 75(1)(b). The legislative history and evolution show that the deemed trusts under s. 57(3) and (4) were intended to apply only to the former amounts and that it was never the intention that there should be a deemed trust or a lien with respect to an employer's potential future liabilities that arise once the plan is wound up.

(d) The Purpose of the Legislation

174 Excluding the wind-up deficiency from the deemed trust is consistent with the broader purposes of the legislation. Pension legislation aims at important protective purposes. These protective purposes, however, are not pursued at all costs and are clearly intended to be balanced with other important interests within the context of a carefully calibrated scheme: *Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Ontario (Superintendent of Financial Services)*, 2004 SCC 54, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 152 (S.C.C.), at paras. 13-14.

175 In this instance, the legislature has created trusts over contributions that were due or accrued to the date of the wind up in order to protect, to some degree, the rights of pension plan beneficiaries and employees from the claims of the employer's other creditors. However, there is also good reason to think that the legislature had in mind other competing objectives in not extending the deemed trust to the wind-up deficiency.

176 First, if there were to be a deemed trust over all employer liabilities that arise when a plan is wound up, much simpler and clearer words could readily be found to achieve that objective.

177 Second, extending the deemed trust protections to the wind-up deficiency might well be viewed as counter-productive in the greater scheme of things. A deemed trust of that nature might give rise to considerable uncertainty on the part of other creditors and potential lenders. This uncertainty might not only complicate creditors' rights, but it might also affect the availability of funds from lenders. The wind-up liability is potentially

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large and, while the business is ongoing, the extent of the liability is unknown and unknowable for up to five years. Its amount may, as the facts of this case disclose, fluctuate dramatically during this time. A liability of this nature could make it very difficult to assess the creditworthiness of a borrower and make an appropriate apportionment of payment among creditors extremely difficult.

178 While I agree that the protection of pension plans is an important objective, it is not for this Court to decide the extent to which that objective will be pursued and at what cost to other interests. In her conclusion, Justice Deschamps notes that although the protection of pension plans is a worthy objective, courts should not use the law of equity to re-arrange the priorities that Parliament has established under the *CCAA*. This is a matter of policy where courts must defer to legislatures (reasons of Justice Deschamps, at para. 82). In my view, my colleague's comments on this point are equally applicable to the policy decisions reflected in the text of the *PBA*. The decision as to the level of protection that should be provided to pension beneficiaries is one to be left to the Ontario legislature. Faced with the language in the *PBA*, I would be slow to infer that the broader protective purpose, with all its potential disadvantages, was intended. In short, the interpretation I would adopt is consistent with a balanced approach to protection of benefits which the legislature intended.

179 For these reasons, I am of the respectful view that the Court of Appeal erred in finding that the s. 57(4) deemed trust applied to the wind-up deficiency.

B. Second Issue: Did the Court of Appeal Err in Finding That Indalex Breached the Fiduciary Duties it Owed to the Pension Beneficiaries as the Plans' Administrator and in Imposing a Constructive Trust as a Remedy?

(1) Introduction

180 The Court of Appeal found that during the *CCAA* proceedings Indalex breached its fiduciary obligations as administrator of the pension plans: para. 116. As a remedy, it imposed a remedial constructive trust over the reserve fund, effectively giving the plan beneficiaries recovery of 100 cents on the dollar in priority to all other creditors, including creditors entitled to the super priority ordered by the *CCAA* court.

181 The breaches identified by the Court of Appeal fall into three categories. First, Indalex breached the prohibition against a fiduciary being in a position of conflict of interest because its interests in dealing with its insolvency conflicted with its duties as plan administrator to act in the best interests of the plans' members and beneficiaries: para. 142. According to the Court of Appeal, the simple fact that Indalex found itself in this position of conflict of interest was, of itself, a breach of its fiduciary duty as plan administrator. Second, Indalex breached its fiduciary duty by applying, without notice to the plans' beneficiaries, for *CCAA* protection: para. 139. Third, Indalex breached its fiduciary duty by seeking and/or obtaining various relief in the *CCAA* proceedings including the "super priority" in favour of the DIP lenders, approval of the sale of the business knowing that no payment would be made to the underfunded plans over the statutory deemed trusts and seeking to be put into bankruptcy with the intention of defeating the deemed trust claims: para. 139. As a remedy for these breaches of fiduciary duty the court imposed a constructive trust.

182 In my view, the Court of Appeal took much too expansive a view of the fiduciary duties owed by Indalex as plan administrator and found breaches where there were none. As I see it, the only breach of fiduciary duty committed by Indalex occurred when, upon insolvency, Indalex's corporate interests were in obvious conflict with its fiduciary duty as plan administrator to ensure that all contributions were made to the plans when due. The breach was not in failing to avoid this conflict — the conflict itself was unavoidable. Its breach was in

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failing to address the conflict to ensure that the plan beneficiaries had the opportunity to have representation in the CCAA proceedings as if there were independent plan administrators. I also conclude that a remedial constructive trust is not available as a remedy for this breach.

183 This part of the appeals requires us to answer two questions which I will address in turn:

- (i) What fiduciary duties did Indalex have in its role as plan administrator and did it breach them?
- (ii) If so, was imposition of a constructive trust an appropriate remedy?

(2) *What Fiduciary Duties did Indalex Have in its Role as Plan Administrator and Did it Breach Those Duties?*

(a) Legal Principles

184 The appellants do not dispute that Indalex, in its role of administrator of the plans, had fiduciary duties to the members of the plan and that when it is acting in that role it can only act in the interests of the plans' beneficiaries. It is not necessary for present purposes to decide whether a pension plan administrator is a *per se* or *ad hoc* fiduciary, although it must surely be rare that a pension plan administrator would not have fiduciary duties in carrying out that role: *Burke v. Hudson's Bay Co.*, 2010 SCC 34, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 273 (S.C.C.), at para. 41, affg 2008 ONCA 394, 67 C.C.P.B. 1 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 55.

185 However, the conclusion that Indalex as plan administrator had fiduciary duties to the plan beneficiaries is the beginning, not the end of the inquiry. This is because fiduciary duties do not exist at large, but arise from and relate to the specific legal interests at stake: *Elder Advocates of Alberta Society v. Alberta*, 2011 SCC 24, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 261 (S.C.C.), at para. 31. As La Forest J. put it in *International Corona Resources Ltd. v. LAC Minerals Ltd.*, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 574 (S.C.C.):

The obligation imposed [on a fiduciary] may vary in its specific substance depending on the relationship ... [N]ot every legal claim arising out of a relationship with fiduciary incidents will give rise to a claim for breach of fiduciary duty.... It is only in relation to breaches of the specific obligations imposed because the relationship is one characterized as fiduciary that a claim for breach of fiduciary duty can be founded.

[Emphasis added; pp. 646-47.]

186 The nature and scope of the fiduciary duty must, therefore, be assessed in the legal framework governing the relationship out of which the fiduciary duty arises: see, e.g., *Sharbern Holding Inc. v. Vancouver Airport Centre Ltd.*, 2011 SCC 23, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 175 (S.C.C.), at para. 141; *Perez v. Galambos*, 2009 SCC 48, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 247 (S.C.C.), at paras. 36-37; *B. (K.L.) v. British Columbia*, 2003 SCC 51, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 403 (S.C.C.), at para. 41. So, for example, as a general rule, a fiduciary has a duty of loyalty including the duty to avoid conflicts of interest: see, e.g., *3464920 Canada Inc. v. Strother*, 2007 SCC 24, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 177 (S.C.C.), at para. 35; *Lac Minerals*, at pp. 646-47. However, this general rule may have to be modified in light of the legal framework within which a particular fiduciary duty must be exercised. In my respectful view, this is such a case.

(b) The Legal Framework of Indalex's Dual Role as a Plan Administrator and Employer

187 In order to define the nature and scope of Indalex's role and fiduciary obligations as a plan administrator-

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or, we must examine the legal framework within which the administrator functions. This framework is established primarily by the plan documents and the relevant provisions of the *PBA*. It is to these sources, first and foremost, that we look in order to shape the specific fiduciary duties owed in this context.

188 Turning first to the plan documents, I take the salaried plan as an example. Under it, the company is appointed the plan administrator: art. 13.01. The term "Company" is defined to mean Indalex Limited and any reference in the plan to actions taken or discretion to be exercised by the Company means Indalex acting through the board of directors or any person authorized by the board for the purposes of the plan: art. 2.09. Article 13.01 provides that the "Management Committee of the Board of Directors of the Company will appoint a Pension and Benefits Committee to act on behalf of the Company in its capacity as administrator of the Plan. The Pension and Benefits Committee will decide conclusively all matters relating to the operation, interpretation and application of the Plan." Thus, the Pension and Benefits Committee is to act on behalf of the company and by virtue of art. 2.09 its acts are considered those of the company. Article 13.02 sets out the duties of the Pension and Benefits Committee which include the "performance of all administrative functions not performed by the Funding Agent, the Actuary or any group annuity contract issuer": art. 13.02(1).

189 The plan administrator also has statutory powers and duties by virtue of the *PBA*. Section 22 lists the general duties of plan administrators, three of which are particularly relevant to these appeals:

22. (1) [Care, diligence and skill] The administrator of a pension plan shall exercise the care, diligence and skill in the administration and investment of the pension fund that a person of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with the property of another person.

(2) [Special knowledge and skill] The administrator of a pension plan shall use in the administration of the pension plan and in the administration and investment of the pension fund all relevant knowledge and skill that the administrator possesses or, by reason of the administrator's profession, business or calling, ought to possess.

.....

(4) [Conflict of interest] An administrator or, if the administrator is a pension committee or a board of trustees, a member of the committee or board that is the administrator of a pension plan shall not knowingly permit the administrator's interest to conflict with the administrator's duties and powers in respect of the pension fund.

190 Not surprisingly, the powers and duties conferred on the administrator by the legislation are administrative in nature. For the most part they pertain to the internal management of the pension fund and to the relationship among the pension administrator, the beneficiaries, and the Superintendent of Financial Services ("Superintendent"). The list includes: applying to the Superintendent for registration of the plan and any amendments to it as well as filing annual information returns: ss. 9, 12 and 20 of the *PBA*; providing beneficiaries and eligible potential beneficiaries with information and documents: ss. 10(1)12 and 25; ensuring that the plan is administered in accordance with the *PBA* and its regulations and plan documents: s. 19; notifying beneficiaries of proposed amendments to the plan that would reduce benefits: s. 26; paying commuted value for pensions: s. 42; and filing wind-up reports if the plan is terminated: s. 70.

191 Of special relevance for this case are two additional provisions. Under s. 56, the administrator has a duty to ensure that pension payments are made when due and to notify the Superintendent if they are not and,

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under s. 59, the administrator has the authority to commence court proceedings when pension payments are not made.

192 The fiduciary duties that employer-administrators owe to plan beneficiaries relate to the statutory and other tasks described above; these are the "specific legal interests" with respect to which the employer-administrator's fiduciary duties attach.

193 Another important aspect of the legal context for Indalex's fiduciary duties as a plan administrator is that it was acting in the dual role of an employer-administrator. This dual role is expressly permitted under s. 8(1)(a) of the *PBA*, but this provision creates a situation where a single entity potentially owes two sets of fiduciary duties (one to the corporation and the other to the plan members).

194 This was the case for Indalex. As an employer-administrator, Indalex acted through its board of directors and so it was that body which owed fiduciary duties to the plan members. The board of directors also owed a fiduciary duty to the company to act in its best interests: *Canada Business Corporations Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, s. 122(1)(a); *BCE Inc., Re*, 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 560 (S.C.C.), at para. 36. In deciding what is in the best interests of the corporation, a board may look to the interests of shareholders, employees, creditors and others. But where those interests are not aligned or may conflict, it is for the directors, acting lawfully and through the exercise of business judgment, to decide what is in the overall best interests of the corporation. Thus, the board of Indalex, as an employer-administrator, could not always act exclusively in the interests of the plan beneficiaries; it also owed duties to Indalex as a corporation.

(c) Breaches of Fiduciary Duty

195 Against the background of these legal principles, I turn to consider the Court of Appeal's findings in relation to Indalex's breach of its fiduciary duties as administrator of the plans. As noted, they fall into three categories: being in a conflict of interest position; taking steps to reduce pension obligations in the *CCAA* proceedings; and seeking bankruptcy status.

(i) Conflict of Interest

196 The questions here are first what constitutes a conflict of interest or duty between Indalex as business decision-maker and Indalex as plan administrator and what must be done when a conflict arises?

197 The Court of Appeal in effect concluded that a conflict of interest arises whenever Indalex makes business decisions that have "the potential to affect the Plans beneficiaries' rights" (para. 132) and that whenever such a conflict of interest arose, the employer-administrator was immediately in breach of its fiduciary duties to the plan members. Respectfully, this position puts the matter far too broadly. It cannot be the case that a conflict arises simply because the employer, exercising its management powers in the best interests of the corporation, does something that has the potential to affect the plan beneficiaries.

198 This conclusion flows inevitably from the statutory context. The existence of apparent conflicts that are inherent in the two roles being performed by the same party cannot be a breach of fiduciary duty because those conflicts are specifically authorized by the statute which permits one party to play both roles. As noted earlier, the *PBA* specifically permits employers to act as plan administrators (s. 8(1)(a)). Moreover, the broader business interests of the employer corporation and the interests of pension beneficiaries in getting the promised benefits are almost always at least potentially in conflict. Every important business decision has the potential to put at

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risk the solvency of the corporation and therefore its ability to live up to its pension obligations. The employer, within the limits set out in the plan documents and the legislation generally, has the authority to amend the plan unilaterally and even to terminate it. These steps may well not serve the best interests of plan beneficiaries.

199 Similarly, the simple existence of the sort of conflicts of interest identified by the Court of Appeal — those inherent in the employer's exercise of business judgment — cannot of themselves be a breach of the administrator's fiduciary duty. Once again, that conclusion is inconsistent with the statutory scheme that expressly permits an employer to act as plan administrator.

200 How, then, should we identify conflicts of interest in this context?

201 In *R. v. Neil*, 2002 SCC 70, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 631 (S.C.C.), Binnie J. referred to the *Restatement Third, The Law Governing Lawyers* (2000), at § 121, to explain when a conflict of interest occurs in the context of the lawyer-client relationship: para. 31. In my view, the same general principle, adapted to the circumstances, applies with respect to employer-administrators. Thus, a situation of conflict of interest occurs when there is a substantial risk that the employer-administrator's representation of the plan beneficiaries would be materially and adversely affected by the employer-administrator's duties to the corporation. I would recall here, however, that the employer-administrator's obligation to represent the plan beneficiaries extends only to those tasks and duties that I have described above.

202 In light of the foregoing, I am of the view that the Court of Appeal erred when it found, in effect that a conflict of interest arose whenever Indalex was making decisions that "had the potential to affect the Plans beneficiaries' rights": para. 132. The Court of Appeal expressed both the potential for conflict of interest or duty and the fiduciary duty of the plan administrator much too broadly.

(ii) Steps in the CCAA Proceedings to Reduce Pension Obligations and Notice of Them

203 The Court of Appeal found that Indalex breached its fiduciary duty simply by commencing *CCAA* proceedings knowing that the plans were underfunded and by failing to give the plan beneficiaries notice of the proceedings: para. 139. As I understand the court's reasons, the decision to commence *CCAA* proceedings was solely the responsibility of the corporation and not part of the administration of the pension plan: para. 131. The difficulty which the Court of Appeal saw arose from the potential of the *CCAA* proceedings to result in a reduction of the corporation's pension obligations to the prejudice of the beneficiaries: paras. 131-32.

204 I respectfully disagree. Like Justice Deschamps, I find that seeking an initial order protecting the corporation from actions by its creditors did not, on its own, give rise to any conflict of interest or duty on the part of Indalex (reasons of Justice Deschamps, at para. 72).

205 First, it is important to remember that the purpose of *CCAA* proceedings is not to disadvantage creditors but rather to try to provide a constructive solution for all stakeholders when a company has become insolvent. As my colleague, Deschamps J. observed in *Century Services*, at para. 15:

... the purpose of the *CCAA* ... is to permit the debtor to continue to carry on business and, where possible, avoid the social and economic costs of liquidating its assets.

In the same decision, at para. 59, Deschamps J. also quoted with approval the following passage from the reasons of Doherty J.A. in *Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)* (1990), 41 O.A.C. 282 (Ont. C.A.), at

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para. 57 (dissenting):

The legislation is remedial in the purest sense in that it provides a means whereby the devastating social and economic effects of bankruptcy or creditor initiated termination of ongoing business operations can be avoided while a court-supervised attempt to reorganize the financial affairs of the debtor company is made.

For this reason, I would be very reluctant to find that, simply by virtue of embarking on *CCAA* proceedings, an employer-administrator breaches its duties to plan members.

206 Second, the facts of this case do not support the contention that the interests of the plan beneficiaries and the employer were in conflict with respect to the decision to seek *CCAA* protection. It cannot seriously be suggested that some other course would have protected more fully the rights of the plan beneficiaries. The Court of Appeal did not suggest an alternative to seeking *CCAA* protection from creditors, nor did any of the parties. Indalex was in serious financial difficulty and its options were limited: either make a proposal to its creditors (under the *CCAA* or under the *BIA*), or go bankrupt. Moreover, the plan administrator's duty and authority do not extend to ensuring the solvency of the corporation and an independent administrator could not reasonably expect to be consulted about the plan sponsor's decision to seek *CCAA* protection. Finally, the application for *CCAA* proceedings did not reduce pension obligations other than to temporarily relieve the corporation of making special payments and it was the only step with any prospect of the pension funds obtaining from the insolvent corporation the money that would become due. There was thus no conflict of duty or interest between the administrator and the employer when protective action was taken for the purpose of preserving the *status quo* for the benefit of all stakeholders.

207 The Court of Appeal also found that it was a breach of fiduciary duty not to give the plan beneficiaries notice of the initial application for *CCAA* protection. Again, here, I must join Deschamps J. in disagreeing with the Court of Appeal's conclusion. Section 11(1) of the *CCAA* as it stood at the time of the proceedings, provided that parties could commence *CCAA* proceedings without giving notice to interested persons:

11. (1) Notwithstanding anything in the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or the *Winding-up Act*, where an application is made under this Act in respect of a company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, subject to this Act, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit, make an order under this section.

208 This provision was renumbered but not substantially changed when the Act was amended in September of 2009 (S.C. 2005, c. 47, s. 128, in force Sept. 18, 2009, SI/2009-68). Although it is not appropriate in every case, *CCAA* courts have discretion to make initial orders on an *ex parte* basis. This may be an appropriate — even necessary — step in order to prevent "creditors from moving to realize on their claims, essentially a 'stampede to the assets' once creditors learn of the debtor's financial distress": J. P. Sarra, *Rescue! The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (2007), at p. 55 ("*Rescue!*"); see also *Algoma Steel Inc., Re* (2001), 25 C.B.R. (4th) 194 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 7. The respondents did not challenge Morawetz J.'s decision to exercise his discretion to make an *ex parte* order in this case.

209 This is not to say, however, that *ex parte* initial orders will always be required or acceptable. Without attempting to be exhaustive or to express any final view on these issues, I simply note that there have been at least three ways in which courts have mitigated the possible negative effect on creditors of making orders without notice to potentially affected parties. First, courts have been reluctant to grant *ex parte* orders where the situation of the debtor company is not urgent. In *Rescue!*, Janis Sarra explains that courts are increasingly ex-

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pecting applicants to have given notice before applying for a stay under the *CCAA*: p. 55. An example is *Marine Drive Properties Ltd., Re*, 2009 BCSC 145, 52 C.B.R. (5th) 47 (B.C. S.C.), a case in which Butler J. held that "[i]nitial applications in *CCAA* proceedings should not be brought without notice merely because it is an application under that Act. The material before the court must be sufficient to indicate an emergent situation": para. 27. Second, courts have included "come-back" clauses in their initial orders so that parties could return to court at a later date to seek to set aside some or all of the order: *Rescue!*, at p. 55. Note that such a clause was included in the initial order by Morawetz J.: para. 46. Finally, courts have limited their initial orders to the issues that need to be resolved immediately and have left other issues to be resolved after all interested parties have been given notice. Thus, in *Timminco Ltd., Re*, 2012 ONSC 506, 85 C.B.R. (5th) 169 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), Morawetz J. limited the initial *CCAA* order so that priorities were only granted over the party that had been given notice. The discussion of suspending special payments or granting creditors priority over pension beneficiaries was left to a later date, after the parties that would be affected had been given notice. A similar approach was taken in the case of *AbitibiBowater Inc., Re*, 2009 QCCS 6459 (Que. S.C.). In his initial *CCAA* order, Gascon J. put off the decision regarding the suspension of past service contributions or special payments to the pension plans in question until the parties likely to be affected could be advised of the applicant's request: para. 7.

210 Failure to give notice of the initial *CCAA* proceedings was not a breach of fiduciary duty in this case. Indalex's decision to act as an employer-administrator cannot give the plan beneficiaries any greater benefit than they would have if their plan was managed by a third party administrator. Had there been a third party administrator in this case, Indalex would not have been under an obligation to tell the administrator that it was planning to enter *CCAA* proceedings. The respondents are asking this Court to give the advantage of Indalex's knowledge as employer to Indalex as the plan administrator in circumstances where the employer would have been unlikely to disclose the information itself. I am not prepared to blur the line between employers and administrators in this way.

211 I conclude that Indalex did not breach its fiduciary duty by commencing *CCAA* proceedings or by not giving notice to the plan beneficiaries of its intention to seek the initial *CCAA* order.

212 I turn next to the Court of Appeal's conclusion that seeking and obtaining the DIP orders without notice to the plan beneficiaries and seeking and obtaining the sale approval order constituted breaches of fiduciary duty.

213 To begin, I agree with the Court of Appeal that "just because the initial decision to commence *CCAA* proceedings is solely a corporate one ... does not mean that all subsequent decisions made during the proceedings are also solely corporate ones": para. 132. It was at this point that Indalex's interests as a corporation came into conflict with its duties as a pension plan administrator.

214 The DIP orders could easily have the effect of making it impossible for Indalex to satisfy its funding obligations to the plan beneficiaries. When Indalex, through the exercise of business judgment, sought *CCAA* orders that would or might have this effect, it was in conflict with its duty as plan administrator to ensure that all contributions were paid when due.

215 I do not think, however, that the simple existence of this conflict of interest and duty, on its own, was a breach of fiduciary duty in these circumstances. As discussed earlier, the *PBA* expressly permits an employer to be a pension administrator and the statutory provisions about conflict of interest must be understood and applied in light of that fact. Moreover, an independent plan administrator would have no decision-making role with re-

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spect to the conduct of *CCAA* proceedings. So in my view, the difficulty that arose here was not the existence of the conflict itself, but Indalex's failure to take steps so that the plan beneficiaries would have the opportunity to have their interests protected in the *CCAA* proceedings as if the plans were administered by an independent administrator. In short, the difficulty was not the existence of the conflict, but the failure to address it.

216 Despite Indalex's failure to address its conflict of interest, the plan beneficiaries, through their own efforts, were represented at subsequent steps in the *CCAA* proceedings. The effect of Indalex's breach was therefore mitigated, a point which I will discuss in greater detail when I turn to the issue of the constructive trust.

217 Nevertheless, for the purposes of providing some guidance for future *CCAA* proceedings, I take this opportunity to briefly address what an employer-administrator can do to respond to these sorts of conflicts. First and foremost, an employer-administrator who finds itself in a conflict must bring the conflict to the attention of the *CCAA* judge. It is not enough to include the beneficiaries in the list of creditors; the judge must be made aware that the debtor, as an administrator of the plan is, or may be, in a conflict of interest.

218 Given their expertise and their knowledge of particular cases, *CCAA* judges are well placed to decide how best to ensure that the interests of the plan beneficiaries are fully represented in the context of "real-time" litigation under the *CCAA*. Knowing of the conflict, a *CCAA* judge might consider it appropriate to appoint an independent administrator or independent counsel as *amicus curiae* on terms appropriate to the particular case. Indeed, there have been cases in which representative counsel have been appointed to represent tort claimants, clients, pensioners and non-unionized employees in *CCAA* proceedings on terms determined by the judge: *Rescue!*, at p. 278; see, e.g., *First Leaside Wealth Management Inc., Re*, 2012 ONSC 1299 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]); *Nortel Networks Corp., Re* (2009), 75 C.C.P.B. 206 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]). In other circumstances, a *CCAA* judge might find that it is feasible to give notice directly to the pension beneficiaries. In my view, notice, though desirable, may not always be feasible and decisions on such matters should be left to the judicial discretion of the *CCAA* judge. Alternatively, the judge might consider limiting draws on the DIP facility until notice can be given to the beneficiaries: *Royal Oak Mines Inc., Re* (1999), 6 C.B.R. (4th) 314 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), at para. 24. Ultimately, the appropriate response or combination of responses should be left to the discretion of the *CCAA* judge in a particular case. The point, as well expressed by the Court of Appeal, is that the insolvent corporation which is also a pension plan administrator cannot "simply ignore its obligations as the Plans' administrator once it decided to seek *CCAA* protection": para. 132.

219 I conclude that the Court of Appeal erred in finding that Indalex breached its fiduciary duties as plan administrator by taking the various steps it did in the *CCAA* proceedings. However, I agree with the Court of Appeal that it breached its fiduciary duty by failing to take steps to ensure that the plan beneficiaries had the opportunity to be as fully represented in those proceedings as if there had been an independent plan administrator.

(iii) The Bankruptcy Motion

220 At the same time Indalex applied for the sale approval order, it also applied to lift the *CCAA* stay so that it could file an assignment into bankruptcy. As Campbell J. put it, this was done "to ensure the priority regime [it] urged as the basis for resisting the deemed trust": para. 52. The Court of Appeal concluded that this was a breach of Indalex's fiduciary duties because the motion was brought "with the intention of defeating the deemed trust claims and ensuring that the Reserve Fund was transferred to [the U.S. debtors]": para. 139. I respectfully disagree.

221 It was certainly open to Indalex as an employer to bring a motion to voluntarily enter into bankruptcy.

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A pension plan administrator has no responsibility or authority in relation to that step. The problem here is not that the motion was brought, but that Indalex failed to meaningfully address the conflict between its corporate interests and its duties as plan administrator.

222 To sum up, I conclude that Indalex did not breach any fiduciary duty by undertaking *CCAA* proceedings or seeking the relief that it did. The breach arose from Indalex's failure to ensure that its pension plan beneficiaries had the opportunity to have their interests effectively represented in the insolvency proceedings, particularly when Indalex sought the DIP financing approval, the sale approval and the motion for bankruptcy.

(3) *Was Imposing a Constructive Trust Appropriate in This Case?*

223 The next issue is whether a remedial constructive trust is, as the Court of Appeal concluded, an appropriate remedy in response to the breach of fiduciary duty.

224 The Court of Appeal exercised its discretion to impose a constructive trust and its exercise of this discretion is entitled to deference. Only if the discretion has been exercised on the basis of an erroneous principle should the order be overturned on appeal: *Donkin v. Bugoy*, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 85 (S.C.C.), cited in *Soulos v. Korkontzilas*, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 217 (S.C.C.), at para. 54, by Sopinka J. (dissenting, but not on this point). In my respectful view, the Court of Appeal's erroneous conclusions about the scope of a plan administrator's fiduciary duties require us to examine the constructive trust issue anew. Moreover, the Court of Appeal, in my respectful opinion, erred in principle in finding that the asset in this case resulted from the breach of fiduciary duty such that it would be unjust for the party in breach to retain it.

225 As noted earlier, the Court of Appeal imposed a constructive trust in favour of the plan beneficiaries with respect to funds retained in the reserve fund equal to the total amount of the wind-up deficiency for both plans. In other words, upon insolvency of Indalex, the plan beneficiaries received 100 cents on the dollar as a result of a judicially imposed trust taking priority over secured creditors, and indeed over other unsecured creditors, assuming there was no deemed trust for the executive plan.

226 I have explained earlier why I take a different view than did the Court of Appeal of Indalex's breach of fiduciary duty. In light of what I conclude was the breach which could give rise to a remedy, my view is that the constructive trust cannot properly be imposed in this case and the Court of Appeal erred in principle in exercising its discretion to impose this remedy.

227 I part company with the Court of Appeal with respect to several aspects of its constructive trust analysis; it is far from clear to me that any of the conditions for imposing a constructive trust were present here. However, I will only address one of them in detail. As I will explain, a remedial constructive trust for a breach of fiduciary duty is only appropriate if the wrongdoer's acts give rise to an identifiable asset which it would be unjust for the wrongdoer (or sometimes a third party) to retain. In my view, Indalex's failure to meaningfully address conflicts of interest that arose during the *CCAA* proceedings did not result in any such asset.

228 As the Court of Appeal recognized, the governing authority concerning the remedial constructive trust outside the domain of unjust enrichment is *Soulos*. In *Soulos*, McLachlin J. (as she then was) wrote that a constructive trust may be an appropriate remedy for breach of fiduciary duty: paras. 19-45. She laid out four requirements that should generally be satisfied before a constructive trust will be imposed: para. 45. Although, in *Soulos*, McLachlin J. was careful to indicate that these are conditions that "generally" must be present, all parties in this case accept that these four conditions must be present before a remedial constructive trust may be ordered

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for breach of fiduciary duty. The four conditions are these:

- (1) The defendant must have been under an equitable obligation, that is, an obligation of the type that courts of equity have enforced, in relation to the activities giving rise to the assets in his hands;
- (2) The assets in the hands of the defendant must be shown to have resulted from deemed or actual agency activities of the defendant in breach of his equitable obligation to the plaintiff;
- (3) The plaintiff must show a legitimate reason for seeking a proprietary remedy, either personal or related to the need to ensure that others like the defendant remain faithful to their duties and;
- (4) There must be no factors which would render imposition of a constructive trust unjust in all the circumstances of the case; e.g., the interests of intervening creditors must be protected. [para. 45]

229 My concern is with respect to the second requirement, that is, whether the breach resulted in an asset in the hands of Indalex. A constructive trust arises when the law imposes upon a party an obligation to hold specific property for another: D. W. M. Waters, M. R. Gillen and L. D. Smith, *Waters' Law of Trusts in Canada* (3rd ed. 2005), at p. 454 ("*Waters*"). The purpose of imposing a constructive trust as a remedy for a breach of duty or unjust enrichment is to prevent parties "from retaining property which in 'good conscience' they should not be permitted to retain": *Soulos*, at para. 17. It follows, therefore, that while the remedial constructive trust may be appropriate in a variety of situations, the wrongdoer's conduct toward the plaintiff must generally have given rise to assets in the hands of the wrongdoer (or of a third party in some situations) which cannot in justice and good conscience be retained. That cannot be said here.

230 The Court of Appeal held that this second condition was present because "[t]he assets [i.e. the reserve fund monies] are directly connected to the process in which Indalex committed its breaches of fiduciary obligation": para. 204. Respectfully, this conclusion is based on incorrect legal principles. To satisfy this second condition, it must be shown that the breach *resulted in* the assets being in Indalex's hands, not simply, as the Court of Appeal thought, that there was a "connection" between the assets and "the process" in which Indalex breached its fiduciary duty. Recall that in *Soulos* itself, *the defendant's acquisition of the disputed property was a direct result of his breach of his duty of loyalty* to the plaintiff: para. 48. This is not our case. As the Court observed, in the context of an unjust enrichment claim in *Peter v. Beblow*, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 980 (S.C.C.), at p. 995;

... for a constructive trust to arise, the plaintiff must establish a direct link to the property which is the subject of the trust by reason of the plaintiff's contribution.

231 While cases of breach of fiduciary duty are different in important ways from cases of unjust enrichment, La Forest J. (with Lamer J. concurring on this point) applied a similar standard for proprietary relief in *Lac Minerals*, a case in which wrongdoing was the basis for the constructive trust: p. 678, quoted in *Waters*', at p. 471. His comments demonstrate the high standard to be met in order for a constructive trust to be awarded:

The constructive trust awards a right in property, but that right can only arise once a right to relief has been established. In the vast majority of cases a constructive trust will not be the appropriate remedy.... [A] constructive trust should only be awarded if there is reason to grant to the plaintiff the additional rights that flow from recognition of a right of property. [p. 678]

232 The relevant breach in this case was the failure of Indalex to meaningfully address the conflicts of in-

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terest that arose in the course of the *CCAA* proceedings. (The breach that arose with respect to the bankruptcy motion is irrelevant because that motion was not addressed and therefore could not have given rise to the assets.) The "assets" in issue here are the funds in the reserve fund which were retained from the proceeds of the sale of Indalex as a going concern. Indalex's breach in this case did not give rise to the funds which were retained by the Monitor in the reserve fund.

233 Where does the respondents' claim of a procedural breach take them? Taking their position at its highest, it would be that the DIP approval proceedings and the sale would not have been approved. This position, however, is fatally flawed. Turning first to the DIP approval, there is no evidence to support the view that, had Indalex addressed its conflict in the DIP approval process, the DIP financing would have been rejected or granted on different terms. The *CCAA* judge, being fully aware of the pension situation, ruled that the DIP financing was "required", that there was "no other alternative available to the Applicants for a going concern solution", and that "the benefit to stakeholders and creditors of the DIP Financing outweighs any potential prejudice to unsecured creditors that may arise as a result of the granting of super-priority secured financing": endorsement of Morawetz J., April 8, 2009, at paras. 6 and 9. In effect, the respondents are claiming funds which arose only because of the process to which they now object. Taking into account that there was an absence of any evidence that more favourable financing terms were available, that the judge's decision was made with full knowledge of the plan beneficiaries' claims, and that he found that the DIP financing was necessary, the respondents' contention is not only speculative, it also directly contradicts the conclusions of the *CCAA* judge.

234 Turning next to the sale approval and the approval of the distribution of the assets, it is clear that the plan beneficiaries had independent representation but that this did not change the result. Although, perhaps with little thanks to Indalex, the interests of both plans were fully and ably represented before Campbell J. at the sale approval and interim distribution motions in July of 2009.

235 The executive plan retirees, through able counsel, objected to the sale on the basis that the liquidation values set out in the Monitor's seventh report would provide greater return for unsecured creditors. The motions judge dismissed this objection "on the basis *that there was no clear evidence to support the proposition and in any event the transaction as approved did preserve value for suppliers, customers and preserve approximately 950 jobs*": trial reasons of Campbell J., at para. 13 (emphasis added). Both the executive plan retirees and the USW, which represented some members of the salaried plan, objected to the proposed distribution of the sale proceeds. In response to this objection, it was agreed that those objections would be heard promptly and that the Monitor would retain sufficient funds to satisfy the pensioners' claims if they were upheld: trial reasons of Campbell J., at paras. 14-16.

236 There is no evidence to support the contention that Indalex's breach of its fiduciary duty as pension administrator resulted in the assets retained in the reserve fund. I therefore conclude that the Court of Appeal erred in law in finding that the second condition for imposing a constructive trust — i.e. that the assets in the defendant's hands must be shown to have resulted from the defendant's breaches of duty to the plaintiff — had been established.

237 I would add only two further comments with respect to the constructive trust. A major concern of the Court of Appeal was that unless a constructive trust were imposed, the reserve funds would end up in the hands of other Indalex entities which were not operating at arm's length from Indalex. The U.S. debtors claimed the reserve fund because it had paid on its guarantee of the DIP loans and thereby stepped into the shoes of the DIP lender with respect to priority. Sun Indalex claims in the U.S. bankruptcy proceedings as a secured creditor of

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the U.S. debtors. The Court of Appeal put its concern this way: "To permit Sun Indalex to recover on behalf of [the U.S. debtors] would be to effectively permit the party who breached its fiduciary obligations to take the benefit of those breaches, to the detriment of those to whom the fiduciary obligations were owed": para. 199.

238 There are two difficulties with this approach, in my respectful view. The U.S. debtors paid real money to honour their guarantees. Moreover, unless there is a legal basis for ignoring the separate corporate personality of separate corporate entities, those separate corporate existences must be respected. Neither the parties nor the Court of Appeal advanced such a reason.

239 Finally, I would note that imposing a constructive trust was wholly disproportionate to Indalex's breach of fiduciary duty. Its breach — the failure to meaningfully address the conflicts of interest that arose during the CCAA process — had no adverse impact on the plan beneficiaries in the sale approval process which gave rise to the "asset" in issue. Their interests were fully represented and carefully considered before the sale was approved and the funds distributed. The sale was nonetheless judged to be in the best interests of the corporation, all things considered. In my respectful view, imposing a \$6.75 million penalty on the other creditors as a remedial response to this breach is so grossly disproportionate to the breach as to be unreasonable.

240 A judicially ordered constructive trust, imposed long after the fact, is a remedy that tends to destabilize the certainty which is essential for commercial affairs and which is particularly important in financing a workout for an insolvent corporation. To impose a constructive trust in response to a breach of fiduciary duty to ensure for the plan beneficiaries some procedural protections that they in fact took advantage of in any case is an unjust response in all of the circumstances.

241 I conclude that a constructive trust is not an appropriate remedy in this case and that the Court of Appeal erred in principle by imposing it.

C. Third Issue: Did the Court of Appeal Err in Concluding That the Super Priority Granted in the CCAA Proceedings Did Not Have Priority by Virtue of the Doctrine of Federal Paramountcy?

242 Although I disagree with my colleague Justice Deschamps with respect to the scope of the s. 57(4) deemed trust, I agree that if there was a deemed trust in this case, it would be superseded by the DIP loan because of the operation of the doctrine of federal paramountcy: paras. 48-60.

D. Fourth Issue: Did the Court of Appeal Err in its Cost Endorsement Respecting the USW?

(1) Introduction

243 The disposition of costs in the Court of Appeal was somewhat complex. Although the costs appeal relates only to the costs of the USW, it is necessary in order to understand their position to set out the costs order below in full.

244 With respect to the costs of the appeal to the Court of Appeal, no order was made for or against the Monitor due to its prior agreement with the former executives and the USW. However, the court ordered that the former executives and the USW, as successful parties, were each entitled to costs on a partial indemnity basis fixed at \$40,000 inclusive of taxes and disbursements from Sun Indalex and the U.S. Trustee, payable jointly and severally: costs endorsement, 2011 ONCA 578, 81 C.B.R. (5th) 165 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 7.

245 Morneau Shepell Ltd., the Superintendent, and the former executives reached an agreement with respect

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to legal fees and disbursements and the Court of Appeal approved that agreement. The former executives received full indemnity legal fees and disbursements in the amount of \$269,913.78 to be paid from the executive plan attributable to each of the 14 former executives' accrued pension benefits, allocated among the 14 former executives in relation to their pension entitlement from the executive plan. In other words, the costs would not be borne by the other three members of the executive plan who did not participate in the proceedings: C.A. costs endorsement, at para. 2. The costs of the appeal payable by Sun Indalex and the U.S. Trustee were to be paid into the fund of the executive plan and allocated among the 14 former executives in relation to their pension entitlement from the executive plan.

246 USW sought an order for payment of its costs from the fund of the salaried plan. However, the Court of Appeal declined to make such an order because the USW was in a "materially different position" than that of the former executives: costs endorsement, at para. 3. The latter were beneficiaries to the pension fund (14 of the 17 members of the plan), and they consented to the payment of costs from their individual benefit entitlements. Those who had not consented would not be affected by the payment. In contrast, the USW was the bargaining agent (not the beneficiary) for only 7 of the 169 beneficiaries of the salaried plan, none of whom was given notice of, or consented to, the payment of legal costs from the salaried plan. Moreover, the USW sought and seeks an order that its costs be paid out of the fund. This request is significantly different than the order made in favour of the former executives. The former executives explicitly ensured that their choice to pursue the litigation would not put at risk the pension benefits of those members who did not retain counsel even though of course those members would benefit in the event the litigation was successful. The USW is not proposing to insulate the 162 members whom it does not represent from the risk of litigation; it seeks an order requiring all members to share the risk of the litigation even though it represents only 7 of the 169. The proposition advanced by the USW was thus materially different from that advanced on behalf of the executive plan and approved by the court.

(2) Standard of Review

247 In *Kerry (Canada) Inc. v. Ontario (Superintendent of Financial Services)*, 2009 SCC 39, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 678 (S.C.C.), Rothstein J. held that "costs awards are quintessentially discretionary": para. 126. Discretionary costs decisions should only be set aside on appeal if the court below "has made an error in principle or if the costs award is plainly wrong": *Hamilton v. Open Window Bakery Ltd.* (2003), 2004 SCC 9, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 303 (S.C.C.), at para. 27.

