

**THE QUEEN'S BENCH
WINNIPEG CENTRE**

IN THE MATTER OF: THE APPOINTMENT OF A RECEIVER PURSUANT
TO SECTION 243 OF THE *BANKRUPTCY AND*
INSOLVENCY ACT R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, AS AMENDED

B E T W E E N:

CAMERON STEPHENS FINANCIAL CORPORATION,

Applicant,

- and -

5448124 MANITOBA LTD.,

Respondent.

**MOTION BRIEF OF THE RECEIVER
(APPROVAL OF SALE PROCESS)
DATE OF HEARING: TUESDAY, MAY 7, 2019 AT 9:00 A.M.
DEWAR, J.**

TAYLOR McCaffrey LLP
Barristers and Solicitors
9th Floor - 400 St. Mary Avenue
Winnipeg, Manitoba
R3C 4K5

David R.M. Jackson (204 988-0375)
Fax – 204 957-0945
Client File No. 98665-1 DJAC

**THE QUEEN'S BENCH
WINNIPEG CENTRE**

BETWEEN:

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MOTION BRIEF OF THE RECEIVER

A. Authorities to be Relied Upon

1. Queen's Bench Rules 3.02(1), 14, 16.04(1), 16.08, 37.08(2) and 41.05.
2. *Corporations Act* CCSM c.C225 s. 95.
3. *Court of Queen's Bench Act*, CCSM c.C280 s. 77(1).
4. *Personal Property Security Act* CCSM c.P35 s. 64(7).
5. *Royal Bank v. Soundair* 1991 Carswell Ont. 205 (ONCA).
6. *Bank of Montreal v. Calgary West* 2001 ABQB 293.
7. *CCM Master Qualified Fund v. Blutip Power Technologies* 2012 ONSC 1750.
8. *Nortel Networks Corporation* 2009 CanLii 39492 (ONSC).
9. Such further and other authorities as counsel may advise and this Honourable Court may permit.

B. Documentary Evidence to be Relied Upon

1. The pleadings and proceedings herein.
2. The Amended and Re-Stated Receivership Order dated October 27, 2015 ("Receivership Order").

3. The Fourth Report of the Receiver dated April 13, 2017.
4. The Fifth Report of the Receiver dated March 29, 2018.
5. The Sixth Report of the Receiver to be filed.
6. Such further and other evidence as counsel may advise and this Honourable Court may permit.

C. Points in Issue

Service

1. Notwithstanding the ordinary requirements of service, the Court has the authority to abridge time requirements, validate defective service or even dispense with service where necessary in the interest of justice. The Receivership Order also contemplates parties on the Service List being served by e-mail. To the extent it may be necessary, service of the motion materials ought to be validated.

Queen's Bench Rules 3.02(1), 16.04(1), 16.08 and 37.08(2) (TAB 1)

Receivership Order, paras. 25-27

Approval of Sale Process

2. This Honourable Court has the jurisdiction to approve the sale process contemplated by the Receiver.

Receivership Order, para. 28

Corporations Act CCSM c.C225, s. 95 (TAB 2)

Personal Property Security Act CCSM c.P35, s. 64(7) (TAB 4)

Queen's Bench Rule 47.05 (TAB 1)

3. It is recognized that when a Receiver seeks the Court's approval for a proposed sale process it must be assessed in light of the factors identified in *Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.* 1991 Carswell Ont. 205 (Ont.C.A.)(TAB 5)

Bank of Montreal v. Calgary West 2001 ABQB 293 at paras. 33 and 34 (TAB 6)

CCM Master Qualified Fund v. Blutip Power Technologies 2012 ●NSC 1750 at para. 6 (TAB 7)

4. More specifically when reviewing the sale and marketing process proposed by the Receiver the Court should assess:

- a) The fairness, transparency and integrity of the process proposed;
- b) The commercial efficacy of the proposed process in light of the specific circumstances facing the Receiver;
- c) Whether the sale process will optimize the chances, in the particular circumstances of securing the best possible price for the assets for sale.

CCM Master Qualified. Supra, para. 6 (TAB 7)

5. The application of these principals in the present case demonstrates why this Court should approve the sale process as proposed in the Receiver's Sixth Report:

- a) *The process is fair and transparent*: the sale process includes an extensive marketing phase that will be coordinated by a recognized and experienced listing agent. Interest parties will have ample opportunity to participate in the process, which has been described in detail in the Sixth Report;
- b) *The process is commercially effective*: the sale process is designed to market, and solicit offers for, the Property. The involvement of the listing agent is a key component of the strategy;
- c) *The process will optimize the chances of achieving the best results*: the sale process will provide interested parties with a fair and transparent process by which they may make offers to purchase the Property. The duration of the process is sufficient to allow interested parties to submit offers and for the Receiver to identify any superior offer and thereby optimizing the prospects of achieving the best possible price.

6. Ultimately any Asset Purchase Agreement entered into as well as the distribution of sale proceeds will remain subject to further approval of the Court.

Sealing Order

7. This Honourable Court has the jurisdiction to order that a document filed in civil proceedings is confidential, to be sealed and not form a part of the public record.

Queen's Bench Act s. 77(1) (TAB 3)

8. Temporary Sealing Orders are frequently granted where premature disclosure of financial details or where there is sensitive price information would ultimately be prejudicial to the stakeholders and the integrity of the sale process.

Nortel Networks Corporation 2009 CanLii 39492 (ONSC) at para. 3 and 57 (TAB 8)

Other Matters

9. This Honourable Court has the jurisdiction to approve the conduct and activities of the Receiver from time to time including passing of its accounts and that of its legal counsel.