(3) Analysis

248 I do not see any basis to interfere with the Court of Appeal's costs endorsement in this case. In my view, the USW's submissions are largely based on an inaccurate reading of the Court of Appeal's costs endorsement. Contrary to what the USW submits, the Court of Appeal did *not* require the consent of plan beneficiaries as a prerequisite to ordering payment of costs from the fund. Nor is it correct to suggest that the costs endorsement would "restrict recovery of beneficiary costs to instances when there is a surplus in the pension trust fund" or "preclude financing of beneficiary action when a fund is in deficit": USW factum, at paras. 71 and 76. Nor would I read the Court of Appeal's brief costs endorsement as laying down a rule that a union representing pension beneficiaries cannot recover costs from the fund because the union itself is not a beneficiary.

249 The premise of the USW's appeal appears to be that it was entitled to costs because it met what it refers to in its submissions as the Costs Payment Test and that if the executive plan members got their costs out of

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their pension fund, the union should get its costs out of the salaried employees' pension fund. Respectfully, I do not accept the validity of either premise.

250 The decision whether to award costs from the pension fund remains a discretionary matter. In *Nolan*, Rothstein J. surveyed the various factors that courts have taken into account when deciding whether to award a litigant its costs out of a pension trust. The first broad inquiry considered in *Nolan* was into whether the litigation concerned the due administration of the trust. In connection with this inquiry, courts have considered the following factors: (1) whether the litigation was primarily about the construction of the plan documents; (2) whether it clarified a problematic area of the law; (3) whether it was the only means of clarifying the parties' rights; (4) whether the claim alleged maladministration; and (5) whether the litigation had no effect on other beneficiaries of the trust fund: *Nolan*, at para. 126.

251 The second broad inquiry discussed in *Nolan* was whether the litigation was ultimately adversarial: para. 127. The following factors have been considered: (1) whether the litigation included allegations by an unsuccessful party of a breach of fiduciary duty; (2) whether the litigation only benefited a class of members and would impose costs on other members if successful; and (3) whether the litigation had any merit.

252 I do not think that it is correct to elevate these two inquiries (which constitute the Costs Payment Test articulated by the USW) to a test for entitlement to costs in the pension context. The factors set out in *Nolan* and other cases cited therein are best understood as highly relevant considerations guiding the exercise of judicial discretion with respect to costs.

253 The litigation undertaken here raised novel points of law with all of the uncertainty and risk inherent in such an undertaking. The Court of Appeal in essence decided that the USW, representing only 7 of 169 members of the plan, should not without consultation be able to in effect impose the risks of that litigation on all of the plan members, the vast majority of whom were not union members. Whatever arguments might be raised against the Court of Appeal's decision in light of the success of the litigation and the sharing by all plan members of the benefits, the failure of the litigation seems to me to leave no basis to impose the cost consequences of taking that risk on all of the plan members of an already underfunded plan.

254 The second premise of the USW appeal appears to be that if the executive plan members have their costs paid out of the fund, so too should the salaried plan members. Respectfully, however, this is not an accurate statement of the order made with respect to the executive plan.

255 The Court of Appeal's order with respect to the executive plan meant that only the pension fund attributable to those members of the plan who actually supported the litigation — the vast majority I would add — would contribute to the costs of the litigation even though all members of the plan would benefit in the case of success. As the Court of Appeal noted:

The individual represented Retirees, who comprise 14 of 17 members of the Executive Plan, have consented to the payment of costs from their individual benefit entitlements. Those who have not consented will not be affected by the payment. [Costs endorsement, at para. 3]

256 The Court of Appeal therefore approved an agreement as to costs which did not put at further risk the pension funds available to satisfy the pension entitlements of those who did not support the litigation. Thus, the Court of Appeal did not apply what the USW refers to as the Costs Payment Test to the executive plan because the costs order was the product of agreement and did not order payment of costs out of the fund as a whole.

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257 In the case of the USW request, there was no such agreement and no such limitation of risk to the supporters of the litigation.

258 I see no error in principle in the Court of Appeal's refusal to order the USW costs to be paid out of the pension fund, particularly in light of the disposition of the appeal to this Court. I would dismiss the USW costs appeal but without costs.

IV. Disposition

259 I would allow the Sun Indalex, FTI Consulting and George L. Miller appeals and, except as noted below, I would set aside the orders of the Ontario Court of Appeal and restore the February 18, 2010 orders of Campbell J.

260 With respect to costs, I would set aside the Court of Appeal's orders with respect to the costs of the appeals before that court and order that all parties bear their own costs in the Court of Appeal and in this Court.

261 I would not disturb paras. 9 and 10 of the order of the Court of Appeal in the former executives' appeal so that the full indemnity legal fees and disbursements of the former executives in the amount of \$269,913.78 shall be paid from the fund of the executive plan attributable to each of the 14 former executives' accrued pension benefits, and specifically such amounts shall be allocated among the 14 former executives in relation to their pension entitlement from the executive plan and will not be borne by the other three members of the executive plan.

262 I would dismiss the USW costs appeal, but without costs.

LeBel J. (dissenting):

I. Introduction

263 The members of two pension plans set up by Indalex Limited ("Indalex") stand to lose half or more of their pension benefits as a consequence of the insolvency of their employer and of the arrangement approved by the Ontario Superior Court of Justice under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 ("CCAA"). The Court of Appeal for Ontario found that the members were entitled to a remedy. For different and partly conflicting reasons, my colleagues Justices Deschamps and Cromwell would hold that no remedy is available to them. With all due respect for their opinions, I would conclude, like the Court of Appeal, that the remedy of a constructive trust is open to them and should be imposed in the circumstances of this case, for the following reasons.

264 I do not intend to summarize the facts of this case, which were outlined by my colleagues. I will address these facts as needed in the course of my reasons. Before moving to my areas of disagreement with my colleagues, I will briefly indicate where and to what extent I agree with them on the relevant legal issues.

265 Like my colleagues, I conclude that no deemed trust could arise under s. 57(4) of the *Pension Benefits Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.8 ("PBA"), in the case of the Executive Plan because this plan had not been wound up when the CCAA proceedings were initiated. In the case of the Salaried Employees Plan, I agree with Deschamps J. that a deemed trust arises in respect of the wind-up deficiency. But, like her, I accept that the debtor-in-possession ("DIP") super priority prevails by reason of the application of the federal paramountcy doctrine. I

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also agree that the costs appeal of the United Steelworkers should be dismissed.

266 But, with respect for the opinions of my colleagues, I take a different view of the nature and extent of the fiduciary duties of an employer who elects to act as administrator of a pension plan governed by the *PBA*. This dual status does not entitle the employer to greater leniency in the determination and exercise of its fiduciary duties or excuse wrongful actions. On the contrary, as we shall see below, I conclude that Indalex not only neglected its obligations towards the beneficiaries, but actually took a course of action that was actively inimical to their interests. The seriousness of these breaches amply justified the decision of the Court of Appeal to impose a constructive trust. To that extent, I propose to uphold the opinion of Gillese J.A. and the judgment of the Court of Appeal (2011 ONCA 265, 104 O.R. (3d) 641).

II. The Employer as Administrator of a Pension Plan: Its Fiduciary Duties

267 Before entering into an analysis of the obligations of an employer as administrator of a pension plan under the *PBA*, it is necessary to consider the position of the beneficiaries. Who are they? At what stage are they in their lives? What are their vulnerabilities? A fiduciary relationship is a relationship, grounded in fact and law, between a vulnerable beneficiary and a fiduciary who holds and may exercise power over the beneficiary in situations recognized by law. Any analysis of such a relationship requires careful consideration of the characteristics of the beneficiary. It ought not stop at the level of a theoretical and detached approach that fails to address how, very concretely, this relationship works or can be twisted, perverted or abused, as was the situation in this case.

268 The beneficiaries were in a very vulnerable position relative to Indalex. They did not enjoy the protection that the existence of an independent administrator might have given them. They had no say and no input in the management of the plans. The information about the plans and their situation came from Indalex in its dual role as employer and manager of the plans. Their particular vulnerability arose from their relationship with Indalex, acting both as their employer and as the administrator of their retirement plans. Their vulnerability was substantially a consequence of that specific relationship (*Perez v. Galambos*, 2009 SCC 48, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 247 (S.C.C.), at para. 68, *per* Cromwell J.). The nature of this relationship had very practical consequences on their interests. For example, as Gillese J.A. noted in her reasons (at para. 40) the consequences of the decisions made in the course of management of the plan and during the *CCAA* proceedings signify that the members of the Executive Plan stand to lose one-half to two-thirds of their retirement benefits, unless additional money is somehow paid into the plan. These losses of benefits are, in all probability, permanent in the case of the beneficiaries who have already retired or who are close to retirement. They deeply affect their lives and expectations. For most of them, what is lost is lost for good. No arrangement will allow them to get a start on a new life. We should not view the situation of the beneficiaries as regrettable but unavoidable collateral damage arising out of the ebbs and tides of the economy. In my view, the law should give the members some protection, as the Court of Appeal intended when it imposed a constructive trust.

269 Indalex was in a conflict of interest from the moment it started to contemplate putting itself under the protection of the *CCAA* and proposing an arrangement to its creditors. From the corporate perspective, one could hardly find fault with such a decision. It was a business decision. But the trouble is that at the same time, Indalex was a fiduciary in relation to the members and retirees of its pension plans. The "two hats" analogy offers no defence to Indalex. It could not switch off the fiduciary relationship at will when it conflicted with its business obligations or decisions. Throughout the arrangement process and until it was replaced by an independent administrator (*Morneau Shepell Ltd.*) it remained a fiduciary.

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270 It is true that the *PBA* allows an employer to act as an administrator of a pension plan in Ontario. In such cases, the legislature accepts that conflicts of interest may arise. But, in my opinion, nothing in the *PBA* allows that the employer *qua* administrator will be held to a lower standard or will be subject to duties and obligations that are less stringent than those of an independent administrator. The employer remains a fiduciary under the statute and at common law (*PBA*, s. 22(4)). The employer is under no obligation to assume the burdens of administering the pension plans that it has agreed to set up or that are the legacy of previous decisions. However, if it decides to do so, a fiduciary relationship is created with the expectation that the employer will be able to avoid or resolve the conflicts of interest that might arise. If this proves to be impossible, the employer is still "seized" with fiduciary duties, and cannot ignore them out of hand.

271 Once Indalex had considered the *CCAA* process and decided to proceed in that manner, it should have been obvious that such a move would trigger conflicts of interest with the beneficiaries of the pension plans and that these conflicts would become untenable, as per the terms of s. 22(4) of the *PBA*. Given the nature of its obligations as administrator and fiduciary, it was impossible to wear the "two hats". Indalex had to discharge its corporate duties, but at the same time it had to address its fiduciary obligations to the members and beneficiaries of the plans. I do not fault it for applying under the *CCAA*, but rather for not relinquishing its position as administrator of the plans at the time of the application. It even retained this position once it engaged in the arrangement process. Other conflicts and breaches of fiduciary duties and of fundamental rules of procedural equity in the Superior Court flowed from this first decision. Moreover, Indalex maintained a strongly adversarial attitude towards the interest of the beneficiaries throughout the arrangement process, while it was still, at least in form, the administrator of the plans.

272 The option given to employers to act as administrators of pension plans under the *PBA* does not constitute a licence to breach the fiduciary duties that flow from this function. It should not be viewed as an invitation for the courts to whitewash the consequences of such breaches. The option is predicated on the ability of the employer-administrator to avoid the conflicts of interests that cause these breaches. An employer deciding to assume the position of administrator cannot claim to be in the same situation as the Crown when it discharges fiduciary obligations towards certain groups in society under the Constitution or the law. For those cases, the Crown assumes those duties because it is obligated to do so by virtue of its role, not because it chooses to do so. In such circumstances, the Crown must often balance conflicting interests and obligations to the broader society in the discharge of those fiduciary duties (*Elder Advocates of Alberta Society v. Alberta*, 2011 SCC 24, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 261 (S.C.C.), at paras. 37-38). If Indalex found itself in a situation where it had to balance conflicting interests and obligations, as it essentially argues, it could not retain the position of administrator that it had willingly assumed. The solution was not to place its function as administrator and its associated fiduciary duties in abeyance. Rather, it had to abandon this role and diligently transfer its function as manager to an independent administrator.

273 Indalex could apply for protection under the *CCAA*. But, in so doing, it needed to make arrangements to avoid conflicts of interests. As nothing was done, the members of the plans were left to play catch up as best they could when the process that put in place the DIP financing and its super priority was initiated. The process had been launched in such a way that it took significant time before the beneficiaries could effectively participate in the process. In practice, the United Steelworkers union, which represented only a small group of the members of the Salaried Employees Plan, acted for them after the start of the procedures. The members of the Executive Plan hired counsel who appeared for them. But, throughout, there were problems with notices, delays and the ability to participate in the process. Indeed, during the *CCAA* proceedings, the Monitor and Indalex seemed to have been more concerned about keeping the members of the plans out of the process rather than ensuring

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that their voices could be heard. Two paragraphs of the submissions to this Court by Morneau Shepell Ltd., the subsequently appointed administrator of the plan, aptly sums up the behaviour of Indalex and the Monitor towards the beneficiaries, whose representations were always deemed to be either premature or late:

When counsel for the Retirees again appeared at a motion to approve the bidding procedure, his objections were considered premature:

In my view, the issues raised by the retirees do not have any impact on the Bidding Procedures. The issues can be raised by the retirees on any application to approve a transaction — but that is for another day. [(2009), 79 C.C.P.B. 101 (Ont. S.C.J.), at para. 10, *per* Morawetz J.]

Only when counsel appeared at the sale approval motion, as directed by the motions judge, were the concerns of the pension plan beneficiaries heard. At that time, the Appellants complain, the beneficiaries were too late and their motion constituted a collateral attack on the original DIP Order. However, it cannot be the case that stakeholder groups are too early, until they are too late. [Factum, at paras. 54-55]

274 I must also mention the failed attempt to assign Indalex in bankruptcy once the sale of its business had been approved. One of the purposes of this action was essentially to harm the interests of the members of the plans. At the time, Indalex was still wearing its two hats, at least from a legal perspective. But its duties as a fiduciary were clearly not at the forefront of its concerns. There were constant conflicts of interest throughout the process. Indalex did not attempt to resolve them; it brushed them aside. In so acting, it breached its duties as a fiduciary and its statutory obligations under s. 22(4) *PBA*.

III. Procedural Fairness in CCAA Proceedings

275 The manner in which this matter was conducted in the Superior Court was, at least partially, the result of Indalex disregarding its fiduciary duties. The procedural issues that arose in that court did not assist in mitigating the consequences of these breaches. It is true that, in the end, the beneficiaries obtained, or were given, some information pertaining to the proceedings and that counsel appeared on their behalf at various stages of the proceedings. However, the basic problem is that the proceedings were not conducted according to the spirit and principles of the Canadian system of civil justice.

276 I accept that those procedures are often urgent. The situation of a debtor requires quick and efficient action. The turtle-like pace of some civil litigation would not meet the needs of the application of the *CCAA*. However, the conduct of proceedings under this statute is not solely an administrative process. It is also a judicial process conducted according to the tenets of the adversarial system. The fundamentals of such a system must not be ignored. All interested parties are entitled to a fair procedure that allows their voices to be raised and heard. It is not an answer to these concerns to say that nothing else could be done, that no other solution would have been better, that, in substance, hearing the members would have been a waste of time. In all branches of procedure whether in administrative law, criminal law or civil action, the rights to be informed and to be heard in some way remain fundamental principles of justice. Those principles retain their place in the *CCAA*, as some authors and judges have emphasized (J. P. Sarra, *Rescue! The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (2007), at pp. 55-56; *Royal Oak Mines Inc., Re* (1999), 7 C.B.R. (4th) 293 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), at para. 5, *per* Farley J.). This was not done in this case, as my colleagues admit, while they downplay the consequences of these procedural flaws and breaches.

IV. Imposing a Constructive Trust

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277 In this context, I see no error in the decision of the Court of Appeal to impose a constructive trust (paras. 200-207). It was a fair decision that met the requirements of justice, under the principles set out by our Court in *Canson Enterprises Ltd. v. Boughton & Co.*, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 534 (S.C.C.), and in *Soulos v. Korkontzilas*, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 217 (S.C.C.). The remedy of a constructive trust was justified in order to correct the wrong caused by Indalex (*Soulos*, at para. 36, *per* McLachlin J. (as she then was)). The facts of the situation met the four conditions that generally justify the imposition of a constructive trust (*Soulos*, at para. 45), as determined by Justice Gillese in her reasons, at paras. 203 and 204: (1) the defendant was under an equitable obligation in relation to the activities giving rise to the assets in his or her hands; (2) the assets in the hands of the defendant were shown to have resulted from deemed or actual agency activities of the defendant in breach of his or her equitable obligation to the plaintiff; (3) the plaintiff has shown a legitimate reason for seeking a proprietary remedy, either personal or related to the need to ensure that others like the defendants remain faithful to their duties; and (4) there are no factors which would render imposition of a constructive trust unjust in all the circumstances of the case, such as the protection of the interests of intervening creditors.

278 In crafting such a remedy, the Court of Appeal was relying on the inherent powers of the courts to craft equitable remedies, not only in respect of procedural issues, but also of substantive questions. Section 9 of the CCAA is broadly drafted and does not deprive courts of their power to fill in gaps in the law when this is necessary in order to grant justice to the parties (G. R. Jackson and J. Sarra, "Selecting the Judicial Tool to get the Job Done: An Examination of Statutory Interpretation, Discretionary Power and Inherent Jurisdiction in Insolvency Matters", in J. P. Sarra, ed., *Annual Review of Insolvency Law, 2007* (2008), 41, at pp. 78-79).

279 The imposition of the trust did not disregard the different corporate personalities of Indalex and Indalex U.S. It properly acknowledged the close relationship between the two companies, the second in effect controlling the first. This relationship could and needed to be taken into consideration in order to determine whether a constructive trust was a proper remedy.

280 For these reasons, I would uphold the imposition of a constructive trust and I would dismiss the appeal with costs to the respondents.

Order accordingly.

Ordonnance en conséquence.

Appendix

The Pension Benefits Amendment Act, 1973, S.O. 1973, c. 113

6. The said Act is amended by adding thereto the following sections:

23a. — (1) Any sum received by an employer from an employee pursuant to an arrangement for the payment of such sum by the employer into a pension plan as the employee's contribution thereto shall be deemed to be held by the employer in trust for payment of the same after his receipt thereof into the pension plan as the employee's contribution thereto and the employer shall not appropriate or convert any part thereof to his own use or to any use not authorized by the trust.

(2) For the purposes of subsection 1, any sum withheld by an employer, whether by payroll deduction

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or otherwise, from moneys payable to an employee shall be deemed to be a sum received by the employer from the employee.

(3) Any sum required to be paid into a pension plan by an employer as the employer's contribution to the plan shall, when due under the plan, be deemed to be held by the employer in trust for payment of the same into the plan in accordance with the plan and this Act and the regulations as the employer's contribution and the employer shall not appropriate or convert any part of the amount required to be paid to the fund to his own use or to any use not authorized by the terms of the pension plan.

Pension Benefits Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 373

21. . . .

(2) Upon the termination or winding up of a pension plan filed for registration as required by section 17, the employer is liable to pay all amounts that would otherwise have been required to be paid to meet the tests for solvency prescribed by the regulations, up to the date of such termination or winding up, to the insurer, administrator or trustee of the pension plan.

.

23. — (1) Where a sum is received by an employer from an employee under an arrangement for the payment of the sum by the employer into a pension plan as the employee's contribution thereto, the employer shall be deemed to hold the sum in trust for the employee until the sum is paid into the pension plan whether or not the sum has in fact been kept separate and apart by the employer and the employee has a lien upon the assets of the employer for such amount that in the ordinary course of business would be entered in books of account whether so entered or not.

.

(3) Where an employer is required to make contributions to a pension plan, he shall be deemed to hold in trust for the members of the plan an amount calculated in accordance with subsection (4), whether or not,

- (a) the employer contributions are payable into the plan under the terms of the plan or this Act; or
- (b) the amount has been kept separate and apart by the employer,

and the members have a lien upon the assets of the employer in such amount that in the ordinary course of business would be entered into the books of account whether so entered or not.

(4) For the purpose of determining the amount deemed to be held in trust under subsection (3) on a specific date, the calculation shall be made as if the plan had been wound up on that date.

.

32. In addition to any amounts the employer is liable to pay under subsection 21 (2), where a defined benefit pension plan is terminated or wound up or the plan is amended so that it is no longer a defined benefit pension plan, the employer is liable to the plan for the difference between,

- (a) the value of the assets of the plan; and

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(b) the value of pension benefits guaranteed under subsection 31 (1) and any other pension benefit vested under the terms of the plan,

and the employer shall make payments to the insurer, trustee or administrator of the pension plan to fund the amount owing in such manner as is prescribed by regulation.

Pension Benefits Amendment Act, 1983, S.O. 1983, c. 2

2. Subsection 21 (2) of the said Act is repealed and the following substituted therefor:

(2) Upon the termination or winding up of a registered pension plan, the employer of employees covered by the pension plan shall pay to the administrator, insurer or trustee of the pension plan,

(a) an amount equal to,

(i) the current service cost, and

(ii) the special payments prescribed by the regulations,

that have accrued to and including the date of the termination or winding up but, under the terms of the pension plan or the regulations, are not due on that date; and

(b) all other payments that, by the terms of the pension plan or the regulations, are due from the employer to the pension plan but have not been paid at the date of the termination or winding up.

(2a) For the purposes of clause (2) (a), the current service cost and special payments shall be deemed to accrue on a daily basis.

3. Section 23 of the said Act is repealed and the following substituted therefor:

23. — (1) Where an employer receives money from an employee under an arrangement that the employer will pay the money into a pension plan as the employee's contribution to the pension plan, the employer shall be deemed to hold the money in trust for the employee until the employer pays the money into the pension plan.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), money withheld by an employer, whether by payroll deduction or otherwise, from moneys payable to an employee shall be deemed to be money received by the employer from the employee.

(3) The administrator or trustee of the pension plan has a lien and charge upon the assets of the employer in an amount equal to the amount that is deemed to be held in trust under subsection (1).

(4) An employer who is required by a pension plan to contribute to the pension plan shall be deemed to hold in trust for the members of the pension plan an amount of money equal to the total of,

(a) all moneys that the employer is required to pay into the pension plan to meet,

(i) the current service cost, and

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(ii) the special payments prescribed by the regulations,

that are due under the pension plan or the regulations and have not been paid into the pension plan; and

(b) where the pension plan is terminated or wound up, any other money that the employer is liable to pay under clause 21 (2) (a).

(5) The administrator or trustee of the pension plan has a lien and charge upon the assets of the employer in an amount equal to the amount that is deemed to be held in trust under subsection (4).

(6) Subsections (1) and (4) apply whether or not the moneys mentioned in those subsections are kept separate and apart from other money.

.....

8. Sections 32 and 33 of the said Act are repealed and the following substituted therefor:

32. — (1) The employer of employees who are members of a defined benefit pension plan that the employer is bound by or to which the employer is a party and that is partly or wholly wound up shall pay to the administrator, insurer or trustee of the plan an amount of money equal to the amount by which the value of the pension benefits guaranteed by section 31 plus the value of the pension benefits vested under the defined benefit pension plan exceeds the value of the assets of the plan allocated in accordance with the regulations for payment of pension benefits accrued with respect to service in Ontario.

(2) The amount that the employer is required to pay under subsection (1) is in addition to the amounts that the employer is liable to pay under subsection 21 (2).

(3) The employer shall pay the amount required under subsection (1) to the administrator, insurer or trustee of the defined benefit pension plan in the manner prescribed by the regulations.

Pension Benefits Act, 1987, S.O. 1987, c. 35

58. — (1) Where an employer receives money from an employee under an arrangement that the employer will pay the money into a pension fund as the employee's contribution under the pension plan, the employer shall be deemed to hold the money in trust for the employee until the employer pays the money into the pension fund.

.....

(3) An employer who is required to pay contributions to a pension fund shall be deemed to hold in trust for the beneficiaries of the pension plan an amount of money equal to the employer contributions due and not paid into the pension fund.

(4) Where a pension plan is wound up in whole or in part, an employer who is required to pay contributions to the pension fund shall be deemed to hold in trust for the beneficiaries of the pension plan an amount of money equal to employer contributions accrued to the date of the wind up but not yet due under the plan or regulations.

.....

2013 CarswellOnt 733, 2013 SCC 6, D.T.E. 2013T-97, J.E. 2013-185, 96 C.B.R. (5th) 171, 354 D.L.R. (4th) 581, 223 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1049, 2 C.C.P.B. (2nd) 1, [2013] W.D.F.L. 1591, [2013] W.D.F.L. 1592, 20 P.P.S.A.C. (3d) 1, 439 N.R. 235, 301 O.A.C. 1, 8 B.L.R. (5th) 1

59. — (1) Money that an employer is required to pay into a pension fund accrues on a daily basis.

(2) Interest on contributions shall be calculated and credited at a rate not less than the prescribed rates and in accordance with prescribed requirements.

.....

75. — (1) A member in Ontario of a pension plan whose combination of age plus years of continuous employment or membership in the pension plan equals at least fifty-five, at the effective date of the wind up of the pension plan in whole or in part, has the right to receive,

(a) a pension in accordance with the terms of the pension plan, if, under the pension plan, the member is eligible for immediate payment of the pension benefit;

(b) a pension in accordance with the terms of the pension plan, beginning at the earlier of,

(i) the normal retirement date under the pension plan, or

(ii) the date on which the member would be entitled to an unreduced pension under the pension plan if the pension plan were not wound up and if the member's membership continued to that date; or

(c) a reduced pension in the amount payable under the terms of the pension plan beginning on the date on which the member would be entitled to the reduced pension under the pension plan if the pension plan were not wound up and if the member's membership continued to that date.

.....

76. — (1) Where a pension plan is wound up in whole or in part, the employer shall pay into the pension fund,

(a) an amount equal to the total of all payments that, under this Act, the regulations and the pension plan, are due or that have accrued and that have not been paid into the pension fund; and

(b) an amount equal to the amount by which,

(i) the value of the pension benefits under the pension plan that would be guaranteed by the Guarantee Fund under this Act and the regulations if the Commission declares that the Guarantee Fund applies to the pension plan,

(ii) the value of the pension benefits accrued with respect to employment in Ontario vested under the pension plan, and

(iii) the value of benefits accrued with respect to employment in Ontario resulting from the application of subsection 40 (3) (50 per cent rule) and section 75,

exceed the value of the assets of the pension fund allocated as prescribed for payment of pension benefits accrued with respect to employment in Ontario.

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Pension Benefits Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.8

57. (1) [Trust property] Where an employer receives money from an employee under an arrangement that the employer will pay the money into a pension fund as the employee's contribution under the pension plan, the employer shall be deemed to hold the money in trust for the employee until the employer pays the money into the pension fund.

(2) [Money withheld] For the purposes of subsection (1), money withheld by an employer, whether by payroll deduction or otherwise, from money payable to an employee shall be deemed to be money received by the employer from the employee.

(3) [Accrued contributions] An employer who is required to pay contributions to a pension fund shall be deemed to hold in trust for the beneficiaries of the pension plan an amount of money equal to the employer contributions due and not paid into the pension fund.

(4) [Wind up] Where a pension plan is wound up in whole or in part, an employer who is required to pay contributions to the pension fund shall be deemed to hold in trust for the beneficiaries of the pension plan an amount of money equal to employer contributions accrued to the date of the wind up but not yet due under the plan or regulations.

.....

58. (1) [Accrual] Money that an employer is required to pay into a pension fund accrues on a daily basis.

(2) [Interest] Interest on contributions shall be calculated and credited at a rate not less than the prescribed rates and in accordance with prescribed requirements.

.....

74. (1) [Activating events] This section applies if a person ceases to be a member of a pension plan on the effective date of one of the following activating events:

1. The wind up of a pension plan, if the effective date of the wind up is on or after April 1, 1987.
 2. The employer's termination of the member's employment, if the effective date of the termination is on or after July 1, 2012. However, this paragraph does not apply if the termination occurs in any of the circumstances described in subsection (1.1).
 3. The occurrence of such other events as may be prescribed in such circumstances as may be specified by regulation.
- (1.1) [Same, termination of employment] Termination of employment is not an activating event if the termination is a result of wilful misconduct, disobedience or wilful neglect of duty by the member that is not trivial and has not been condoned by the employer or if the termination occurs in such other circumstances as may be prescribed.
- (1.2) [Exceptions, election by certain pension plans] This section does not apply with respect to a jointly sponsored pension plan or a multi-employer pension plan while an election made under section

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74.1 for the plan and its members is in effect.

(1.3) [Benefit] A member in Ontario of a pension plan whose combination of age plus years of continuous employment or membership in the pension plan equals at least 55 on the effective date of the activating event has the right to receive,

(a) a pension in accordance with the terms of the pension plan, if, under the pension plan, the member is eligible for immediate payment of the pension benefit;

(b) a pension in accordance with the terms of the pension plan, beginning at the earlier of,

(i) the normal retirement date under the pension plan, or

(ii) the date on which the member would be entitled to an unreduced pension under the pension plan if the activating event had not occurred and if the member's membership continued to that date; or

(c) a reduced pension in the amount payable under the terms of the pension plan beginning on the date on which the member would be entitled to the reduced pension under the pension plan if the activating event had not occurred and if the member's membership continued to that date.

(2) [Part year] In determining the combination of age plus employment or membership, one-twelfth credit shall be given for each month of age and for each month of continuous employment or membership on the effective date of the activating event.

(3) [Member for 10 years] Bridging benefits offered under the pension plan to which a member would be entitled if the activating event had not occurred and if his or her membership were continued shall be included in calculating the pension benefit under subsection (1.3) of a person who has at least 10 years of continuous employment with the employer or has been a member of the pension plan for at least 10 years.

(4) [Prorated bridging benefit] For the purposes of subsection (3), if the bridging benefit offered under the pension plan is not related to periods of employment or membership in the pension plan, the bridging benefit shall be prorated by the ratio that the member's actual period of employment bears to the period of employment that the member would have to the earliest date on which the member would be entitled to payment of pension benefits and a full bridging benefit under the pension plan if the activating event had not occurred.

(5) [Notice of termination of employment] Membership in a pension plan that is wound up includes the period of notice of termination of employment required under Part XV of the *Employment Standards Act, 2000*.

(6) [Application of subs. (5)] Subsection (5) does not apply for the purpose of calculating the amount of a pension benefit of a member who is required to make contributions to the pension fund unless the member makes the contributions in respect of the period of notice of termination of employment.

(7) [Consent of employer] For the purposes of this section, where the consent of an employer is an eligibility requirement for entitlement to receive an ancillary benefit, the employer shall be deemed to have given the consent.

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(7.1) [Consent of administrator, jointly sponsored pension plans] For the purposes of this section, where the consent of the administrator of a jointly sponsored pension plan is an eligibility requirement for entitlement to receive an ancillary benefit, the administrator shall be deemed to have given the consent.

(8) [Use in calculating pension benefit] A benefit described in clause (1.3) (a), (b) or (c) for which a member has met all eligibility requirements under this section shall be included in calculating the member's pension benefit or the commuted value of the pension benefit.

.....

75. (1) [Liability of employer on wind up] Where a pension plan is wound up, the employer shall pay into the pension fund,

(a) an amount equal to the total of all payments that, under this Act, the regulations and the pension plan, are due or that have accrued and that have not been paid into the pension fund; and

(b) an amount equal to the amount by which,

(i) the value of the pension benefits under the pension plan that would be guaranteed by the Guarantee Fund under this Act and the regulations if the Superintendent declares that the Guarantee Fund applies to the pension plan,

(ii) the value of the pension benefits accrued with respect to employment in Ontario vested under the pension plan, and

(iii) the value of benefits accrued with respect to employment in Ontario resulting from the application of subsection 39 (3) (50 per cent rule) and section 74,

exceed the value of the assets of the pension fund allocated as prescribed for payment of pension benefits accrued with respect to employment in Ontario.

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TAB 5

2010 CarswellBC 3419, 2010 SCC 60, J.E. 2011-5, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 534, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 533, 12 B.C.L.R. (5th) 1, 2011 D.T.C. 5006 (Eng.), 2011 G.T.C. 2006 (Eng.), [2011] 2 W.W.R. 383, 72 C.B.R. (5th) 170, 409 N.R. 201, 326 D.L.R. (4th) 577, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379, [2010] G.S.T.C. 186, 296 B.C.A.C. 1, 503 W.A.C. 1, 196 A.C.W.S. (3d) 27



2010 CarswellBC 3419, 2010 SCC 60, J.E. 2011-5, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 534, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 533, 12 B.C.L.R. (5th) 1, 2011 D.T.C. 5006 (Eng.), 2011 G.T.C. 2006 (Eng.), [2011] 2 W.W.R. 383, 72 C.B.R. (5th) 170, 409 N.R. 201, 326 D.L.R. (4th) 577, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379, [2010] G.S.T.C. 186, 296 B.C.A.C. 1, 503 W.A.C. 1, 196 A.C.W.S. (3d) 27

Ted Leroy Trucking [Century Services] Ltd., Re

Century Services Inc. (Appellant) and Attorney General of Canada on behalf of Her Majesty The Queen in Right of Canada (Respondent)

Supreme Court of Canada

Deschamps J., McLachlin C.J.C., Binnie, LeBel, Fish, Abella, Charron, Rothstein, Cromwell JJ.

Heard: May 11, 2010

Judgment: December 16, 2010

Docket: 33239

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Proceedings: reversing *Ted Leroy Trucking Ltd., Re* (2009), 2009 CarswellBC 1195, 2009 G.T.C. 2020 (Eng.), 2009 BCCA 205, 270 B.C.A.C. 167, 454 W.A.C. 167, [2009] 12 W.W.R. 684, 98 B.C.L.R. (4th) 242, [2009] G.S.T.C. 79 (B.C. C.A.); reversing *Ted Leroy Trucking Ltd., Re* (2008), 2008 CarswellBC 2895, 2008 BCSC 1805, [2008] G.S.T.C. 221, 2009 G.T.C. 2011 (Eng.) (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers])

Counsel: Mary I.A. Buttery, Owen J. James, Matthew J.G. Curtis for Appellant

Gordon Bourgard, David Jacyk, Michael J. Lema for Respondent

Subject: Estates and Trusts; Goods and Services Tax (GST); Tax — Miscellaneous; Insolvency

Tax --- Goods and Services Tax — Collection and remittance — GST held in trust

Debtor owed Crown under Excise Tax Act (ETA) for unremitted GST — Debtor sought relief under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) — Under order of BC Supreme Court, amount of GST debt was placed in trust account and remaining proceeds of sale of assets paid to major secured creditor — Debtor's application for partial lifting of stay of proceedings to assign itself into bankruptcy was granted, while Crown's application for payment of tax debt was dismissed — Crown's appeal to BC Court of Appeal was allowed — Creditor appealed to Supreme Court of Canada — Appeal allowed — Analysis of ETA and CCAA yielded conclusion that CCAA provides that statutory deemed trusts do not apply, and that Parliament did not intend to restore Crown's deemed trust priority in GST claims under CCAA when it amended ETA in 2000 — Parliament had moved away from asserting priority for Crown claims under both CCAA and Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA), and neither

2010 CarswellBC 3419, 2010 SCC 60, J.E. 2011-5, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 534, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 533, 12 B.C.L.R. (5th) 1, 2011 D.T.C. 5006 (Eng.), 2011 G.T.C. 2006 (Eng.), [2011] 2 W.W.R. 383, 72 C.B.R. (5th) 170, 409 N.R. 201, 326 D.L.R. (4th) 577, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379, [2010] G.S.T.C. 186, 296 B.C.A.C. 1, 503 W.A.C. 1, 196 A.C.W.S. (3d) 27

statute provided for preferred treatment of GST claims — Giving Crown priority over GST claims during CCAA proceedings but not in bankruptcy would reduce use of more flexible and responsive CCAA regime — Parliament likely inadvertently succumbed to drafting anomaly — Section 222(3) of ETA could not be seen as having impliedly repealed s. 18.3 of CCAA by its subsequent passage, given recent amendments to CCAA — Court had discretion under CCAA to construct bridge to liquidation under BIA, and partially lift stay of proceedings to allow entry into liquidation — No "gap" should exist when moving from CCAA to BIA — Court order segregating funds did not have certainty that Crown rather than creditor would be beneficiary sufficient to support express trust — Amount held in respect of GST debt was not subject to deemed trust, priority or express trust in favour of Crown — Excise Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15, ss. 222(1), (1.1).

Tax --- General principles — Priority of tax claims in bankruptcy proceedings

Debtor owed Crown under Excise Tax Act (ETA) for unremitted GST — Debtor sought relief under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) — Under order of BC Supreme Court, amount of GST debt was placed in trust account and remaining proceeds of sale of assets paid to major secured creditor — Debtor's application for partial lifting of stay of proceedings to assign itself into bankruptcy was granted, while Crown's application for payment of tax debt was dismissed — Crown's appeal to BC Court of Appeal was allowed — Creditor appealed to Supreme Court of Canada — Appeal allowed — Analysis of ETA and CCAA yielded conclusion that CCAA provides that statutory deemed trusts do not apply, and that Parliament did not intend to restore Crown's deemed trust priority in GST claims under CCAA when it amended ETA in 2000 — Parliament had moved away from asserting priority for Crown claims under both CCAA and Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA), and neither statute provided for preferred treatment of GST claims — Giving Crown priority over GST claims during CCAA proceedings but not in bankruptcy would reduce use of more flexible and responsive CCAA regime — Parliament likely inadvertently succumbed to drafting anomaly — Section 222(3) of ETA could not be seen as having impliedly repealed s. 18.3 of CCAA by its subsequent passage, given recent amendments to CCAA — Court had discretion under CCAA to construct bridge to liquidation under BIA, and partially lift stay of proceedings to allow entry into liquidation — No "gap" should exist when moving from CCAA to BIA — Court order segregating funds did not have certainty that Crown rather than creditor would be beneficiary sufficient to support express trust — Amount held in respect of GST debt was not subject to deemed trust, priority or express trust in favour of Crown.

Taxation --- Taxe sur les produits et services — Perception et versement — Montant de TPS détenu en fiducie

Débitrice devait à la Couronne des montants de TPS qu'elle n'avait pas remis, en vertu de la Loi sur la taxe d'accise (LTA) — Débitrice a entamé des procédures judiciaires en vertu de la Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies (LACC) — En vertu d'une ordonnance du tribunal, le montant de la créance fiscale a été déposé dans un compte en fiducie et la balance du produit de la vente des actifs a servi à payer le créancier garanti principal — Demande de la débitrice visant à obtenir la levée partielle de la suspension de procédures afin qu'elle puisse faire cession de ses biens a été accordée, alors que la demande de la Couronne visant à obtenir le paiement des montants de TPS non remis a été rejetée — Appel interjeté par la Couronne a été accueilli — Créancier a formé un pourvoi — Pourvoi accueilli — Analyse de la LTA et de la LACC conduisait à la conclusion que le législateur ne saurait avoir eu l'intention de redonner la priorité, dans le cadre de la LACC, à la fiducie réputée de la Couronne à l'égard de ses créances relatives à la TPS quand il a modifié la LTA, en 2000 — Législateur avait mis un terme à la priorité accordée aux créances de la Couronne sous les régimes de la LACC et de la Loi sur la faillite et l'insolvabilité (LFI), et ni l'une ni l'autre de ces lois ne prévoyait que les créances relatives à la TPS bénéficiaient d'un traitement préférentiel — Fait de faire primer la priorité de la Couronne sur

2010 CarswellBC 3419, 2010 SCC 60, J.E. 2011-5, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 534, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 533, 12 B.C.L.R. (5th) 1, 2011 D.T.C. 5006 (Eng.), 2011 G.T.C. 2006 (Eng.), [2011] 2 W.W.R. 383, 72 C.B.R. (5th) 170, 409 N.R. 201, 326 D.L.R. (4th) 577, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379, [2010] G.S.T.C. 186, 296 B.C.A.C. 1, 503 W.A.C. 1, 196 A.C.W.S. (3d) 27

les créances découlant de la TPS dans le cadre de procédures fondées sur la LACC mais pas en cas de faillite aurait pour effet de restreindre le recours à la possibilité de se restructurer sous le régime plus souple et mieux adapté de la LACC — Il semblait probable que le législateur avait par inadvertance commis une anomalie rédactionnelle — On ne pourrait pas considérer l'art. 222(3) de la LTA comme ayant implicitement abrogé l'art. 18.3 de la LACC, compte tenu des modifications récemment apportées à la LACC — Sous le régime de la LACC, le tribunal avait discrétion pour établir une passerelle vers une liquidation opérée sous le régime de la LFI et de lever la suspension partielle des procédures afin de permettre à la débitrice de procéder à la transition au régime de liquidation — Il n'y avait aucune certitude, en vertu de l'ordonnance du tribunal, que la Couronne était le bénéficiaire véritable de la fiducie ni de fondement pour donner naissance à une fiducie expresse — Montant perçu au titre de la TPS ne faisait l'objet d'aucune fiducie présumée, priorité ou fiducie expresse en faveur de la Couronne.

Taxation --- Principes généraux — Priorité des créances fiscales dans le cadre de procédures en faillite

Débitrice devait à la Couronne des montants de TPS qu'elle n'avait pas remis, en vertu de la Loi sur la taxe d'accise (LTA) — Débitrice a entamé des procédures judiciaires en vertu de la Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies (LACC) — En vertu d'une ordonnance du tribunal, le montant de la créance fiscale a été déposé dans un compte en fiducie et la balance du produit de la vente des actifs a servi à payer le créancier garanti principal — Demande de la débitrice visant à obtenir la levée partielle de la suspension de procédures afin qu'elle puisse faire cession de ses biens a été accordée, alors que la demande de la Couronne visant à obtenir le paiement des montants de TPS non remis a été rejetée — Appel interjeté par la Couronne a été accueilli — Créancier a formé un pourvoi — Pourvoi accueilli — Analyse de la LTA et de la LACC conduisait à la conclusion que le législateur ne saurait avoir eu l'intention de redonner la priorité, dans le cadre de la LACC, à la fiducie réputée de la Couronne à l'égard de ses créances relatives à la TPS quand il a modifié la LTA, en 2000 — Législateur avait mis un terme à la priorité accordée aux créances de la Couronne sous les régimes de la LACC et de la Loi sur la faillite et l'insolvabilité (LFI), et ni l'une ni l'autre de ces lois ne prévoyait que les créances relatives à la TPS bénéficiaient d'un traitement préférentiel — Fait de faire primer la priorité de la Couronne sur les créances découlant de la TPS dans le cadre de procédures fondées sur la LACC mais pas en cas de faillite aurait pour effet de restreindre le recours à la possibilité de se restructurer sous le régime plus souple et mieux adapté de la LACC — Il semblait probable que le législateur avait par inadvertance commis une anomalie rédactionnelle — On ne pourrait pas considérer l'art. 222(3) de la LTA comme ayant implicitement abrogé l'art. 18.3 de la LACC, compte tenu des modifications récemment apportées à la LACC — Sous le régime de la LACC, le tribunal avait discrétion pour établir une passerelle vers une liquidation opérée sous le régime de la LFI et de lever la suspension partielle des procédures afin de permettre à la débitrice de procéder à la transition au régime de liquidation — Il n'y avait aucune certitude, en vertu de l'ordonnance du tribunal, que la Couronne était le bénéficiaire véritable de la fiducie ni de fondement pour donner naissance à une fiducie expresse — Montant perçu au titre de la TPS ne faisait l'objet d'aucune fiducie présumée, priorité ou fiducie expresse en faveur de la Couronne.

The debtor company owed the Crown under the Excise Tax Act (ETA) for GST that was not remitted. The debtor commenced proceedings under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA). Under an order by the B.C. Supreme Court, the amount of the tax debt was placed in a trust account, and the remaining proceeds from the sale of the debtor's assets were paid to the major secured creditor. The debtor's application for a partial lifting of the stay of proceedings in order to assign itself into bankruptcy was granted, while the Crown's application for the immediate payment of the unremitted GST was dismissed.

2010 CarswellBC 3419, 2010 SCC 60, J.E. 2011-5, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 534, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 533, 12 B.C.L.R. (5th) 1, 2011 D.T.C. 5006 (Eng.), 2011 G.T.C. 2006 (Eng.), [2011] 2 W.W.R. 383, 72 C.B.R. (5th) 170, 409 N.R. 201, 326 D.L.R. (4th) 577, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379, [2010] G.S.T.C. 186, 296 B.C.A.C. 1, 503 W.A.C. 1, 196 A.C.W.S. (3d) 27

The Crown's appeal to the B.C. Court of Appeal was allowed. The Court of Appeal found that the lower court was bound by the ETA to give the Crown priority once bankruptcy was inevitable. The Court of Appeal ruled that there was a deemed trust under s. 222 of the ETA or that an express trust was created in the Crown's favour by the court order segregating the GST funds in the trust account.

The creditor appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

Held: The appeal was allowed.

Per Deschamps J. (McLachlin C.J.C., Binnie, LeBel, Charron, Rothstein, Cromwell JJ. concurring): A purposive and contextual analysis of the ETA and CCAA yielded the conclusion that Parliament could not have intended to restore the Crown's deemed trust priority in GST claims under the CCAA when it amended the ETA in 2000. Parliament had moved away from asserting priority for Crown claims in insolvency law under both the CCAA and Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA). Unlike for source deductions, there was no express statutory basis in the CCAA or BIA for concluding that GST claims enjoyed any preferential treatment. The internal logic of the CCAA also militated against upholding a deemed trust for GST claims.

Giving the Crown priority over GST claims during CCAA proceedings but not in bankruptcy would, in practice, deprive companies of the option to restructure under the more flexible and responsive CCAA regime. It seemed likely that Parliament had inadvertently succumbed to a drafting anomaly, which could be resolved by giving precedence to s. 18.3 of the CCAA. Section 222(3) of the ETA could no longer be seen as having impliedly repealed s. 18.3 of the CCAA by being passed subsequently to the CCAA, given the recent amendments to the CCAA. The legislative context supported the conclusion that s. 222(3) of the ETA was not intended to narrow the scope of s. 18.3 of the CCAA.

The breadth of the court's discretion under the CCAA was sufficient to construct a bridge to liquidation under the BIA, so there was authority under the CCAA to partially lift the stay of proceedings to allow the debtor's entry into liquidation. There should be no gap between the CCAA and BIA proceedings that would invite a race to the courthouse to assert priorities.

The court order did not have the certainty that the Crown would actually be the beneficiary of the funds sufficient to support an express trust, as the funds were segregated until the dispute between the creditor and the Crown could be resolved. The amount collected in respect of GST but not yet remitted to the Receiver General of Canada was not subject to a deemed trust, priority or express trust in favour of the Crown.

Per Fish J. (concurring): Parliament had declined to amend the provisions at issue after detailed consideration of the insolvency regime, so the apparent conflict between s. 18.3 of the CCAA and s. 222 of the ETA should not be treated as a drafting anomaly. In the insolvency context, a deemed trust would exist only when two complementary elements co-existed: first, a statutory provision creating the trust; and second, a CCAA or BIA provision confirming its effective operation. Parliament had created the Crown's deemed trust in the Income Tax Act, Canada Pension Plan and Employment Insurance Act and then confirmed in clear and unmistakable terms its continued operation under both the CCAA and the BIA regimes. In contrast, the ETA created a deemed trust in favour of the Crown, purportedly notwithstanding any contrary legislation, but Parliament did not expressly provide for its continued operation in either the BIA or the CCAA. The absence of this confirmation reflected Parliament's intention to allow the deemed trust to lapse with the commencement of insolvency proceedings. Parliament's evident intent was to render GST deemed trusts inoperative upon the institution of insolvency proceedings, and so s. 222 of the ETA mentioned the BIA so as to exclude it from its ambit, rather than include it as

2010 CarswellBC 3419, 2010 SCC 60, J.E. 2011-5, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 534, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 533, 12 B.C.L.R. (5th) 1, 2011 D.T.C. 5006 (Eng.), 2011 G.T.C. 2006 (Eng.), [2011] 2 W.W.R. 383, 72 C.B.R. (5th) 170, 409 N.R. 201, 326 D.L.R. (4th) 577, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379, [2010] G.S.T.C. 186, 296 B.C.A.C. 1, 503 W.A.C. 1, 196 A.C.W.S. (3d) 27

the other statutes did. As none of these statutes mentioned the CCAA expressly, the specific reference to the BIA had no bearing on the interaction with the CCAA. It was the confirmatory provisions in the insolvency statutes that would determine whether a given deemed trust would subsist during insolvency proceedings.

Per Abella J. (dissenting): The appellate court properly found that s. 222(3) of the ETA gave priority during CCAA proceedings to the Crown's deemed trust in unremitted GST. The failure to exempt the CCAA from the operation of this provision was a reflection of clear legislative intent. Despite the requests of various constituencies and case law confirming that the ETA took precedence over the CCAA, there was no responsive legislative revision and the BIA remained the only exempted statute. There was no policy justification for interfering, through interpretation, with this clarity of legislative intention and, in any event, the application of other principles of interpretation reinforced this conclusion. Contrary to the majority's view, the "later in time" principle did not favour the precedence of the CCAA, as the CCAA was merely re-enacted without significant substantive changes. According to the Interpretation Act, in such circumstances, s. 222(3) of the ETA remained the later provision. The chambers judge was required to respect the priority regime set out in s. 222(3) of the ETA and so did not have the authority to deny the Crown's request for payment of the GST funds during the CCAA proceedings.

La compagnie débitrice devait à la Couronne des montants de TPS qu'elle n'avait pas remis, en vertu de la Loi sur la taxe d'accise (LTA). La débitrice a entamé des procédures judiciaires en vertu de la Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies (LACC). En vertu d'une ordonnance du tribunal, le montant de la créance fiscale a été déposé dans un compte en fiducie et la balance du produit de la vente des actifs de la débitrice a servi à payer le créancier garanti principal. La demande de la débitrice visant à obtenir la levée partielle de la suspension de procédures afin qu'elle puisse faire cession de ses biens a été accordée, alors que la demande de la Couronne visant à obtenir le paiement immédiat des montants de TPS non remis a été rejetée.

L'appel interjeté par la Couronne a été accueilli. La Cour d'appel a conclu que le tribunal se devait, en vertu de la LTA, de donner priorité à la Couronne une fois la faillite inévitable. La Cour d'appel a estimé que l'art. 222 de la LTA établissait une fiducie présumée ou bien que l'ordonnance du tribunal à l'effet que les montants de TPS soient détenus dans un compte en fiducie créait une fiducie expresse en faveur de la Couronne.

Le créancier a formé un pourvoi.

Arrêt: Le pourvoi a été accueilli.

Deschamps, J. (McLachlin, J.C.C., Binnie, LeBel, Charron, Rothstein, Cromwell, JJ., souscrivant à son opinion) : Une analyse téléologique et contextuelle de la LTA et de la LACC conduisait à la conclusion que le législateur ne saurait avoir eu l'intention de redonner la priorité, dans le cadre de la LACC, à la fiducie réputée de la Couronne à l'égard de ses créances relatives à la TPS quand il a modifié la LTA, en 2000. Le législateur avait mis un terme à la priorité accordée aux créances de la Couronne dans le cadre du droit de l'insolvabilité, sous le régime de la LACC et celui de la Loi sur la faillite et l'insolvabilité (LFI). Contrairement aux retenues à la source, aucune disposition législative expresse ne permettait de conclure que les créances relatives à la TPS bénéficiaient d'un traitement préférentiel sous le régime de la LACC ou celui de la LFI. La logique interne de la LACC allait également à l'encontre du maintien de la fiducie réputée à l'égard des créances découlant de la TPS.

Le fait de faire primer la priorité de la Couronne sur les créances découlant de la TPS dans le cadre de procédures fondées sur la LACC mais pas en cas de faillite aurait pour effet, dans les faits, de priver les compagnies de la possibilité de se restructurer sous le régime plus souple et mieux adapté de la LACC. Il semblait prob-

2010 CarswellBC 3419, 2010 SCC 60, J.E. 2011-5, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 534, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 533, 12 B.C.L.R. (5th) 1, 2011 D.T.C. 5006 (Eng.), 2011 G.T.C. 2006 (Eng.), [2011] 2 W.W.R. 383, 72 C.B.R. (5th) 170, 409 N.R. 201, 326 D.L.R. (4th) 577, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379, [2010] G.S.T.C. 186, 296 B.C.A.C. 1, 503 W.A.C. 1, 196 A.C.W.S. (3d) 27

able que le législateur avait par inadvertance commis une anomalie rédactionnelle, laquelle pouvait être corrigée en donnant préséance à l'art. 18.3 de la LACC. On ne pouvait plus considérer l'art. 222(3) de la LTA comme ayant implicitement abrogé l'art. 18.3 de la LACC parce qu'il avait été adopté après la LACC, compte tenu des modifications récemment apportées à la LACC. Le contexte législatif étayait la conclusion suivant laquelle l'art. 222(3) de la LTA n'avait pas pour but de restreindre la portée de l'art. 18.3 de la LACC.

L'ampleur du pouvoir discrétionnaire conféré au tribunal par la LACC était suffisant pour établir une passerelle vers une liquidation opérée sous le régime de la LFI, de sorte qu'il avait, en vertu de la LACC, le pouvoir de lever la suspension partielle des procédures afin de permettre à la débitrice de procéder à la transition au régime de liquidation. Il n'y avait aucune certitude, en vertu de l'ordonnance du tribunal, que la Couronne était le bénéficiaire véritable de la fiducie ni de fondement pour donner naissance à une fiducie expresse, puisque les fonds étaient détenus à part jusqu'à ce que le litige entre le créancier et la Couronne soit résolu. Le montant perçu au titre de la TPS mais non encore versé au receveur général du Canada ne faisait l'objet d'aucune fiducie présumée, priorité ou fiducie expresse en faveur de la Couronne.

Fish, J. (souscrivant aux motifs des juges majoritaires) : Le législateur a refusé de modifier les dispositions en question suivant un examen approfondi du régime d'insolvabilité, de sorte qu'on ne devrait pas qualifier l'apparente contradiction entre l'art. 18.3 de la LACC et l'art. 222 de la LTA d'anomalie rédactionnelle. Dans un contexte d'insolvabilité, on ne pourrait conclure à l'existence d'une fiducie présumée que lorsque deux éléments complémentaires étaient réunis : en premier lieu, une disposition législative qui crée la fiducie et, en second lieu, une disposition de la LACC ou de la LFI qui confirme l'existence de la fiducie. Le législateur a établi une fiducie présumée en faveur de la Couronne dans la Loi de l'impôt sur le revenu, le Régime de pensions du Canada et la Loi sur l'assurance-emploi puis, il a confirmé en termes clairs et explicites sa volonté de voir cette fiducie présumée produire ses effets sous le régime de la LACC et de la LFI. Dans le cas de la LTA, il a établi une fiducie présumée en faveur de la Couronne, sciemment et sans égard pour toute législation à l'effet contraire, mais n'a pas expressément prévu le maintien en vigueur de celle-ci sous le régime de la LFI ou celui de la LACC. L'absence d'une telle confirmation témoignait de l'intention du législateur de laisser la fiducie présumée devenir caduque au moment de l'introduction de la procédure d'insolvabilité. L'intention du législateur était manifestement de rendre inopérantes les fiducies présumées visant la TPS dès l'introduction d'une procédure d'insolvabilité et, par conséquent, l'art. 222 de la LTA mentionnait la LFI de manière à l'exclure de son champ d'application, et non de l'y inclure, comme le faisaient les autres lois. Puisqu'aucune de ces lois ne mentionnait spécifiquement la LACC, la mention explicite de la LFI n'avait aucune incidence sur l'interaction avec la LACC. C'était les dispositions confirmatoires que l'on trouvait dans les lois sur l'insolvabilité qui déterminaient si une fiducie présumée continuerait d'exister durant une procédure d'insolvabilité.

Abella, J. (dissidente) : La Cour d'appel a conclu à bon droit que l'art. 222(3) de la LTA donnait préséance à la fiducie présumée qui est établie en faveur de la Couronne à l'égard de la TPS non versée. Le fait que la LACC n'ait pas été soustraite à l'application de cette disposition témoignait d'une intention claire du législateur. Malgré les demandes répétées de divers groupes et la jurisprudence ayant confirmé que la LTA l'emportait sur la LACC, le législateur n'est pas intervenu et la LFI est demeurée la seule loi soustraite à l'application de cette disposition. Il n'y avait pas de considération de politique générale qui justifierait d'aller à l'encontre, par voie d'interprétation législative, de l'intention aussi clairement exprimée par le législateur et, de toutes manières, cette conclusion était renforcée par l'application d'autres principes d'interprétation. Contrairement à l'opinion des juges majoritaires, le principe de la préséance de la « loi postérieure » ne militait pas en faveur de la préséance de la LACC, celle-ci ayant été simplement adoptée à nouveau sans que l'on ne lui ait apporté de modifications importantes. En vertu de la Loi d'interprétation, dans ces circonstances, l'art. 222(3) de la LTA demeurait la disposition

2010 CarswellBC 3419, 2010 SCC 60, J.E. 2011-5, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 534, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 533, 12 B.C.L.R. (5th) 1, 2011 D.T.C. 5006 (Eng.), 2011 G.T.C. 2006 (Eng.), [2011] 2 W.W.R. 383, 72 C.B.R. (5th) 170, 409 N.R. 201, 326 D.L.R. (4th) 577, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379, [2010] G.S.T.C. 186, 296 B.C.A.C. 1, 503 W.A.C. 1, 196 A.C.W.S. (3d) 27

postérieure. Le juge siégeant en son cabinet était tenu de respecter le régime de priorités établi à l'art. 222(3) de la LTA, et il ne pouvait pas refuser la demande présentée par la Couronne en vue de se faire payer la TPS dans le cadre de la procédure introduite en vertu de la LACC.

Cases considered by Deschamps J.:

Air Canada, Re (2003), 42 C.B.R. (4th) 173, 2003 CarswellOnt 2464 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Air Canada, Re (2003), 2003 CarswellOnt 4967 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Alternative granite & marbre inc., Re (2009), (sub nom. *Dep. Min. Rev. Quebec v. Caisse populaire Desjardins de Montmagny*) 2009 G.T.C. 2036 (Eng.), (sub nom. *Quebec (Revenue) v. Caisse populaire Desjardins de Montmagny*) [2009] 3 S.C.R. 286, 312 D.L.R. (4th) 577, [2009] G.S.T.C. 154, (sub nom. 9083-4185 *Québec Inc. (Bankrupt), Re*) 394 N.R. 368, 60 C.B.R. (5th) 1, 2009 SCC 49, 2009 CarswellQue 10706, 2009 CarswellQue 10707 (S.C.C.) — referred to

ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp. (2008), 2008 ONCA 587, 2008 CarswellOnt 4811, (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re*) 240 O.A.C. 245, (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re*) 296 D.L.R. (4th) 135, (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re*) 92 O.R. (3d) 513, 45 C.B.R. (5th) 163, 47 B.L.R. (4th) 123 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

Canadian Airlines Corp., Re (2000), [2000] 10 W.W.R. 269, 20 C.B.R. (4th) 1, 84 Alta. L.R. (3d) 9, 9 B.L.R. (3d) 41, 2000 CarswellAlta 662, 2000 ABQB 442, 265 A.R. 201 (Alta. Q.B.) — referred to

Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix Rouge, Re (2000), 2000 CarswellOnt 3269, 19 C.B.R. (4th) 158 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to

Doré c. Verdun (Municipalité) (1997), (sub nom. *Doré v. Verdun (City)*) [1997] 2 S.C.R. 862, (sub nom. *Doré v. Verdun (Ville)*) 215 N.R. 81, (sub nom. *Doré v. Verdun (City)*) 150 D.L.R. (4th) 385, 1997 CarswellQue 159, 1997 CarswellQue 850 (S.C.C.) — distinguished

Dylex Ltd., Re (1995), 31 C.B.R. (3d) 106, 1995 CarswellOnt 54 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — considered

First Vancouver Finance v. Minister of National Revenue (2002), [2002] 3 C.T.C. 285, (sub nom. *Minister of National Revenue v. First Vancouver Finance*) 2002 D.T.C. 6998 (Eng.), (sub nom. *Minister of National Revenue v. First Vancouver Finance*) 2002 D.T.C. 7007 (Fr.), 288 N.R. 347, 212 D.L.R. (4th) 615, [2002] G.S.T.C. 23, [2003] 1 W.W.R. 1, 45 C.B.R. (4th) 213, 2002 SCC 49, 2002 CarswellSask 317, 2002 CarswellSask 318, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 720 (S.C.C.) — considered

Gauntlet Energy Corp., Re (2003), 30 Alta. L.R. (4th) 192, 2003 ABQB 894, 2003 CarswellAlta 1735, [2003] G.S.T.C. 193, 49 C.B.R. (4th) 213, [2004] 10 W.W.R. 180, 352 A.R. 28 (Alta. Q.B.) — referred to

Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd. (1990), 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 84, 1990 CarswellBC 394, 4 C.B.R. (3d) 311, (sub nom. *Chef Ready Foods Ltd. v. Hongkong Bank of Canada*) [1991] 2 W.W.R. 136 (B.C. C.A.) — referred to

2010 CarswellBC 3419, 2010 SCC 60, J.E. 2011-5, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 534, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 533, 12 B.C.L.R. (5th) 1, 2011 D.T.C. 5006 (Eng.), 2011 G.T.C. 2006 (Eng.), [2011] 2 W.W.R. 383, 72 C.B.R. (5th) 170, 409 N.R. 201, 326 D.L.R. (4th) 577, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379, [2010] G.S.T.C. 186, 296 B.C.A.C. 1, 503 W.A.C. 1, 196 A.C.W.S. (3d) 27

Ivaco Inc., Re (2006), 2006 C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8218, 25 C.B.R. (5th) 176, 83 O.R. (3d) 108, 275 D.L.R. (4th) 132, 2006 CarswellOnt 6292, 56 C.C.P.B. 1, 26 B.L.R. (4th) 43 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

Komunik Corp., Re (2010), 2010 CarswellQue 686, 2010 QCCA 183 (Que. C.A.) — referred to

Komunik Corp., Re (2009), 2009 QCCS 6332, 2009 CarswellQue 13962 (Que. S.C.) — referred to

Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of) (1990), 1990 CarswellOnt 139, 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101, (sub nom. *Elan Corp. v. Comiskey*) 1 O.R. (3d) 289, (sub nom. *Elan Corp. v. Comiskey*) 41 O.A.C. 282 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

Ottawa Senators Hockey Club Corp., Re (2005), 2005 G.T.C. 1327 (Eng.), 6 C.B.R. (5th) 293, 2005 D.T.C. 5233 (Eng.), 2005 CarswellOnt 8, [2005] G.S.T.C. 1, 193 O.A.C. 95, 73 O.R. (3d) 737 (Ont. C.A.) — not followed

Pacific National Lease Holding Corp., Re (1992), 72 B.C.L.R. (2d) 368, 19 B.C.A.C. 134, 34 W.A.C. 134, 15 C.B.R. (3d) 265, 1992 CarswellBC 524 (B.C. C.A. [In Chambers]) — referred to

Philip's Manufacturing Ltd., Re (1992), 9 C.B.R. (3d) 25, 67 B.C.L.R. (2d) 84, 4 B.L.R. (2d) 142, 1992 CarswellBC 542 (B.C. C.A.) — referred to

Quebec (Deputy Minister of Revenue) c. Rainville (1979), (sub nom. *Bourgeault, Re*) 33 C.B.R. (N.S.) 301, (sub nom. *Bourgeault's Estate v. Quebec (Deputy Minister of Revenue)*) 30 N.R. 24, (sub nom. *Bourgault, Re*) 105 D.L.R. (3d) 270, 1979 CarswellQue 165, 1979 CarswellQue 266, (sub nom. *Quebec (Deputy Minister of Revenue) v. Bourgeault (Trustee of)*) [1980] 1 S.C.R. 35 (S.C.C.) — referred to

Reference re Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (Canada) (1934), [1934] 4 D.L.R. 75, 1934 CarswellNat 1, 16 C.B.R. 1, [1934] S.C.R. 659 (S.C.C.) — referred to

Royal Bank v. Sparrow Electric Corp. (1997), 193 A.R. 321, 135 W.A.C. 321, [1997] 2 W.W.R. 457, 208 N.R. 161, 12 P.P.S.A.C. (2d) 68, 1997 CarswellAlta 112, 1997 CarswellAlta 113, 46 Alta. L.R. (3d) 87, (sub nom. *R. v. Royal Bank*) 97 D.T.C. 5089, 143 D.L.R. (4th) 385, 44 C.B.R. (3d) 1, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 411 (S.C.C.) — considered

Skeena Cellulose Inc., Re (2003), 2003 CarswellBC 1399, 2003 BCCA 344, 184 B.C.A.C. 54, 302 W.A.C. 54, 43 C.B.R. (4th) 187, 13 B.C.L.R. (4th) 236 (B.C. C.A.) — referred to

Skydome Corp., Re (1998), 16 C.B.R. (4th) 118, 1998 CarswellOnt 5922 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Solid Resources Ltd., Re (2002), [2003] G.S.T.C. 21, 2002 CarswellAlta 1699, 40 C.B.R. (4th) 219 (Alta. Q.B.) — referred to

Stelco Inc., Re (2005), 253 D.L.R. (4th) 109, 75 O.R. (3d) 5, 2 B.L.R. (4th) 238, 9 C.B.R. (5th) 135, 2005 CarswellOnt 1188, 196 O.A.C. 142 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

United Used Auto & Truck Parts Ltd., Re (1999), 12 C.B.R. (4th) 144, 1999 CarswellBC 2673 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]) — referred to

2010 CarswellBC 3419, 2010 SCC 60, J.E. 2011-5, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 534, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 533, 12 B.C.L.R. (5th) 1, 2011 D.T.C. 5006 (Eng.), 2011 G.T.C. 2006 (Eng.), [2011] 2 W.W.R. 383, 72 C.B.R. (5th) 170, 409 N.R. 201, 326 D.L.R. (4th) 577, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379, [2010] G.S.T.C. 186, 296 B.C.A.C. 1, 503 W.A.C. 1, 196 A.C.W.S. (3d) 27

United Used Auto & Truck Parts Ltd., Re (2000), 2000 BCCA 146, 135 B.C.A.C. 96, 221 W.A.C. 96, 2000 CarswellBC 414, 73 B.C.L.R. (3d) 236, 16 C.B.R. (4th) 141, [2000] 5 W.W.R. 178 (B.C. C.A.) — referred to

Cases considered by *Fish J.*:

Ottawa Senators Hockey Club Corp., Re (2005), 2005 G.T.C. 1327 (Eng.), 6 C.B.R. (5th) 293, 2005 D.T.C. 5233 (Eng.), 2005 CarswellOnt 8, [2005] G.S.T.C. 1, 193 O.A.C. 95, 73 O.R. (3d) 737 (Ont. C.A.) — not followed

Cases considered by *Abella J.* (dissenting):

Canada (Attorney General) v. Canada (Public Service Staff Relations Board) (1977), [1977] 2 F.C. 663, 14 N.R. 257, 74 D.L.R. (3d) 307, 1977 CarswellNat 62, 1977 CarswellNat 62F (Fed. C.A.) — referred to

Doré c. Verdun (Municipalité) (1997), (sub nom. *Doré v. Verdun (City)*) [1997] 2 S.C.R. 862, (sub nom. *Doré v. Verdun (Ville)*) 215 N.R. 81, (sub nom. *Doré v. Verdun (City)*) 150 D.L.R. (4th) 385, 1997 CarswellQue 159, 1997 CarswellQue 850 (S.C.C.) — referred to

Ottawa Senators Hockey Club Corp., Re (2005), 2005 G.T.C. 1327 (Eng.), 6 C.B.R. (5th) 293, 2005 D.T.C. 5233 (Eng.), 2005 CarswellOnt 8, [2005] G.S.T.C. 1, 193 O.A.C. 95, 73 O.R. (3d) 737 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

R. v. Tele-Mobile Co. (2008), 2008 CarswellOnt 1588, 2008 CarswellOnt 1589, 2008 SCC 12, (sub nom. *Tele-Mobile Co. v. Ontario*) 372 N.R. 157, 55 C.R. (6th) 1, (sub nom. *Ontario v. Tele-Mobile Co.*) 229 C.C.C. (3d) 417, (sub nom. *Tele-Mobile Co. v. Ontario*) 235 O.A.C. 369, (sub nom. *Tele-Mobile Co. v. Ontario*) [2008] 1 S.C.R. 305, (sub nom. *R. v. Tele-Mobile Company (Telus Mobility)*) 92 O.R. (3d) 478 (note), (sub nom. *Ontario v. Tele-Mobile Co.*) 291 D.L.R. (4th) 193 (S.C.C.) — considered

Statutes considered by *Deschamps J.*:

Bank Act, S.C. 1991, c. 46

Generally — referred to

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3

Generally — referred to

s. 67(2) — referred to

s. 67(3) — referred to

s. 81.1 [en. 1992, c. 27, s. 38(1)] — considered

s. 81.2 [en. 1992, c. 27, s. 38(1)] — considered

s. 86(1) — considered

2010 CarswellBC 3419, 2010 SCC 60, J.E. 2011-5, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 534, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 533, 12 B.C.L.R. (5th) 1, 2011 D.T.C. 5006 (Eng.), 2011 G.T.C. 2006 (Eng.), [2011] 2 W.W.R. 383, 72 C.B.R. (5th) 170, 409 N.R. 201, 326 D.L.R. (4th) 577, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379, [2010] G.S.T.C. 186, 296 B.C.A.C. 1, 503 W.A.C. 1, 196 A.C.W.S. (3d) 27

s. 86(3) — referred to

Bankruptcy Act and to amend the Income Tax Act in consequence thereof, Act to amend the, S.C. 1992, c. 27

Generally — referred to

s. 39 — referred to

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act and the Income Tax Act, Act to amend the, S.C. 1997, c. 12

s. 73 — referred to

s. 125 — referred to

s. 126 — referred to

Canada Pension Plan, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-8

Generally — referred to

s. 23(3) — referred to

s. 23(4) — referred to

Cités et villes, Loi sur les, L.R.Q., c. C-19

en général — referred to

Code civil du Québec, L.Q. 1991, c. 64

en général — referred to

art. 2930 — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, Act to Amend, S.C. 1952-53, c. 3

Generally — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, 1933, S.C. 1932-33, c. 36

Generally — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

s. 11 — considered

s. 11(1) — considered

2010 CarswellBC 3419, 2010 SCC 60, J.E. 2011-5, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 534, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 533, 12 B.C.L.R. (5th) 1, 2011 D.T.C. 5006 (Eng.), 2011 G.T.C. 2006 (Eng.), [2011] 2 W.W.R. 383, 72 C.B.R. (5th) 170, 409 N.R. 201, 326 D.L.R. (4th) 577, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379, [2010] G.S.T.C. 186, 296 B.C.A.C. 1, 503 W.A.C. 1, 196 A.C.W.S. (3d) 27

s. 11(3) — referred to

s. 11(4) — referred to

s. 11(6) — referred to

s. 11.02 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — referred to

s. 11.09 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

s. 11.4 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — referred to

s. 18.3 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 125] — considered

s. 18.3(1) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 125] — considered

s. 18.3(2) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 125] — considered

s. 18.4 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 125] — referred to

s. 18.4(1) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 125] — considered

s. 18.4(3) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 125] — considered

s. 20 — considered

s. 21 — considered

s. 37 — considered

s. 37(1) — referred to

Employment Insurance Act, S.C. 1996, c. 23

Generally — referred to

s. 86(2) — referred to

s. 86(2.1) [en. 1998, c. 19, s. 266(1)] — referred to

Excise Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15

Generally — referred to

s. 222(1) [en. 1990, c. 45, s. 12(1)] — referred to

s. 222(3) [en. 1990, c. 45, s. 12(1)] — considered

Fairness for the Self-Employed Act, S.C. 2009, c. 33

Generally — referred to

2010 CarswellBC 3419, 2010 SCC 60, J.E. 2011-5, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 534, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 533, 12 B.C.L.R. (5th) 1, 2011 D.T.C. 5006 (Eng.), 2011 G.T.C. 2006 (Eng.), [2011] 2 W.W.R. 383, 72 C.B.R. (5th) 170, 409 N.R. 201, 326 D.L.R. (4th) 577, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379, [2010] G.S.T.C. 186, 296 B.C.A.C. 1, 503 W.A.C. 1, 196 A.C.W.S. (3d) 27

Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.)

s. 227(4) — referred to

s. 227(4.1) [en. 1998, c. 19, s. 226(1)] — referred to

Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21

s. 44(f) — considered

Personal Property Security Act, S.A. 1988, c. P-4.05

Generally — referred to

Sales Tax and Excise Tax Amendments Act, 1999, S.C. 2000, c. 30

Generally — referred to

Wage Earner Protection Program Act, S.C. 2005, c. 47, s. 1

Generally — referred to

s. 69 — referred to

s. 128 — referred to

s. 131 — referred to

Statutes considered *Fish J.*:

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3

Generally — referred to

s. 67(2) — considered

s. 67(3) — considered

Canada Pension Plan, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-8

Generally — referred to

s. 23 — considered

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

s. 11 — considered

s. 18.3(1) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 125] — considered

2010 CarswellBC 3419, 2010 SCC 60, J.E. 2011-5, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 534, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 533, 12 B.C.L.R. (5th) 1, 2011 D.T.C. 5006 (Eng.), 2011 G.T.C. 2006 (Eng.), [2011] 2 W.W.R. 383, 72 C.B.R. (5th) 170, 409 N.R. 201, 326 D.L.R. (4th) 577, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379, [2010] G.S.T.C. 186, 296 B.C.A.C. 1, 503 W.A.C. 1, 196 A.C.W.S. (3d) 27

s. 18.3(2) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 125] — considered

s. 37(1) — considered

Employment Insurance Act, S.C. 1996, c. 23

Generally — referred to

s. 86(2) — referred to

s. 86(2.1) [en. 1998, c. 19, s. 266(1)] — referred to

Excise Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15

Generally — referred to

s. 222 [en. 1990, c. 45, s. 12(1)] — considered

s. 222(1) [en. 1990, c. 45, s. 12(1)] — considered

s. 222(3) [en. 1990, c. 45, s. 12(1)] — considered

s. 222(3)(a) [en. 1990, c. 45, s. 12(1)] — considered

Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.)

Generally — referred to

s. 227(4) — considered

s. 227(4.1) [en. 1998, c. 19, s. 226(1)] — considered

s. 227(4.1)(a) [en. 1998, c. 19, s. 226(1)] — considered

Statutes considered *Abella J.* (dissenting):

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3

Generally — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

s. 11 — considered

s. 11(1) — considered

s. 11(3) — considered

s. 18.3(1) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 125] — considered

2010 CarswellBC 3419, 2010 SCC 60, J.E. 2011-5, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 534, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 533, 12 B.C.L.R. (5th) 1, 2011 D.T.C. 5006 (Eng.), 2011 G.T.C. 2006 (Eng.), [2011] 2 W.W.R. 383, 72 C.B.R. (5th) 170, 409 N.R. 201, 326 D.L.R. (4th) 577, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379, [2010] G.S.T.C. 186, 296 B.C.A.C. 1, 503 W.A.C. 1, 196 A.C.W.S. (3d) 27

s. 37(1) — considered

Excise Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15

Generally — referred to

s. 222 [en. 1990, c. 45, s. 12(1)] — considered

s. 222(3) [en. 1990, c. 45, s. 12(1)] — considered

Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21

s. 2(1)"enactment" — considered

s. 44(f) — considered

Winding-up and Restructuring Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. W-11

Generally — referred to

APPEAL by creditor from judgment reported at 2009 CarswellBC 1195, 2009 BCCA 205, [2009] G.S.T.C. 79, 98 B.C.L.R. (4th) 242, [2009] 12 W.W.R. 684, 270 B.C.A.C. 167, 454 W.A.C. 167, 2009 G.T.C. 2020 (Eng.) (B.C. C.A.), allowing Crown's appeal from dismissal of application for immediate payment of tax debt.

Deschamps J.:

1 For the first time this Court is called upon to directly interpret the provisions of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 ("CCAA"). In that respect, two questions are raised. The first requires reconciliation of provisions of the CCAA and the *Excise Tax Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15 ("ETA"), which lower courts have held to be in conflict with one another. The second concerns the scope of a court's discretion when supervising reorganization. The relevant statutory provisions are reproduced in the Appendix. On the first question, having considered the evolution of Crown priorities in the context of insolvency and the wording of the various statutes creating Crown priorities, I conclude that it is the CCAA and not the ETA that provides the rule. On the second question, I conclude that the broad discretionary jurisdiction conferred on the supervising judge must be interpreted having regard to the remedial nature of the CCAA and insolvency legislation generally. Consequently, the court had the discretion to partially lift a stay of proceedings to allow the debtor to make an assignment under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 ("BIA"). I would allow the appeal.

1. Facts and Decisions of the Courts Below

2 Ted LeRoy Trucking Ltd. ("LeRoy Trucking") commenced proceedings under the CCAA in the Supreme Court of British Columbia on December 13, 2007, obtaining a stay of proceedings with a view to reorganizing its financial affairs. LeRoy Trucking sold certain redundant assets as authorized by the order.

3 Amongst the debts owed by LeRoy Trucking was an amount for Goods and Services Tax ("GST") collected but unremitted to the Crown. The ETA creates a deemed trust in favour of the Crown for amounts collected in respect of GST. The deemed trust extends to any property or proceeds held by the person collecting GST and any property of that person held by a secured creditor, requiring that property to be paid to the Crown in priority to all security interests. The ETA provides that the deemed trust operates despite any other enactment of Canada

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except the *BIA*. However, the *CCAA* also provides that subject to certain exceptions, none of which mentions GST, deemed trusts in favour of the Crown do not operate under the *CCAA*. Accordingly, under the *CCAA* the Crown ranks as an unsecured creditor in respect of GST. Nonetheless, at the time LeRoy Trucking commenced *CCAA* proceedings the leading line of jurisprudence held that the *ETA* took precedence over the *CCAA* such that the Crown enjoyed priority for GST claims under the *CCAA*, even though it would have lost that same priority under the *BIA*. The *CCAA* underwent substantial amendments in 2005 in which some of the provisions at issue in this appeal were renumbered and reformulated (S.C. 2005, c. 47). However, these amendments only came into force on September 18, 2009. I will refer to the amended provisions only where relevant.

4 On April 29, 2008, Brenner C.J.S.C., in the context of the *CCAA* proceedings, approved a payment not exceeding \$5 million, the proceeds of redundant asset sales, to Century Services, the debtor's major secured creditor. LeRoy Trucking proposed to hold back an amount equal to the GST monies collected but unremitted to the Crown and place it in the Monitor's trust account until the outcome of the reorganization was known. In order to maintain the *status quo* while the success of the reorganization was uncertain, Brenner C.J.S.C. agreed to the proposal and ordered that an amount of \$305,202.30 be held by the Monitor in its trust account.

5 On September 3, 2008, having concluded that reorganization was not possible, LeRoy Trucking sought leave to make an assignment in bankruptcy under the *BIA*. The Crown sought an order that the GST monies held by the Monitor be paid to the Receiver General of Canada. Brenner C.J.S.C. dismissed the latter application. Reasoning that the purpose of segregating the funds with the Monitor was "to facilitate an ultimate payment of the GST monies which were owed pre-filing, but only if a viable plan emerged", the failure of such a reorganization, followed by an assignment in bankruptcy, meant the Crown would lose priority under the *BIA* (2008 BCSC 1805, [2008] G.S.T.C. 221 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers])).

6 The Crown's appeal was allowed by the British Columbia Court of Appeal (2009 BCCA 205, [2009] G.S.T.C. 79, 270 B.C.A.C. 167 (B.C. C.A.)). Tysoe J.A. for a unanimous court found two independent bases for allowing the Crown's appeal.