Receivership Order, para. 19 and 28

Queen's Bench Rule 41.05 (TAB 1)

Corporations Act s. 95 (TAB 2)

Personal Property Security Act s. 64(7) (TAB 4)

- a) Approval of Receiver's Reports

10. In accordance with a practice that has developed the stakeholders have had a reasonably opportunity to review and take issue with the activities set out in the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Reports of the Receiver including the Receiver's interim statements of receipt and disbursements for the period ending March 31, 2019 and

the activities described therein. Absent any significant objection, these reports should be approved by this Honourable Court.

b) Approval of Receiver's Annual Renewal of Borrowing Facilities

11. The previously approved Receiver's loan facilities with CSFC would have expired on December 31, 2016 and it was reasonable for the Receiver to negotiate the renewals as set out in the Second Loan Amending Agreement, Third Loan Amending Agreement and Fourth Loan Amending Agreement as detailed in the Receiver's reports.

c) Approval of Professional Fees

12. The stakeholders have had a reasonable opportunity to review and take issue with the Receiver's fees and disbursements, including that of its legal counsel, for the period ending March 31, 2017. Absent any significant objection the fees should be approved.

Conclusion

13. It is respectfully submitted that this Honourable Court ought to grant the proposed Order sought by the Receiver.

All of which is respectfully submitted.

May 1, 2019

TAYLOR McCAFFREY LLP
9th Floor – 400 St. Mary Avenue
Winnipeg, Manitoba
R3C 4K5

David R.M. Jackson
204-988-0375

TAB 1

General powers of court

3.02(1) The court may by order extend or abridge any time prescribed by these rules or an order, on such terms as are just.

RULE 14**COMMENCEMENT AND TRANSFER OF PROCEEDINGS****HOW PROCEEDINGS COMMENCED****By issuing originating process**

14.01(1) All civil proceedings shall be commenced by the issuing of an originating process by a registrar, except where a statute provides otherwise and as provided in subrule (2).

Exceptions

14.01(2) A counterclaim that is only against persons who are already parties to the main action, and a crossclaim, shall be commenced by the filing and serving of the pleading containing the counterclaim, or crossclaim, and the pleading need not be issued.

Where leave required

14.01(3) Where leave of the court is required to commence a proceeding, the leave shall be sought by preliminary motion.

Relying on subsequent fact

14.01(4) A party may rely on a fact that occurs after the commencement of a proceeding, even though the fact gives rise to a new claim or defence, and, if necessary, may move to amend an originating process or pleading to allege the fact.

PROCEEDINGS BY ACTION AS GENERAL RULE

14.02 Every proceeding shall be by action, except where a statute or these rules provide otherwise.

ACTIONS - BY STATEMENT OF CLAIM

14.03 The originating process for the commencement of an action is a Statement of Claim (Form 14A) except as provided by,

- (a) rule 70.03 (commencement of family proceedings);
- (b) rule 27.01 (counterclaim against person not already a party);
- (c) rule 29.01 (third party claim); and
- (d) rule 29.11 (fourth and subsequent party claims).

M.R. 151/2002

WHERE STATEMENT OF CLAIM TO BE FILED

14.04 A statement of claim may be issued and filed at any administrative or judicial centre except as otherwise provided by statute and subject to the transfer provisions of this Rule.

APPLICATIONS — BY NOTICE OF APPLICATION**Notice of application**

14.05(1) The originating process for the commencement of an application is a notice of application (Form 14B or such other form prescribed by these Rules).

Proceedings which may be commenced by application

14.05(2) A proceeding may be commenced by application,

- (a) where authorized by these rules;
- (b) where a statute authorizes an application, appeal or motion to the court and does not require the commencement of an action;
- (c) where the relief claimed is for,
 - (i) the opinion, advice or direction of the court on a question affecting the rights of a person in respect of the administration of the estate of a deceased person or the execution of a trust,
 - (ii) an order directing executors, administrators or trustees to do or abstain from doing any particular act in respect of an estate or trust for which they are responsible,
 - (iii) the removal or replacement of one or more executors, administrators or trustees, or the fixing of their compensation,
 - (iv) the determination of rights which depend upon the interpretation of a deed, will, agreement, contract or other instrument, or upon the interpretation of a statute, order in council, order, rule, regulation, by-law or resolution,
 - (v) the declaration of an interest in or charge on land, including the nature and extent of the interest or charge or the boundaries of the land, or the settling of the priority of interests or charges, or
 - (vi) the approval of an arrangement or compromise or the approval of a purchase, sale, mortgage, lease or variation of trust; or
- (d) in respect of any matter where it is unlikely there will be any material facts in dispute.

Injunction, declaration, receiver

14.05(3) Where the relief claimed in a proceeding includes an injunction, declaration or the appointment of a receiver, the proceedings shall be commenced by action; but the court may also grant such relief where it is ancillary to relief claimed in a proceeding properly commenced by application.

TITLE OF PROCEEDING**Originating process generally**

14.06(1) Every originating process shall contain a title of the proceeding setting out the names of all the parties and the capacity in which they are made parties, if other than in their personal capacity.

Actions generally

14.06(2) In an action other than by petition, the title of the proceeding shall name the party commencing the action as the plaintiff and the opposite party as the defendant.

Petitions

14.06(3) In an action by petition, the title of the proceeding shall name the party commencing the action as the petitioner and the opposite party as the respondent.

Applications

14.06(4) In an application, the title of the proceeding shall name the party commencing the application as the applicant and the opposite party, if any, as the respondent and the notice of application shall state the statutory provision or rule, if any, under which the application is made.

TIME FOR SERVICE IN ACTIONS

14.07 Where an action is commenced by a statement of claim, the statement of claim shall be served within six months after it is issued.

TRANSFER OF ACTIONS

Transfer by defendant

14.08(1) Where an action is commenced in a centre other than the judicial centre nearest the place,

- (a) where the cause of action, in whole or in part, arose;
- (b) where a defendant resided at the time the proceedings were commenced; or
- (c) where a defendant carried on business at the time the proceedings were commenced;

a defendant may, by requisition, require the registrar at the center in which the action was commenced to transfer the action to the judicial centre nearest one of the places referred to in clauses (a), (b) or (c).

Exception

14.08(2) Subrule (1) does not apply,

- (a) where the action has already been transferred to a judicial centre under subrules (1), (3) or (6); or
- (b) with respect to the transfer of actions between centres within the City of Winnipeg.

Transfer with consent

14.08(3) Any party may, by requisition, and with the written consent of all other parties, require the registrar to transfer an action to any judicial centre agreed to by the parties.

Content of requisition

14.08(4) The requisition under subrules (1) and (3) shall be in Form 4E and shall,

- (a) name the judicial centre to which the action is to be transferred;
- (b) if the requisition is pursuant to subrule (1), identify the clause under subrule (1) being relied upon and describe the location of the place in question; and
- (c) be filed in the centre where the court file is located.

Requisition

14.08(5) A requisition under subrule (1) shall be filed prior to the close of pleadings, and a copy thereof shall, upon filing, be served on all other parties.

Transfer ordered by court

14.08(6) Notwithstanding subrule (1), the court may on motion and at any time order that an action be transferred to any judicial centre which better serves the convenience of the parties.

Registrar to forward court file

14.08(7) Upon receipt of a requisition in compliance with subrules (1) or (3), or an order under subrule (6), the registrar shall forthwith forward the court file to the judicial centre named in the requisition or order.

Transfer upon filing motion

14.08(8) Where an action is pending in a centre which is not a judicial centre and the registrar has not received a requisition or order under subrules (1), (3) or (6), the registrar shall, upon the filing of a notice of motion, transfer the action to the judicial centre named in the notice of motion.

Filing after transfer

14.08(9) Subsequent to the transfer of an action under this rule, all documents shall be filed in the judicial centre to which the action has been transferred.

TRANSFER OF APPLICATIONS

14.09 Rule 14.08, excepting subrule (1) thereof, applies with necessary modification to the transfer of an application.

14.10 Repealed.

M.R. 146/90

DISCONTINUANCE OF ACTION WHERE DEFENDANT PAYS CLAIM

14.11 Where a plaintiff's claim is for a stated amount of money only and a defendant pays the amount of the claim and \$750 for costs to the plaintiff or to the plaintiff's lawyer within the time prescribed for filing a statement of defence, the plaintiff shall discontinue the claim against that defendant or that defendant may upon motion to the court have the action dismissed.

Where order may be made

16.04(1) Where it appears to the court that it is impractical for any reason to effect prompt service of an originating process or any other document required to be served personally or by an alternative to personal service the court may make an order for substituted service or, where necessary in the interest of justice, may dispense with service.

VALIDATING SERVICE

16.08(1) Where a document has been served in an unauthorized or irregular manner, the court may make an order validating the service where the court is satisfied that,

- (a) the document came to the notice of the person to be served; or
- (b) the document was served in such a manner that it would have come to the notice of the person to be served, except for the person's own attempts to evade service.

M.R. 11/2018

Exception

16.08(2) Subrule (1) does not apply when service must be made in accordance with the Hague Service Convention.

M.R. 11/2018

Immediate hearing where urgent, etc.

37.08(2) In a case of urgency or where otherwise appropriate, the judge or master may proceed to hear the motion.

DIRECTIONS

41.05 A receiver may obtain directions at any time on motion to a judge, unless there has been a reference of the conduct of the receivership, in which case the motion shall be made to the master who has conduct of the reference.

TAB 2

Directions given by court

95 Upon an application by a receiver or receiver-manager, whether appointed by a court or under an instrument, or upon an application by any interested person, a court may make any order it thinks fit including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing,

- (a) an order appointing, replacing or discharging a receiver or receiver-manager and approving his accounts;
- (b) an order determining the notice to be given to any person or dispensing with notice to any person;
- (c) an order fixing the remuneration of the receiver or receiver-manager;
- (d) an order requiring the receiver or receiver-manager, or a person by or on behalf of whom he is appointed, to make good any default in connection with the receiver's or receiver-manager's custody or management of the property and business of the corporation, or to relieve the person from any default on such terms as the court thinks fit, and to confirm any act of the receiver or receiver-manager;
- (e) an order giving directions on any matter relating to the duties of the receiver or receiver-manager.

TAB 3

Sealing confidential documents

77(1) The court may order that a document filed in a civil proceeding is confidential, is to be sealed and is not a part of the public record of the proceeding.

TAB 4

Powers of court respecting receiver

64(7) Upon application by an interested person, the court may do one or more of the following:

- (a) appoint a receiver;
- (b) remove, replace or discharge a receiver, whether appointed by the court or pursuant to a security agreement;
- (c) give directions on any matter relating to the duties of a receiver;
- (d) approve the accounts and fix the remuneration of a receiver;
- (e) notwithstanding anything contained in a security agreement or other document providing for the appointment of a receiver, make an order requiring a receiver or a person by or on behalf of whom the receiver is appointed to make good a default in connection with the receiver's custody, management or disposition of the collateral of the debtor or to relieve the receiver or person from any default on such terms as the court thinks fit;
- (f) exercise with respect to receivers appointed pursuant to a security agreement the jurisdiction that it has over receivers appointed by the court.