7 First, the court's authority under s. 11 of the *CCAA* was held not to extend to staying the Crown's application for immediate payment of the GST funds subject to the deemed trust after it was clear that reorganization efforts had failed and that bankruptcy was inevitable. As restructuring was no longer a possibility, staying the Crown's claim to the GST funds no longer served a purpose under the *CCAA* and the court was bound under the priority scheme provided by the *ETA* to allow payment to the Crown. In so holding, Tysoe J.A. adopted the reasoning in *Ottawa Senators Hockey Club Corp. (Re)*, [2005] G.S.T.C. 1, 73 O.R. (3d) 737 (Ont. C.A.), which found that the *ETA* deemed trust for GST established Crown priority over secured creditors under the *CCAA*.

8 Second, Tysoe J.A. concluded that by ordering the GST funds segregated in the Monitor's trust account on April 29, 2008, the judge had created an express trust in favour of the Crown from which the monies in question could not be diverted for any other purposes. The Court of Appeal therefore ordered that the money held by the Monitor in trust be paid to the Receiver General.

2. Issues

9 This appeal raises three broad issues which are addressed in turn:

(1) Did s. 222(3) of the *ETA* displace s. 18.3(1) of the *CCAA* and give priority to the Crown's *ETA* deemed trust during *CCAA* proceedings as held in *Ottawa Senators*?

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(2) Did the court exceed its *CCAA* authority by lifting the stay to allow the debtor to make an assignment in bankruptcy?

(3) Did the court's order of April 29, 2008 requiring segregation of the Crown's GST claim in the Monitor's trust account create an express trust in favour of the Crown in respect of those funds?

3. Analysis

10 The first issue concerns Crown priorities in the context of insolvency. As will be seen, the *ETA* provides for a deemed trust in favour of the Crown in respect of GST owed by a debtor "[d]espite ... any other enactment of Canada (except the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*)" (s. 222(3)), while the *CCAA* stated at the relevant time that "notwithstanding any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be [so] regarded" (s. 18.3(1)). It is difficult to imagine two statutory provisions more apparently in conflict. However, as is often the case, the apparent conflict can be resolved through interpretation.

11 In order to properly interpret the provisions, it is necessary to examine the history of the *CCAA*, its function amidst the body of insolvency legislation enacted by Parliament, and the principles that have been recognized in the jurisprudence. It will be seen that Crown priorities in the insolvency context have been significantly pared down. The resolution of the second issue is also rooted in the context of the *CCAA*, but its purpose and the manner in which it has been interpreted in the case law are also key. After examining the first two issues in this case, I will address Tysoe J.A.'s conclusion that an express trust in favour of the Crown was created by the court's order of April 29, 2008.

3.1 Purpose and Scope of Insolvency Law

12 Insolvency is the factual situation that arises when a debtor is unable to pay creditors (see generally, R. J. Wood, *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law* (2009), at p. 16). Certain legal proceedings become available upon insolvency, which typically allow a debtor to obtain a court order staying its creditors' enforcement actions and attempt to obtain a binding compromise with creditors to adjust the payment conditions to something more realistic. Alternatively, the debtor's assets may be liquidated and debts paid from the proceeds according to statutory priority rules. The former is usually referred to as reorganization or restructuring while the latter is termed liquidation.

13 Canadian commercial insolvency law is not codified in one exhaustive statute. Instead, Parliament has enacted multiple insolvency statutes, the main one being the *BIA*. The *BIA* offers a self-contained legal regime providing for both reorganization and liquidation. Although bankruptcy legislation has a long history, the *BIA* itself is a fairly recent statute — it was enacted in 1992. It is characterized by a rules-based approach to proceedings. The *BIA* is available to insolvent debtors owing \$1000 or more, regardless of whether they are natural or legal persons. It contains mechanisms for debtors to make proposals to their creditors for the adjustment of debts. If a proposal fails, the *BIA* contains a bridge to bankruptcy whereby the debtor's assets are liquidated and the proceeds paid to creditors in accordance with the statutory scheme of distribution.

14 Access to the *CCAA* is more restrictive. A debtor must be a company with liabilities in excess of \$5 million. Unlike the *BIA*, the *CCAA* contains no provisions for liquidation of a debtor's assets if reorganization fails. There are three ways of exiting *CCAA* proceedings. The best outcome is achieved when the stay of proceedings provides the debtor with some breathing space during which solvency is restored and the *CCAA* process termin-

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ates without reorganization being needed. The second most desirable outcome occurs when the debtor's compromise or arrangement is accepted by its creditors and the reorganized company emerges from the *CCAA* proceedings as a going concern. Lastly, if the compromise or arrangement fails, either the company or its creditors usually seek to have the debtor's assets liquidated under the applicable provisions of the *BIA* or to place the debtor into receivership. As discussed in greater detail below, the key difference between the reorganization regimes under the *BIA* and the *CCAA* is that the latter offers a more flexible mechanism with greater judicial discretion, making it more responsive to complex reorganizations.

15 As I will discuss at greater length below, the purpose of the *CCAA* — Canada's first reorganization statute — is to permit the debtor to continue to carry on business and, where possible, avoid the social and economic costs of liquidating its assets. Proposals to creditors under the *BIA* serve the same remedial purpose, though this is achieved through a rules-based mechanism that offers less flexibility. Where reorganization is impossible, the *BIA* may be employed to provide an orderly mechanism for the distribution of a debtor's assets to satisfy creditor claims according to predetermined priority rules.

16 Prior to the enactment of the *CCAA* in 1933 (S.C. 1932-33, c. 36), practice under existing commercial insolvency legislation tended heavily towards the liquidation of a debtor company (J. Sarra, *Creditor Rights and the Public Interest: Restructuring Insolvent Corporations* (2003), at p. 12). The battering visited upon Canadian businesses by the Great Depression and the absence of an effective mechanism for reaching a compromise between debtors and creditors to avoid liquidation required a legislative response. The *CCAA* was innovative as it allowed the insolvent debtor to attempt reorganization under judicial supervision outside the existing insolvency legislation which, once engaged, almost invariably resulted in liquidation (*Reference re Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (Canada)*, [1934] S.C.R. 659 (S.C.C.), at pp. 660-61; Sarra, *Creditor Rights*, at pp. 12-13).

17 Parliament understood when adopting the *CCAA* that liquidation of an insolvent company was harmful for most of those it affected — notably creditors and employees — and that a workout which allowed the company to survive was optimal (Sarra, *Creditor Rights*, at pp. 13-15).

18 Early commentary and jurisprudence also endorsed the *CCAA*'s remedial objectives. It recognized that companies retain more value as going concerns while underscoring that intangible losses, such as the evaporation of the companies' goodwill, result from liquidation (S. E. Edwards, "Reorganizations Under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act" (1947), 25 *Can. Bar Rev.* 587, at p. 592). Reorganization serves the public interest by facilitating the survival of companies supplying goods or services crucial to the health of the economy or saving large numbers of jobs (*ibid.*, at p. 593). Insolvency could be so widely felt as to impact stakeholders other than creditors and employees. Variants of these views resonate today, with reorganization justified in terms of rehabilitating companies that are key elements in a complex web of interdependent economic relationships in order to avoid the negative consequences of liquidation.

19 The *CCAA* fell into disuse during the next several decades, likely because amendments to the Act in 1953 restricted its use to companies issuing bonds (S.C. 1952-53, c. 3). During the economic downturn of the early 1980s, insolvency lawyers and courts adapting to the resulting wave of insolvencies resurrected the statute and deployed it in response to new economic challenges. Participants in insolvency proceedings grew to recognize and appreciate the statute's distinguishing feature: a grant of broad and flexible authority to the supervising court to make the orders necessary to facilitate the reorganization of the debtor and achieve the *CCAA*'s objectives. The manner in which courts have used *CCAA* jurisdiction in increasingly creative and flexible ways is ex-

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plored in greater detail below.

20 Efforts to evolve insolvency law were not restricted to the courts during this period. In 1970, a government-commissioned panel produced an extensive study recommending sweeping reform but Parliament failed to act (see *Bankruptcy and Insolvency: Report of the Study Committee on Bankruptcy and Insolvency Legislation* (1970)). Another panel of experts produced more limited recommendations in 1986 which eventually resulted in enactment of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* of 1992 (S.C. 1992, c. 27) (see *Proposed Bankruptcy Act Amendments: Report of the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy and Insolvency* (1986)). Broader provisions for reorganizing insolvent debtors were then included in Canada's bankruptcy statute. Although the 1970 and 1986 reports made no specific recommendations with respect to the *CCAA*, the House of Commons committee studying the *BIA*'s predecessor bill, C-22, seemed to accept expert testimony that the *BIA*'s new reorganization scheme would shortly supplant the *CCAA*, which could then be repealed, with commercial insolvency and bankruptcy being governed by a single statute (*Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on Consumer and Corporate Affairs and Government Operations*, Issue No. 15, October 3, 1991, at pp. 15:15-15:16).

21 In retrospect, this conclusion by the House of Commons committee was out of step with reality. It overlooked the renewed vitality the *CCAA* enjoyed in contemporary practice and the advantage that a flexible judicially supervised reorganization process presented in the face of increasingly complex reorganizations, when compared to the stricter rules-based scheme contained in the *BIA*. The "flexibility of the *CCAA* [was seen as] a great benefit, allowing for creative and effective decisions" (Industry Canada, Marketplace Framework Policy Branch, *Report on the Operation and Administration of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (2002), at p. 41). Over the past three decades, resurrection of the *CCAA* has thus been the mainspring of a process through which, one author concludes, "the legal setting for Canadian insolvency restructuring has evolved from a rather blunt instrument to one of the most sophisticated systems in the developed world" (R. B. Jones, "The Evolution of Canadian Restructuring: Challenges for the Rule of Law", in J. P. Sarra, ed., *Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2005* (2006), 481, at p. 481).

22 While insolvency proceedings may be governed by different statutory schemes, they share some commonalities. The most prominent of these is the single proceeding model. The nature and purpose of the single proceeding model are described by Professor Wood in *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law*:

They all provide a collective proceeding that supersedes the usual civil process available to creditors to enforce their claims. The creditors' remedies are collectivized in order to prevent the free-for-all that would otherwise prevail if creditors were permitted to exercise their remedies. In the absence of a collective process, each creditor is armed with the knowledge that if they do not strike hard and swift to seize the debtor's assets, they will be beat out by other creditors. [pp. 2-3]

The single proceeding model avoids the inefficiency and chaos that would attend insolvency if each creditor initiated proceedings to recover its debt. Grouping all possible actions against the debtor into a single proceeding controlled in a single forum facilitates negotiation with creditors because it places them all on an equal footing, rather than exposing them to the risk that a more aggressive creditor will realize its claims against the debtor's limited assets while the other creditors attempt a compromise. With a view to achieving that purpose, both the *CCAA* and the *BIA* allow a court to order all actions against a debtor to be stayed while a compromise is sought.

23 Another point of convergence of the *CCAA* and the *BIA* relates to priorities. Because the *CCAA* is silent

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about what happens if reorganization fails, the *BIA* scheme of liquidation and distribution necessarily supplies the backdrop for what will happen if a *CCAA* reorganization is ultimately unsuccessful. In addition, one of the important features of legislative reform of both statutes since the enactment of the *BIA* in 1992 has been a cut-back in Crown priorities (S.C. 1992, c. 27, s. 39; S.C. 1997, c. 12, ss. 73 and 125; S.C. 2000, c. 30, s. 148; S.C. 2005, c. 47, ss. 69 and 131; S.C. 2009, c. 33, ss. 25 and 29; see also *Alternative granite & marbre inc., Re*, 2009 SCC 49, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 286, [2009] G.S.T.C. 154 (S.C.C.); *Quebec (Deputy Minister of Revenue) c. Rainville* (1979), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 35 (S.C.C.); *Proposed Bankruptcy Act Amendments: Report of the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy and Insolvency* (1986)).

24 With parallel *CCAA* and *BIA* restructuring schemes now an accepted feature of the insolvency law landscape, the contemporary thrust of legislative reform has been towards harmonizing aspects of insolvency law common to the two statutory schemes to the extent possible and encouraging reorganization over liquidation (see *An Act to establish the Wage Earner Protection Program Act, to amend the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts*, S.C. 2005, c. 47; *Gauntlet Energy Corp., Re*, 2003 ABQB 894, [2003] G.S.T.C. 193, 30 Alta. L.R. (4th) 192 (Alta. Q.B.), at para. 19).

25 Mindful of the historical background of the *CCAA* and *BIA*, I now turn to the first question at issue.

3.2 GST Deemed Trust Under the CCAA

26 The Court of Appeal proceeded on the basis that the *ETA* precluded the court from staying the Crown's enforcement of the GST deemed trust when partially lifting the stay to allow the debtor to enter bankruptcy. In so doing, it adopted the reasoning in a line of cases culminating in *Ottawa Senators*, which held that an *ETA* deemed trust remains enforceable during *CCAA* reorganization despite language in the *CCAA* that suggests otherwise.

27 The Crown relies heavily on the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in *Ottawa Senators* and argues that the later in time provision of the *ETA* creating the GST deemed trust trumps the provision of the *CCAA* purporting to nullify most statutory deemed trusts. The Court of Appeal in this case accepted this reasoning but not all provincial courts follow it (see, e.g., *Komunik Corp., Re*, 2009 QCCS 6332 (Que. S.C.), leave to appeal granted, 2010 QCCA 183 (Que. C.A.)). Century Services relied, in its written submissions to this Court, on the argument that the court had authority under the *CCAA* to continue the stay against the Crown's claim for unremitted GST. In oral argument, the question of whether *Ottawa Senators* was correctly decided nonetheless arose. After the hearing, the parties were asked to make further written submissions on this point. As appears evident from the reasons of my colleague Abella J., this issue has become prominent before this Court. In those circumstances, this Court needs to determine the correctness of the reasoning in *Ottawa Senators*.

28 The policy backdrop to this question involves the Crown's priority as a creditor in insolvency situations which, as I mentioned above, has evolved considerably. Prior to the 1990s, Crown claims largely enjoyed priority in insolvency. This was widely seen as unsatisfactory as shown by both the 1970 and 1986 insolvency reform proposals, which recommended that Crown claims receive no preferential treatment. A closely related matter was whether the *CCAA* was binding at all upon the Crown. Amendments to the *CCAA* in 1997 confirmed that it did indeed bind the Crown (see *CCAA*, s. 21, as am. by S.C. 1997, c. 12, s. 126).

29 Claims of priority by the state in insolvency situations receive different treatment across jurisdictions worldwide. For example, in Germany and Australia, the state is given no priority at all, while the state enjoys

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wide priority in the United States and France (see B. K. Morgan, "Should the Sovereign be Paid First? A Comparative International Analysis of the Priority for Tax Claims in Bankruptcy" (2000), 74 *Am. Bank. L.J.* 461, at p. 500). Canada adopted a middle course through legislative reform of Crown priority initiated in 1992. The Crown retained priority for source deductions of income tax, Employment Insurance ("EI") and Canada Pension Plan ("CPP") premiums, but ranks as an ordinary unsecured creditor for most other claims.

30 Parliament has frequently enacted statutory mechanisms to secure Crown claims and permit their enforcement. The two most common are statutory deemed trusts and powers to garnish funds third parties owe the debtor (see F. L. Lamer, *Priority of Crown Claims in Insolvency* (loose-leaf), at § 2).

31 With respect to GST collected, Parliament has enacted a deemed trust. The *ETA* states that every person who collects an amount on account of GST is deemed to hold that amount in trust for the Crown (s. 222(1)). The deemed trust extends to other property of the person collecting the tax equal in value to the amount deemed to be in trust if that amount has not been remitted in accordance with the *ETA*. The deemed trust also extends to property held by a secured creditor that, but for the security interest, would be property of the person collecting the tax (s. 222(3)).

32 Parliament has created similar deemed trusts using almost identical language in respect of source deductions of income tax, EI premiums and CPP premiums (see s. 227(4) of the *Income Tax Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.) ("*ITA*"), ss. 86(2) and (2.1) of the *Employment Insurance Act*, S.C. 1996, c. 23, and ss. 23(3) and (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-8). I will refer to income tax, EI and CPP deductions as "source deductions".

33 In *Royal Bank v. Sparrow Electric Corp.*, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 411 (S.C.C.), this Court addressed a priority dispute between a deemed trust for source deductions under the *ITA* and security interests taken under both the *Bank Act*, S.C. 1991, c. 46, and the *Alberta Personal Property Security Act*, S.A. 1988, c. P-4.05 ("*PPSA*"). As then worded, an *ITA* deemed trust over the debtor's property equivalent to the amount owing in respect of income tax became effective at the time of liquidation, receivership, or assignment in bankruptcy. *Sparrow Electric* held that the *ITA* deemed trust could not prevail over the security interests because, being fixed charges, the latter attached as soon as the debtor acquired rights in the property such that the *ITA* deemed trust had no property on which to attach when it subsequently arose. Later, in *First Vancouver Finance v. Minister of National Revenue*, 2002 SCC 49, [2002] G.S.T.C. 23, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 720 (S.C.C.), this Court observed that Parliament had legislated to strengthen the statutory deemed trust in the *ITA* by deeming it to operate from the moment the deductions were not paid to the Crown as required by the *ITA*, and by granting the Crown priority over all security interests (paras. 27-29) (the "*Sparrow Electric* amendment").

34 The amended text of s. 227(4.1) of the *ITA* and concordant source deductions deemed trusts in the *Canada Pension Plan* and the *Employment Insurance Act* state that the deemed trust operates notwithstanding any other enactment of Canada, except ss. 81.1 and 81.2 of the *BIA*. The *ETA* deemed trust at issue in this case is similarly worded, but it excepts the *BIA* in its entirety. The provision reads as follows:

222. (3) Despite any other provision of this Act (except subsection (4)), any other enactment of Canada (except the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*), any enactment of a province or any other law, if at any time an amount deemed by subsection (1) to be held by a person in trust for Her Majesty is not remitted to the Receiver General or withdrawn in the manner and at the time provided under this Part, property of the person and property held by any secured creditor of the person that, but for a security interest, would be property of

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the person, equal in value to the amount so deemed to be held in trust, is deemed

35 The Crown submits that the *Sparrow Electric* amendment, added by Parliament to the *ETA* in 2000, was intended to preserve the Crown's priority over collected GST under the *CCAA* while subordinating the Crown to the status of an unsecured creditor in respect of GST only under the *BIA*. This is because the *ETA* provides that the GST deemed trust is effective "despite" any other enactment except the *BIA*.

36 The language used in the *ETA* for the GST deemed trust creates an apparent conflict with the *CCAA*, which provides that subject to certain exceptions, property deemed by statute to be held in trust for the Crown shall not be so regarded.

37 Through a 1997 amendment to the *CCAA* (S.C. 1997, c. 12, s. 125), Parliament appears to have, subject to specific exceptions, nullified deemed trusts in favour of the Crown once reorganization proceedings are commenced under the Act. The relevant provision reads:

18.3 (1) Subject to subsection (2), notwithstanding any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be regarded as held in trust for Her Majesty unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

This nullification of deemed trusts was continued in further amendments to the *CCAA* (S.C. 2005, c. 47), where s. 18.3(1) was renumbered and reformulated as s. 37(1):

37. (1) Subject to subsection (2), despite any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be regarded as being held in trust for Her Majesty unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

38 An analogous provision exists in the *BIA*, which, subject to the same specific exceptions, nullifies statutory deemed trusts and makes property of the bankrupt that would otherwise be subject to a deemed trust part of the debtor's estate and available to creditors (S.C. 1992, c. 27, s. 39; S.C. 1997, c. 12, s. 73; *BIA*, s. 67(2)). It is noteworthy that in both the *CCAA* and the *BIA*, the exceptions concern source deductions (*CCAA*, s. 18.3(2); *BIA*, s. 67(3)). The relevant provision of the *CCAA* reads:

18.3 (2) Subsection (1) does not apply in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan* or subsection 86(2) or (2.1) of the *Employment Insurance Act*....

Thus, the Crown's deemed trust and corresponding priority in source deductions remain effective both in reorganization and in bankruptcy.

39 Meanwhile, in both s. 18.4(1) of the *CCAA* and s. 86(1) of the *BIA*, other Crown claims are treated as unsecured. These provisions, establishing the Crown's status as an unsecured creditor, explicitly exempt statutory deemed trusts in source deductions (*CCAA*, s. 18.4(3); *BIA*, s. 86(3)). The *CCAA* provision reads as follows:

18.4 (3) Subsection (1) [Crown ranking as unsecured creditor] does not affect the operation of

(a) subsections 224(1.2) and (1.3) of the *Income Tax Act*,

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(b) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution

Therefore, not only does the *CCAA* provide that Crown claims do not enjoy priority over the claims of other creditors (s. 18.3(1)), but the exceptions to this rule (i.e., that Crown priority is maintained for source deductions) are repeatedly stated in the statute.

40 The apparent conflict in this case is whether the rule in the *CCAA* first enacted as s. 18.3 in 1997, which provides that subject to certain explicit exceptions, statutory deemed trusts are ineffective under the *CCAA*, is overridden by the one in the *ETA* enacted in 2000 stating that GST deemed trusts operate despite any enactment of Canada except the *BIA*. With respect for my colleague Fish J., I do not think the apparent conflict can be resolved by denying it and creating a rule requiring both a statutory provision enacting the deemed trust, and a second statutory provision confirming it. Such a rule is unknown to the law. Courts must recognize conflicts, apparent or real, and resolve them when possible.

41 A line of jurisprudence across Canada has resolved the apparent conflict in favour of the *ETA*, thereby maintaining GST deemed trusts under the *CCAA*. *Ottawa Senators*, the leading case, decided the matter by invoking the doctrine of implied repeal to hold that the later in time provision of the *ETA* should take precedence over the *CCAA* (see also *Solid Resources Ltd., Re* (2002), 40 C.B.R. (4th) 219, [2003] G.S.T.C. 21 (Alta. Q.B.); *Gauntlet*

42 The Ontario Court of Appeal in *Ottawa Senators* rested its conclusion on two considerations. First, it was persuaded that by explicitly mentioning the *BIA* in *ETA* s. 222(3), but not the *CCAA*, Parliament made a deliberate choice. In the words of MacPherson J.A.:

The *BIA* and the *CCAA* are closely related federal statutes. I cannot conceive that Parliament would specifically identify the *BIA* as an exception, but accidentally fail to consider the *CCAA* as a possible second exception. In my view, the omission of the *CCAA* from s. 222(3) of the *ETA* was almost certainly a considered omission. [para. 43]

43 Second, the Ontario Court of Appeal compared the conflict between the *ETA* and the *CCAA* to that before this Court in *Doré c. Verdun (Municipalité)*, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 862 (S.C.C.), and found them to be "identical" (para. 46). It therefore considered *Doré* binding (para. 49). In *Doré*, a limitations provision in the more general and recently enacted *Civil Code of Québec*, S.Q. 1991, c. 64 ("C.C.Q."), was held to have repealed a more specific provision of the earlier *Quebec Cities and Towns Act*, R.S.Q., c. C-19, with which it conflicted. By analogy, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that the later in time and more general provision, s. 222(3) of the *ETA*, impliedly repealed the more specific and earlier in time provision, s. 18.3(1) of the *CCAA* (paras. 47-49).

44 Viewing this issue in its entire context, several considerations lead me to conclude that neither the reasoning nor the result in *Ottawa Senators* can stand. While a conflict may exist at the level of the statutes' wording, a purposive and contextual analysis to determine Parliament's true intent yields the conclusion that Parliament could not have intended to restore the Crown's deemed trust priority in GST claims under the *CCAA* when it amended the *ETA* in 2000 with the *Sparrow Electric* amendment.

45 I begin by recalling that Parliament has shown its willingness to move away from asserting priority for Crown claims in insolvency law. Section 18.3(1) of the *CCAA* (subject to the s. 18.3(2) exceptions) provides that the Crown's deemed trusts have no effect under the *CCAA*. Where Parliament has sought to protect certain

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Crown claims through statutory deemed trusts and intended that these deemed trusts continue in insolvency, it has legislated so explicitly and elaborately. For example, s. 18.3(2) of the *CCAA* and s. 67(3) of the *BIA* expressly provide that deemed trusts for source deductions remain effective in insolvency. Parliament has, therefore, clearly carved out exceptions from the general rule that deemed trusts are ineffective in insolvency. The *CCAA* and *BIA* are in harmony, preserving deemed trusts and asserting Crown priority only in respect of source deductions. Meanwhile, there is no express statutory basis for concluding that GST claims enjoy a preferred treatment under the *CCAA* or the *BIA*. Unlike source deductions, which are clearly and expressly dealt with under both these insolvency statutes, no such clear and express language exists in those Acts carving out an exception for GST claims.

46 The internal logic of the *CCAA* also militates against upholding the *ETA* deemed trust for GST. The *CCAA* imposes limits on a suspension by the court of the Crown's rights in respect of source deductions but does not mention the *ETA* (s. 11.4). Since source deductions deemed trusts are granted explicit protection under the *CCAA*, it would be inconsistent to afford a better protection to the *ETA* deemed trust absent explicit language in the *CCAA*. Thus, the logic of the *CCAA* appears to subject the *ETA* deemed trust to the waiver by Parliament of its priority (s. 18.4).

47 Moreover, a strange asymmetry would arise if the interpretation giving the *ETA* priority over the *CCAA* urged by the Crown is adopted here: the Crown would retain priority over GST claims during *CCAA* proceedings but not in bankruptcy. As courts have reflected, this can only encourage statute shopping by secured creditors in cases such as this one where the debtor's assets cannot satisfy both the secured creditors' and the Crown's claims (*Gauntlet*, at para. 21). If creditors' claims were better protected by liquidation under the *BIA*, creditors' incentives would lie overwhelmingly with avoiding proceedings under the *CCAA* and not risking a failed reorganization. Giving a key player in any insolvency such skewed incentives against reorganizing under the *CCAA* can only undermine that statute's remedial objectives and risk inviting the very social ills that it was enacted to avert.

48 Arguably, the effect of *Ottawa Senators* is mitigated if restructuring is attempted under the *BIA* instead of the *CCAA*, but it is not cured. If *Ottawa Senators* were to be followed, Crown priority over GST would differ depending on whether restructuring took place under the *CCAA* or the *BIA*. The anomaly of this result is made manifest by the fact that it would deprive companies of the option to restructure under the more flexible and responsive *CCAA* regime, which has been the statute of choice for complex reorganizations.

49 Evidence that Parliament intended different treatments for GST claims in reorganization and bankruptcy is scant, if it exists at all. Section 222(3) of the *ETA* was enacted as part of a wide-ranging budget implementation bill in 2000. The summary accompanying that bill does not indicate that Parliament intended to elevate Crown priority over GST claims under the *CCAA* to the same or a higher level than source deductions claims. Indeed, the summary for deemed trusts states only that amendments to existing provisions are aimed at "ensuring that employment insurance premiums and Canada Pension Plan contributions that are required to be remitted by an employer are fully recoverable by the Crown in the case of the bankruptcy of the employer" (Summary to S.C. 2000, c. 30, at p. 4a). The wording of GST deemed trusts resembles that of statutory deemed trusts for source deductions and incorporates the same overriding language and reference to the *BIA*. However, as noted above, Parliament's express intent is that only source deductions deemed trusts remain operative. An exception for the *BIA* in the statutory language establishing the source deductions deemed trusts accomplishes very little, because the explicit language of the *BIA* itself (and the *CCAA*) carves out these source deductions deemed trusts and maintains their effect. It is however noteworthy that no equivalent language maintaining GST deemed trusts

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exists under either the *BIA* or the *CCAA*.

50 It seems more likely that by adopting the same language for creating GST deemed trusts in the *ETA* as it did for deemed trusts for source deductions, and by overlooking the inclusion of an exception for the *CCAA* alongside the *BIA* in s. 222(3) of the *ETA*, Parliament may have inadvertently succumbed to a drafting anomaly. Because of a statutory lacuna in the *ETA*, the GST deemed trust could be seen as remaining effective in the *CCAA*, while ceasing to have any effect under the *BIA*, thus creating an apparent conflict with the wording of the *CCAA*. However, it should be seen for what it is: a facial conflict only, capable of resolution by looking at the broader approach taken to Crown priorities and by giving precedence to the statutory language of s. 18.3 of the *CCAA* in a manner that does not produce an anomalous outcome.

51 Section 222(3) of the *ETA* evinces no explicit intention of Parliament to repeal *CCAA* s. 18.3. It merely creates an apparent conflict that must be resolved by statutory interpretation. Parliament's intent when it enacted *ETA* s. 222(3) was therefore far from unambiguous. Had it sought to give the Crown a priority for GST claims, it could have done so explicitly as it did for source deductions. Instead, one is left to infer from the language of *ETA* s. 222(3) that the GST deemed trust was intended to be effective under the *CCAA*.

52 I am not persuaded that the reasoning in *Doré* requires the application of the doctrine of implied repeal in the circumstances of this case. The main issue in *Doré* concerned the impact of the adoption of the *C.C.Q.* on the administrative law rules with respect to municipalities. While Gonthier J. concluded in that case that the limitation provision in art. 2930 *C.C.Q.* had repealed by implication a limitation provision in the *Cities and Towns Act*, he did so on the basis of more than a textual analysis. The conclusion in *Doré* was reached after thorough contextual analysis of both pieces of legislation, including an extensive review of the relevant legislative history (paras. 31-41). Consequently, the circumstances before this Court in *Doré* are far from "identical" to those in the present case, in terms of text, context and legislative history. Accordingly, *Doré* cannot be said to require the automatic application of the rule of repeal by implication.

53 A noteworthy indicator of Parliament's overall intent is the fact that in subsequent amendments it has not displaced the rule set out in the *CCAA*. Indeed, as indicated above, the recent amendments to the *CCAA* in 2005 resulted in the rule previously found in s. 18.3 being renumbered and reformulated as s. 37. Thus, to the extent the interpretation allowing the GST deemed trust to remain effective under the *CCAA* depends on *ETA* s. 222(3) having impliedly repealed *CCAA* s. 18.3(1) because it is later in time, we have come full circle. Parliament has renumbered and reformulated the provision of the *CCAA* stating that, subject to exceptions for source deductions, deemed trusts do not survive the *CCAA* proceedings and thus the *CCAA* is now the later in time statute. This confirms that Parliament's intent with respect to GST deemed trusts is to be found in the *CCAA*.

54 I do not agree with my colleague Abella J. that s. 44(f) of the *Interpretation Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21, can be used to interpret the 2005 amendments as having no effect. The new statute can hardly be said to be a mere re-enactment of the former statute. Indeed, the *CCAA* underwent a substantial review in 2005. Notably, acting consistently with its goal of treating both the *BIA* and the *CCAA* as sharing the same approach to insolvency, Parliament made parallel amendments to both statutes with respect to corporate proposals. In addition, new provisions were introduced regarding the treatment of contracts, collective agreements, interim financing and governance agreements. The appointment and role of the Monitor was also clarified. Noteworthy are the limits imposed by *CCAA* s. 11.09 on the court's discretion to make an order staying the Crown's source deductions deemed trusts, which were formerly found in s. 11.4. No mention whatsoever is made of GST deemed trusts (see Summary to S.C. 2005, c. 47). The review went as far as looking at the very expression used to de-

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scribe the statutory override of deemed trusts. The comments cited by my colleague only emphasize the clear intent of Parliament to maintain its policy that only source deductions deemed trusts survive in *CCAA* proceedings.

55 In the case at bar, the legislative context informs the determination of Parliament's legislative intent and supports the conclusion that *ETA* s. 222(3) was not intended to narrow the scope of the *CCAA*'s override provision. Viewed in its entire context, the conflict between the *ETA* and the *CCAA* is more apparent than real. I would therefore not follow the reasoning in *Ottawa Senators* and affirm that *CCAA* s. 18.3 remained effective.

56 My conclusion is reinforced by the purpose of the *CCAA* as part of Canadian remedial insolvency legislation. As this aspect is particularly relevant to the second issue, I will now discuss how courts have interpreted the scope of their discretionary powers in supervising a *CCAA* reorganization and how Parliament has largely endorsed this interpretation. Indeed, the interpretation courts have given to the *CCAA* helps in understanding how the *CCAA* grew to occupy such a prominent role in Canadian insolvency law.

3.3 Discretionary Power of a Court Supervising a *CCAA* Reorganization

57 Courts frequently observe that "[t]he *CCAA* is skeletal in nature" and does not "contain a comprehensive code that lays out all that is permitted or barred" (*ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.*, 2008 ONCA 587, 92 O.R. (3d) 513 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 44, *per* Blair J.A.). Accordingly, "[t]he history of *CCAA* law has been an evolution of judicial interpretation" (*Dylex Ltd., Re* (1995), 31 C.B.R. (3d) 106 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List])), at para. 10, *per* Farley J.).

58 *CCAA* decisions are often based on discretionary grants of jurisdiction. The incremental exercise of judicial discretion in commercial courts under conditions one practitioner aptly describes as "the hothouse of real-time litigation" has been the primary method by which the *CCAA* has been adapted and has evolved to meet contemporary business and social needs (see Jones, at p. 484).

59 Judicial discretion must of course be exercised in furtherance of the *CCAA*'s purposes. The remedial purpose I referred to in the historical overview of the Act is recognized over and over again in the jurisprudence. To cite one early example:

The legislation is remedial in the purest sense in that it provides a means whereby the devastating social and economic effects of bankruptcy or creditor initiated termination of ongoing business operations can be avoided while a court-supervised attempt to reorganize the financial affairs of the debtor company is made.

(*Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)* (1990), 41 O.A.C. 282 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 57, *per* Doherty J.A., dissenting)

60 Judicial decision making under the *CCAA* takes many forms. A court must first of all provide the conditions under which the debtor can attempt to reorganize. This can be achieved by staying enforcement actions by creditors to allow the debtor's business to continue, preserving the *status quo* while the debtor plans the compromise or arrangement to be presented to creditors, and supervising the process and advancing it to the point where it can be determined whether it will succeed (see, e.g., *Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.* (1990), 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 84 (B.C. C.A.), at pp. 88-89; *Pacific National Lease Holding Corp., Re* (1992), 19 B.C.A.C. 134 (B.C. C.A. [In Chambers]), at para. 27). In doing so, the court must often be cognizant of the various interests at stake in the reorganization, which can extend beyond those of the debtor and creditors to include

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employees, directors, shareholders, and even other parties doing business with the insolvent company (see, e.g., *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re*, 2000 ABQB 442, 84 Alta. L.R. (3d) 9 (Alta. Q.B.), at para. 144, *per* Paperny J. (as she then was); *Air Canada, Re* (2003), 42 C.B.R. (4th) 173 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), at para. 3; *Air Canada, Re* [2003 CarswellOnt 4967 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List])], 2003 CanLII 49366, at para. 13, *per* Farley J.; Sarra, *Creditor Rights*, at pp. 181-92 and 217-26). In addition, courts must recognize that on occasion the broader public interest will be engaged by aspects of the reorganization and may be a factor against which the decision of whether to allow a particular action will be weighed (see, e.g., *Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix Rouge, Re* (2000), 19 C.B.R. (4th) 158 (Ont. S.C.J.), at para. 2, *per* Blair J. (as he then was); Sarra, *Creditor Rights*, at pp. 195-214).

61 When large companies encounter difficulty, reorganizations become increasingly complex. CCAA courts have been called upon to innovate accordingly in exercising their jurisdiction beyond merely staying proceedings against the debtor to allow breathing room for reorganization. They have been asked to sanction measures for which there is no explicit authority in the CCAA. Without exhaustively cataloguing the various measures taken under the authority of the CCAA, it is useful to refer briefly to a few examples to illustrate the flexibility the statute affords supervising courts.

62 Perhaps the most creative use of CCAA authority has been the increasing willingness of courts to authorize post-filing security for debtor in possession financing or super-priority charges on the debtor's assets when necessary for the continuation of the debtor's business during the reorganization (see, e.g., *Skydome Corp., Re* (1998), 16 C.B.R. (4th) 118 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]); *United Used Auto & Truck Parts Ltd., Re*, 2000 BCCA 146, 135 B.C.A.C. 96 (B.C. C.A.), *aff'd* (1999), 12 C.B.R. (4th) 144 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]); and generally, J. P. Sarra, *Rescue! The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (2007), at pp. 93-115). The CCAA has also been used to release claims against third parties as part of approving a comprehensive plan of arrangement and compromise, even over the objections of some dissenting creditors (see Metcalfe & Mansfield). As well, the appointment of a Monitor to oversee the reorganization was originally a measure taken pursuant to the CCAA's supervisory authority; Parliament responded, making the mechanism mandatory by legislative amendment.

63 Judicial innovation during CCAA proceedings has not been without controversy. At least two questions it raises are directly relevant to the case at bar: (1) what are the sources of a court's authority during CCAA proceedings? (2) what are the limits of this authority?

64 The first question concerns the boundary between a court's statutory authority under the CCAA and a court's residual authority under its inherent and equitable jurisdiction when supervising a reorganization. In authorizing measures during CCAA proceedings, courts have on occasion purported to rely upon their equitable jurisdiction to advance the purposes of the Act or their inherent jurisdiction to fill gaps in the statute. Recent appellate decisions have counselled against purporting to rely on inherent jurisdiction, holding that the better view is that courts are in most cases simply construing the authority supplied by the CCAA itself (see, e.g., *Skeena Cellulose Inc., Re*, 2003 BCCA 344, 13 B.C.L.R. (4th) 236 (B.C. C.A.), at paras. 45-47, *per* Newbury J.A.; *Stelco Inc. (Re)* (2005), 75 O.R. (3d) 5 (Ont. C.A.), paras. 31-33, *per* Blair J.A.).

65 I agree with Justice Georgina R. Jackson and Professor Janis Sarra that the most appropriate approach is a hierarchical one in which courts rely first on an interpretation of the provisions of the CCAA text before turning to inherent or equitable jurisdiction to anchor measures taken in a CCAA proceeding (see G. R. Jackson and J. Sarra, "Selecting the Judicial Tool to get the Job Done: An Examination of Statutory Interpretation, Discretionary Power and Inherent Jurisdiction in Insolvency Matters", in J. P. Sarra, ed., *Annual Review of Insolvency*

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Law 2007 (2008), 41, at p. 42). The authors conclude that when given an appropriately purposive and liberal interpretation, the *CCAA* will be sufficient in most instances to ground measures necessary to achieve its objectives (p. 94).

66 Having examined the pertinent parts of the *CCAA* and the recent history of the legislation, I accept that in most instances the issuance of an order during *CCAA* proceedings should be considered an exercise in statutory interpretation. Particularly noteworthy in this regard is the expansive interpretation the language of the statute at issue is capable of supporting.

67 The initial grant of authority under the *CCAA* empowered a court "where an application is made under this Act in respect of a company ... on the application of any person interested in the matter ..., subject to this Act, [to] make an order under this section" (*CCAA*, s. 11(1)). The plain language of the statute was very broad.

68 In this regard, though not strictly applicable to the case at bar, I note that Parliament has in recent amendments changed the wording contained in s. 11(1), making explicit the discretionary authority of the court under the *CCAA*. Thus in s. 11 of the *CCAA* as currently enacted, a court may, "subject to the restrictions set out in this Act, ... make any order that it considers appropriate in the circumstances" (S.C. 2005, c. 47, s. 128). Parliament appears to have endorsed the broad reading of *CCAA* authority developed by the jurisprudence.

69 The *CCAA* also explicitly provides for certain orders. Both an order made on an initial application and an order on subsequent applications may stay, restrain, or prohibit existing or new proceedings against the debtor. The burden is on the applicant to satisfy the court that the order is appropriate in the circumstances and that the applicant has been acting in good faith and with due diligence (*CCAA*, ss. 11(3), (4) and (6)).

70 The general language of the *CCAA* should not be read as being restricted by the availability of more specific orders. However, the requirements of appropriateness, good faith, and due diligence are baseline considerations that a court should always bear in mind when exercising *CCAA* authority. Appropriateness under the *CCAA* is assessed by inquiring whether the order sought advances the policy objectives underlying the *CCAA*. The question is whether the order will usefully further efforts to achieve the remedial purpose of the *CCAA* — avoiding the social and economic losses resulting from liquidation of an insolvent company. I would add that appropriateness extends not only to the purpose of the order, but also to the means it employs. Courts should be mindful that chances for successful reorganizations are enhanced where participants achieve common ground and all stakeholders are treated as advantageously and fairly as the circumstances permit.