TAB 5

Most Negative Treatment: Distinguished

Most Recent Distinguished: PCAS Patient Care Automation Services Inc., Re | 2012 ONSC 3367, 2012 CarswellOnt 7248, 91 C.B.R. (5th) 285, 216 A.C.W.S. (3d) 551 | (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List], Jun 9, 2012)

1991 CarswellOnt 205
Ontario Court of Appeal

Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.

1991 CarswellOnt 205, [1991] O.J. No. 1137, 27 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1178,
46 O.A.C. 321, 4 O.R. (3d) 1, 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1, 83 D.L.R. (4th) 76

**ROYAL BANK OF CANADA (plaintiff/respondent) v. SOUNDAIR CORPORATION
(respondent), CANADIAN PENSION CAPITAL LIMITED (appellant)
and CANADIAN INSURERS' CAPITAL CORPORATION (appellant)**

Goodman, McKinlay and Galligan J.J.A.

Heard: June 11, 12, 13 and 14, 1991

Judgment: July 3, 1991

Docket: Doc. CA 318/91

Counsel: *J. B. Berkow* and *S. H. Goldman* , for appellants Canadian Pension Capital Limited and Canadian Insurers' Capital Corporation.

J. T. Morin, Q.C. , for Air Canada.

L.A.J. Burnes and *L.E. Ritchie* , for plaintiff/respondent Royal Bank of Canada.

S.F. Dumphy and *G.K. Ketcheson* , for Ernst & Young Inc., receiver of respondent Soundair Corporation.

W.G. Horton , for Ontario Express Limited.

N.J. Spies , for Frontier Air Limited.

Subject: Corporate and Commercial; Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications

Debtors and creditors

VII Receivers

VII.6 Conduct and liability of receiver

VII.6.4 General conduct of receiver

Headnote

Receivers --- Conduct and liability of receiver — General conduct of receiver

Court considering its position when approving sale recommended by receiver.

S Corp., which engaged in the air transport business, had a division known as AT. When S Corp. experienced financial difficulties, one of the secured creditors, who had an interest in the assets of AT, brought a motion for the appointment of a receiver. The receiver was ordered to operate AT and to sell it as a going concern. The receiver had two offers. It accepted the offer made by OEL and rejected an offer by 922 which contained an unacceptable condition. Subsequently, 922 obtained an order allowing it to make a second offer removing the condition. The secured creditors supported acceptance of the 922 offer. The court approved the sale to OEL and dismissed the motion to approve the 922 offer. An appeal was brought from this order.

Held:

The appeal was dismissed.

Per Galligan J.A.: When a court appoints a receiver to use its commercial expertise to sell an airline, it is inescapable that it intends to rely upon the receiver's expertise and not upon its own. The court should be reluctant to second-guess, with the benefit of hindsight, the considered business decisions made by its receiver.

The conduct of the receiver should be reviewed in the light of the specific mandate given to him by the court. The order appointing the receiver did not say how the receiver was to negotiate the sale. The order obviously intended, because of the unusual nature of the asset being sold, to leave the method of sale substantially to the discretion of the receiver.

To determine whether a receiver has acted providently, the conduct of the receiver should be examined in light of the information the receiver had when it agreed to accept an offer. On the date the receiver accepted the OEL offer, it had only two offers: that of OEL, which was acceptable, and that of 922, which contained an unacceptable condition. The decision made was a sound one in the circumstances. The receiver made a sufficient effort to obtain the best price, and did not act improvidently.

The court must exercise extreme caution before it interferes with the process adopted by a receiver to sell an unusual asset. It is important that prospective purchasers know that, if they are acting in good faith, bargain seriously with a receiver and enter into an agreement with it, a court will not lightly interfere with the commercial judgment of the receiver to sell the assets to them.

Per McKinlay J.A. (concurring in the result): It is most important that the integrity of procedures followed by court-appointed receivers be protected in the interests of both commercial morality and the future confidence of business persons in their dealings with receivers. In all cases, the court should carefully scrutinize the procedure followed by the receiver. While the procedure carried out by the receiver in this case was appropriate, given the unfolding of events and the unique nature of the asset involved, it may not be a procedure that is likely to be appropriate in many receivership sales.

Per Goodman J.A. (dissenting): It was imprudent and unfair on the part of the receiver to ignore an offer from an interested party which offered approximately triple the cash down payment without giving a chance to the offeror to remove the conditions or other terms which made the offer unacceptable to the receiver. The offer accepted by the receiver was improvident and unfair insofar as two creditors were concerned.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered:

Beauty Counsellors of Canada Ltd., Re (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 237 (Ont. S.C.) — referred to
British Columbia Development Corp. v. Spun Cast Industries Ltd. (1977), 26 C.B.R. (N.S.) 28, 5 B.C.L.R. 94 (S.C.) — referred to
Cameron v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1981), 38 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 45 N.S.R. (2d) 303, 86 A.P.R. 303 (C.A.) — referred to
Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg (1986), 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 320n, 60 O.R. (2d) 87, 22 C.P.C. (2d) 131, 39 D.L.R. (4th) 526 (H.C.) — applied
Salima Investments Ltd. v. Bank of Montreal (1985), 59 C.B.R. (N.S.) 242, 41 Alta. L.R. (2d) 58, 65 A.R. 372, 21 D.L.R. (4th) (C.A.) — referred to
Selkirk, Re (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 245 (Ont. S.C.) — referred to
Selkirk, Re (1987), 64 C.B.R. (N.S.) 140 (Ont. S.C.) — referred to

Statutes considered:

Employment Standards Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 137.

Environmental Protection Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 141.

Appeal from order approving sale of assets by receiver.

Galligan J.A. :

1 This is an appeal from the order of Rosenberg J. made on May 1, 1991. By that order, he approved the sale of Air Toronto to Ontario Express Limited and Frontier Air Limited, and he dismissed a motion to approve an offer to purchase Air Toronto by 922246 Ontario Limited.

2 It is necessary at the outset to give some background to the dispute. Soundair Corporation ("Soundair") is a corporation engaged in the air transport business. It has three divisions. One of them is Air Toronto. Air Toronto

operates a scheduled airline from Toronto to a number of mid-sized cities in the United States of America. Its routes serve as feeders to several of Air Canada's routes. Pursuant to a connector agreement, Air Canada provides some services to Air Toronto and benefits from the feeder traffic provided by it. The operational relationship between Air Canada and Air Toronto is a close one.

3 In the latter part of 1989 and the early part of 1990, Soundair was in financial difficulty. Soundair has two secured creditors who have an interest in the assets of Air Toronto. The Royal Bank of Canada (the "Royal Bank") is owed at least \$65 million dollars. The appellants Canadian Pension Capital Limited and Canadian Insurers' Capital Corporation (collectively called "CCFL") are owed approximately \$9,500,000. Those creditors will have a deficiency expected to be in excess of \$50 million on the winding up of Soundair.

4 On April 26, 1990, upon the motion of the Royal Bank, O'Brien J. appointed Ernst & Young Inc. (the "receiver") as receiver of all of the assets, property and undertakings of Soundair. The order required the receiver to operate Air Toronto and sell it as a going concern. Because of the close relationship between Air Toronto and Air Canada, it was contemplated that the receiver would obtain the assistance of Air Canada to operate Air Toronto. The order authorized the receiver:

(b) to enter into contractual arrangements with Air Canada to retain a manager or operator, including Air Canada, to manage and operate Air Toronto under the supervision of Ernst & Young Inc. until the completion of the sale of Air Toronto to Air Canada or other person.

Also because of the close relationship, it was expected that Air Canada would purchase Air Toronto. To that end, the order of O'Brien J. authorized the Receiver:

(c) to negotiate and do all things necessary or desirable to complete a sale of Air Toronto to Air Canada and, if a sale to Air Canada cannot be completed, to negotiate and sell Air Toronto to another person, subject to terms and conditions approved by this Court.

5 Over a period of several weeks following that order, negotiations directed towards the sale of Air Toronto took place between the receiver and Air Canada. Air Canada had an agreement with the receiver that it would have exclusive negotiating rights during that period. I do not think it is necessary to review those negotiations, but I note that Air Canada had complete access to all of the operations of Air Toronto and conducted due diligence examinations. It became thoroughly acquainted with every aspect of Air Toronto's operations.

6 Those negotiations came to an end when an offer made by Air Canada on June 19, 1990, was considered unsatisfactory by the receiver. The offer was not accepted and lapsed. Having regard to the tenor of Air Canada's negotiating stance and a letter sent by its solicitors on July 20, 1990, I think that the receiver was eminently reasonable when it decided that there was no realistic possibility of selling Air Toronto to Air Canada.

7 The receiver then looked elsewhere. Air Toronto's feeder business is very attractive, but it only has value to a national airline. The receiver concluded reasonably, therefore, that it was commercially necessary for one of Canada's two national airlines to be involved in any sale of Air Toronto. Realistically, there were only two possible purchasers, whether direct or indirect. They were Air Canada and Canadian Airlines International.

8 It was well known in the air transport industry that Air Toronto was for sale. During the months following the collapse of the negotiations with Air Canada, the receiver tried unsuccessfully to find viable purchasers. In late 1990, the receiver turned to Canadian Airlines International, the only realistic alternative. Negotiations began between them. Those negotiations led to a letter of intent dated February 11, 1990. On March 6, 1991, the receiver received an offer from Ontario Express Limited and Frontier Airlines Limited, who are subsidiaries of Canadian Airlines International. This offer is called the OEL offer.

9 In the meantime, Air Canada and CCFL were having discussions about making an offer for the purchase of Air Toronto. They formed 92246 Ontario Limited ("922") for the purpose of purchasing Air Toronto. On March 1, 1991, CCFL wrote to the receiver saying that it proposed to make an offer. On March 7, 1991, Air Canada and CCFL presented an offer to the receiver in the name of 922. For convenience, its offers are called the "922 offers."

10 The first 922 offer contained a condition which was unacceptable to the receiver. I will refer to that condition in more detail later. The receiver declined the 922 offer and on March 8, 1991, accepted the OEL offer. Subsequently, 922 obtained an order allowing it to make a second offer. It then submitted an offer which was virtually identical to that of March 7, 1991, except that the unacceptable condition had been removed.

11 The proceedings before Rosenberg J. then followed. He approved the sale to OEL and dismissed a motion for the acceptance of the 922 offer. Before Rosenberg J., and in this court, both CCFL and the Royal Bank supported the acceptance of the second 922 offer.

12 There are only two issues which must be resolved in this appeal. They are:

(1) Did the receiver act properly when it entered into an agreement to sell Air Toronto to OEL?

(2) What effect does the support of the 922 offer by the secured creditors have on the result?

13 I will deal with the two issues separately.

1. Did the Receiver Act Properly in Agreeing to Sell to OEL?

14 Before dealing with that issue, there are three general observations which I think I should make. The first is that the sale of an airline as a going concern is a very complex process. The best method of selling an airline at the best price is something far removed from the expertise of a court. When a court appoints a receiver to use its commercial expertise to sell an airline, it is inescapable that it intends to rely upon the receiver's expertise and not upon its own. Therefore, the court must place a great deal of confidence in the actions taken and in the opinions formed by the receiver. It should also assume that the receiver is acting properly unless the contrary is clearly shown. The second observation is that the court should be reluctant to second-guess, with the benefit of hindsight, the considered business decisions made by its receiver. The third observation which I wish to make is that the conduct of the receiver should be reviewed in the light of the specific mandate given to him by the court.