71 It is well-established that efforts to reorganize under the *CCAA* can be terminated and the stay of proceedings against the debtor lifted if the reorganization is "doomed to failure" (see *Chef Ready*, at p. 88; *Philip's Manufacturing Ltd., Re* (1992), 9 C.B.R. (3d) 25 (B.C. C.A.), at paras. 6-7). However, when an order is sought that does realistically advance the *CCAA*'s purposes, the ability to make it is within the discretion of a *CCAA* court.

72 The preceding discussion assists in determining whether the court had authority under the *CCAA* to continue the stay of proceedings against the Crown once it was apparent that reorganization would fail and bankruptcy was the inevitable next step.

73 In the Court of Appeal, Tysoe J.A. held that no authority existed under the *CCAA* to continue staying the Crown's enforcement of the GST deemed trust once efforts at reorganization had come to an end. The appellant submits that in so holding, Tysoe J.A. failed to consider the underlying purpose of the *CCAA* and give the statute

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an appropriately purposive and liberal interpretation under which the order was permissible. The Crown submits that Tysoe J.A. correctly held that the mandatory language of the *ETA* gave the court no option but to permit enforcement of the GST deemed trust when lifting the *CCAA* stay to permit the debtor to make an assignment under the *BIA*. Whether the *ETA* has a mandatory effect in the context of a *CCAA* proceeding has already been discussed. I will now address the question of whether the order was authorized by the *CCAA*.

74 It is beyond dispute that the *CCAA* imposes no explicit temporal limitations upon proceedings commenced under the Act that would prohibit ordering a continuation of the stay of the Crown's GST claims while lifting the general stay of proceedings temporarily to allow the debtor to make an assignment in bankruptcy.

75 The question remains whether the order advanced the underlying purpose of the *CCAA*. The Court of Appeal held that it did not because the reorganization efforts had come to an end and the *CCAA* was accordingly spent. I disagree.

76 There is no doubt that had reorganization been commenced under the *BIA* instead of the *CCAA*, the Crown's deemed trust priority for the GST funds would have been lost. Similarly, the Crown does not dispute that under the scheme of distribution in bankruptcy under the *BIA*, the deemed trust for GST ceases to have effect. Thus, after reorganization under the *CCAA* failed, creditors would have had a strong incentive to seek immediate bankruptcy and distribution of the debtor's assets under the *BIA*. In order to conclude that the discretion does not extend to partially lifting the stay in order to allow for an assignment in bankruptcy, one would have to assume a gap between the *CCAA* and the *BIA* proceedings. Brenner C.J.S.C.'s order staying Crown enforcement of the GST claim ensured that creditors would not be disadvantaged by the attempted reorganization under the *CCAA*. The effect of his order was to blunt any impulse of creditors to interfere in an orderly liquidation. His order was thus in furtherance of the *CCAA*'s objectives to the extent that it allowed a bridge between the *CCAA* and *BIA* proceedings. This interpretation of the tribunal's discretionary power is buttressed by s. 20 of the *CCAA*. That section provides that the *CCAA* "may be applied together with the provisions of any Act of Parliament... that authorizes or makes provision for the sanction of compromises or arrangements between a company and its shareholders or any class of them", such as the *BIA*. Section 20 clearly indicates the intention of Parliament for the *CCAA* to operate *in tandem* with other insolvency legislation, such as the *BIA*.

77 The *CCAA* creates conditions for preserving the *status quo* while attempts are made to find common ground amongst stakeholders for a reorganization that is fair to all. Because the alternative to reorganization is often bankruptcy, participants will measure the impact of a reorganization against the position they would enjoy in liquidation. In the case at bar, the order fostered a harmonious transition between reorganization and liquidation while meeting the objective of a single collective proceeding that is common to both statutes.

78 Tysoe J.A. therefore erred in my view by treating the *CCAA* and the *BIA* as distinct regimes subject to a temporal gap between the two, rather than as forming part of an integrated body of insolvency law. Parliament's decision to maintain two statutory schemes for reorganization, the *BIA* and the *CCAA*, reflects the reality that reorganizations of differing complexity require different legal mechanisms. By contrast, only one statutory scheme has been found to be needed to liquidate a bankrupt debtor's estate. The transition from the *CCAA* to the *BIA* may require the partial lifting of a stay of proceedings under the *CCAA* to allow commencement of the *BIA* proceedings. However, as Laskin J.A. for the Ontario Court of Appeal noted in a similar competition between secured creditors and the Ontario Superintendent of Financial Services seeking to enforce a deemed trust, "[t]he two statutes are related" and no "gap" exists between the two statutes which would allow the enforcement of property interests at the conclusion of *CCAA* proceedings that would be lost in bankruptcy *Ivaco Inc. (Re)*

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(2006), 83 O.R. (3d) 108 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 62-63).

79 The Crown's priority in claims pursuant to source deductions deemed trusts does not undermine this conclusion. Source deductions deemed trusts survive under both the *CCAA* and the *BIA*. Accordingly, creditors' incentives to prefer one Act over another will not be affected. While a court has a broad discretion to stay source deductions deemed trusts in the *CCAA* context, this discretion is nevertheless subject to specific limitations applicable only to source deductions deemed trusts (*CCAA*, s. 11.4). Thus, if *CCAA* reorganization fails (e.g., either the creditors or the court refuse a proposed reorganization), the Crown can immediately assert its claim in unremitted source deductions. But this should not be understood to affect a seamless transition into bankruptcy or create any "gap" between the *CCAA* and the *BIA* for the simple reason that, regardless of what statute the reorganization had been commenced under, creditors' claims in both instances would have been subject to the priority of the Crown's source deductions deemed trust.

80 Source deductions deemed trusts aside, the comprehensive and exhaustive mechanism under the *BIA* must control the distribution of the debtor's assets once liquidation is inevitable. Indeed, an orderly transition to liquidation is mandatory under the *BIA* where a proposal is rejected by creditors. The *CCAA* is silent on the transition into liquidation but the breadth of the court's discretion under the Act is sufficient to construct a bridge to liquidation under the *BIA*. The court must do so in a manner that does not subvert the scheme of distribution under the *BIA*. Transition to liquidation requires partially lifting the *CCAA* stay to commence proceedings under the *BIA*. This necessary partial lifting of the stay should not trigger a race to the courthouse in an effort to obtain priority unavailable under the *BIA*.

81 I therefore conclude that Brenner C.J.S.C. had the authority under the *CCAA* to lift the stay to allow entry into liquidation.

3.4 Express Trust

82 The last issue in this case is whether Brenner C.J.S.C. created an express trust in favour of the Crown when he ordered on April 29, 2008, that proceeds from the sale of LeRoy Trucking's assets equal to the amount of unremitted GST be held back in the Monitor's trust account until the results of the reorganization were known. Tysoe J.A. in the Court of Appeal concluded as an alternative ground for allowing the Crown's appeal that it was the beneficiary of an express trust. I disagree.

83 Creation of an express trust requires the presence of three certainties: intention, subject matter, and object. Express or "true trusts" arise from the acts and intentions of the settlor and are distinguishable from other trusts arising by operation of law (see D. W. M. Waters, M. R. Gillen and L. D. Smith, eds., *Waters' Law of Trusts in Canada* (3rd ed. 2005), at pp. 28-29 especially fn. 42).

84 Here, there is no certainty to the object (i.e. the beneficiary) inferable from the court's order of April 29, 2008, sufficient to support an express trust.

85 At the time of the order, there was a dispute between Century Services and the Crown over part of the proceeds from the sale of the debtor's assets. The court's solution was to accept LeRoy Trucking's proposal to segregate those monies until that dispute could be resolved. Thus there was no certainty that the Crown would actually be the beneficiary, or object, of the trust.

86 The fact that the location chosen to segregate those monies was the Monitor's trust account has no inde-

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pendent effect such that it would overcome the lack of a clear beneficiary. In any event, under the interpretation of *CCAA* s. 18.3(1) established above, no such priority dispute would even arise because the Crown's deemed trust priority over GST claims would be lost under the *CCAA* and the Crown would rank as an unsecured creditor for this amount. However, Brenner C.J.S.C. may well have been proceeding on the basis that, in accordance with *Ottawa Senators*, the Crown's GST claim would remain effective if reorganization was successful, which would not be the case if transition to the liquidation process of the *BIA* was allowed. An amount equivalent to that claim would accordingly be set aside pending the outcome of reorganization.

87 Thus, uncertainty surrounding the outcome of the *CCAA* restructuring eliminates the existence of any certainty to permanently vest in the Crown a beneficial interest in the funds. That much is clear from the oral reasons of Brenner C.J.S.C. on April 29, 2008, when he said: "Given the fact that [*CCAA* proceedings] are known to fail and filings in bankruptcy result, it seems to me that maintaining the status quo in the case at bar supports the proposal to have the monitor hold these funds in trust." Exactly who might take the money in the final result was therefore evidently in doubt. Brenner C.J.S.C.'s subsequent order of September 3, 2008, denying the Crown's application to enforce the trust once it was clear that bankruptcy was inevitable, confirms the absence of a clear beneficiary required to ground an express trust.

4. Conclusion

88 I conclude that Brenner C.J.S.C. had the discretion under the *CCAA* to continue the stay of the Crown's claim for enforcement of the GST deemed trust while otherwise lifting it to permit LeRoy Trucking to make an assignment in bankruptcy. My conclusion that s. 18.3(1) of the *CCAA* nullified the GST deemed trust while proceedings under that Act were pending confirms that the discretionary jurisdiction under s. 11 utilized by the court was not limited by the Crown's asserted GST priority, because there is no such priority under the *CCAA*.

89 For these reasons, I would allow the appeal and declare that the \$305,202.30 collected by LeRoy Trucking in respect of GST but not yet remitted to the Receiver General of Canada is not subject to deemed trust or priority in favour of the Crown. Nor is this amount subject to an express trust. Costs are awarded for this appeal and the appeal in the court below.

Fish J. (concurring):

I

90 I am in general agreement with the reasons of Justice Deschamps and would dispose of the appeal as she suggests.

91 More particularly, I share my colleague's interpretation of the scope of the judge's discretion under s. 11 of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 ("*CCAA*"). And I share my colleague's conclusion that Brenner C.J.S.C. did not create an express trust in favour of the Crown when he segregated GST funds into the Monitor's trust account (2008 BCSC 1805, [2008] G.S.T.C. 221 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers])).

92 I nonetheless feel bound to add brief reasons of my own regarding the interaction between the *CCAA* and the *Excise Tax Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15 ("*ETA*").

93 In upholding deemed trusts created by the *ETA* notwithstanding insolvency proceedings, *Ottawa Senators Hockey Club Corp. (Re)* (2005), 73 O.R. (3d) 737, [2005] G.S.T.C. 1 (Ont. C.A.), and its progeny have been

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unduly protective of Crown interests which Parliament itself has chosen to subordinate to competing prioritized claims. In my respectful view, a clearly marked departure from that jurisprudential approach is warranted in this case.

94 Justice Deschamps develops important historical and policy reasons in support of this position and I have nothing to add in that regard. I do wish, however, to explain why a comparative analysis of related statutory provisions adds support to our shared conclusion.

95 Parliament has in recent years given detailed consideration to the Canadian insolvency scheme. It has declined to amend the provisions at issue in this case. Ours is not to wonder why, but rather to treat Parliament's preservation of the relevant provisions as a deliberate exercise of the legislative discretion that is Parliament's alone. With respect, I reject any suggestion that we should instead characterize the apparent conflict between s. 18.3(1) (now s. 37(1)) of the *CCAA* and s. 222 of the *ETA* as a drafting anomaly or statutory lacuna properly subject to judicial correction or repair.

II

96 In the context of the Canadian insolvency regime, a deemed trust will be found to exist only where two complementary elements co-exist: first, a statutory provision *creating* the trust; and second, a *CCAA* or *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 ("*BIA*") provision *confirming* — or explicitly preserving — its effective operation.

97 This interpretation is reflected in three federal statutes. Each contains a deemed trust provision framed in terms strikingly similar to the wording of s. 222 of the *ETA*.

98 The first is the *Income Tax Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.) ("*ITA*") where s. 227(4) *creates* a deemed trust:

227 (4) Trust for moneys deducted — Every person who deducts or withholds an amount under this Act is deemed, notwithstanding any security interest (as defined in subsection 224(1.3)) in the amount so deducted or withheld, to hold the amount separate and apart from the property of the person and from property held by any secured creditor (as defined in subsection 224(1.3)) of that person that but for the security interest would be property of the person, in trust for Her Majesty and for payment to Her Majesty in the manner and at the time provided under this Act. [Here and below, the emphasis is of course my own.]

99 In the next subsection, Parliament has taken care to make clear that this trust is unaffected by federal or provincial legislation to the contrary:

(4.1) Extension of trust — Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (except sections 81.1 and 81.2 of that Act), any other enactment of Canada, any enactment of a province or any other law, where at any time an amount deemed by subsection 227(4) to be held by a person in trust for Her Majesty is not paid to Her Majesty in the manner and at the time provided under this Act, property of the person ... equal in value to the amount so deemed to be held in trust is deemed

(a) to be held, from the time the amount was deducted or withheld by the person, separate and apart from the property of the person, in trust for Her Majesty whether or not the property is subject to such a security interest, ...

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...

... and the proceeds of such property shall be paid to the Receiver General in priority to all such security interests.

100 The continued operation of this deemed trust is expressly *confirmed* in s. 18.3 of the *CCAA*:

18.3 (1) Subject to subsection (2), notwithstanding any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be regarded as being held in trust for Her Majesty unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan* or subsection 86(2) or (2.1) of the *Employment Insurance Act*....

101 The operation of the *ITA* deemed trust is also confirmed in s. 67 of the *BIA*:

67 (2) Subject to subsection (3), notwithstanding any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a bankrupt shall not be regarded as held in trust for Her Majesty for the purpose of paragraph (1)(a) unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

(3) Subsection (2) does not apply in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan* or subsection 86(2) or (2.1) of the *Employment Insurance Act*....

102 Thus, Parliament has first *created* and then *confirmed the continued operation* of the Crown's *ITA* deemed trust under *both* the *CCAA* and the *BIA* regimes.

103 The second federal statute for which this scheme holds true is the *Canada Pension Plan*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-8 ("*CPP*"). At s. 23, Parliament creates a deemed trust in favour of the Crown and specifies that it exists despite all contrary provisions in any other Canadian statute. Finally, and in almost identical terms, the *Employment Insurance Act*, S.C. 1996, c. 23 ("*EIA*"), creates a deemed trust in favour of the Crown: see ss. 86(2) and (2.1).

104 As we have seen, the survival of the deemed trusts created under these provisions of the *ITA*, the *CPP* and the *EIA* is confirmed in s. 18.3(2) the *CCAA* and in s. 67(3) the *BIA*. In all three cases, Parliament's intent to enforce the Crown's deemed trust through insolvency proceedings is expressed in clear and unmistakable terms.

105 The same is not true with regard to the deemed trust created under the *ETA*. Although Parliament creates a deemed trust in favour of the Crown to hold unremitted GST monies, and although it purports to maintain this trust notwithstanding any contrary federal or provincial legislation, it does not *confirm* the trust — or expressly provide for its continued operation — in either the *BIA* or the *CCAA*. The second of the two mandatory elements I have mentioned is thus absent reflecting Parliament's intention to allow the deemed trust to lapse with the commencement of insolvency proceedings.

106 The language of the relevant *ETA* provisions is identical in substance to that of the *ITA*, *CPP*, and *EIA*

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provisions:

222. (1) [Deemed] Trust for amounts collected — Subject to subsection (1.1), every person who collects an amount as or on account of tax under Division II is deemed for all purposes and despite any security interest in the amount, to hold the amount in trust for Her Majesty in right of Canada, separate and apart from the property of the person and from property held by any secured creditor of the person that, but for a security interest, would be property of the person, until the amount is remitted to the Receiver General or withdrawn under subsection (2).

...

(3) Extension of trust — Despite any other provision of this Act (except subsection (4)), any other enactment of Canada (except the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act), any enactment of a province or any other law, if at any time an amount deemed by subsection (1) to be held by a person in trust for Her Majesty is not remitted to the Receiver General or withdrawn in the manner and at the time provided under this Part, property of the person and property held by any secured creditor of the person that, but for a security interest, would be property of the person, equal in value to the amount so deemed to be held in trust, is deemed

(a) to be held, from the time the amount was collected by the person, in trust for Her Majesty, separate and apart from the property of the person, whether or not the property is subject to a security interest, ...

...

... and the proceeds of the property shall be paid to the Receiver General in priority to all security interests.

107 Yet no provision of the *CCAA* provides for the continuation of this deemed trust after the *CCAA* is brought into play.

108 In short, Parliament has imposed *two* explicit conditions, or "building blocks", for survival under the *CCAA* of deemed trusts created by the *ITA*, *CPP*, and *EIA*. Had Parliament intended to likewise preserve under the *CCAA* deemed trusts created by the *ETA*, it would have included in the *CCAA* the sort of confirmatory provision that explicitly preserves other deemed trusts.

109 With respect, unlike Tysoe J.A., I do not find it "inconceivable that Parliament would specifically identify the *BIA* as an exception when enacting the current version of s. 222(3) of the *ETA* without considering the *CCAA* as a possible second exception" (2009 BCCA 205, 98 B.C.L.R. (4th) 242, [2009] G.S.T.C. 79 (B.C. C.A.), at para. 37). *All* of the deemed trust provisions excerpted above make explicit reference to the *BIA*. Section 222 of the *ETA* does not break the pattern. Given the near-identical wording of the four deemed trust provisions, it would have been surprising indeed had Parliament not addressed the *BIA* at all in the *ETA*.

110 Parliament's evident intent was to render GST deemed trusts inoperative upon the institution of insolvency proceedings. Accordingly, s. 222 mentions the *BIA* so as to *exclude* it from its ambit — rather than to *include* it, as do the *ITA*, the *CPP*, and the *EIA*.

111 Conversely, I note that *none* of these statutes mentions the *CCAA* expressly. Their specific reference to the *BIA* has no bearing on their interaction with the *CCAA*. Again, it is the confirmatory provisions *in the insolvency statutes* that determine whether a given deemed trust will subsist during insolvency proceedings.

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112 Finally, I believe that chambers judges should not segregate GST monies into the Monitor's trust account during *CCAA* proceedings, as was done in this case. The result of Justice Deschamps's reasoning is that GST claims become unsecured under the *CCAA*. Parliament has deliberately chosen to nullify certain Crown super-priorities during insolvency; this is one such instance.

III

113 For these reasons, like Justice Deschamps, I would allow the appeal with costs in this Court and in the courts below and order that the \$305,202.30 collected by LeRoy Trucking in respect of GST but not yet remitted to the Receiver General of Canada be subject to no deemed trust or priority in favour of the Crown.

Abella J. (dissenting):

114 The central issue in this appeal is whether s. 222 of the *Excise Tax Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15 ("ETA"), and specifically s. 222(3), gives priority during *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 ("CCAA"), proceedings to the Crown's deemed trust in unremitted GST. I agree with Tysoe J.A. that it does. It follows, in my respectful view, that a court's discretion under s. 11 of the *CCAA* is circumscribed accordingly.

115 Section 11[FN1] of the *CCAA* stated:

11. (1) Notwithstanding anything in the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or the *Winding-up Act*, where an application is made under this Act in respect of a company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, subject to this Act, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit, make an order under this section.

To decide the scope of the court's discretion under s. 11, it is necessary to first determine the priority issue. Section 222(3), the provision of the *ETA* at issue in this case, states:

222 (3) Extension of trust — Despite any other provision of this Act (except subsection (4)), any other enactment of Canada (except the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*), any enactment of a province or any other law, if at any time an amount deemed by subsection (1) to be held by a person in trust for Her Majesty is not remitted to the Receiver General or withdrawn in the manner and at the time provided under this Part, property of the person and property held by any secured creditor of the person that, but for a security interest, would be property of the person, equal in value to the amount so deemed to be held in trust, is deemed

(a) to be held, from the time the amount was collected by the person, in trust for Her Majesty, separate and apart from the property of the person, whether or not the property is subject to a security interest, and

(b) to form no part of the estate or property of the person from the time the amount was collected, whether or not the property has in fact been kept separate and apart from the estate or property of the person and whether or not the property is subject to a security interest

and is property beneficially owned by Her Majesty in right of Canada despite any security interest in the property or in the proceeds thereof and the proceeds of the property shall be paid to the Receiver General in priority to all security interests.

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116 Century Services argued that the *CCAA*'s general override provision, s. 18.3(1), prevailed, and that the deeming provisions in s. 222 of the *ETA* were, accordingly, inapplicable during *CCAA* proceedings. Section 18.3(1) states:

18.3 (1) ... [N]otwithstanding any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be regarded as held in trust for Her Majesty unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

117 As MacPherson J.A. correctly observed in *Ottawa Senators Hockey Club Corp. (Re)* (2005), 73 O.R. (3d) 737, [2005] G.S.T.C. 1 (Ont. C.A.), s. 222(3) of the *ETA* is in "clear conflict" with s. 18.3(1) of the *CCAA* (para. 31). Resolving the conflict between the two provisions is, essentially, what seems to me to be a relatively uncomplicated exercise in statutory interpretation: does the language reflect a clear legislative intention? In my view it does. The deemed trust provision, s. 222(3) of the *ETA*, has unambiguous language stating that it operates notwithstanding any law except the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 ("*BIA*").

118 By expressly excluding only one statute from its legislative grasp, and by unequivocally stating that it applies despite any other law anywhere in Canada *except* the *BIA*, s. 222(3) has defined its boundaries in the clearest possible terms. I am in complete agreement with the following comments of MacPherson J.A. in *Ottawa Senators*:

The legislative intent of s. 222(3) of the *ETA* is clear. If there is a conflict with "any other enactment of Canada (except the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*)", s. 222(3) prevails. In these words Parliament did two things: it decided that s. 222(3) should trump all other federal laws and, importantly, it addressed the topic of exceptions to its trumping decision and identified a single exception, the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* The *BIA* and the *CCAA* are closely related federal statutes. I cannot conceive that Parliament would specifically identify the *BIA* as an exception, but accidentally fail to consider the *CCAA* as a possible second exception. In my view, the omission of the *CCAA* from s. 222(3) of the *ETA* was almost certainly a considered omission. [para. 43]

119 MacPherson J.A.'s view that the failure to exempt the *CCAA* from the operation of the *ETA* is a reflection of a clear legislative intention, is borne out by how the *CCAA* was subsequently changed after s. 18.3(1) was enacted in 1997. In 2000, when s. 222(3) of the *ETA* came into force, amendments were also introduced to the *CCAA*. Section 18.3(1) was not amended.

120 The failure to amend s. 18.3(1) is notable because its effect was to protect the legislative *status quo*, notwithstanding repeated requests from various constituencies that s. 18.3(1) be amended to make the priorities in the *CCAA* consistent with those in the *BIA*. In 2002, for example, when Industry Canada conducted a review of the *BIA* and the *CCAA*, the Insolvency Institute of Canada and the Canadian Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Professionals recommended that the priority regime under the *BIA* be extended to the *CCAA* (Joint Task Force on Business Insolvency Law Reform, *Report* (March 15, 2002), Sch. B, proposal 71, at pp. 37-38). The same recommendations were made by the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce in its 2003 report, *Debtors and Creditors Sharing the Burden: A Review of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*; by the Legislative Review Task Force (Commercial) of the Insolvency Institute of Canada and the Canadian Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Professionals in its 2005 *Report on the Commercial Provisions of Bill C-55*; and in 2007 by the Insolvency Institute of Canada in a sub-

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mission to the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce commenting on reforms then under consideration.

121 Yet the *BIA* remains the only exempted statute under s. 222(3) of the *ETA*. Even after the 2005 decision in *Ottawa Senators* which confirmed that the *ETA* took precedence over the *CCAA*, there was no responsive legislative revision. I see this lack of response as relevant in this case, as it was in *R. v. Tele-Mobile Co.*, 2008 SCC 12, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 305 (S.C.C.), where this Court stated:

While it cannot be said that legislative silence is necessarily determinative of legislative intention, in this case the silence is Parliament's answer to the consistent urging of Telus and other affected businesses and organizations that there be express language in the legislation to ensure that businesses can be reimbursed for the reasonable costs of complying with evidence-gathering orders. I see the legislative history as reflecting Parliament's intention that compensation not be paid for compliance with production orders. [para. 42]

122 All this leads to a clear inference of a deliberate legislative choice to protect the deemed trust in s. 222(3) from the reach of s. 18.3(1) of the *CCAA*.

123 Nor do I see any "policy" justification for interfering, through interpretation, with this clarity of legislative intention. I can do no better by way of explaining why I think the policy argument cannot succeed in this case, than to repeat the words of Tysoe J.A. who said:

I do not dispute that there are valid policy reasons for encouraging insolvent companies to attempt to restructure their affairs so that their business can continue with as little disruption to employees and other stakeholders as possible. It is appropriate for the courts to take such policy considerations into account, but only if it is in connection with a matter that has not been considered by Parliament. Here, Parliament must be taken to have weighed policy considerations when it enacted the amendments to the *CCAA* and *ETA* described above. As Mr. Justice MacPherson observed at para. 43 of *Ottawa Senators*, it is inconceivable that Parliament would specifically identify the *BIA* as an exception when enacting the current version of s. 222(3) of the *ETA* without considering the *CCAA* as a possible second exception. I also make the observation that the 1992 set of amendments to the *BIA* enabled proposals to be binding on secured creditors and, while there is more flexibility under the *CCAA*, it is possible for an insolvent company to attempt to restructure under the auspices of the *BIA*. [para. 37]

124 Despite my view that the clarity of the language in s. 222(3) is dispositive, it is also my view that even the application of other principles of interpretation reinforces this conclusion. In their submissions, the parties raised the following as being particularly relevant: the Crown relied on the principle that the statute which is "later in time" prevails; and Century Services based its argument on the principle that the general provision gives way to the specific (*generalia specialibus non derogant*).

125 The "later in time" principle gives priority to a more recent statute, based on the theory that the legislature is presumed to be aware of the content of existing legislation. If a new enactment is inconsistent with a prior one, therefore, the legislature is presumed to have intended to derogate from the earlier provisions (Ruth Sullivan, *Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes* (5th ed. 2008), at pp. 346-47; Pierre-André Côté, *The Interpretation of Legislation in Canada* (3rd ed. 2000), at p. 358).

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126 The exception to this presumptive displacement of pre-existing inconsistent legislation, is the *generalia specialibus non derogant* principle that "[a] more recent, general provision will not be construed as affecting an earlier, special provision" (Côté, at p. 359). Like a Russian Doll, there is also an exception within this exception, namely, that an earlier, specific provision may in fact be "overruled" by a subsequent general statute if the legislature indicates, through its language, an intention that the general provision prevails (*Doré c. Verdun (Municipalité)*, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 862 (S.C.C.)).

127 The primary purpose of these interpretive principles is to assist in the performance of the task of determining the intention of the legislature. This was confirmed by MacPherson J.A. in *Ottawa Senators*, at para. 42:

[T]he overarching rule of statutory interpretation is that statutory provisions should be interpreted to give effect to the intention of the legislature in enacting the law. This primary rule takes precedence over all maxims or canons or aids relating to statutory interpretation, including the maxim that the specific prevails over the general (*generalia specialibus non derogant*). As expressed by Hudson J. in *Canada v. Williams*, [1944] S.C.R. 226, ... at p. 239 ...:

The maxim *generalia specialibus non derogant* is relied on as a rule which should dispose of the question, but the maxim is not a rule of law but a rule of construction and bows to the intention of the legislature, if such intention can reasonably be gathered from all of the relevant legislation.

(See also Côté, at p. 358, and Pierre-Andre Côté, with the collaboration of S. Beaulac and M. Devinat, *Interprétation des lois* (4th ed. 2009), at para. 1335.)

128 I accept the Crown's argument that the "later in time" principle is conclusive in this case. Since s. 222(3) of the *ETA* was enacted in 2000 and s. 18.3(1) of the *CCAA* was introduced in 1997, s. 222(3) is, on its face, the later provision. This chronological victory can be displaced, as Century Services argues, if it is shown that the more recent provision, s. 222(3) of the *ETA*, is a general one, in which case the earlier, specific provision, s. 18.3(1), prevails (*generalia specialibus non derogant*). But, as previously explained, the prior specific provision does not take precedence if the subsequent general provision appears to "overrule" it. This, it seems to me, is precisely what s. 222(3) achieves through the use of language stating that it prevails despite any law of Canada, of a province, or "any other law" *other than the BIA*. Section 18.3(1) of the *CCAA*, is thereby rendered inoperative for purposes of s. 222(3).

129 It is true that when the *CCAA* was amended in 2005,[FN2] s. 18.3(1) was re-enacted as s. 37(1) (S.C. 2005, c. 47, s. 131). Deschamps J. suggests that this makes s. 37(1) the new, "later in time" provision. With respect, her observation is refuted by the operation of s. 44(f) of the *Interpretation Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21, which expressly deals with the (non) effect of re-enacting, without significant substantive changes, a repealed provision (see *Canada (Attorney General) v. Canada (Public Service Staff Relations Board)*, [1977] 2 F.C. 663 (Fed. C.A.), dealing with the predecessor provision to s. 44(f)). It directs that new enactments not be construed as "new law" unless they differ in substance from the repealed provision:

44. Where an enactment, in this section called the "former enactment", is repealed and another enactment, in this section called the "new enactment", is substituted therefor,

...

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(f) except to the extent that the provisions of the new enactment are not in substance the same as those of the former enactment, the new enactment shall not be held to operate as new law, but shall be construed and have effect as a consolidation and as declaratory of the law as contained in the former enactment;

Section 2 of the *Interpretation Act* defines an enactment as "an Act or regulation or *any portion of an Act or regulation*".

130 Section 37(1) of the current *CCAA* is almost identical to s. 18.3(1). These provisions are set out for ease of comparison, with the differences between them underlined:

37.(1) Subject to subsection (2), despite any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be regarded as being held in trust for Her Majesty unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

18.3 (1) Subject to subsection (2), notwithstanding any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be regarded as held in trust for Her Majesty unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

131 The application of s. 44(f) of the *Interpretation Act* simply confirms the government's clearly expressed intent, found in Industry Canada's clause-by-clause review of Bill C-55, where s. 37(1) was identified as "a technical amendment to reorder the provisions of this Act". During second reading, the Hon. Bill Rompkey, then the Deputy Leader of the Government in the Senate, confirmed that s. 37(1) represented only a technical change:

On a technical note relating to the treatment of deemed trusts for taxes, the bill [*sic*] makes no changes to the underlying policy intent, despite the fact that in the case of a restructuring under the *CCAA*, sections of the act [*sic*] were repealed and substituted with renumbered versions due to the extensive reworking of the *CCAA*.

(*Debates of the Senate*, vol. 142, 1st Sess., 38th Parl., November 23, 2005, at p. 2147)

132 Had the substance of s. 18.3(1) altered in any material way when it was replaced by s. 37(1), I would share Deschamps J.'s view that it should be considered a new provision. But since s. 18.3(1) and s. 37(1) are the same in substance, the transformation of s. 18.3(1) into s. 37(1) has no effect on the interpretive queue, and s. 222(3) of the *ETA* remains the "later in time" provision (Sullivan, at p. 347).

133 This means that the deemed trust provision in s. 222(3) of the *ETA* takes precedence over s. 18.3(1) during *CCAA* proceedings. The question then is how that priority affects the discretion of a court under s. 11 of the *CCAA*.

134 While s. 11 gives a court discretion to make orders notwithstanding the *BIA* and the *Winding-up Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. W-11, that discretion is not liberated from the operation of any other federal statute. Any exercise of discretion is therefore circumscribed by whatever limits are imposed by statutes *other* than the *BIA* and the *Winding-up Act*. That includes the *ETA*. The chambers judge in this case was, therefore, required to respect

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the priority regime set out in s. 222(3) of the *ETA*. Neither s. 18.3(1) nor s. 11 of the *CCAA* gave him the authority to ignore it. He could not, as a result, deny the Crown's request for payment of the GST funds during the *CCAA* proceedings.

135 Given this conclusion, it is unnecessary to consider whether there was an express trust.

136 I would dismiss the appeal.

Appeal allowed.

Pourvoi accueilli.

Appendix

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 (as at December 13, 2007)

11. (1) Powers of court — Notwithstanding anything in the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or the *Winding-up Act*, where an application is made under this Act in respect of a company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, subject to this Act, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit, make an order under this section.

...

(3) Initial application court orders — A court may, on an initial application in respect of a company, make an order on such terms as it may impose, effective for such period as the court deems necessary not exceeding thirty days,

(a) staying, until otherwise ordered by the court, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under an Act referred to in subsection (i);

(b) restraining, until otherwise ordered by the court, further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company; and

(c) prohibiting, until otherwise ordered by the court, the commencement of or proceeding with any other action, suit or proceeding against the company.

(4) Other than initial application court orders — A court may, on an application in respect of a company other than an initial application, make an order on such terms as it may impose,

(a) staying, until otherwise ordered by the court, for such period as the court deems necessary, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under an Act referred to in subsection (1);

(b) restraining, until otherwise ordered by the court, further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company; and

(c) prohibiting, until otherwise ordered by the court, the commencement of or proceeding with any oth-

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er action, suit or proceeding against the company.

...

(6) Burden of proof on application — The court shall not make an order under subsection (3) or (4) unless

- (a) the applicant satisfies the court that circumstances exist that make such an order appropriate; and
- (b) in the case of an order under subsection (4), the applicant also satisfies the court that the applicant has acted, and is acting, in good faith and with due diligence.

11.4 (1) Her Majesty affected — An order made under section 11 may provide that

(a) Her Majesty in right of Canada may not exercise rights under subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* or any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, in respect of the company if the company is a tax debtor under that subsection or provision, for such period as the court considers appropriate but ending not later than

- (i) the expiration of the order,
- (ii) the refusal of a proposed compromise by the creditors or the court,
- (iii) six months following the court sanction of a compromise or arrangement,
- (iv) the default by the company on any term of a compromise or arrangement, or
- (v) the performance of a compromise or arrangement in respect of the company; and

(b) Her Majesty in right of a province may not exercise rights under any provision of provincial legislation in respect of the company where the company is a debtor under that legislation and the provision has a similar purpose to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, where the sum

- (i) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or
- (ii) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection,

for such period as the court considers appropriate but ending not later than the occurrence or time referred to in whichever of subparagraphs (a)(i) to (v) may apply.

(2) When order ceases to be in effect — An order referred to in subsection (1) ceases to be in effect if

2010 CarswellBC 3419, 2010 SCC 60, J.E. 2011-5, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 534, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 533, 12 B.C.L.R. (5th) 1, 2011 D.T.C. 5006 (Eng.), 2011 G.T.C. 2006 (Eng.), [2011] 2 W.W.R. 383, 72 C.B.R. (5th) 170, 409 N.R. 201, 326 D.L.R. (4th) 577, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379, [2010] G.S.T.C. 186, 296 B.C.A.C. 1, 503 W.A.C. 1, 196 A.C.W.S. (3d) 27

(a) the company defaults on payment of any amount that becomes due to Her Majesty after the order is made and could be subject to a demand under

(i) subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*,

(ii) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, or

(iii) under any provision of provincial legislation that has a similar purpose to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or that refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, where the sum

(A) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or

(B) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection; or

(b) any other creditor is or becomes entitled to realize a security on any property that could be claimed by Her Majesty in exercising rights under

(i) subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*,

(ii) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, or

(iii) any provision of provincial legislation that has a similar purpose to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or that refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, where the sum

(A) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or

(B) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection.

(3) Operation of similar legislation — An order made under section 11, other than an order referred to in

2010 CarswellBC 3419, 2010 SCC 60, J.E. 2011-5, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 534, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 533, 12 B.C.L.R. (5th) 1, 2011 D.T.C. 5006 (Eng.), 2011 G.T.C. 2006 (Eng.), [2011] 2 W.W.R. 383, 72 C.B.R. (5th) 170, 409 N.R. 201, 326 D.L.R. (4th) 577, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379, [2010] G.S.T.C. 186, 296 B.C.A.C. 1, 503 W.A.C. 1, 196 A.C.W.S. (3d) 27

subsection (1) of this section, does not affect the operation of

(a) subsections 224(1.2) and (1.3) of the *Income Tax Act*,

(b) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, or

(c) any provision of provincial legislation that has a similar purpose to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or that refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, where the sum

(i) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or

(ii) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection,

and for the purpose of paragraph (c), the provision of provincial legislation is, despite any Act of Canada or of a province or any other law, deemed to have the same effect and scope against any creditor, however secured, as subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* in respect of a sum referred to in subparagraph (c)(i), or as subsection 23(2) of the *Canada Pension Plan* in respect of a sum referred to in subparagraph (c)(ii), and in respect of any related interest, penalties or other amounts.

18.3 (1) Deemed trusts — Subject to subsection (2), notwithstanding any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be regarded as held in trust for Her Majesty unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

(2) Exceptions — Subsection (1) does not apply in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan* or subsection 86(2) or (2.1) of the *Employment Insurance Act* (each of which is in this subsection referred to as a "federal provision") nor in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under any law of a province that creates a deemed trust the sole purpose of which is to ensure remittance to Her Majesty in right of the province of amounts deducted or withheld under a law of the province where

(a) that law of the province imposes a tax similar in nature to the tax imposed under the *Income Tax Act* and the amounts deducted or withheld under that law of the province are of the same nature as the amounts referred to in subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, or

(b) the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan*, that law of the province establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection and the amounts deducted or withheld under that law of the province are of the same nature as amounts referred to in subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan*,

2010 CarswellBC 3419, 2010 SCC 60, J.E. 2011-5, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 534, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 533, 12 B.C.L.R. (5th) 1, 2011 D.T.C. 5006 (Eng.), 2011 G.T.C. 2006 (Eng.), [2011] 2 W.W.R. 383, 72 C.B.R. (5th) 170, 409 N.R. 201, 326 D.L.R. (4th) 577, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379, [2010] G.S.T.C. 186, 296 B.C.A.C. 1, 503 W.A.C. 1, 196 A.C.W.S. (3d) 27

and for the purpose of this subsection, any provision of a law of a province that creates a deemed trust is, notwithstanding any Act of Canada or of a province or any other law, deemed to have the same effect and scope against any creditor, however secured, as the corresponding federal provision.

18.4 (1) Status of Crown claims — In relation to a proceeding under this Act, all claims, including secured claims, of Her Majesty in right of Canada or a province or any body under an enactment respecting workers' compensation, in this section and in section 18.5 called a "workers' compensation body", rank as unsecured claims.

...

(3) Operation of similar legislation — Subsection (1) does not affect the operation of

(a) subsections 224(1.2) and (1.3) of the *Income Tax Act*,

(b) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, or

(c) any provision of provincial legislation that has a similar purpose to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or that refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, where the sum

(i) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or

(ii) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection,

and for the purpose of paragraph (c), the provision of provincial legislation is, despite any Act of Canada or of a province or any other law, deemed to have the same effect and scope against any creditor, however secured, as subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* in respect of a sum referred to in subparagraph (c)(i), or as subsection 23(2) of the *Canada Pension Plan* in respect of a sum referred to in subparagraph (c)(ii), and in respect of any related interest, penalties or other amounts.

...

20. [Act to be applied conjointly with other Acts] — The provisions of this Act may be applied together with the provisions of any Act of Parliament or of the legislature of any province, that authorizes or makes provision for the sanction of compromises or arrangements between a company and its shareholders or any class of them.

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 (as at September 18, 2009)

11. General power of court — Despite anything in the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or the *Winding-up*

2010 CarswellBC 3419, 2010 SCC 60, J.E. 2011-5, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 534, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 533, 12 B.C.L.R. (5th) 1, 2011 D.T.C. 5006 (Eng.), 2011 G.T.C. 2006 (Eng.), [2011] 2 W.W.R. 383, 72 C.B.R. (5th) 170, 409 N.R. 201, 326 D.L.R. (4th) 577, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379, [2010] G.S.T.C. 186, 296 B.C.A.C. 1, 503 W.A.C. 1, 196 A.C.W.S. (3d) 27

and Restructuring Act, if an application is made under this Act in respect of a debtor company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, subject to the restrictions set out in this Act, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit, make any order that it considers appropriate in the circumstances.

...

11.02 (1) Stays, etc. — initial application — A court may, on an initial application in respect of a debtor company, make an order on any terms that it may impose, effective for the period that the court considers necessary, which period may not be more than 30 days,

- (a) staying, until otherwise ordered by the court, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act*;
- (b) restraining, until otherwise ordered by the court, further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company; and
- (c) prohibiting, until otherwise ordered by the court, the commencement of any action, suit or proceeding against the company.