15 The order of O'Brien J. provided that if the receiver could not complete the sale to Air Canada that it was "to negotiate and sell Air Toronto to another person." The court did not say how the receiver was to negotiate the sale. It did not say it was to call for bids or conduct an auction. It told the receiver to negotiate and sell. It obviously intended, because of the unusual nature of the asset being sold, to leave the method of sale substantially in the discretion of the receiver. I think, therefore, that the court should not review minutely the process of the sale when, broadly speaking, it appears to the court to be a just process.

16 As did Rosenberg J., I adopt as correct the statement made by Anderson J. in *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg* (1986), 60 O.R. (2d) 87, 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 320n, 22 C.P.C. (2d) 131, 39 D.L.R. (4th) 526 (H.C.), at pp. 92-94 [O.R.], of the duties which a court must perform when deciding whether a receiver who has sold a property acted properly. When he set out the court's duties, he did not put them in any order of priority, nor do I. I summarize those duties as follows:

1. It should consider whether the receiver has made a sufficient effort to get the best price and has not acted improvidently.

2. It should consider the interests of all parties.

3. It should consider the efficacy and integrity of the process by which offers are obtained.

4. It should consider whether there has been unfairness in the working out of the process.

17 I intend to discuss the performance of those duties separately.

1. Did the Receiver make a sufficient effort to get the best price and did it act providently?

18 Having regard to the fact that it was highly unlikely that a commercially viable sale could be made to anyone but the two national airlines, or to someone supported by either of them, it is my view that the receiver acted wisely and reasonably when it negotiated only with Air Canada and Canadian Airlines International. Furthermore, when Air Canada said that it would submit no further offers and gave the impression that it would not participate further in the receiver's efforts to sell, the only course reasonably open to the receiver was to negotiate with Canadian Airlines International. Realistically, there was nowhere else to go but to Canadian Airlines International. In doing so, it is my opinion that the receiver made sufficient efforts to sell the airline.

19 When the receiver got the OEL offer on March 6, 1991, it was over 10 months since it had been charged with the responsibility of selling Air Toronto. Until then, the receiver had not received one offer which it thought was acceptable. After substantial efforts to sell the airline over that period, I find it difficult to think that the receiver acted improvidently in accepting the only acceptable offer which it had.

20 On March 8, 1991, the date when the receiver accepted the OEL offer, it had only two offers, the OEL offer, which was acceptable, and the 922 offer, which contained an unacceptable condition. I cannot see how the receiver, assuming for the moment that the price was reasonable, could have done anything but accept the OEL offer.

21 When deciding whether a receiver had acted providently, the court should examine the conduct of the receiver in light of the information the receiver had when it agreed to accept an offer. In this case, the court should look at the receiver's conduct in the light of the information it had when it made its decision on March 8, 1991. The court should be very cautious before deciding that the receiver's conduct was improvident based upon information which has come to light after it made its decision. To do so, in my view, would derogate from the mandate to sell given to the receiver by the order of O'Brien J. I agree with and adopt what was said by Anderson J. in *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg*, supra, at p. 112 [O.R.]:

Its decision was made as a matter of business judgment *on the elements then available to it*. It is of the very essence of a receiver's function to make such judgments and in the making of them to act seriously and responsibly so as to be prepared to stand behind them.

If the court were to reject the recommendation of the Receiver in any but the most exceptional circumstances, it would materially diminish and weaken the role and function of the Receiver both in the perception of receivers and in the perception of any others who might have occasion to deal with them. It would lead to the conclusion that the decision of the Receiver was of little weight and that the real decision was always made upon the motion for approval. That would be a consequence susceptible of immensely damaging results to the disposition of assets by court-appointed receivers.

[Emphasis added.]

22 I also agree with and adopt what was said by Macdonald J.A. in *Cameron v. Bank of Nova Scotia* (1981), 38 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 45 N.S.R. (2d) 303, 86 A.P.R. 303 (C.A.), at p. 11 [C.B.R.]:

In my opinion if the decision of the receiver to enter into an agreement of sale, subject to court approval, with respect to certain assets is reasonable and sound under the circumstances *at the time existing* it should not be set aside simply because a later and higher bid is made. To do so would literally create chaos in the commercial world and receivers and purchasers would never be sure they had a binding agreement.

[Emphasis added.]

23 On March 8, 1991, the receiver had two offers. One was the OEL offer, which it considered satisfactory but which could be withdrawn by OEL at any time before it was accepted. The receiver also had the 922 offer, which contained a condition that was totally unacceptable. It had no other offers. It was faced with the dilemma of whether it should decline to accept the OEL offer and run the risk of it being withdrawn, in the hope that an acceptable offer would be forthcoming from 922. An affidavit filed by the president of the receiver describes the dilemma which the receiver faced, and the judgment made in the light of that dilemma:

24. An asset purchase agreement was received by Ernst & Young on March 7, 1991 which was dated March 6, 1991. This agreement was received from CCFL in respect of their offer to purchase the assets and undertaking of Air Toronto. Apart from financial considerations, which will be considered in a subsequent affidavit, the *Receiver determined that it would not be prudent to delay acceptance of the OEL agreement to negotiate a highly uncertain arrangement with Air Canada and CCFL*. Air Canada had the benefit of an 'exclusive' in negotiations for Air Toronto and had clearly indicated its intention take itself out of the running while ensuring that no other party could seek to purchase Air Toronto and maintain the Air Canada connector arrangement vital to its survival. The CCFL offer represented a radical reversal of this position by Air Canada at the eleventh hour. However, it contained a significant number of conditions to closing which were entirely beyond the control of the Receiver. As well, the CCFL offer came less than 24 hours before signing of the agreement with OEL which had been negotiated over a period of months, at great time and expense.

[Emphasis added.] I am convinced that the decision made was a sound one in the circumstances faced by the receiver on March 8, 1991.

24 I now turn to consider whether the price contained in the OEL offer was one which it was provident to accept. At the outset, I think that the fact that the OEL offer was the only acceptable one available to the receiver on March 8, 1991, after 10 months of trying to sell the airline, is strong evidence that the price in it was reasonable. In a deteriorating economy, I doubt that it would have been wise to wait any longer.

25 I mentioned earlier that, pursuant to an order, 922 was permitted to present a second offer. During the hearing of the appeal, counsel compared at great length the price contained in the second 922 offer with the price contained in the OEL offer. Counsel put forth various hypotheses supporting their contentions that one offer was better than the other.

26 It is my opinion that the price contained in the 922 offer is relevant only if it shows that the price obtained by the receiver in the OEL offer was not a reasonable one. In *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg*, supra, Anderson J., at p. 113 [O.R.], discussed the comparison of offers in the following way:

No doubt, as the cases have indicated, situations might arise where the disparity was so great as to call in question the adequacy of the mechanism which had produced the offers. It is not so here, and in my view that is substantially an end of the matter.

27 In two judgments, Saunders J. considered the circumstances in which an offer submitted after the receiver had agreed to a sale should be considered by the court. The first is *Re Selkirk* (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 245 (Ont. S.C.), at p. 247:

If, for example, in this case there had been a second offer of a substantially higher amount, then the court would have to take that offer into consideration in assessing whether the receiver had properly carried out his function of endeavouring to obtain the best price for the property.

28 The second is *Re Beauty Counsellors of Canada Ltd.* (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 237 (Ont. S.C.), at p. 243:

If a substantially higher bid turns up at the approval stage, the court should consider it. Such a bid may indicate, for example, that the trustee has not properly carried out its duty to endeavour to obtain the best price for the estate.

29 In *Re Selkirk* (1987), 64 C.B.R. (N.S.) 140 (Ont. S.C.), at p. 142, McRae J. expressed a similar view:

The court will not lightly withhold approval of a sale by the receiver, particularly in a case such as this where the receiver is given rather wide discretionary authority as per the order of Mr. Justice Trainor and, of course, where the receiver is an officer of this court. Only in a case where there seems to be some unfairness in the process of the sale or *where there are substantially higher offers which would tend to show that the sale was improvident* will the court withhold approval. It is important that the court recognize the commercial exigencies that would flow if prospective purchasers are allowed to wait until the sale is in court for approval before submitting their final offer. This is something that must be discouraged.

[Emphasis added.]

30 What those cases show is that the prices in other offers have relevance only if they show that the price contained in the offer accepted by the receiver was so unreasonably low as to demonstrate that the receiver was improvident in accepting it. I am of the opinion, therefore, that if they do not tend to show that the receiver was improvident, they should not be considered upon a motion to confirm a sale recommended by a court-appointed receiver. If they were, the process would be changed from a sale by a receiver, subject to court approval, into an auction conducted by the court at the time approval is sought. In my opinion, the latter course is unfair to the person who has entered bona fide into an agreement with the receiver, can only lead to chaos, and must be discouraged.

31 If, however, the subsequent offer is so substantially higher than the sale recommended by the receiver, then it may be that the receiver has not conducted the sale properly. In such circumstances, the court would be justified itself in entering into the sale process by considering competitive bids. However, I think that that process should be entered into only if the court is satisfied that the receiver has not properly conducted the sale which it has recommended to the court.

32 It is necessary to consider the two offers. Rosenberg J. held that the 922 offer was slightly better or marginally better than the OEL offer. He concluded that the difference in the two offers did not show that the sale process adopted by the receiver was inadequate or improvident.

33 Counsel for the appellants complained about the manner in which Rosenberg J. conducted the hearing of the motion to confirm the OEL sale. The complaint was that when they began to discuss a comparison of the two offers, Rosenberg J. said that he considered the 922 offer to be better than the OEL offer. Counsel said that when that comment was made, they did not think it necessary to argue further the question of the difference in value between the two offers. They complain that the finding that the 922 offer was only marginally better or slightly better than the OEL offer was made without them having had the opportunity to argue that the 922 offer was substantially better or significantly better than the OEL offer. I cannot understand how counsel could have thought that by expressing the opinion that the 922 offer was better, Rosenberg J. was saying that it was a significantly or substantially better one. Nor can I comprehend how counsel took the comment to mean that they were foreclosed from arguing that the offer was significantly or substantially better. If there was some misunderstanding on the part of counsel, it should have been raised before Rosenberg J. at the time. I am sure that if it had been, the misunderstanding would have been cleared up quickly. Nevertheless, this court permitted extensive argument dealing with the comparison of the two offers.

34 The 922 offer provided for \$6 million cash to be paid on closing with a royalty based upon a percentage of Air Toronto profits over a period of 5 years up to a maximum of \$3 million. The OEL offer provided for a payment of \$2 million on closing with a royalty paid on gross revenues over a 5-year period. In the short term, the 922 offer is obviously better because there is substantially more cash up front. The chances of future returns are substantially greater in the OEL offer because royalties are paid on gross revenues, while the royalties under the 922 offer are paid only on profits. There is an element of risk involved in each offer.

35 The receiver studied the two offers. It compared them and took into account the risks, the advantages and the disadvantages of each. It considered the appropriate contingencies. It is not necessary to outline the factors which

were taken into account by the receiver because the manager of its insolvency practice filed an affidavit outlining the considerations which were weighed in its evaluation of the two offers. They seem to me to be reasonable ones. That affidavit concluded with the following paragraph:

24. On the basis of these considerations the Receiver has approved the OEL offer and has concluded that it represents the achievement of the highest possible value at this time for the Air Toronto division of SoundAir.