(2) Stays, etc. — other than initial application — A court may, on an application in respect of a debtor company other than an initial application, make an order, on any terms that it may impose,

- (a) staying, until otherwise ordered by the court, for any period that the court considers necessary, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under an Act referred to in paragraph (1)(a);
- (b) restraining, until otherwise ordered by the court, further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company; and
- (c) prohibiting, until otherwise ordered by the court, the commencement of any action, suit or proceeding against the company.

(3) Burden of proof on application — The court shall not make the order unless

- (a) the applicant satisfies the court that circumstances exist that make the order appropriate; and
- (b) in the case of an order under subsection (2), the applicant also satisfies the court that the applicant has acted, and is acting, in good faith and with due diligence.

...

11.09 (1) Stay — Her Majesty — An order made under section 11.02 may provide that

- (a) Her Majesty in right of Canada may not exercise rights under subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* or any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, in respect of the com-

2010 CarswellBC 3419, 2010 SCC 60, J.E. 2011-5, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 534, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 533, 12 B.C.L.R. (5th) 1, 2011 D.T.C. 5006 (Eng.), 2011 G.T.C. 2006 (Eng.), [2011] 2 W.W.R. 383, 72 C.B.R. (5th) 170, 409 N.R. 201, 326 D.L.R. (4th) 577, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379, [2010] G.S.T.C. 186, 296 B.C.A.C. 1, 503 W.A.C. 1, 196 A.C.W.S. (3d) 27

pany if the company is a tax debtor under that subsection or provision, for the period that the court considers appropriate but ending not later than

- (i) the expiry of the order,
- (ii) the refusal of a proposed compromise by the creditors or the court,
- (iii) six months following the court sanction of a compromise or an arrangement,
- (iv) the default by the company on any term of a compromise or an arrangement, or
- (v) the performance of a compromise or an arrangement in respect of the company; and

(b) Her Majesty in right of a province may not exercise rights under any provision of provincial legislation in respect of the company if the company is a debtor under that legislation and the provision has a purpose similar to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, and the sum

- (i) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or
- (ii) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection,

for the period that the court considers appropriate but ending not later than the occurrence or time referred to in whichever of subparagraphs (a)(i) to (v) that may apply.

(2) When order ceases to be in effect — The portions of an order made under section 11.02 that affect the exercise of rights of Her Majesty referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b) cease to be in effect if

- (a) the company defaults on the payment of any amount that becomes due to Her Majesty after the order is made and could be subject to a demand under
 - (i) subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*,
 - (ii) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, or
 - (iii) any provision of provincial legislation that has a purpose similar to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or that refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, and the sum
- (A) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax*

2010 CarswellBC 3419, 2010 SCC 60, J.E. 2011-5, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 534, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 533, 12 B.C.L.R. (5th) 1, 2011 D.T.C. 5006 (Eng.), 2011 G.T.C. 2006 (Eng.), [2011] 2 W.W.R. 383, 72 C.B.R. (5th) 170, 409 N.R. 201, 326 D.L.R. (4th) 577, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379, [2010] G.S.T.C. 186, 296 B.C.A.C. 1, 503 W.A.C. 1, 196 A.C.W.S. (3d) 27

Act, or

(B) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection; or

(b) any other creditor is or becomes entitled to realize a security on any property that could be claimed by Her Majesty in exercising rights under

(i) subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*,

(ii) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, or

(iii) any provision of provincial legislation that has a purpose similar to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or that refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, and the sum

(A) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or

(B) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection.

(3) Operation of similar legislation — An order made under section 11.02, other than the portions of that order that affect the exercise of rights of Her Majesty referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b), does not affect the operation of

(a) subsections 224(1.2) and (1.3) of the *Income Tax Act*,

(b) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, or

(c) any provision of provincial legislation that has a purpose similar to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or that refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, and the sum

(i) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or

2010 CarswellBC 3419, 2010 SCC 60, J.E. 2011-5, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 534, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 533, 12 B.C.L.R. (5th) 1, 2011 D.T.C. 5006 (Eng.), 2011 G.T.C. 2006 (Eng.), [2011] 2 W.W.R. 383, 72 C.B.R. (5th) 170, 409 N.R. 201, 326 D.L.R. (4th) 577, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379, [2010] G.S.T.C. 186, 296 B.C.A.C. 1, 503 W.A.C. 1, 196 A.C.W.S. (3d) 27

(ii) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection,

and for the purpose of paragraph (c), the provision of provincial legislation is, despite any Act of Canada or of a province or any other law, deemed to have the same effect and scope against any creditor, however secured, as subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* in respect of a sum referred to in subparagraph (c)(i), or as subsection 23(2) of the *Canada Pension Plan* in respect of a sum referred to in subparagraph (c)(ii), and in respect of any related interest, penalties or other amounts.

37. (1) Deemed trusts — Subject to subsection (2), despite any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a debtor company shall not be regarded as being held in trust for Her Majesty unless it would be so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

(2) Exceptions — Subsection (1) does not apply in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan* or subsection 86(2) or (2.1) of the *Employment Insurance Act* (each of which is in this subsection referred to as a "federal provision"), nor does it apply in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under any law of a province that creates a deemed trust the sole purpose of which is to ensure remittance to Her Majesty in right of the province of amounts deducted or withheld under a law of the province if

(a) that law of the province imposes a tax similar in nature to the tax imposed under the *Income Tax Act* and the amounts deducted or withheld under that law of the province are of the same nature as the amounts referred to in subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, or

(b) the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan*, that law of the province establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection and the amounts deducted or withheld under that law of the province are of the same nature as amounts referred to in subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan*,

and for the purpose of this subsection, any provision of a law of a province that creates a deemed trust is, despite any Act of Canada or of a province or any other law, deemed to have the same effect and scope against any creditor, however secured, as the corresponding federal provision.

***Excise Tax Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15 (as at December 13, 2007)**

222. (1) [Deemed] Trust for amounts collected — Subject to subsection (1.1), every person who collects an amount as or on account of tax under Division II is deemed, for all purposes and despite any security interest in the amount, to hold the amount in trust for Her Majesty in right of Canada, separate and apart from the property of the person and from property held by any secured creditor of the person that, but for a security interest, would be property of the person, until the amount is remitted to the Receiver General or withdrawn under subsection (2).

(1.1) Amounts collected before bankruptcy — Subsection (1) does not apply, at or after the time a person becomes a bankrupt (within the meaning of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*), to any amounts that, before

2010 CarswellBC 3419, 2010 SCC 60, J.E. 2011-5, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 534, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 533, 12 B.C.L.R. (5th) 1, 2011 D.T.C. 5006 (Eng.), 2011 G.T.C. 2006 (Eng.), [2011] 2 W.W.R. 383, 72 C.B.R. (5th) 170, 409 N.R. 201, 326 D.L.R. (4th) 577, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379, [2010] G.S.T.C. 186, 296 B.C.A.C. 1, 503 W.A.C. 1, 196 A.C.W.S. (3d) 27

that time, were collected or became collectible by the person as or on account of tax under Division II.

...

(3) Extension of trust — Despite any other provision of this Act (except subsection (4)), any other enactment of Canada (except the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*), any enactment of a province or any other law, if at any time an amount deemed by subsection (1) to be held by a person in trust for Her Majesty is not remitted to the Receiver General or withdrawn in the manner and at the time provided under this Part, property of the person and property held by any secured creditor of the person that, but for a security interest, would be property of the person, equal in value to the amount so deemed to be held in trust, is deemed

(a) to be held, from the time the amount was collected by the person, in trust for Her Majesty, separate and apart from the property of the person, whether or not the property is subject to a security interest, and

(b) to form no part of the estate or property of the person from the time the amount was collected, whether or not the property has in fact been kept separate and apart from the estate or property of the person and whether or not the property is subject to a security interest

and is property beneficially owned by Her Majesty in right of Canada despite any security interest in the property or in the proceeds thereof and the proceeds of the property shall be paid to the Receiver General in priority to all security interests.

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 (as at December 13, 2007)

67. (1) Property of bankrupt — The property of a bankrupt divisible among his creditors shall not comprise

(a) property held by the bankrupt in trust for any other person,

(b) any property that as against the bankrupt is exempt from execution or seizure under any laws applicable in the province within which the property is situated and within which the bankrupt resides, or

(b.1) such goods and services tax credit payments and prescribed payments relating to the essential needs of an individual as are made in prescribed circumstances and are not property referred to in paragraph (a) or (b),

but it shall comprise

(c) all property wherever situated of the bankrupt at the date of his bankruptcy or that may be acquired by or devolve on him before his discharge, and

(d) such powers in or over or in respect of the property as might have been exercised by the bankrupt for his own benefit.

(2) Deemed trusts — Subject to subsection (3), notwithstanding any provision in federal or provincial legislation that has the effect of deeming property to be held in trust for Her Majesty, property of a bankrupt shall not be regarded as held in trust for Her Majesty for the purpose of paragraph (1)(a) unless it would be

2010 CarswellBC 3419, 2010 SCC 60, J.E. 2011-5, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 534, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 533, 12 B.C.L.R. (5th) 1, 2011 D.T.C. 5006 (Eng.), 2011 G.T.C. 2006 (Eng.), [2011] 2 W.W.R. 383, 72 C.B.R. (5th) 170, 409 N.R. 201, 326 D.L.R. (4th) 577, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379, [2010] G.S.T.C. 186, 296 B.C.A.C. 1, 503 W.A.C. 1, 196 A.C.W.S. (3d) 27

so regarded in the absence of that statutory provision.

(3) Exceptions — Subsection (2) does not apply in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan* or subsection 86(2) or (2.1) of the *Employment Insurance Act* (each of which is in this subsection referred to as a "federal provision") nor in respect of amounts deemed to be held in trust under any law of a province that creates a deemed trust the sole purpose of which is to ensure remittance to Her Majesty in right of the province of amounts deducted or withheld under a law of the province where

(a) that law of the province imposes a tax similar in nature to the tax imposed under the *Income Tax Act* and the amounts deducted or withheld under that law of the province are of the same nature as the amounts referred to in subsection 227(4) or (4.1) of the *Income Tax Act*, or

(b) the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan*, that law of the province establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in that subsection and the amounts deducted or withheld under that law of the province are of the same nature as amounts referred to in subsection 23(3) or (4) of the *Canada Pension Plan*,

and for the purpose of this subsection, any provision of a law of a province that creates a deemed trust is, notwithstanding any Act of Canada or of a province or any other law, deemed to have the same effect and scope against any creditor, however secured, as the corresponding federal provision.

86. (1) Status of Crown claims — In relation to a bankruptcy or proposal, all provable claims, including secured claims, of Her Majesty in right of Canada or a province or of any body under an Act respecting workers' compensation, in this section and in section 87 called a "workers' compensation body", rank as unsecured claims.

...

(3) Exceptions — Subsection (1) does not affect the operation of

(a) subsections 224(1.2) and (1.3) of the *Income Tax Act*;

(b) any provision of the *Canada Pension Plan* or of the *Employment Insurance Act* that refers to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* and provides for the collection of a contribution, as defined in the *Canada Pension Plan*, or an employee's premium, or employer's premium, as defined in the *Employment Insurance Act*, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts; or

(c) any provision of provincial legislation that has a similar purpose to subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act*, or that refers to that subsection, to the extent that it provides for the collection of a sum, and of any related interest, penalties or other amounts, where the sum

(i) has been withheld or deducted by a person from a payment to another person and is in respect of a tax similar in nature to the income tax imposed on individuals under the *Income Tax Act*, or

(ii) is of the same nature as a contribution under the *Canada Pension Plan* if the province is a "province providing a comprehensive pension plan" as defined in subsection 3(1) of the *Canada Pension Plan* and the provincial legislation establishes a "provincial pension plan" as defined in

2010 CarswellBC 3419, 2010 SCC 60, J.E. 2011-5, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 534, [2011] B.C.W.L.D. 533, 12 B.C.L.R. (5th) 1, 2011 D.T.C. 5006 (Eng.), 2011 G.T.C. 2006 (Eng.), [2011] 2 W.W.R. 383, 72 C.B.R. (5th) 170, 409 N.R. 201, 326 D.L.R. (4th) 577, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379, [2010] G.S.T.C. 186, 296 B.C.A.C. 1, 503 W.A.C. 1, 196 A.C.W.S. (3d) 27

that subsection,

and for the purpose of paragraph (c), the provision of provincial legislation is, despite any Act of Canada or of a province or any other law, deemed to have the same effect and scope against any creditor, however secured, as subsection 224(1.2) of the *Income Tax Act* in respect of a sum referred to in subparagraph (c)(i), or as subsection 23(2) of the *Canada Pension Plan* in respect of a sum referred to in subparagraph (c)(ii), and in respect of any related interest, penalties or other amounts.

FN1 Section 11 was amended, effective September 18, 2009, and now states: **11.** Despite anything in the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act*, if an application is made under this Act in respect of a debtor company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, subject to the restrictions set out in this Act, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit, make any order that it considers appropriate in the circumstances.

FN2 The amendments did not come into force until September 18, 2009.

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TAB 6

2009 CarswellOnt 4467, 55 C.B.R. (5th) 229, 179 A.C.W.S. (3d) 265

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2009 CarswellOnt 4467, 55 C.B.R. (5th) 229, 179 A.C.W.S. (3d) 265

Nortel Networks Corp., Re

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS
AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF NORTEL NETWORKS
CORPORATION, NORTEL NETWORKS LIMITED, NORTEL NETWORKS GLOBAL CORPORATION,
NORTEL NETWORKS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION AND NORTEL NETWORKS TECHNOLOGY
CORPORATION (Applicants)

APPLICATION UNDER THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS
AMENDED

Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Morawetz J.

Heard: June 29, 2009

Written reasons: July 23, 2009

Docket: 09-CL-7950

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K. Zych for Noteholders

Pamela Huff, Craig Thorburn for MatlinPatterson Global Advisors LLC, MatlinPatterson Global Opportunities Partners III L.P., Matlin Patterson Opportunities Partners (Cayman) III L.P.

David Ward for UK Pension Protection Fund

Leanne Williams for Flextronics Inc.

Alex MacFarlane for Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors

Arthur O. Jacques, Tom McRae for Felske & Sylvain (de facto Continuing Employees' Committee)

Robin B. Schwill, Matthew P. Gottlieb for Nortel Networks UK Limited

A. Kauffman for Export Development Canada

D. Ullman for Verizon Communications Inc.

G. Benchetrit for IBM

Subject: Insolvency; Estates and Trusts

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Proposal — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Miscellaneous issues

Telecommunication company entered protection under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("Act") — Company decided to pursue "going concern" sales for various business units — Company entered into sale agreement with respect to assets in Code Division Multiple Access business and Long-Term Evolution Access assets — Company was pursuing sale of its other business units — Company brought motion for approval of bidding procedures and asset sale agreement — Motion granted — Court has jurisdiction to authorize sales process under Act in absence of formal plan of compromise or arrangement and creditor vote — Sale by company which preserved its business as going concern was consistent with objectives of Act — Unless sale was undertaken at this time, long-term viability of business would be in jeopardy.

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Administration of estate — Sale of assets — Jurisdiction of court to approve sale

Telecommunication company entered protection under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("Act") — Company decided to pursue "going concern" sales for various business units — Company entered into sale agreement with respect to assets in Code Division Multiple Access business and Long-Term Evolution Access assets — Company was pursuing sale of its other business units — Company brought motion for approval of bidding procedures and asset sale agreement — Motion granted — Court has jurisdiction to authorize sales process under Act in absence of formal plan of compromise or arrangement and creditor vote — Sale by company which preserved its business as going concern was consistent with objectives of Act — Unless sale was undertaken at this time, long-term viability of business would be in jeopardy.

Cases considered by Morawetz J.:

Asset Engineering LP v. Forest & Marine Financial Ltd. Partnership (2009), 2009 BCCA 319, 2009 CarswellBC 1738 (B.C. C.A.) — followed

ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp. (2008), 2008 ONCA 587, 2008 CarswellOnt 4811, (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re*) 240 O.A.C. 245, (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re*) 296 D.L.R. (4th) 135, (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re*) 92 O.R. (3d) 513, 45 C.B.R. (5th) 163, 47 B.L.R. (4th) 123 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp. (2008), 2008 CarswellOnt 5432,

2008 CarswellOnt 5433 (S.C.C.) — referred to

Boutiques San Francisco Inc., Re (2004), 2004 CarswellQue 10918, 7 C.B.R. (5th) 189 (Que. S.C.) — referred to

Calpine Canada Energy Ltd., Re (2007), 2007 CarswellAlta 1050, 2007 ABQB 504, 35 C.B.R. (5th) 1, 415 A.R. 196, 33 B.L.R. (4th) 68 (Alta. Q.B.) — referred to

Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re (1998), 1998 CarswellOnt 3346, 5 C.B.R. (4th) 299, 72 O.T.C. 99 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — considered

Caterpillar Financial Services Ltd. v. Hard-Rock Paving Co. (2008), 2008 CarswellOnt 4046, 45 C.B.R. (5th) 87 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to

Cliffs Over Maple Bay Investments Ltd. v. Fisgard Capital Corp. (2008), 2008 BCCA 327, 2008 Carswell-BC 1758, 83 B.C.L.R. (4th) 214, 296 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 434 W.A.C. 187, 258 B.C.A.C. 187, 46 C.B.R. (5th) 7, [2008] 10 W.W.R. 575 (B.C. C.A.) — distinguished

Consumers Packaging Inc., Re (2001), 150 O.A.C. 384, 27 C.B.R. (4th) 197, 2001 CarswellOnt 3482, 12 C.P.C. (5th) 208 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24, 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275, 1993 CarswellOnt 183 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

PSINET Ltd., Re (2001), 28 C.B.R. (4th) 95, 2001 CarswellOnt 3405 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Residential Warranty Co. of Canada Inc., Re (2006), 2006 ABQB 236, 2006 CarswellAlta 383, (sub nom. *Residential Warranty Co. of Canada Inc. (Bankrupt), Re*) 393 A.R. 340, 62 Alta. L.R. (4th) 168, 21 C.B.R. (5th) 57 (Alta. Q.B.) — referred to

Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp. (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1, 83 D.L.R. (4th) 76, 46 O.A.C. 321, 4 O.R. (3d) 1, 1991 CarswellOnt 205 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

Stelco Inc., Re (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 4084, 6 C.B.R. (5th) 316 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Tiger Brand Knitting Co., Re (2005), 2005 CarswellOnt 1240, 9 C.B.R. (5th) 315 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to

Winnipeg Motor Express Inc., Re (2008), 2008 CarswellMan 560, 2008 MBQB 297, 49 C.B.R. (5th) 302 (Man. Q.B.) — referred to

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.

s. 363 — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

s. 11 — referred to

s. 11(4) — considered

MOTION by company for approval of bidding procedures for sale of business and asset sale agreement.

Morawetz J.:

Introduction

1 On June 29, 2009, I granted the motion of the Applicants and approved the bidding procedures (the "Bidding Procedures") described in the affidavit of Mr. Riedel sworn June 23, 2009 (the "Riedel Affidavit") and the Fourteenth Report of Ernst & Young, Inc., in its capacity as Monitor (the "Monitor") (the "Fourteenth Report"). The order was granted immediately after His Honour Judge Gross of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (the "U.S. Court") approved the Bidding Procedures in the Chapter 11 proceedings.

2 I also approved the Asset Sale Agreement dated as of June 19, 2009 (the "Sale Agreement") among Nokia Siemens Networks B.V. ("Nokia Siemens Networks" or the "Purchaser"), as buyer, and Nortel Networks Corporation ("NNC"), Nortel Networks Limited ("NNL"), Nortel Networks, Inc. ("NNI") and certain of their affiliates, as vendors (collectively the "Sellers") in the form attached as Appendix "A" to the Fourteenth Report and I also approved and accepted the Sale Agreement for the purposes of conducting the "stalking horse" bidding process in accordance with the Bidding Procedures including, the Break-Up Fee and the Expense Reimbursement (as both terms are defined in the Sale Agreement).

3 An order was also granted sealing confidential Appendix "B" to the Fourteenth Report containing the schedules and exhibits to the Sale Agreement pending further order of this court.

4 The following are my reasons for granting these orders.

5 The hearing on June 29, 2009 (the "Joint Hearing") was conducted by way of video conference with a similar motion being heard by the U.S. Court. His Honor Judge Gross presided over the hearing in the U.S. Court. The Joint Hearing was conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Cross-Border Protocol, which had previously been approved by both the U.S. Court and this court.

6 The Sale Agreement relates to the Code Division Multiple Access ("CDMA") business Long-Term Evolution ("LTE") Access assets.

7 The Sale Agreement is not insignificant. The Monitor reports that revenues from CDMA comprised over 21% of Nortel's 2008 revenue. The CDMA business employs approximately 3,100 people (approximately 500 in Canada) and the LTE business employs approximately 1,000 people (approximately 500 in Canada). The purchase price under the Sale Agreement is \$650 million.

Background

8 The Applicants were granted CCAA protection on January 14, 2009. Insolvency proceedings have also

been commenced in the United States, the United Kingdom, Israel and France.

9 At the time the proceedings were commenced, Nortel's business operated through 143 subsidiaries, with approximately 30,000 employees globally. As of January 2009, Nortel employed approximately 6,000 people in Canada alone.

10 The stated purpose of Nortel's filing under the CCAA was to stabilize the Nortel business to maximize the chances of preserving all or a portion of the enterprise. The Monitor reported that a thorough strategic review of the company's assets and operations would have to be undertaken in consultation with various stakeholder groups.

11 In April 2009, the Monitor updated the court and noted that various restructuring alternatives were being considered.

12 On June 19, 2009, Nortel announced that it had entered into the Sale Agreement with respect to its assets in its CMDA business and LTE Access assets (collectively, the "Business") and that it was pursuing the sale of its other business units. Mr. Riedel in his affidavit states that Nortel has spent many months considering various restructuring alternatives before determining in its business judgment to pursue "going concern" sales for Nortel's various business units.

13 In deciding to pursue specific sales processes, Mr. Riedel also stated that Nortel's management considered:

- (a) the impact of the filings on Nortel's various businesses, including deterioration in sales; and
- (b) the best way to maximize the value of its operations, to preserve jobs and to continue businesses in Canada and the U.S.

14 Mr. Riedel notes that while the Business possesses significant value, Nortel was faced with the reality that:

- (a) the Business operates in a highly competitive environment;
- (b) full value cannot be realized by continuing to operate the Business through a restructuring; and
- (c) in the absence of continued investment, the long-term viability of the Business would be put into jeopardy.

15 Mr. Riedel concluded that the proposed process for the sale of the Business pursuant to an auction process provided the best way to preserve the Business as a going concern and to maximize value and preserve the jobs of Nortel employees.

16 In addition to the assets covered by the Sale Agreement, certain liabilities are to be assumed by the Purchaser. This issue is covered in a comprehensive manner at paragraph 34 of the Fourteenth Report. Certain liabilities to employees are included on this list. The assumption of these liabilities is consistent with the provisions of the Sale Agreement that requires the Purchaser to extend written offers of employment to at least 2,500 employees in the Business.

17 The Monitor also reports that given that certain of the U.S. Debtors are parties to the Sale Agreement and given the desire to maximize value for the benefit of stakeholders, Nortel determined and it has agreed with the Purchaser that the Sale Agreement is subject to higher or better offers being obtained pursuant to a sale process under s. 363 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and that the Sale Agreement shall serve as a "stalking horse" bid pursuant to that process.

18 The Bidding Procedures provide that all bids must be received by the Seller by no later than July 21, 2009 and that the Sellers will conduct an auction of the purchased assets on July 24, 2009. It is anticipated that Nortel will ultimately seek a final sales order from the U.S. Court on or about July 28, 2009 and an approval and vesting order from this court in respect of the Sale Agreement and purchased assets on or about July 30, 2009.

19 The Monitor recognizes the expeditious nature of the sale process but the Monitor has been advised that given the nature of the Business and the consolidation occurring in the global market, there are likely to be a limited number of parties interested in acquiring the Business.

20 The Monitor also reports that Nortel has consulted with, among others, the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the "UCC") and the bondholder group regarding the Bidding Procedures and is of the view that both are supportive of the timing of this sale process. (It is noted that the UCC did file a limited objection to the motion relating to certain aspects of the Bidding Procedures.)

21 Given the sale efforts made to date by Nortel, the Monitor supports the sale process outlined in the Fourteenth Report and more particularly described in the Bidding Procedures.

22 Objections to the motion were filed in the U.S. Court and this court by MatlinPatterson Global Advisors LLC, MatlinPatterson Global Opportunities Partners III L.P. and Matlin Patterson Opportunities Partners (Cayman) III L.P. (collectively, "MatlinPatterson") as well the UCC.

23 The objections were considered in the hearing before Judge Gross and, with certain limited exceptions, the objections were overruled.

Issues and Discussion

24 The threshold issue being raised on this motion by the Applicants is whether the CCAA affords this court the jurisdiction to approve a sales process in the absence of a formal plan of compromise or arrangement and a creditor vote. If the question is answered in the affirmative, the secondary issue is whether this sale should authorize the Applicants to sell the Business.

25 The Applicants submit that it is well established in the jurisprudence that this court has the jurisdiction under the CCAA to approve the sales process and that the requested order should be granted in these circumstances.

26 Counsel to the Applicants submitted a detailed factum which covered both issues.

27 Counsel to the Applicants submits that one of the purposes of the CCAA is to preserve the going concern value of debtors companies and that the court's jurisdiction extends to authorizing sale of the debtor's business, even in the absence of a plan or creditor vote.

28 The CCAA is a flexible statute and it is particularly useful in complex insolvency cases in which the

court is required to balance numerous constituents and a myriad of interests.

29 The CCAA has been described as "skeletal in nature". It has also been described as a "sketch, an outline, a supporting framework for the resolution of corporate insolvencies in the public interest". (2008), 45 C.B.R. (5th) 163 (Ont. C.A.) at paras. 44, 61, leave to appeal refused [2008] S.C.C.A. No. 337 (S.C.C.). ("ATB Financial").

30 The jurisprudence has identified as sources of the court's discretionary jurisdiction, *inter alia*:

(a) the power of the court to impose terms and conditions on the granting of a stay under s. 11(4) of the CCAA;

(b) the specific provision of s. 11(4) of the CCAA which provides that the court may make an order "on such terms as it may impose"; and

(c) the inherent jurisdiction of the court to "fill in the gaps" of the CCAA in order to give effect to its objects. *Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re* (1998), 5 C.B.R. (4th) 299 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) at para. 43; *PSINET Ltd., Re* (2001), 28 C.B.R. (4th) 95 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para. 5, *ATB Financial, supra*, at paras. 43-52.

31 However, counsel to the Applicants acknowledges that the discretionary authority of the court under s. 11 must be informed by the purpose of the CCAA.

Its exercise must be guided by the scheme and object of the Act and by the legal principles that govern corporate law issues. *Re Stelco Inc.* (2005), 9 C.B.R. (5th) 135 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 44.

32 In support of the court's jurisdiction to grant the order sought in this case, counsel to the Applicants submits that Nortel seeks to invoke the "overarching policy" of the CCAA, namely, to preserve the going concern. *Residential Warranty Co. of Canada Inc., Re* (2006), 21 C.B.R. (5th) 57 (Alta. Q.B.) at para. 78.

33 Counsel to the Applicants further submits that CCAA courts have repeatedly noted that the purpose of the CCAA is to preserve the benefit of a going concern business for all stakeholders, or "the whole economic community":

The purpose of the CCAA is to facilitate arrangements that might avoid liquidation of the company and allow it to continue in business to the benefit of the whole economic community, including the shareholders, the creditors (both secured and unsecured) and the employees. *Citibank Canada v. Chase Manhattan Bank of Canada* (1991), 5 C.B.R. (3rd) 167 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at para. 29. *Re Consumers Packaging Inc.* (2001) 27 C.B.R. (4th) 197 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 5.

34 Counsel to the Applicants further submits that the CCAA should be given a broad and liberal interpretation to facilitate its underlying purpose, including the preservation of the going concern for the benefit of all stakeholders and further that it should not matter whether the business continues as a going concern under the debtor's stewardship or under new ownership, for as long as the business continues as a going concern, a primary goal of the CCAA will be met.

35 Counsel to the Applicants makes reference to a number of cases where courts in Ontario, in appropriate cases, have exercised their jurisdiction to approve a sale of assets, even in the absence of a plan of arrangement

being tendered to stakeholders for a vote. In doing so, counsel to the Applicants submits that the courts have repeatedly recognized that they have jurisdiction under the CCAA to approve asset sales in the absence of a plan of arrangement, where such sale is in the best interests of stakeholders generally. *Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re, supra, Re PSINet, supra, Consumers Packaging Inc., Re* [2001 CarswellOnt 3482 (Ont. C.A.)], *supra, Stelco Inc., Re* (2004), 6 C.B.R. (5th) 316 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para. 1, *Tiger Brand Knitting Co., Re* (2005), 9 C.B.R. (5th) 315 (Ont. S.C.J.), *Caterpillar Financial Services Ltd. v. Hard-Rock Paving Co.* (2008), 45 C.B.R. (5th) 87 (Ont. S.C.J.) and *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]).

36 In *Re Consumers Packaging, supra*, the Court of Appeal for Ontario specifically held that a sale of a business as a going concern during a CCAA proceeding is consistent with the purposes of the CCAA:

The sale of Consumers' Canadian glass operations as a going concern pursuant to the Owens-Illinois bid allows the preservation of Consumers' business (albeit under new ownership), and is therefore consistent with the purposes of the CCAA.

...we cannot refrain from commenting that Farley J.'s decision to approve the Owens-Illinois bid is consistent with previous decisions in Ontario and elsewhere that have emphasized the broad remedial purpose of flexibility of the CCAA and have approved the sale and disposition of assets during CCAA proceedings prior to a formal plan being tendered. *Re Consumers Packaging, supra, at paras. 5, 9.*

37 Similarly, in *Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re, supra*, Blair J. (as he then was) expressly affirmed the court's jurisdiction to approve a sale of assets in the course of a CCAA proceeding before a plan of arrangement had been approved by creditors. *Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re, supra, at paras. 43, 45.*

38 Similarly, in *PSINet Limited, supra*, the court approved a going concern sale in a CCAA proceeding where no plan was presented to creditors and a substantial portion of the debtor's Canadian assets were to be sold. Farley J. noted as follows:

[If the sale was not approved,] there would be a liquidation scenario ensuing which would realize far less than this going concern sale (which appears to me to have involved a transparent process with appropriate exposure designed to maximize the proceeds), thus impacting upon the rest of the creditors, especially as to the unsecured, together with the material enlarging of the unsecured claims by the disruption claims of approximately 8,600 customers (who will be materially disadvantaged by an interrupted transition) plus the job losses for approximately 200 employees. *Re PSINet Limited, supra, at para. 3.*

39 In *Re Stelco Inc., supra*, in 2004, Farley J. again addressed the issue of the feasibility of selling the operations as a going concern:

I would observe that usually it is the creditor side which wishes to terminate CCAA proceedings and that when the creditors threaten to take action, there is a realization that a liquidation scenario will not only have a negative effect upon a CCAA applicant, but also upon its workforce. Hence, the CCAA may be employed to provide stability during a period of necessary financial and operational restructuring - and if a restructuring of the "old company" is not feasible, then there is the exploration of the feasibility of the sale of the operations/enterprise as a going concern (with continued employment) in whole or in part. *Re Stelco Inc, supra, at para. 1.*

40 I accept these submissions as being general statements of the law in Ontario. The value of equity in an insolvent debtor is dubious, at best, and, in my view, it follows that the determining factor should not be whether the business continues under the debtor's stewardship or under a structure that recognizes a new equity structure. An equally important factor to consider is whether the case can be made to continue the business as a going concern.

41 Counsel to the Applicants also referred to decisions from the courts in Quebec, Manitoba and Alberta which have similarly recognized the court's jurisdiction to approve a sale of assets during the course of a CCAA proceeding. *Boutiques San Francisco Inc., Re* (2004), 7 C.B.R. (5th) 189 (Que. S.C.), *Winnipeg Motor Express Inc., Re* (2008), 49 C.B.R. (5th) 302 (Man. Q.B.) at paras. 41, 44, and *Calpine Canada Energy Ltd., Re* (2007), 35 C.B.R. (5th) 1 (Alta. Q.B.) at para. 75.

42 Counsel to the Applicants also directed the court's attention to a recent decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal which questioned whether the court should authorize the sale of substantially all of the debtor's assets where the debtor's plan "will simply propose that the net proceeds from the sale...be distributed to its creditors". In *Cliffs Over Maple Bay Investments Ltd. v. Fisgard Capital Corp.* (2008), 46 C.B.R. (5th) 7 (B.C. C.A.) ("*Cliffs Over Maple Bay*"), the court was faced with a debtor who had no active business but who nonetheless sought to stave off its secured creditor indefinitely. The case did not involve any type of sale transaction but the Court of Appeal questioned whether a court should authorize the sale under the CCAA without requiring the matter to be voted upon by creditors.

43 In addressing this matter, it appears to me that the British Columbia Court of Appeal focussed on whether the court should grant the requested relief and not on the question of whether a CCAA court has the jurisdiction to grant the requested relief.

44 I do not disagree with the decision in *Cliffs Over Maple Bay*. However, it involved a situation where the debtor had no active business and did not have the support of its stakeholders. That is not the case with these Applicants.

45 The *Cliffs Over Maple Bay* decision has recently been the subject of further comment by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in *Asset Engineering LP v. Forest & Marine Financial Ltd. Partnership*, 2009 BCCA 319 (B.C. C.A.).

46 At paragraphs 24 - 26 of the *Forest and Marine* decision, Newbury J.A. stated:

24. In *Cliffs Over Maple Bay*, the debtor company was a real estate developer whose one project had failed. The company had been dormant for some time. It applied for CCAA protection but described its proposal for restructuring in vague terms that amounted essentially to a plan to "secure sufficient funds" to complete the stalled project (Para. 34). This court, per Tysoe J.A., ruled that although the Act can apply to single-project companies, its purposes are unlikely to be engaged in such instances, since mortgage priorities are fully straight forward and there will be little incentive for senior secured creditors to compromise their interests (Para. 36). Further, the Court stated, the granting of a stay under s. 11 is "not a free standing remedy that the court may grant whenever an insolvent company wishes to undertake a "restructuring"...Rather, s. 11 is ancillary to the fundamental purpose of the CCAA, and a stay of proceedings freezing the rights of creditors should only be granted in furtherance of the CCAA's fundamental purpose". That purpose has been described in *Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto Dominion Bank* (1984) 11 D.L.R. (4th) 576 (Alta. Q.B.):

The legislation is intended to have wide scope and allow a judge to make orders which will effectively maintain the status quo for a period while the insolvent company attempts to gain the approval of its creditors for a proposed arrangement which will enable the company to remain in operation for what is, hopefully, the future benefit of both the company and its creditors. [at 580]

25. The Court was not satisfied in *Cliffs Over Maple Bay* that the "restructuring" contemplated by the debtor would do anything other than distribute the net proceeds from the sale, winding up or liquidation of its business. The debtor had no intention of proposing a plan of arrangement, and its business would not continue following the execution of its proposal - thus it could not be said the purposes of the statute would be engaged...

26. In my view, however, the case at bar is quite different from *Cliffs Over Maple Bay*. Here, the main debtor, the Partnership, is at the centre of a complicated corporate group and carries on an active financing business that it hopes to save notwithstanding the current economic cycle. (The business itself which fills a "niche" in the market, has been carried on in one form or another since 1983.) The CCAA is appropriate for situations such as this where it is unknown whether the "restructuring" will ultimately take the form of a refinancing or will involve a reorganization of the corporate entity or entities and a true compromise of the rights of one or more parties. The "fundamental purpose" of the Act - to preserve the *status quo* while the debtor prepares a plan that will enable it to remain in business to the benefit of all concerned - will be furthered by granting a stay so that the means contemplated by the Act - a compromise or arrangement - can be developed, negotiated and voted on if necessary...

47 It seems to me that the foregoing views expressed in *Forest and Marine* are not inconsistent with the views previously expressed by the courts in Ontario. The CCAA is intended to be flexible and must be given a broad and liberal interpretation to achieve its objectives and a sale by the debtor which preserves its business as a going concern is, in my view, consistent with those objectives.

48 I therefore conclude that the court does have the jurisdiction to authorize a sale under the CCAA in the absence of a plan.

49 I now turn to a consideration of whether it is appropriate, in this case, to approve this sales process. Counsel to the Applicants submits that the court should consider the following factors in determining whether to authorize a sale under the CCAA in the absence of a plan:

- (a) is a sale transaction warranted at this time?
- (b) will the sale benefit the whole "economic community"?
- (c) do any of the debtors' creditors have a *bona fide* reason to object to a sale of the business?
- (d) is there a better viable alternative?

I accept this submission.

50 It is the position of the Applicants that Nortel's proposed sale of the Business should be approved as this decision is to the benefit of stakeholders and no creditor is prejudiced. Further, counsel submits that in the absence of a sale, the prospects for the Business are a loss of competitiveness, a loss of value and a loss of jobs.

51 Counsel to the Applicants summarized the facts in support of the argument that the Sale Transaction should be approved, namely:

- (a) Nortel has been working diligently for many months on a plan to reorganize its business;
- (b) in the exercise of its business judgment, Nortel has concluded that it cannot continue to operate the Business successfully within the CCAA framework;
- (c) unless a sale is undertaken at this time, the long-term viability of the Business will be in jeopardy;
- (d) the Sale Agreement continues the Business as a going concern, will save at least 2,500 jobs and constitutes the best and most valuable proposal for the Business;
- (e) the auction process will serve to ensure Nortel receives the highest possible value for the Business;
- (f) the sale of the Business at this time is in the best interests of Nortel and its stakeholders; and
- (g) the value of the Business is likely to decline over time.

52 The objections of MatlinPatterson and the UCC have been considered. I am satisfied that the issues raised in these objections have been addressed in a satisfactory manner by the ruling of Judge Gross and no useful purpose would be served by adding additional comment.

53 Counsel to the Applicants also emphasize that Nortel will return to court to seek approval of the most favourable transaction to emerge from the auction process and will aim to satisfy the elements established by the court for approval as set out in *Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.* (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 16.

Disposition

54 The Applicants are part of a complicated corporate group. They carry on an active international business. I have accepted that an important factor to consider in a CCAA process is whether the case can be made to continue the business as a going concern. I am satisfied having considered the factors referenced at [49], as well as the facts summarized at [51], that the Applicants have met this test. I am therefore satisfied that this motion should be granted.

55 Accordingly, I approve the Bidding Procedures as described in the Riedel Affidavit and the Fourteenth Report of the Monitor, which procedures have been approved by the U.S. Court.

56 I am also satisfied that the Sale Agreement should be approved and further that the Sale Agreement be approved and accepted for the purposes of conducting the "stalking horse" bidding process in accordance with the Bidding Procedures including, without limitation the Break-Up Fee and the Expense Reimbursement (as both terms are defined in the Sale Agreement).

57 Further, I have also been satisfied that Appendix B to the Fourteenth Report contains information which is commercially sensitive, the dissemination of which could be detrimental to the stakeholders and, accordingly, I order that this document be sealed, pending further order of the court.

58 In approving the Bidding Procedures, I have also taken into account that the auction will be conducted

prior to the sale approval motion. This process is consistent with the practice of this court.

59 Finally, it is the expectation of this court that the Monitor will continue to review ongoing issues in respect of the Bidding Procedures. The Bidding Procedures permit the Applicants to waive certain components of qualified bids without the consent of the UCC, the bondholder group and the Monitor. However, it is the expectation of this court that, if this situation arises, the Applicants will provide advance notice to the Monitor of its intention to do so.

Motion granted.

END OF DOCUMENT

TAB 7

2010 CarswellOnt 212, 2010 ONSC 222, 63 C.B.R. (5th) 115, 184 A.C.W.S. (3d) 684

C

2010 CarswellOnt 212, 2010 ONSC 222, 63 C.B.R. (5th) 115, 184 A.C.W.S. (3d) 684

Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., Re

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, C-36, AS AMENDED AND IN THE MATTER OF A PROPOSED PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF **CANWEST PUBLISHING INC./PUBLICATIONS CANWEST INC., CANWEST BOOKS INC. AND CANWEST (CANADA) INC.**

Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Pepall J.

Judgment: January 18, 2010

Docket: CV-10-8533-00CL

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Counsel: Lyndon Barnes, Alex Cobb, Duncan Ault for Applicant, LP Entities

Mario Forte for Special Committee of the Board of Directors

Andrew Kent, Hilary Clarke for Administrative Agent of the Senior Secured Lenders' Syndicate

Peter Griffin for Management Directors

Robin B. Schwill, Natalie Renner for Ad Hoc Committee of 9.25% Senior Subordinated Noteholders

David Byers, Maria Konyukhova for Proposed Monitor, FTI Consulting Canada Inc.

Subject: Insolvency; Corporate and Commercial

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Miscellaneous

CMI, entity of C Corp., obtained protection from creditors in Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("CCAA") proceedings in October 2009 — CPI, newspaper entities related to C, sought similar protection — CPI brought application for order pursuant to CCAA and for stay of proceedings and other benefits of order to be extended to CPI — Application granted — CPI was clearly insolvent — Community served by CPI was huge — Granting of order premised on anticipated going concern sale of newspaper business, which would serve interests of CPI and stakeholders and also community at large — Order requested would provide stability and enable CPI to pursue restructuring and preserve enterprise value for stakeholders — Without benefit of stay, CPI would have been required to pay approximately \$1.45 billion and would have been unable to continue operating business.

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Arrangements — Approval by creditors

CMI, entity of C Corp., obtained protection from creditors in Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("CCAA") proceedings in October 2009 — CPI, newspaper entities related to C, sought similar protection — CPI brought application for order pursuant to CCAA and for stay of proceedings and other benefits of order to be extended to CPI — Application granted — CPI was clearly insolvent — Community served by CPI was huge — Granting of order premised on anticipated going concern sale of newspaper business, which would serve interests of CPI and stakeholders and also community at large — Order requested would provide stability and enable CPI to pursue restructuring and preserve enterprise value for stakeholders — Without benefit of stay, CPI would have been required to pay approximately \$1.45 billion and would have been unable to continue operating business — In circumstances, it was appropriate to allow CPI to file and present plan only to secured creditors.

Cases considered by *Pepall J.*:

Anvil Range Mining Corp., Re (2002), 2002 CarswellOnt 2254, 34 C.B.R. (4th) 157 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

Anvil Range Mining Corp., Re (2003), 310 N.R. 200 (note), 2003 CarswellOnt 730, 2003 CarswellOnt 731, 180 O.A.C. 399 (note) (S.C.C.) — referred to

Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 6184, 59 C.B.R. (5th) 72 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — followed

Grant Forest Products Inc., Re (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 4699, 57 C.B.R. (5th) 128 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24, 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275, 1993 CarswellOnt 183 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

MuscleTech Research & Development Inc., Re (2006), 19 C.B.R. (5th) 54, 2006 CarswellOnt 264 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — followed

Philip Services Corp., Re (1999), 13 C.B.R. (4th) 159, 1999 CarswellOnt 4673 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance) (2002), 287 N.R. 203, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada*) 18 C.P.R. (4th) 1, 44 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 161, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada*) 211 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 223 F.T.R. 137 (note), 20 C.P.C. (5th) 1, 40 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, 2002 SCC 41, 2002 CarswellNat 822, 2002 CarswellNat 823, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada*) 93 C.R.R. (2d) 219, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522 (S.C.C.) — followed

Statutes considered:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

s. 4 — considered

s. 5 — considered

s. 11.2 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.2(1) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.2(4) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.4 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.4(1) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.4(2) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.7(2) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — referred to

s. 11.51 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

s. 11.52 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43

s. 137(2) — considered

APPLICATION by entity of company already protected under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act for similar protection.

Pepall J.:

Reasons for Decision

Introduction

1 Canwest Global Communications Corp. ("Canwest Global") is a leading Canadian media company with interests in (i) newspaper publishing and digital media; and (ii) free-to-air television stations and subscription based specialty television channels. Canwest Global, the entities in its Canadian television business (excluding CW Investments Co. and its subsidiaries) and the National Post Company (which prior to October 30, 2009 owned and published the National Post) (collectively, the "CMI Entities"), obtained protection from their creditors in a *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*[FN1] ("CCAA") proceeding on October 6, 2009.[FN2] Now, the Canwest Global Canadian newspaper entities with the exception of National Post Inc. seek similar protection. Specifically, Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc. ("CPI"), Canwest Books Inc. ("CBI"), and Canwest (Canada) Inc. ("CCI") apply for an order pursuant to the CCAA. They also seek to have the stay of proceedings and the other benefits of the order extend to Canwest Limited Partnership/Canwest Société en Commandite (the "Limited Partnership"). The Applicants and the Limited Partnership are referred to as the "LP Entities" throughout these reasons. The term "Canwest" will be used to refer to the Canwest enterprise as a whole. It includes the LP Entities and Canwest Global's other subsidiaries which are not applicants in this proceeding.

2 All appearing on this application supported the relief requested with the exception of the Ad Hoc Committee of 9.25% Senior Subordinated Noteholders. That Committee represents certain unsecured creditors whom I

will discuss more fully later.

3 I granted the order requested with reasons to follow. These are my reasons.

4 I start with three observations. Firstly, Canwest Global, through its ownership interests in the LP Entities, is the largest publisher of daily English language newspapers in Canada. The LP Entities own and operate 12 daily newspapers across Canada. These newspapers are part of the Canadian heritage and landscape. The oldest, The Gazette, was established in Montreal in 1778. The others are the Vancouver Sun, The Province, the Ottawa Citizen, the Edmonton Journal, the Calgary Herald, The Windsor Star, the Times Colonist, The Star Phoenix, the Leader-Post, the Nanaimo Daily News and the Alberni Valley Times. These newspapers have an estimated average weekly readership that exceeds 4 million. The LP Entities also publish 23 non-daily newspapers and own and operate a number of digital media and online operations. The community served by the LP Entities is huge. In addition, based on August 31, 2009 figures, the LP Entities employ approximately 5,300 employees in Canada with approximately 1,300 of those employees working in Ontario. The granting of the order requested is premised on an anticipated going concern sale of the newspaper business of the LP Entities. This serves not just the interests of the LP Entities and their stakeholders but the Canadian community at large.

5 Secondly, the order requested may contain some shortcomings; it may not be perfect. That said, insolvency proceedings typically involve what is feasible, not what is flawless.

6 Lastly, although the builders of this insolvent business are no doubt unhappy with its fate, gratitude is not misplaced by acknowledging their role in its construction.

Background Facts

(i) Financial Difficulties

7 The LP Entities generate the majority of their revenues through the sale of advertising. In the fiscal year ended August 31, 2009, approximately 72% of the LP Entities' consolidated revenue derived from advertising. The LP Entities have been seriously affected by the economic downturn in Canada and their consolidated advertising revenues declined substantially in the latter half of 2008 and in 2009. In addition, they experienced increases in certain of their operating costs.

8 On May 29, 2009 the Limited Partnership failed, for the first time, to make certain interest and principal reduction payments and related interest and cross currency swap payments totaling approximately \$10 million in respect of its senior secured credit facilities. On the same day, the Limited Partnership announced that, as of May 31, 2009, it would be in breach of certain financial covenants set out in the credit agreement dated as of July 10, 2007 between its predecessor, Canwest Media Works Limited Partnership, The Bank of Nova Scotia as administrative agent, a syndicate of secured lenders ("the LP Secured Lenders"), and the predecessors of CCI, CPI and CBI as guarantors. The Limited Partnership also failed to make principal, interest and fee payments due pursuant to this credit agreement on June 21, June 22, July 21, July 22 and August 21, 2009.

9 The May 29, 2009, defaults under the senior secured credit facilities triggered defaults in respect of related foreign currency and interest rate swaps. The swap counterparties (the "Hedging Secured Creditors") demanded payment of \$68.9 million. These unpaid amounts rank pari passu with amounts owing under the LP Secured Lenders' credit facilities.

10 On or around August 31, 2009, the Limited Partnership and certain of the LP Secured Lenders entered into a forbearance agreement in order to allow the LP Entities and the LP Secured Lenders the opportunity to negotiate a pre-packaged restructuring or reorganization of the affairs of the LP Entities. On November 9, 2009, the forbearance agreement expired and since then, the LP Secured Lenders have been in a position to demand payment of approximately \$953.4 million, the amount outstanding as at August 31, 2009. Nonetheless, they continued negotiations with the LP Entities. The culmination of this process is that the LP Entities are now seeking a stay of proceedings under the CCAA in order to provide them with the necessary "breathing space" to restructure and reorganize their businesses and to preserve their enterprise value for the ultimate benefit of their broader stakeholder community.

11 The Limited Partnership released its annual consolidated financial statements for the twelve months ended August 31, 2009 and 2008 on November 26, 2009. As at August 31, 2009, the Limited Partnership had total consolidated assets with a net book value of approximately \$644.9 million. This included consolidated current assets of \$182.7 million and consolidated non-current assets of approximately \$462.2 million. As at that date, the Limited Partnership had total consolidated liabilities of approximately \$1.719 billion (increased from \$1.656 billion as at August 31, 2008). These liabilities consisted of consolidated current liabilities of \$1.612 billion and consolidated non-current liabilities of \$107 million.

12 The Limited Partnership had been experiencing deteriorating financial results over the past year. For the year ended August 31, 2009, the Limited Partnership's consolidated revenues decreased by \$181.7 million or 15% to \$1.021 billion as compared to \$1.203 billion for the year ended August 31, 2008. For the year ended August 31, 2009, the Limited Partnership reported a consolidated net loss of \$66 million compared to consolidated net earnings of \$143.5 million for fiscal 2008.

(ii) Indebtedness under the Credit Facilities

13 The indebtedness under the credit facilities of the LP Entities consists of the following.

(a) The LP senior secured credit facilities are the subject matter of the July 10, 2007 credit agreement already mentioned. They are guaranteed by CCI, CPI and CBI. The security held by the LP Secured Lenders has been reviewed by the solicitors for the proposed Monitor, FTI Consulting Canada Inc. and considered to be valid and enforceable.[FN3] As at August 31, 2009, the amounts owing by the LP Entities totaled \$953.4 million exclusive of interest.[FN4]

(b) The Limited Partnership is a party to the aforementioned foreign currency and interest rate swaps with the Hedging Secured Creditors. Defaults under the LP senior secured credit facilities have triggered defaults in respect of these swap arrangements. Demand for repayment of amounts totaling \$68.9 million (exclusive of unpaid interest) has been made. These obligations are secured.

(c) Pursuant to a senior subordinated credit agreement dated as of July 10, 2007, between the Limited Partnership, The Bank of Nova Scotia as administrative agent for a syndicate of lenders, and others, certain subordinated lenders agreed to provide the Limited Partnership with access to a term credit facility of up to \$75 million. CCI, CPI, and CBI are guarantors. This facility is unsecured, guaranteed on an unsecured basis and currently fully drawn. On June 20, 2009, the Limited Partnership failed to make an interest payment resulting in an event of default under the credit agreement. In addition, the defaults under the senior secured credit facilities resulted in a default under this facility. The senior subordinated lenders are in a position to take steps to demand payment.

(d) Pursuant to a note indenture between the Limited Partnership, The Bank of New York Trust Company of Canada as trustee, and others, the Limited Partnership issued 9.5% per annum senior subordinated unsecured notes due 2015 in the aggregate principal amount of US \$400 million. CPI and CBI are guarantors. The notes are unsecured and guaranteed on an unsecured basis. The noteholders are in a position to take steps to demand immediate payment of all amounts outstanding under the notes as a result of events of default.

14 The LP Entities use a centralized cash management system at the Bank of Nova Scotia which they propose to continue. Obligations owed pursuant to the existing cash management arrangements are secured (the "Cash Management Creditor").

(iii) LP Entities' Response to Financial Difficulties

15 The LP Entities took a number of steps to address their circumstances with a view to improving cash flow and strengthening their balance sheet. Nonetheless, they began to experience significant tightening of credit from critical suppliers and other trade creditors. The LP Entities' debt totals approximately \$1.45 billion and they do not have the liquidity required to make payment in respect of this indebtedness. They are clearly insolvent.

16 The board of directors of Canwest Global struck a special committee of directors (the "Special Committee") with a mandate to explore and consider strategic alternatives. The Special Committee has appointed Thomas Strike, the President, Corporate Development & Strategy Implementation, as Recapitalization Officer and has retained Gary Colter of CRS Inc. as Restructuring Advisor for the LP Entities (the "CRA"). The President of CPI, Dennis Skulsky, will report directly to the Special Committee.

17 Given their problems, throughout the summer and fall of 2009, the LP Entities have participated in difficult and complex negotiations with their lenders and other stakeholders to obtain forbearance and to work towards a consensual restructuring or recapitalization.

18 An ad hoc committee of the holders of the senior subordinated unsecured notes (the "Ad Hoc Committee") was formed in July, 2009 and retained Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg as counsel. Among other things, the Limited Partnership agreed to pay the Committee's legal fees up to a maximum of \$250,000. Representatives of the Limited Partnership and their advisors have had ongoing discussions with representatives of the Ad Hoc Committee and their counsel was granted access to certain confidential information following execution of a confidentiality agreement. The Ad Hoc Committee has also engaged a financial advisor who has been granted access to the LP Entities' virtual data room which contains confidential information regarding the business and affairs of the LP Entities. There is no evidence of any satisfactory proposal having been made by the noteholders. They have been in a position to demand payment since August, 2009, but they have not done so.

19 In the meantime and in order to permit the businesses of the LP Entities to continue to operate as going concerns and in an effort to preserve the greatest number of jobs and maximize value for the stakeholders of the LP Entities, the LP Entities have been engaged in negotiations with the LP Senior Lenders, the result of which is this CCAA application.

(iv) The Support Agreement, the Secured Creditors' Plan and the Solicitation Process

20 Since August 31, 2009, the LP Entities and the LP administrative agent for the LP Secured Lenders have worked together to negotiate terms for a consensual, prearranged restructuring, recapitalization or reorganization of the business and affairs of the LP Entities as a going concern. This is referred to by the parties as the Support Transaction.

21 As part of this Support Transaction, the LP Entities are seeking approval of a Support Agreement entered into by them and the administrative agent for the LP Secured Lenders. 48% of the LP Secured Lenders, the Hedging Secured Creditors, and the Cash Management Creditor (the "Secured Creditors") are party to the Support Agreement.

22 Three interrelated elements are contemplated by the Support Agreement and the Support Transaction: the credit acquisition, the Secured Creditors' plan (the "Plan"), and the sale and investor solicitation process which the parties refer to as SISP.

23 The Support Agreement contains various milestones with which the LP Entities are to comply and, subject to a successful bid arising from the solicitation process (an important caveat in my view), commits them to support a credit acquisition. The credit acquisition involves an acquisition by an entity capitalized by the Secured Creditors and described as AcquireCo. AcquireCo. would acquire substantially all of the assets of the LP Entities (including the shares in National Post Inc.) and assume certain of the liabilities of the LP Entities. It is contemplated that AcquireCo. would offer employment to all or substantially all of the employees of the LP Entities and would assume all of the LP Entities' existing pension plans and existing post-retirement and post-employment benefit plans subject to a right by AcquireCo., acting commercially reasonably and after consultation with the operational management of the LP Entities, to exclude certain specified liabilities. The credit acquisition would be the subject matter of a Plan to be voted on by the Secured Creditors on or before January 31, 2010. There would only be one class. The Plan would only compromise the LP Entities' secured claims and would not affect or compromise any other claims against any of the LP Entities ("unaffected claims"). No holders of the unaffected claims would be entitled to vote on or receive any distributions of their claims. The Secured Creditors would exchange their outstanding secured claims against the LP Entities under the LP credit agreement and the swap obligations respectively for their *pro rata* shares of the debt and equity to be issued by AcquireCo. All of the LP Entities' obligations under the LP secured claims calculated as of the date of closing less \$25 million would be deemed to be satisfied following the closing of the Acquisition Agreement. LP secured claims in the amount of \$25 million would continue to be held by AcquireCo. and constitute an outstanding unsecured claim against the LP Entities.

24 The Support Agreement contemplates that the Financial Advisor, namely RBC Dominion Securities Inc., under the supervision of the Monitor, will conduct the solicitation process. Completion of the credit acquisition process is subject to a successful bid arising from the solicitation process. In general terms, the objective of the solicitation process is to obtain a better offer (with some limitations described below) than that reflected in the credit acquisition. If none is obtained in that process, the LP Entities intend for the credit acquisition to proceed assuming approval of the Plan. Court sanction would also be required.

25 In more detailed terms, Phase I of the solicitation process is expected to last approximately 7 weeks and qualified interested parties may submit non-binding proposals to the Financial Advisor on or before February 26, 2010. Thereafter, the Monitor will assess the proposals to determine whether there is a reasonable prospect of obtaining a Superior Offer. This is in essence a cash offer that is equal to or higher than that represented by the credit acquisition. If there is such a prospect, the Monitor will recommend that the process continue into Phase

II. If there is no such prospect, the Monitor will then determine whether there is a Superior Alternative Offer, that is, an offer that is not a Superior Offer but which might nonetheless receive approval from the Secured Creditors. If so, to proceed into Phase II, the Superior Alternative Offer must be supported by Secured Creditors holding more than at least 33.3% of the secured claims. If it is not so supported, the process would be terminated and the LP Entities would then apply for court sanction of the Plan.

26 Phase II is expected to last approximately 7 weeks as well. This period allows for due diligence and the submission of final binding proposals. The Monitor will then conduct an assessment akin to the Phase 1 process with somewhat similar attendant outcomes if there are no Superior Offers and no acceptable Alternative Superior Offers. If there were a Superior Offer or an acceptable Alternative Superior Offer, an agreement would be negotiated and the requisite approvals sought.

27 The solicitation process is designed to allow the LP Entities to test the market. One concern is that a Superior Offer that benefits the secured lenders might operate to preclude a Superior Alternative Offer that could provide a better result for the unsecured creditors. That said, the LP Entities are of the view that the solicitation process and the support transaction present the best opportunity for the businesses of the LP Entities to continue as going concerns, thereby preserving jobs as well as the economic and social benefits of their continued operation. At this stage, the alternative is a bankruptcy or liquidation which would result in significant detriment not only to the creditors and employees of the LP Entities but to the broader community that benefits from the continued operation of the LP Entities' business. I also take some comfort from the position of the Monitor which is best captured in an excerpt from its preliminary Report:

The terms of the Support Agreement and SISP were the subject of lengthy and intense arm's length negotiations between the LP Entities and the LP Administrative Agent. The Proposed Monitor supports approval of the process contemplated therein and of the approval of those documents, but without in any way fettering the various powers and discretions of the Monitor.

28 It goes without saying that the Monitor, being a court appointed officer, may apply to the court for advice and directions and also owes reporting obligations to the court.

29 As to the objection of the Ad Hoc Committee, I make the following observations. Firstly, they represent unsecured subordinated debt. They have been in a position to take action since August, 2009. Furthermore, the LP Entities have provided up to \$250,000 for them to retain legal counsel. Meanwhile, the LP Secured Lenders have been in a position to enforce their rights through a non-consensual court proceeding and have advised the LP Entities of their abilities in that regard in the event that the LP Entities did not move forward as contemplated by the Support Agreement. With the Support Agreement and the solicitation process, there is an enhanced likelihood of the continuation of going concern operations, the preservation of jobs and the maximization of value for stakeholders of the LP Entities. It seemed to me that in the face of these facts and given that the Support Agreement expired on January 8, 2010, adjourning the proceeding was not merited in the circumstances. The Committee did receive very short notice. Without being taken as encouraging or discouraging the use of the comeback clause in the order, I disagree with the submission of counsel to the Ad Hoc Committee to the effect that it is very difficult if not impossible to stop a process relying on that provision. That provision in the order is a meaningful one as is clear from the decision in *Muscletech Research & Development Inc., Re*[FN5]. On a come back motion, although the positions of parties who have relied bona fide on an Initial Order should not be prejudiced, the onus is on the applicants for an Initial Order to satisfy the court that the existing terms should be upheld.

Proposed Monitor

30 The Applicants propose that FTI Consulting Canada Inc. serve as the Monitor. It currently serves as the Monitor in the CMI Entities' CCAA proceeding. It is desirable for FTI to act; it is qualified to act; and it has consented to act. It has not served in any of the incompatible capacities described in section 11.7(2) of the CCAA. The proposed Monitor has an enhanced role that is reflected in the order and which is acceptable.

Proposed Order

31 As mentioned, I granted the order requested. It is clear that the LP Entities need protection under the CCAA. The order requested will provide stability and enable the LP Entities to pursue their restructuring and preserve enterprise value for their stakeholders. Without the benefit of a stay, the LP Entities would be required to pay approximately \$1.45 billion and would be unable to continue operating their businesses.

(a) Threshold Issues

32 The chief place of business of the Applicants is Ontario. They qualify as debtor companies under the CCAA. They are affiliated companies with total claims against them that far exceed \$5 million. Demand for payment of the swap indebtedness has been made and the Applicants are in default under all of the other facilities outlined in these reasons. They do not have sufficient liquidity to satisfy their obligations. They are clearly insolvent.

(b) Limited Partnership

33 The Applicants seek to extend the stay of proceedings and the other relief requested to the Limited Partnership. The CCAA definition of a company does not include a partnership or a limited partnership but courts have exercised their inherent jurisdiction to extend the protections of an Initial CCAA Order to partnerships when it was just and convenient to do so. The relief has been held to be appropriate where the operations of the partnership are so intertwined with those of the debtor companies that irreparable harm would ensue if the requested stay were not granted: *Canwest Global Communications Corp.*, Re[FN6] and *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd.*, Re[FN7].

34 In this case, the Limited Partnership is the administrative backbone of the LP Entities and is integral to and intertwined with the Applicants' ongoing operations. It owns all shared information technology assets; it provides hosting services for all Canwest properties; it holds all software licences used by the LP Entities; it is party to many of the shared services agreements involving other Canwest entities; and employs approximately 390 full-time equivalent employees who work in Canwest's shared services area. The Applicants state that failure to extend the stay to the Limited Partnership would have a profoundly negative impact on the value of the Applicants, the Limited Partnership and the Canwest Global enterprise as a whole. In addition, exposing the assets of the Limited Partnership to the demands of creditors would make it impossible for the LP Entities to successfully restructure. I am persuaded that under these circumstances it is just and convenient to grant the request.

(c) Filing of the Secured Creditors' Plan

35 The LP Entities propose to present the Plan only to the Secured Creditors. Claims of unsecured creditors will not be addressed.

36 The CCAA seems to contemplate a single creditor-class plan. Sections 4 and 5 state:

s.4 Where a compromise or an arrangement is proposed between a debtor company and its unsecured creditors or any class of them, the court may, on the application in a summary way of the company or of any such creditor or of the trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator of the company, order a meeting of the creditors or class of creditors and, if the court so determines, of the shareholders of the company, to be summoned in such manner as the court directs.

s.5 Where a compromise or an arrangement is proposed between a debtor company and its secured creditors or any class of them, the court may, on the application in a summary way of the company or of any such creditor or of the trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator of the company, order a meeting of the creditors or class of creditors and, if the court so determines, of the shareholders of the company, to be summoned in such manner as the court directs.

37 Case law has interpreted these provisions as authorizing a single creditor-class plan. For instance, Blair J. (as he then was) stated in *Philip Services Corp., Re*[FN8]: "There is no doubt that a debtor is at liberty, under the terms of sections 4 and 5 of the CCAA, to make a proposal to secured creditors or to unsecured creditors or to both groups." [FN9] Similarly, in *Anvil Range Mining Corp., Re*[FN10], the Court of Appeal stated: "It may also be noted that s. 5 of the CCAA contemplates a plan which is a compromise between a debtor company and its secured creditors and that by the terms of s. 6 of the Act, applied to the facts of this case, the plan is binding only on the secured creditors and the company and not on the unsecured creditors." [FN11]

38 Based on the foregoing, it is clear that a debtor has the statutory authority to present a plan to a single class of creditors. In *Anvil Range Mining Corp., Re*, the issue was raised in the context of the plan's sanction by the court and a consideration of whether the plan was fair and reasonable as it eliminated the opportunity for unsecured creditors to realize anything. The basis of the argument was that the motions judge had erred in not requiring a more complete and in depth valuation of the company's assets relative to the claims of the secured creditors.

39 In this case, I am not being asked to sanction the Plan at this stage. Furthermore, the Monitor will supervise a vigorous and lengthy solicitation process to thoroughly canvass the market for alternative transactions. The solicitation should provide a good indication of market value. In addition, as counsel for the LP Entities observed, the noteholders and the LP Entities never had any forbearance agreement. The noteholders have been in a position to take action since last summer but chose not to do so. One would expect some action on their part if they themselves believed that they "were in the money". While the process is not perfect, it is subject to the supervision of the court and the Monitor is obliged to report on its results to the court.

40 In my view it is appropriate in the circumstances to authorize the LP Entities to file and present a Plan only to the Secured Creditors.

(D) DIP Financing

41 The Applicants seek approval of a DIP facility in the amount of \$25 million which would be secured by a charge over all of the assets of the LP Entities and rank ahead of all other charges except the Administration Charge, and ahead of all other existing security interests except validly perfected purchase money security interests and certain specific statutory encumbrances.

42 Section 11.2 of the CCAA provides the statutory jurisdiction to grant a DIP charge. In *Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re*[FN12], I addressed this provision. Firstly, an applicant should address the require-

ments contained in section 11.2 (1) and then address the enumerated factors found in section 11.2(4) of the CCAA. As that list is not exhaustive, it may be appropriate to consider other factors as well.

43 Applying these principles to this case and dealing firstly with section 11.2(1) of the CCAA, notice either has been given to secured creditors likely to be affected by the security or charge or alternatively they are not affected by the DIP charge. While funds are not anticipated to be immediately necessary, the cash flow statements project a good likelihood that the LP Entities will require the additional liquidity afforded by the \$25 million. The ability to borrow funds that are secured by a charge will help retain the confidence of the LP Entities' trade creditors, employees and suppliers. It is expected that the DIP facility will permit the LP Entities to conduct the solicitation process and consummate a recapitalization transaction of a sale of all or some of its assets. The charge does not secure any amounts that were owing prior to the filing. As such, there has been compliance with the provisions of section 11.2 (1).

44 Turning then to a consideration of the factors found in section 11.2(4) of the Act, the LP Entities are expected to be subject to these CCAA proceedings until July 31, 2010. Their business and financial affairs will be amply managed during the proceedings. This is a consensual filing which is reflective of the confidence of the major creditors in the current management configuration. All of these factors favour the granting of the charge. The DIP loan would enhance the prospects of a viable compromise or arrangement and would ensure the necessary stability during the CCAA process. I have already touched upon the issue of value. That said, in relative terms, the quantum of the DIP financing is not large and there is no readily apparent material prejudice to any creditor arising from the granting of the charge and approval of the financing. I also note that it is endorsed by the proposed Monitor in its report.

45 Other factors to consider in assessing whether to approve a DIP charge include the reasonableness of the financing terms and more particularly the associated fees. Ideally there should be some evidence on this issue. Prior to entering into the forbearance agreement, the LP Entities sought proposals from other third party lenders for a DIP facility. In this case, some but not all of the Secured Creditors are participating in the financing of the DIP loan. Therefore, only some would benefit from the DIP while others could bear the burden of it. While they may have opted not to participate in the DIP financing for various reasons, the concurrence of the non participating Secured Creditors is some market indicator of the appropriateness of the terms of the DIP financing.

46 Lastly, I note that the DIP lenders have indicated that they would not provide a DIP facility if the charge was not approved. In all of these circumstances, I was prepared to approve the DIP facility and grant the DIP charge.

(e) Critical Suppliers

47 The LP Entities ask that they be authorized but not required to pay pre-filing amounts owing in arrears to certain suppliers if the supplier is critical to the business and ongoing operations of the LP Entities or the potential future benefit of the payments is considerable and of value to the LP Entities as a whole. Such payments could only be made with the consent of the proposed Monitor. At present, it is contemplated that such suppliers would consist of certain newspaper suppliers, newspaper distributors, logistic suppliers and the Amex Bank of Canada. The LP Entities do not seek a charge to secure payments to any of its critical suppliers.

48 Section 11.4 of the CCAA addresses critical suppliers. It states:

11.4(1) On application by a debtor company and on notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be af-

affected by the security or charge, the court may make an order declaring a person to be a critical supplier to the company if the court is satisfied that the person is a supplier of goods and services to the company and that the goods or services that are supplied are critical to the company's continued operation.

(2) If the court declares the person to be a critical supplier, the court may make an order requiring the person to supply any goods or services specified by the court to the company on any terms and conditions that are consistent with the supply relationship or that the court considers appropriate.

(3) If the court makes an order under subsection (2), the court shall, in the order, declare that all or part of the property of the company is subject to a security or charge in favour of the person declared to be a critical supplier, in an amount equal to the value of the goods or services supplied upon the terms of the order.

(4) The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.

49 Mr. Byers, who is counsel for the Monitor, submits that the court has always had discretion to authorize the payment of critical suppliers and that section 11.4 is not intended to address that issue. Rather, it is intended to respond to a post-filing situation where a debtor company wishes to compel a supplier to supply. In those circumstances, the court may declare a person to be a critical supplier and require the person to supply. If the court chooses to compel a person to supply, it must authorize a charge as security for the supplier. Mr. Barnes, who is counsel for the LP Entities, submits that section 11.4 is not so limited. Section 11.4 (1) gives the court general jurisdiction to declare a supplier to be a "critical supplier" where the supplier provides goods or services that are essential to the ongoing business of the debtor company. The permissive as opposed to mandatory language of section 11.4 (2) supports this interpretation.

50 Section 11.4 is not very clear. As a matter of principle, one would expect the purpose of section 11.4 to be twofold: (i) to codify the authority to permit suppliers who are critical to the continued operation of the company to be paid and (ii) to require the granting of a charge in circumstances where the court is compelling a person to supply. If no charge is proposed to be granted, there is no need to give notice to the secured creditors. I am not certain that the distinction between Mr. Byers and Mr. Barnes' interpretation is of any real significance for the purposes of this case. Either section 11.4(1) does not oust the court's inherent jurisdiction to make provision for the payment of critical suppliers where no charge is requested or it provides authority to the court to declare persons to be critical suppliers. Section 11.4(1) requires the person to be a supplier of goods and services that are critical to the companies' operation but does not impose any additional conditions or limitations.

51 The LP Entities do not seek a charge but ask that they be authorized but not required to make payments for the pre-filing provision of goods and services to certain third parties who are critical and integral to their businesses. This includes newsprint and ink suppliers. The LP Entities are dependent upon a continuous and uninterrupted supply of newsprint and ink and they have insufficient inventory on hand to meet their needs. It also includes newspaper distributors who are required to distribute the newspapers of the LP Entities; American Express whose corporate card programme and accounts are used by LP Entities employees for business related expenses; and royalty fees accrued and owing to content providers for the subscription-based online service provided by FPinfomart.ca, one of the businesses of the LP Entities. The LP Entities believe that it would be damaging to both their ongoing operations and their ability to restructure if they are unable to pay their critical suppliers. I am satisfied that the LP Entities may treat these parties and those described in Mr. Strike's affidavit as critical suppliers but none will be paid without the consent of the Monitor.

(f) Administration Charge and Financial Advisor Charge

52 The Applicants also seek a charge in the amount of \$3 million to secure the fees of the Monitor, its counsel, the LP Entities' counsel, the Special Committee's financial advisor and counsel to the Special Committee, the CRA and counsel to the CRA. These are professionals whose services are critical to the successful restructuring of the LP Entities' business. This charge is to rank in priority to all other security interests in the LP Entities' assets, with the exception of purchase money security interests and specific statutory encumbrances as provided for in the proposed order.[FN13] The LP Entities also request a \$10 million charge in favour of the Financial Advisor, RBC Dominion Securities Inc. The Financial Advisor is providing investment banking services to the LP Entities and is essential to the solicitation process. This charge would rank in third place, subsequent to the administration charge and the DIP charge.

53 In the past, an administration charge was granted pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of the court. Section 11.52 of the amended CCAA now provides statutory jurisdiction to grant an administration charge. Section 11.52 states:

On notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, the court may make an order declaring that all or part of the property of the debtor company is subject to a security or charge - in an amount that the court considers appropriate - in respect of the fees and expenses of

(a) the monitor, including the fees and expenses of any financial, legal or other experts engaged by the monitor in the performance of the monitor's duties;

(b) any financial, legal or other experts engaged by the company for the purpose of proceedings under this Act; and

(c) any financial, legal or other experts engaged by any other interested person if the court is satisfied that the security or charge is necessary for their effective participation in proceedings under this Act.

(2) The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.

54 I am satisfied that the issue of notice has been appropriately addressed by the LP Entities. As to whether the amounts are appropriate and whether the charges should extend to the proposed beneficiaries, the section does not contain any specific criteria for a court to consider in its assessment. It seems to me that factors that might be considered would include:

(a) the size and complexity of the businesses being restructured;

(b) the proposed role of the beneficiaries of the charge;

(c) whether there is an unwarranted duplication of roles;

(d) whether the quantum of the proposed charge appears to be fair and reasonable;

(e) the position of the secured creditors likely to be affected by the charge; and

(f) the position of the Monitor.

This is not an exhaustive list and no doubt other relevant factors will be developed in the jurisprudence.

55 There is no question that the restructuring of the LP Entities is large and highly complex and it is reasonable to expect extensive involvement by professional advisors. Each of the professionals whose fees are to be secured has played a critical role in the LP Entities restructuring activities to date and each will continue to be integral to the solicitation and restructuring process. Furthermore, there is no unwarranted duplication of roles. As to quantum of both proposed charges, I accept the Applicants' submissions that the business of the LP Entities and the tasks associated with their restructuring are of a magnitude and complexity that justify the amounts. I also take some comfort from the fact that the administrative agent for the LP Secured Lenders has agreed to them. In addition, the Monitor supports the charges requested. The quantum of the administration charge appears to be fair and reasonable. As to the quantum of the charge in favour of the Financial Advisor, it is more unusual as it involves an incentive payment but I note that the Monitor conducted its own due diligence and, as mentioned, is supportive of the request. The quantum reflects an appropriate incentive to secure a desirable alternative offer. Based on all of these factors, I concluded that the two charges should be approved.

(g) Directors and Officers

56 The Applicants also seek a directors and officers charge ("D & O charge") in the amount of \$35 million as security for their indemnification obligations for liabilities imposed upon the Applicants' directors and officers. The D & O charge will rank after the Financial Advisor charge and will rank *pari passu* with the MIP charge discussed subsequently. Section 11.51 of the CCAA addresses a D & O charge. I have already discussed section 11.51 in *Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re*[FN14] as it related to the request by the CMI Entities for a D & O charge. Firstly, the charge is essential to the successful restructuring of the LP Entities. The continued participation of the experienced Boards of Directors, management and employees of the LP Entities is critical to the restructuring. Retaining the current officers and directors will also avoid destabilization. Furthermore, a CCAA restructuring creates new risks and potential liabilities for the directors and officers. The amount of the charge appears to be appropriate in light of the obligations and liabilities that may be incurred by the directors and officers. The charge will not cover all of the directors' and officers' liabilities in a worse case scenario. While Canwest Global maintains D & O liability insurance, it has only been extended to February 28, 2009 and further extensions are unavailable. As of the date of the Initial Order, Canwest Global had been unable to obtain additional or replacement insurance coverage.

57 Understandably in my view, the directors have indicated that due to the potential for significant personal liability, they cannot continue their service and involvement in the restructuring absent a D & O charge. The charge also provides assurances to the employees of the LP Entities that obligations for accrued wages and termination and severance pay will be satisfied. All secured creditors have either been given notice or are unaffected by the D & O charge. Lastly, the Monitor supports the charge and I was satisfied that the charge should be granted as requested.

(h) Management Incentive Plan and Special Arrangements

58 The LP Entities have made amendments to employment agreements with 2 key employees and have developed certain Management Incentive Plans for 24 participants (collectively the "MIPs"). They seek a charge in the amount of \$3 million to secure these obligations. It would be subsequent to the D & O charge.

59 The CCAA is silent on charges in support of Key Employee Retention Plans ("KERPs") but they have been approved in numerous CCAA proceedings. Most recently, in *Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re*

[FN15], I approved the KERP requested on the basis of the factors enumerated in *Grant Forest Products Inc., Re* [FN16] and given that the Monitor had carefully reviewed the charge and was supportive of the request as were the Board of Directors, the Special Committee of the Board of Directors, the Human Resources Committee of Canwest Global and the Adhoc Committee of Noteholders.

60 The MIPs in this case are designed to facilitate and encourage the continued participation of certain senior executives and other key employees who are required to guide the LP Entities through a successful restructuring. The participants are critical to the successful restructuring of the LP Entities. They are experienced executives and have played critical roles in the restructuring initiatives to date. They are integral to the continued operation of the business during the restructuring and the successful completion of a plan of restructuring, reorganization, compromise or arrangement.

61 In addition, it is probable that they would consider other employment opportunities in the absence of a charge securing their payments. The departure of senior management would distract from and undermine the restructuring process that is underway and it would be extremely difficult to find replacements for these employees. The MIPs provide appropriate incentives for the participants to remain in their current positions and ensures that they are properly compensated for their assistance in the reorganization process.

62 In this case, the MIPs and the MIP charge have been approved in form and substance by the Board of Directors and the Special Committee of Canwest Global. The proposed Monitor has also expressed its support for the MIPs and the MIP charge in its pre-filing report. In my view, the charge should be granted as requested.

(i) *Confidential Information*

63 The LP Entities request that the court seal the confidential supplement which contains individually identifiable information and compensation information including sensitive salary information about the individuals who are covered by the MIPs. It also contains an unredacted copy of the Financial Advisor's agreement. I have discretion pursuant to Section 137(2) of the *Courts of Justice Act* [FN17] to order that any document filed in a civil proceeding be treated as confidential, sealed and not form part of the public record. That said, public access in an important tenet of our system of justice.

64 The threshold test for sealing orders is found in the Supreme Court of Canada decision of *Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)* [FN18]. In that case, Iacobucci J. stated that an order should only be granted when: (i) it is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to an important interest, including a commercial interest, in the context of litigation because reasonable alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and (ii) the salutary effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the right of civil litigants to a fair trial, outweigh its deleterious effects, including the effects on the right to free expression, which in this context includes the public interest in open and accessible court proceedings.

65 In *Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re* [FN19] I applied the *Sierra Club* test and approved a similar request by the Applicants for the sealing of a confidential supplement containing unredacted copies of KERPs for the employees of the CMI Entities. Here, with respect to the first branch of the *Sierra Club* test, the confidential supplement contains unredacted copies of the MIPs. Protecting the disclosure of sensitive personal and compensation information of this nature, the disclosure of which would cause harm to both the LP Entities and the MIP participants, is an important commercial interest that should be protected. The information would be of obvious strategic advantage to competitors. Moreover, there are legitimate personal privacy concerns in issue. The MIP participants have a reasonable expectation that their names and their salary information will be

kept confidential. With respect to the second branch of the *Sierra Club* test, keeping the information confidential will not have any deleterious effects. As in the *Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re* case, the aggregate amount of the MIP charge has been disclosed and the individual personal information adds nothing. The salutary effects of sealing the confidential supplement outweigh any conceivable deleterious effects. In the normal course, outside of the context of a CCAA proceeding, confidential personal and salary information would be kept confidential by an employer and would not find its way into the public domain. With respect to the undated Financial Advisor agreement, it contains commercially sensitive information the disclosure of which could be harmful to the solicitation process and the salutary effects of sealing it outweigh any deleterious effects. The confidential supplements should be sealed and not form part of the public record at least at this stage of the proceedings.

Conclusion

66 For all of these reasons, I was prepared to grant the order requested.

Application granted.

FN1 R.S.C. 1985, c. C. 36, as amended.

FN2 On October 30, 2009, substantially all of the assets and business of the National Post Company were transferred to the company now known as National Post Inc.

FN3 Subject to certain assumptions and qualifications.

FN4 Although not formally in evidence before the court, counsel for the LP Secured Lenders advised the court that currently \$382,889,000 in principal in Canadian dollars is outstanding along with \$458,042,000 in principal in American dollars.

FN5 2006 CarswellOnt 264 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).

FN6 2009 CarswellOnt 6184 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para. 29.

FN7 (1993), 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]).

FN8 1999 CarswellOnt 4673 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).

FN9 Ibid at para. 16.

FN10 (2002), 34 C.B.R. (4th) 157 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused (March 6, 2003) [2003 CarswellOnt 730 (S.C.C.)].

FN11 Ibid at para. 34.

FN12 Supra, note 7 at paras. 31-35.

FN13 This exception also applies to the other charges granted.

FN14 Supra note 7 at paras. 44-48.

2010 CarswellOnt 212, 2010 ONSC 222, 63 C.B.R. (5th) 115, 184 A.C.W.S. (3d) 684

FN15 Supra note 7.

FN16 [2009] O.J. No. 3344 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).

FN17 R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, as amended.

FN18 [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522 (S.C.C.).

FN19 Supra, note 7 at para. 52.

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TAB 8

2013 CarswellOnt 9796, 2013 ONSC 4756, 230 A.C.W.S. (3d) 355, 4 C.B.R. (6th) 47

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2013 CarswellOnt 9796, 2013 ONSC 4756, 230 A.C.W.S. (3d) 355, 4 C.B.R. (6th) 47

Comstock Canada Ltd., Re

In Bankruptcy and Insolvency

In the Matter of the Notice of Intention to Make a Proposal of Comstock Canada Ltd.

In the Matter of the Notice of Intention to Make a Proposal of CCL Realty Inc.

In the Matter of the Notice of Intention to Make a Proposal of CCL Equities Inc.

Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Morawetz J.

Heard: July 9, 2013

Judgment: July 9, 2013[FN*]

Docket: CV-13-10181-00CL, 32-1763935, 32-1763929, 32-1764011

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Counsel: A. MacFarlane, F. Lamie, A. McFarlane for Applicants, Comstock Canada Ltd., CCL Realty Inc., and CCL Equities Inc.

H. Chaiton for Bank of Montreal

R.B. Schwill for PricewaterhouseCoopers Inc.

B. Harrison for Board of Directors

K. Plunkett for TESC Inc.

J. Milton for Rio Tinto Alcan Inc.

Subject: Insolvency

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Arrangements — Miscellaneous

C Group brought motion for order continuing its restructuring proceedings under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA), and initial order in respect of C Group — C Group also sought declaration that, upon continuance under CCAA, Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act proposal provisions would have no further application,

and sought approval of cost reimbursement agreement — C Group also sought approval of commitment letter, granting of debtor-in-possession (DIP) lender's charge, corresponding priority in favour of bank, and discharge of interim receiver of CC Ltd. — Motion granted — Members of C Group satisfied statutory condition prescribed by s. 11.6(a) of CCAA — Continuation under CCAA was consistent with purposes of CCAA and jurisprudence — Each entity within C Group was company and debtor company as they were insolvent and each committed act of bankruptcy in filing respective notices of intention to make proposal — C Group met traditional test for insolvency — It was necessary and appropriate to grant relief to CC Ltd. under CCAA — Stay of proceeding was appropriate way to preserve status quo and enable C Group to pursue and implement rationalization of business — Request for authorization in initial order to pay obligations owing to suppliers critical to business and ongoing operations was allowed — Administration charge with requested priority ranking was warranted and necessary and was granted in amount of \$1 million — Granting of super-priority in respect of DIP financing was necessary and appropriate — DIP charge was to have priority over construction lien claims and trust claims — Granting director's charge to be subordinate to administration charge and DIP lender's charge was warranted and necessary — Interim receivership proceedings were terminated and interim receiver was discharged.

Cases considered by Morawetz J.:

Clothing for Modern Times Ltd., Re (2011), 2011 ONSC 7522, 2011 CarswellOnt 14402, 88 C.B.R. (5th) 329 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Comstock Canada Ltd., Re (2013), 2013 CarswellOnt 9713, 2013 ONSC 4700 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to

Hemosol Corp., Re (2007), 2007 CarswellOnt 6690, 34 B.L.R. (4th) 113, 36 C.B.R. (5th) 286 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Nortel Networks Corp., Re (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 4467, 55 C.B.R. (5th) 229 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance) (2002), 287 N.R. 203, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada*) 18 C.P.R. (4th) 1, 44 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 161, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada*) 211 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 223 F.T.R. 137 (note), 20 C.P.C. (5th) 1, 40 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, 2002 SCC 41, 2002 CarswellNat 822, 2002 CarswellNat 823, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada*) 93 C.R.R. (2d) 219, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522 (S.C.C.) — followed

Stelco Inc., Re (2004), 48 C.B.R. (4th) 299, 2004 CarswellOnt 1211 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Stelco Inc., Re (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 2936 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

Stelco Inc., Re (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 4084, 6 C.B.R. (5th) 316 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Stelco Inc., Re (2004), 338 N.R. 196 (note), 2004 CarswellOnt 5200, 2004 CarswellOnt 5201 (S.C.C.) — referred to

Ted Leroy Trucking Ltd., Re (2010), (sub nom. *Century Services Inc. v. Canada (A.G.)*) [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379, [2010] G.S.T.C. 186, 12 B.C.L.R. (5th) 1, (sub nom. *Century Services Inc. v. A.G. of Canada*) 2011 G.T.C. 2006 (Eng.), (sub nom. *Century Services Inc. v. A.G. of Canada*) 2011 D.T.C. 5006 (Eng.), (sub

2013 CarswellOnt 9796, 2013 ONSC 4756, 230 A.C.W.S. (3d) 355, 4 C.B.R. (6th) 47

nom. *Leroy (Ted) Trucking Ltd., Re* 503 W.A.C. 1, (sub nom. *Leroy (Ted) Trucking Ltd., Re*) 296 B.C.A.C. 1, 2010 SCC 60, 2010 CarswellBC 3419, 2010 CarswellBC 3420, 409 N.R. 201, (sub nom. *Ted LeRoy Trucking Ltd., Re*) 326 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 72 C.B.R. (5th) 170, [2011] 2 W.W.R. 383 (S.C.C.) — referred to

Timminco Ltd., Re (2012), 2012 ONSC 106, 2012 CarswellOnt 1059, 89 C.B.R. (5th) 127 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3

Generally — referred to

Pt. III — referred to

s. 2 — referred to

s. 50.4(1) [en. 1992, c. 27, s. 19] — considered

Business Corporations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. B.16

Generally — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

s. 2 "company" — referred to

s. 10(1) — considered

s. 11.2 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.2(4) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

s. 11.6(a) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.51 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

s. 11.52(1) [en. 2007, c. 36, s. 66] — considered

Construction Lien Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.30

Generally — referred to

Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43

s. 137(2) — considered

Pension Benefits Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.8

s. 57(3) — considered

Words and phrases considered:

debtor company

I am satisfied the record establishes that each entity within the . . . Group is a "company" within the meaning of the CCAA [*Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36], and that each entity of the . . . Group is a debtor company within the meaning of the definition of "debtor company" as they are each insolvent and have each committed an act of bankruptcy in filing their respective NOIs [Notices of Intention to Make a Proposal].

MOTION by group of companies for order continuing its restructuring proceedings, and related relief.

Morawetz J.:

1 This motion was brought by Comstock Canada Ltd. ("Comstock"), CCL Realty Inc. ("CCL Realty") and CCL Equities Inc. ("CCL Equities", and together with Comstock and CCL Realty, the "Comstock Group") for an order, *inter alia*:

- (a) continuing Comstock Group's restructuring proceedings under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 ("CCAA"), effective as of July 9, 2013;
- (b) granting an initial order (the "Initial Order") under the CCAA in respect of the Comstock Group;
- (c) declaring that, upon the continuance under the CCAA, the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 ("BIA") proposal provisions shall have no further application;
- (d) approving the cost reimbursement agreement entered into by Comstock and Rio Tinto Alcan Inc. ("Rio Tinto");
- (e) approving the Commitment Letter (defined below) and the granting of the DIP Lender's Charge (defined below) and corresponding priority in favour of Bank of Montreal ("BMO"); and
- (f) discharging PricewaterhouseCoopers Inc. ("PwC") in its capacity as interim receiver (in such capacity, the "Interim Receiver") of Comstock.

2 At the conclusion of argument, the motion was granted, with reasons to follow. These are those reasons.

Background

3 Established in 1904, Comstock is one of Canada's largest multi-disciplined contractors, currently employing over 1,000 unionized and non-unionized tradespeople and 80 salaried employees across Canada. For over 100 years, Comstock has provided a broad capability in the completion of large-scale electrical and mechanical contracts to the planning, directing and execution of multi-trade, multi-million dollar commercial, industrial, institutional, automotive, nuclear, oil and gas, overhead and underground, and structural steel assignments. Recent projects include work for Enbridge Pipelines Incorporated, Shell Canada Limited, Petro Canada, Imperial Oil,

Ontario Power Generation, Bruce Nuclear Power, Ford Motor Company, Chrysler Canada Inc., Winnipeg Airport Authority Inc. and Cadillac Fairview Corporation. In 2012, Comstock provided services to 130 customers and had several recurring customers.

4 Comstock experienced financial challenges necessitating a restructuring of the company. While Comstock continues to enjoy a strong market reputation, Comstock's business has experienced liquidity challenges, cost overruns and litigation costs that have imperilled the Comstock Group's business.

5 Comstock's counsel submits that any serious disruption to Comstock's ability to provide core services would imperil the viability of various projects and have negative effects cascading throughout the trades, sub-trades and local economies of these projects. As a result, Comstock's senior management believes that it is imperative to restructure the Comstock Group as soon as reasonably possible with a focus on avoiding disruption to Comstock's operations.

6 The Comstock Group seeks the Initial Order, at this time, to protect its business and preserve its value while it seeks to complete its restructuring.

7 Comstock is a privately-held corporation incorporated pursuant to the *Business Corporations Act (Ontario)*, R.S.O. 1990, c. B.16 ("OBCA"), with headquarters located in Burlington, Ontario and a western office located in Edmonton, Alberta. Comstock maintains additional regional facilities in Ontario, Manitoba, Alberta and British Columbia.

8 Comstock and CCL Realty, a real estate holding company which holds all of the Comstock Group's real property, are the direct and wholly-owned subsidiaries of CCL Equities — a holding company incorporated pursuant to the OBCA with headquarters located in Burlington, Ontario.

9 In 2011, a management buyout was executed in respect of Comstock. Prior to this time, Comstock was a wholly-owned subsidiary of a U.S. publicly-traded company.

Comstock Debt and Lender Security

10 Pursuant to a credit agreement dated July 29, 2011 (the "Credit Agreement") among Comstock, as borrower, CCL Equities Inc., CCL Realty Inc., 3072454 Nova Scotia Company, as guarantors (collectively, the "Guarantors") and BMO, as lender, BMO made available to Comstock a credit facility up to a maximum aggregate amount of \$29,200,000 (the "Credit Facility" or the "Loan").

11 Comstock's indebtedness under the Credit Agreement is secured by a general security agreement in favour of BMO; an assignment of insurance policies of Comstock and the Guarantors; an assignment, postponement, and subordination of shareholder loans; guarantees from each of the Guarantors; and mortgages over all of the real property owned by Comstock and CCL Realty (collectively, the "Lender's Security").

12 A number of entities, including CBSC Capital Inc., Transportation Lease Systems Inc., ATCO Structures and Logistics Ltd., Leavitt Machinery General Partnership, Altruck International Truck Centres, Integrated Distribution Systems LP o/a Wajax Equipment, RCAP Leasing Inc., Horizon North Camp & Catering Inc., also have registered a security interest in respect of certain of Comstock's equipment and vehicles.

13 According to Comstock's trade accounts payable records, Comstock owed approximately \$47 million of unsecured trade debt to approximately 830 vendors as of June 27, 2013.

14 As of July 9, 2013, Comstock is not in arrears in respect of payroll. Payroll obligations of the previous week had been funded through an Interim Receiver's Borrowing Charge, which was subject of an endorsement reported at *Comstock Canada Ltd., Re*, 2013 ONSC 4700 (Ont. S.C.J.).

15 Comstock had payroll of \$1.5 million due on Thursday, July 11, 2013, pertaining to the contracted project in Kitimat, British Columbia. The mechanics enabling this payroll to be met were authorized by the Initial Order.

Comstock's Financial Position

16 Copies of the consolidated and unaudited balance sheet and income statement of the Comstock Group as at December 31, 2012, and all other audited and unaudited financial statements prepared in the year prior to 2013 (collectively, the "Financial Statements"), are attached to the confidential supplement (the "Confidential Supplement") to the Report of PwC in its capacity as proposal trustee and prospective CCAA monitor of the Comstock Group.

17 As at December 31, 2012, the Comstock Group had assets with book value of approximately \$112 million, with corresponding liabilities of \$103.4 million.

18 Comstock has initiated several ongoing litigation claims against various entities, with a total claim face amount in excess of \$120 million. Comstock has been named as defendant in litigation claims, with a face amount in excess of \$110 million.

19 The Comstock Group previously enjoyed financial prosperity due to sustained contracts throughout Canada in respect of various significant engagements. However, counsel advises that Comstock's recent declining economic fortunes have resulted in increasingly severe financial losses, liquidity challenges, cost overruns and litigation costs imperilling the Comstock Group's business.

20 On June 27, 2013, counsel advises that Chrysler Canada locked out Comstock from the performance of its contract at facilities in Ontario and, on July 2, 2013, threatened to terminate all existing contracts and purchase orders with Comstock. On July 3, 2013, Chrysler Canada issued a formal notice of contract termination to Comstock.

21 On July 5, 2013, Travellers Insurance Company of Canada provided Comstock with notices of termination, to be effective in 30 days, in respect of certain contracts.

22 During the week of July 1, 2013, TLS Fleet Management notified Comstock that no further purchases would be authorized in respect of vehicle leases, service and maintenance, and management fees, unless Comstock paid outstanding amounts and provided a security deposit.

23 Certain entities have registered lien claims against Comstock in respect of labour and material allegedly supplied in relation to Enbridge Pipelines (Athabasca) Inc. in Calgary.

Restructuring and Refinancing Efforts

24 In February 2013, the Comstock Group engaged Deloitte & Touche Corporate Finance Canada Inc. ("Deloitte") to conduct a market solicitation process with a view to attracting equity investors and/or purchasers of Comstock. Under this market solicitation process, the Comstock Group did not receive any letters of inten-

tion.

25 Comstock's Counsel advised that the Comstock Group's management believes that, in view of cost overruns and the Comstock Group's liabilities, a number of potential purchasers would not submit letters of intention absent the protections afforded by a restructuring vehicle such as the CCAA or BIA.

Filing of Notices of Intention to Make a Proposal

26 Comstock's counsel advised that in response to Chrysler Canada's lockout and, as a result of unsuccessful negotiations with a potential bridge financier, Comstock's Board of Directors determined that the Comstock Group had no other readily available options but to file Notices of Intention to Make a Proposal (the "NOI") pursuant to section 50.4(1) of the BIA on June 28, 2013 (the "NOI Proceedings") in order to preserve the *status quo* and prepare for a CCAA restructuring.

27 On July 3, 2013, I issued an order appointing PwC as Interim Receiver for the limited and specific purpose of ensuring Comstock's payroll was funded by July 4, 2013 and granting the Interim Receiver a priority charge, including in priority to construction lien and trust claimants, pursuant to the Interim Receiver's Borrowing Charge under the order.

Anticipated Restructuring

28 Comstock anticipates conducting a sales and investor solicitation process (the "SISP") to be administered by the monitor. Comstock and the monitor have advised that they will report back to court once the SISP has been fully developed.

29 In order to avoid disruption to the ongoing operations of one of Comstock's major customers, Rio Tinto, and to minimize enhanced safety risks that would be incurred in the event of such a disruption, Rio Tinto agreed to a cost reimbursement agreement with Comstock in order to ensure that the project continues in an uninterrupted manner. In addition, Rio Tinto and BMO agreed to a cost sharing mechanic which would see Rio Tinto cover portions of the costs for overhead, infrastructure and administrative costs from which they believe they will benefit in relation to the Rio Tinto contracts and their related projects. The material terms of the cost reimbursement agreement are set out at paragraph 61 of Jeffrey Birkbeck's affidavit.

30 The Comstock Group has secured a commitment for Debtor-In-Possession ("DIP") financing ("DIP Financing") from BMO (in such capacity, the "DIP Lender") in the amount of \$7,800,000 under the terms of a DIP Commitment Letter dated July 9, 2013 (the "DIP Loan"), pursuant to which the DIP Financing will provide the Comstock Group with sufficient liquidity to implement its initial restructuring initiatives pursuant to the CCAA and to continue with its core profitable projects during its restructuring.

31 The DIP Financing conditions include a priority charge in favour of BMO in its capacity as DIP Lender, in priority to all other charges save and except the administration charge, and in priority to all present construction lien and trust claims, save and except in relation to those construction liens and trust claims arising in respect of the specific contracts and projects to which the DIP Loan is advanced following the date of such contract-specific and project-specific advances.

32 The proposed DIP Financing contemplates that the DIP Lender will be granted a court-ordered priority charge (the "DIP Lender's Charge"), which is intended to rank in priority to all other charges save and except the

administrative charge and will not apply to any holdbacks owing in respect of the Rio Tinto Kitimat, British Columbia project.

33 Comstock's counsel advises that the DIP Financing is essential to the Comstock Group's restructuring and the maintenance of a substantial portion of the Comstock Group's large-scale construction project.

34 The Comstock Group's counsel submits that the Comstock Group will not be able to obtain alternative financing and maintain its operations without DIP Financing and, as such, submits that court approval of the DIP Financing, including the DIP Credit Agreement and the DIP Lender's Charge, is necessary and in the best interests of the Comstock Group and its stakeholders.

35 The 13-week cash flow forecast that was filed projects that, subject to obtaining DIP Financing, Comstock Group will have sufficient cash to fund its projected operating costs during this period. In the absence of the liquidity provided by the proposed DIP Financing, counsel submits that the Comstock Group would be unable to meet its obligations as they come due or continue as a going concern and, accordingly, is insolvent.

Continuation Under the CCAA

36 Continuations of BIA Part III proposal proceedings under the CCAA are governed by section 11.6(a) of the CCAA which provides:

11.6 Notwithstanding the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act,

(a) proceedings commenced under Part III of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act may be taken up and continued under this Act only if a proposal within the meaning of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act has not been filed under that Part.

37 Comstock, CCL Realty and CCL Equities have not filed a proposal under the BIA. I am satisfied that each member of the Comstock Group has satisfied the statutory condition prescribed by section 11.6(a) of the CCAA.

38 I am also satisfied that the evidence filed by the Comstock Group supports a finding that continuation under the CCAA to permit stabilization of Comstock's projects and to enable a going concern sale of Comstock's business and assets is consistent with the purposes of the CCAA. Counsel submits, and I accept, that such stability and continuation of contracts afforded by a continuation under the CCAA would set the conditions for maximizing recovery for the senior secured creditor, preserve employment for many of the 1,000 independent contractors, and maintain the local economies that are highly integrated into the projects which Comstock services. Further, avoidance of the social and economic losses which would result from the liquidation and the maximization of value would be best achieved outside of bankruptcy.

39 I am also satisfied that continuation under the CCAA is consistent with the jurisprudence on this issue. In arriving at this conclusion, I have considered the following cases: *Hemosol Corp., Re* (2007), 34 B.L.R. (4th) 113, 36 C.B.R. (5th) 286 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]); *Clothing for Modern Times Ltd., Re*, 2011 ONSC 7522 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]); *Ted Leroy Trucking Ltd., Re*, 2010 SCC 60 (S.C.C.); *Stelco Inc., Re* (2004), 6 C.B.R. (5th) 316 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]); and *Nortel Networks Corp., Re* (2009), 55 C.B.R. (5th) 229 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).

40 Comstock Group has also complied with section 10.2 of the CCAA insofar as the required cash flow statements have been filed.

41 I am satisfied the record establishes that each entity within the Comstock Group is a "company" within the meaning of the CCAA, and that each entity of the Comstock Group is a debtor company within the meaning of the definition of "debtor company" as they are each insolvent and have each committed an act of bankruptcy in filing their respective NOIs.

42 I am also satisfied that the Comstock Group meets the traditional test for insolvency (BIA, section 2) and the expanded test for insolvency based on a looming liquidity condition (see *Stelco Inc., Re* (2004), 48 C.B.R. (4th) 299 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]); leave to appeal to C.A. refused, [2004] O.J. No. 1903 (Ont. C.A.); leave to appeal to SCC refused, [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 336 (S.C.C.) [*Stelco*]). In arriving at this conclusion in respect of the expanded test for insolvency, I have taken into account that there has been a decline in Comstock's financial performance due to cost overruns and litigation claims; Comstock Group has been unable to meet its covenants under the Credit Agreement and is in default under the Credit Facility; Comstock Group was not able to obtain additional or alternative financing outside of a court-ordered or statutory mandated process; there is no reasonable expectation that Comstock Group, in the near term, will be able to generate sufficient cash flow to support its existing debt obligations; and the cash flow forecast indicates that without additional funding, the Comstock Group will exhaust its available cash resources and will, thus, be unable to meet its obligations as they become due.

43 I am satisfied that it is both necessary and appropriate to grant relief to Comstock under the CCAA. A stay of proceedings is appropriate in order to preserve the *status quo* and enable the Comstock Group to pursue and implement a rationalization of its business.

44 The Comstock Group's counsel submits that certain suppliers to the Comstock Group are critical to its operations and that they must be paid in the ordinary course in order to avoid disruption to its operations during the CCAA proceedings. Failure to pay these suppliers would likely result in them discontinuing critical ongoing services, which could ultimately put customer, supplier or Comstock's own personnel at risk on the job site. Accordingly, Comstock seeks authorization in the Initial Order to pay obligations owing to its suppliers, regardless of whether such obligations arise before or after the commencement of the CCAA proceedings, if in the opinion of Comstock and with the consent of the monitor, the supplier is critical to the business and ongoing operations.

45 I am satisfied that this request is appropriate in the circumstances and it is to be included in the Initial Order.

Priority Charges

46 Comstock Group seeks approval of certain court-ordered charges over its assets relating to its administrative costs, interim financing and the indemnification of its sole director and officer. The Initial Order contemplates that the Administration Charge, the DIP Charge, and the Director's Charge will rank in priority to all other present and future security interests, trusts, liens, construction liens, trust claims, charges and encumbrances, claims of secured creditors, statutory or otherwise, in favour of any person.

47 The Administration Charge is contemplated to be in the amount of \$1 million. The authority to grant such a charge is contained in section 11.52 of the CCAA. The list of factors to consider in approving an administration charge include:

- (a) the size and complexity of the business being restructured;
- (b) the proposed role of the beneficiaries of the charge;
- (c) whether there is unwarranted duplication of roles;
- (d) whether the quantum of the proposed charge appears to be fair and reasonable;
- (e) the position of the secured creditors likely to be affected by the charge; and
- (f) the position of the monitor.

See *Timminco Ltd., Re*, 2012 ONSC 106 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).

48 Having reviewed the record and considered the foregoing, I am satisfied that the Administration Charge, with the requested priority ranking, is warranted and necessary and the same is granted in the amount of \$1 million.

49 Section 11.52(1) of the CCAA provides that the court may make such an order on notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security. Notification of this motion has not been provided to all secured creditors and, accordingly, this issue is to be revisited on the comeback hearing.

50 Comstock Group also seeks approval of the DIP Commitment Letter providing the DIP Loan of up to \$7,800,000 to be secured by a charge over the assets of the Comstock Group. The DIP Lender's Charge is to be subordinate in priority to the Administration Charge.

51 The authority to grant a DIP financing charge is contained in section 11.2 of the CCAA. The factors to be considered are set out in section 11.2(4) the CCAA.

52 Counsel submits that the following factors support the granting of the DIP Lender's Charge, many of which incorporate the considerations enumerated in section 11.2(4):

- (a) the cash flow forecast indicates Comstock will require additional borrowing;
- (b) Comstock cannot obtain alternative new financing without new liquidity and a reduction of its significant indebtedness;
- (c) the proposed DIP Lenders have indicated that they will not provide the DIP Loan if the DIP Lender's Charge is not approved;
- (d) the DIP Loan is essential to the initiation of the restructuring;
- (e) the Comstock business is intended to continue to operate on a going concern basis during the CCAA proceedings under the direction of management with the assistance of advisors and the monitor;
- (f) the DIP Credit Agreement and the DIP Lender's Charge are necessary and in the best interests of the Comstock Group and its stakeholders; and
- (g) the proposed monitor is supportive of the DIP Loan and the DIP Lender's Charge.

53 I am satisfied, having considered the foregoing factors, that the granting of a super-priority for DIP Financing is both necessary and appropriate in these circumstances.

54 It is also necessary to consider the specific request for the creation of a super-priority in respect of a DIP Charge over construction lien claimants and various trust claimants. This issue was addressed at paragraphs 120-138 of the Comstock factum which reads:

120. Granting the Initial Order substantially in the form sought is consistent with the purpose of the CCAA, the leading jurisprudence with respect to priority, and is fair and reasonable to all affected parties under these exigent and urgent circumstances. Over 1,000 jobs are at stake, the progress of major infrastructure projects with national importance is in the balance, the safety of workers is in jeopardy, and the relevant local economies are relying upon the proper application of the CCAA's overriding purpose to effect a constructive solution in order to achieve a position way forward for all stakeholders.

121. In the event the DIP Charge, and the proposed priority thereof, is not authorized by this Honourable Court in the urgent and precarious circumstances confronting the Comstock Group and its stakeholders, the overriding purpose of the CCAA would be frustrated. The CCAA must always be read in light of the CCAA's overriding purpose — the provision of a constructive solution for all stakeholders and the avoidance of the devastating effects of bankruptcy or creditor initiated termination of business operations.

122. In the recent Supreme Court decision *Sun Indalex Finance, LLC v. United Steelworkers*, Chief Justice McLachlin addressed the overarching purpose of the CCAA as being the provision of a constructive solution for all stakeholders and the avoidance of the devastating effects of bankruptcy or creditor initiated termination of business operations:

[I]t is important to remember that the purpose of CCAA proceedings is not to disadvantage creditors but rather to try to provide a constructive solution for all stakeholders when a company has become insolvent. As my colleague, Deschamps J. observed in *Century Services*, at para. 15:

...the purpose of the CCAA... is to permit the debtor to continue to carry on business and, where possible, avoid the social and economic costs of liquidating its assets.

In the same decision, at para. 59, Deschamps J. also quoted with approval the following passage from the reasons of Doherty J.A. in *Elan Corp. v. Comiskey* (1990), 41 O.A.C. 282, at para. 57 (dissenting):

The legislation is remedial in the sense in that it provides a means whereby the devastating social and economic effects of bankruptcy or creditor initiated termination of ongoing business operations can be avoided while a court-supervised attempt to reorganize the financial affairs of the debtor company is made.

[Emphasis added]

Sun Indalex Finance, LLC v. United Steelworkers ("*Indalex*") 2013 SCC 7 at para. 205.

123. Parliament has granted the Court powers under the CCAA to preserve the *status quo* in order to enable a company to restructure its affairs and to permit time for a plan of compromise to be prepared, filed, and considered by creditors. Section 11.2 of the CCAA establishes the provision of a super priority for DIP financing as a mechanism for accomplishing this goal.

124. The Ontario Legislature has created a statutory trust as a mechanism for accomplishing purpose of the *Construction Lien Act* (the "CLA"). In *Baltimore Aircoil of Canada Inc. v. ESD Industries Inc.*, Justice Wilkins summarized the purpose and intent of the trust provisions of the CLA:

[31] The Construction Lien Act is a specific piece of legislation designed to remedy and rectify problems in the construction industry in Ontario. Section 8 creates trusts in respect of moneys in the hands of described persons under subsections 8(1)(a) and (b).

...

[36] The purpose and intent of the trust provisions of the Act is to impose the provisions of a trust on money owing or received, on account of a contract or sub-contract, which is for the benefit of the sub-contractors or other tradespeople who supplied services and materials to a job site. The legislation is clearly remedial in its effect. The legislation is clearly intended to rectify a circumstance in which persons who provide material and services to a job site, might find that money which was due to them in payment, has been used for other purposes.

Baltimore Aircoil of Canada Inc. v. ESD Industries Inc. 2002 CanLII 49492 (ONSC) at paras. 31, 36.

125. The Supreme Court of Canada's 2013 decision in *Indalex* is instructive when the Court is faced with a request for the creation of a super priority in respect of a DIP charge in favour of a DIP lender over a deemed trust.

126. In *Indalex*, the Supreme Court dealt with whether the priority established under s. 11.2 of the CCAA had priority over a deemed trust established provincially under s. 57(3) of the *Pension Benefits Act* RSO 1990, c. P-8. The Court unanimously agreed with the reasons of Deschamps J., who reasoned that:

"[58] In the instant case, the CCAA judge, in authorizing the DIP charge.... did consider factors that were relevant to the remedial objective of the CCAA and found that Indalex had in fact demonstrated that the CCAA's purpose would be frustrated without the DIP charge. It will be helpful to quote the reasons he gave on April 17, 2009 in authorizing the DIP charge ((2009), 52 C.B.R. (5th) 61):

(a) the Applicants are in need of the additional financing in order to support operations during the period of a going concern restructuring;

(b) there is a benefit to the breathing space that would be afforded by the DIP Financing that will permit the Applicants to identify a going concern solution;

(c) there is no other alternative available to the Applicants for a going concern solution;

...

(f) the benefit to stakeholders and creditors of the DIP Financing outweighs any potential prejudice to unsecured creditors that may arise as a result of the granting of super-priority secured financing against the assets of the Applicants;

...

(h) the balancing of the prejudice weighs in favour of the approval of the DIP Financing.

[59] Given that there was no alternative for a going-concern solution, it is difficult to accept the Court of Appeal's sweeping intimation that the DIP lenders would have accepted that their claim ranked below claims resulting from the deemed trust. There is no evidence in the record that gives credence to this suggestion. Not only is it contradicted by the CCAA judge's findings of fact, but case after case has shown that "the priming of the DIP facility is a key aspect of the debtor's ability to attempt a workout" (J. P. Sarra, *Rescue! The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (2007), at p. 97). The harsh reality is that lending is governed by the commercial imperatives of the lenders, not by the interests of the plan members or the policy considerations that lead provincial governments to legislate in favour of pension fund beneficiaries. The reasons given by Morawetz J. in response to the first attempt of the Executive Plan's members to reserve the rights on June 12, 2009, are instructive. He indicated that any uncertainty as to whether the lenders would withhold advances or whether they would have priority if advances were made did "not represent a positive development". He found that, in the absence of any alternative, the relief sought was "necessary and appropriate". 2009 CanLII 37906 (ON SC), (2009 CanLII 37906, at paras. 7 and 8).

[60] In this case, compliance with the provincial law necessarily entails defiance of the order made under federal law. On the one hand, s. 30(7) of the PPSA required a part of the proceeds from the sale related to assets described in the provincial statute to be paid to the plan's administrator before other secured creditors were paid. On the other hand, the Amended Initial Order provided that the DIP charge ranked in priority to "all other security interests, trusts, liens, charges and encumbrances, statutory or otherwise" (para. 45). Granting priority to the DIP lenders subordinates the claims of other stakeholders, including the Plan Members. This court-ordered priority based on the CCAA has the same effect as a statutory priority. The federal and provincial laws are inconsistent, as they give rise to different, and conflicting, orders of priority. As a result of the application of the doctrine of federal paramountcy, the DIP charge supersedes the deemed trust.

Indalex, at paras. 58-60, concurred with by McLachlin, C.J. at para. 242 and Lebel J. at para. 265.

127. The Supreme Court's approach in *Indalex* is both the correct resolution of the priority issue on the grounds of paramountcy in circumstances where, but for the granting of priority over a statutory deemed trust in favour of the DIP lender, the DIP financing would not be advanced and the distressed company and its stakeholders would see the immediate halt to the restructuring. It is also the practical approach and manifestation of the CCAA's overriding purpose placed into reality.

128. The current case before the Court is analogous to *Indalex* in many respects:

- (a) Comstock is in need of the additional financing in order to support operations during the period of a going concern restructuring;
- (b) No creditor will advance funds to Comstock without the priming of the DIP facility;
- (c) there is a benefit to the breathing space that would be afforded by the DIP facility that will permit Comstock to identify a going concern solution;
- (d) there is no other alternative available to Comstock for a going concern solution;

(e) the benefit to stakeholders and creditors of the DIP facility outweighs any potential prejudice to unsecured creditors, secured creditors, and potential trust beneficiaries that may arise as a result of the granting of super-priority secured financing against the assets of the Comstock Group;

(f) the balancing of the prejudice weighs in favour of the approval of the DIP Financing;

(g) a deemed trust arises as a result of a provincial statute; and

(h) the federal and provincial laws are inconsistent as they give rise to different, and conflicting, priority.

129. The failure to continue Comstock as a going concern will result in substantial costs to all parties contracting with Comstock. The transition alone will require parties to, *inter alia*: (a) re-bid on proposals; (b) negotiate new union agreements; (c) endure significant business interruption and resumption costs; (d) risk the viability of projects; (e) significantly disrupt local economies and those connected to them; and (f) place the safety at workers at risk.

130. This case is also similar to *Indalex*, as there has not been the opportunity to provide notice to all affected parties. Comstock proposes that substituted service is a reasonable solution to the problem of providing notice in time-constrained circumstances.

131. In *Royal Oaks Mines Inc. Re*, Justice Blair, as he then was, cautioned against the priming of DIP financing where there had not been notice to affected parties. However, Justice Blair allowed that a super priority could be granted as a means to effect "what is reasonably necessary to meet the debtor company's urgent needs over the sorting-out period".

Royal Oak Mines Inc., Re 1999 CanLII 14840 at para. 24.

132. In urgent CCAA filings where time compression and logistical constraints result in the limited or non-notification of certain secured creditors on the initial CCAA application, the desire to balance a distressed company's requirement to obtain vital and time-sensitive financing with the protection of other creditors' rights is put to the test. The customary comeback provisions in the Initial order is an appropriate protection afforded to such secured creditors in circumstances where delay of Court intervention would result in the imminent (or in the case of Comstock, immediate) expiry of the company's enterprise.

133. In such circumstances, it is open to secured creditors to seek to review such Court ordering of priorities and parties enjoying such priority in view of their advancement of funds pursuant to such Court-ordered charges may have to ensure such a review and further justify the continued operation of such priority later in the restructuring proceeding. This is a fair and practical result in urgent circumstances. Credit and priority should be given, at least initially, in such exigent circumstances to the "man in the arena" in the commercial conception of the Rooseveltian ethos — the DIP lender who advances funds in the face of limited notice to interested parties with a view to preventing the otherwise certain peril of a company in distress.

134. The inherent tension that arises between the prescribed notice requirements and the rush to the Court house steps in pan-Canadian CCAA applications is further ameliorated in situations where the secured creditors not receiving notice would not likely be affected when considered against the backdrop of the practical realities of restructuring scenarios and the alternatives to permitting the priming charge in favour of a DIP

lender. In the current proceeding, the entities who have registered security interests in the Comstock Group appear to be equipment and vehicle lessors. In a shut-down scenario, their interests would be not likely be [sic] affected differently given that the receivables in such a case would not likely be collected to satisfy such interests.

135. Given the existent circumstances confronting Comstock and its stakeholders, and the large number of affected parties, it is necessary that the DIP loan be given the priority sought in order to allow Comstock to meet its urgent needs during the sorting out period.

136. The Proposal Trustee is of the view that the anticipated DIP Facility represents the only alternative available to the Comstock Group to ensure the continuation of operations. Furthermore, the Proposal Trustee is of the view that the costs associated with the DIP Facility, interest expense, permitted fees and expenses, and facility fees are commercially reasonable.

137. The Proposal Trustee is supportive of the Comstock Group's efforts to obtain the DIP financing so as to avoid liquidation and provide time to attempt to implement a restructuring and going concern sale. Without access to financing under the DIP Facility, the Comstock Group will face an immediate liquidity crisis and would have to cease operations.

138. The purpose of the CCAA, the application of paramountcy in relation to the taking of priority of DIP facilities over provincial deemed trusts, and the commercial realities of this case all militate in favour of the proposed priority of the DIP Loan as set out in the proposal Initial Order.

55 This reasoning is applicable in this case and supports the conclusion that the DIP Charge is to have priority over construction lien claims and various trust claims. I accept the statements made at paragraph 128 of counsel's factum set out above. In my view, the Comstock Group is unlikely to survive without DIP Financing supported by the super priority DIP Charge, which is granted.

56 Comstock Group also seeks a charge in the amount of \$4.6 million over the assets of the Applicants (the "Director's Charge") to indemnify the sole director of the Comstock Group in respect of liabilities he may incur in his capacity as a director and officer of the Comstock Group. The Director's Charge is to be subordinate to the Administration Charge and the DIP Lender's Charge.

57 The authority to grant such a charge is set out in section 11.51 of the CCAA.

58 I am satisfied that granting the Director's Charge, with the requested priority ranking, is warranted and necessary in the circumstances and is granted in the amount of \$4.6 million. Again, I note that section 11.51 requires notice to secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge. Not all secured creditors have been notified and, accordingly, this issue is to be revisited at the comeback hearing.

Substituted Service

59 Counsel advises that, in view of the extensive number of potentially interested parties, including contractors, subcontractors and tradespeople, the Comstock Group is of the view that notice of the effect of the proposed DIP Charge on one occasion in the *The Globe and Mail* (National Edition) and the *Daily Commercial News*, Ontario's only daily construction news newspaper, in a court-approved form, is reasonably likely to bring this application to the attention of contractors and subcontractors that may be affected. I accept this argument

and authorize substituted service in the suggested manner.

Sealing of Documents

60 Comstock's counsel requested that the Confidential Supplement be sealed in order to protect against the disclosure of sensitive and confidential financial information to third parties, the disclosure of which, it is submitted, could adversely affect the Comstock Group and its stakeholders. The "Confidential Supplement — Financial Statements" is documented as Exhibit J to the affidavit of Mr. Birkbeck sworn on July 9, 2013; paragraph 26 of the Birkbeck Affidavit refers to Financial Statements that will be provided to the court at the return of the motion, and paragraph 43 of the Birkbeck Affidavit requests that Confidential Exhibit "J" be sealed from the public record in its entirety.

61 In my view, having considered section 137(2) of the *Courts of Justice Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. C-43 and the governing jurisprudence in *Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)*, 2002 SCC 41 (S.C.C.) [*Sierra Club*], I am satisfied that the sealing order should be granted and the confidential material is to be sealed.

Discharge of the Interim Receiver

62 On July 4, 2013, Comstock required \$1.5 million in order to meet its payroll and independent contractor obligations. On July 3, 2013, Comstock brought a motion seeking an order authorizing BMO to make an immediate advance on a priority basis in order to permit Comstock to fund its payroll and independent contractor obligations. The motion was granted and on July 3, 2013, an order was issued appointing PwC as Interim Receiver for the limited and specific purpose of ensuring Comstock's payroll was funded by July 4, 2013 and granting the Interim Receiver a priority charge, including in priority to construction lien and trust claimants, pursuant to the Interim Receiver's Borrowing Charge under the order.

63 The Interim Receiver has now discharged its duties in connection with its limited purpose appointment and I am satisfied that it is appropriate and reasonable for the interim receivership proceedings to be terminated and to discharge the Interim Receiver. In making this order, I recognize that the contemplated DIP financing will be used, in part, to repay the Interim Receiver's borrowings to BMO, leaving no further purpose for the interim receivership proceedings. The fees and disbursements of the Interim Receiver and its counsel can roll over in to the Administration Charge and be approved as part of the monitor's fee approvals inside the CCAA proceedings.

Disposition

64 In the result, the motion is granted. Two orders have been signed; namely, the Initial Order under the CCAA, which recognizes a continuation of the restructuring proceedings under the CCAA, and an order discharging PwC in its capacity as Interim Receiver of Comstock.

65 A comeback hearing, as provided for in paragraph 61 of the Initial Order, is scheduled for Friday, July 19, 2013.

Motion granted.

FN* A corrigendum issued by the court on July 23, 2013 has been incorporated herein.

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**ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
(COMMERCIAL LIST)**

Proceedings commenced at TORONTO

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