36 The court appointed the receiver to conduct the sale of Air Toronto, and entrusted it with the responsibility of deciding what is the best offer. I put great weight upon the opinion of the receiver. It swore to the court which appointed it that the OEL offer represents the achievement of the highest possible value at this time for Air Toronto. I have not been convinced that the receiver was wrong when he made that assessment. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the 922 offer does not demonstrate any failure upon the part of the receiver to act properly and providently.

37 It follows that if Rosenberg J. was correct when he found that the 922 offer was in fact better, I agree with him that it could only have been slightly or marginally better. The 922 offer does not lead to an inference that the disposition strategy of the receiver was inadequate, unsuccessful or improvident, nor that the price was unreasonable.

38 I am, therefore, of the opinion the the receiver made a sufficient effort to get the best price, and has not acted improvidently.

2. Consideration of the Interests of all Parties

39 It is well established that the primary interest is that of the creditors of the debtor: see *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg*, supra, and *Re Selkirk*, supra (Saunders J.). However, as Saunders J. pointed out in *Re Beauty Counsellors*, supra at p. 244 [C.B.R.], "it is not the only or overriding consideration."

40 In my opinion, there are other persons whose interests require consideration. In an appropriate case, the interests of the debtor must be taken into account. I think also, in a case such as this, where a purchaser has bargained at some length and doubtless at considerable expense with the receiver, the interests of the purchaser ought to be taken into account. While it is not explicitly stated in such cases as *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg*, supra, *Re Selkirk* (1986), supra, *Re Beauty Counsellors*, supra, *Re Selkirk* (1987), supra, and (*Cameron*), supra, I think they clearly imply that the interests of a person who has negotiated an agreement with a court-appointed receiver are very important.

41 In this case, the interests of all parties who would have an interest in the process were considered by the receiver and by Rosenberg J.

3. Consideration of the Efficacy and Integrity of the Process by which the Offer was Obtained

42 While it is accepted that the primary concern of a receiver is the protecting of the interests of the creditors, there is a secondary but very important consideration, and that is the integrity of the process by which the sale is effected. This is particularly so in the case of a sale of such a unique asset as an airline as a going concern.

43 The importance of a court protecting the integrity of the process has been stated in a number of cases. First, I refer to *Re Selkirk*, supra, where Saunders J. said at p. 246 [C.B.R.]:

In dealing with the request for approval, the court has to be concerned primarily with protecting the interest of the creditors of the former bankrupt. A secondary but important consideration is that the process under which the sale agreement is arrived at should be consistent with commercial efficacy and integrity.

In that connection I adopt the principles stated by Macdonald J.A. of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court (Appeal Division) in *Cameron v. Bank of N.S.* (1981), 38 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 45 N.S.R. (2d) 303, 86 A.P.R. 303 (C.A.), where he said at p. 11:

In my opinion if the decision of the receiver to enter into an agreement of sale, subject to court approval, with respect to certain assets is reasonable and sound under the circumstances at the time existing it should not be set aside simply because a later and higher bid is made. To do so would literally create chaos in the commercial world and receivers and purchasers would never be sure they had a binding agreement. On the contrary, they would know that other bids could be received and considered up until the application for court approval is heard — this would be an intolerable situation.

While those remarks may have been made in the context of a bidding situation rather than a private sale, I consider them to be equally applicable to a negotiation process leading to a private sale. Where the court is concerned with the disposition of property, the purpose of appointing a receiver is to have the receiver do the work that the court would otherwise have to do.

44 In *Salima Investments Ltd. v. Bank of Montreal* (1985), 59 C.B.R. (N.S.) 242, 41 Alta. L.R. (2d) 58, 65 A.R. 372, 21 D.L.R. (4th) 473 at p. 476 [D.L.R.], the Alberta Court of Appeal said that sale by tender is not necessarily the best way to sell a business as an ongoing concern. It went on to say that when some other method is used which is provident, the court should not undermine the process by refusing to confirm the sale.

45 Finally, I refer to the reasoning of Anderson J. in *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg*, supra, at p. 124 [O.R.]:

While every proper effort must always be made to assure maximum recovery consistent with the limitations inherent in the process, no method has yet been devised to entirely eliminate those limitations or to avoid their consequences. *Certainly it is not to be found in loosening the entire foundation of the system. Thus to compare the results of the process in this case with what might have been recovered in some other set of circumstances is neither logical nor practical.*

[Emphasis added.]

46 It is my opinion that the court must exercise extreme caution before it interferes with the process adopted by a receiver to sell an unusual asset. It is important that prospective purchasers know that, if they are acting in good faith, bargain seriously with a receiver and enter into an agreement with it, a court will not lightly interfere with the commercial judgment of the receiver to sell the asset to them.

47 Before this court, counsel for those opposing the confirmation of the sale to OEL suggested many different ways in which the receiver could have conducted the process other than the way which he did. However, the evidence does not convince me that the receiver used an improper method of attempting to sell the airline. The answer to those submissions is found in the comment of Anderson J. in *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg*, supra, at p. 109 [O.R.]:

The court ought not to sit as on appeal from the decision of the Receiver, reviewing in minute detail every element of the process by which the decision is reached. To do so would be a futile and duplicitous exercise.

48 It would be a futile and duplicitous exercise for this court to examine in minute detail all of circumstances leading up to the acceptance of the OEL offer. Having considered the process adopted by the receiver, it is my opinion that the process adopted was a reasonable and prudent one.

4. Was there unfairness in the process?

49 As a general rule, I do not think it appropriate for the court to go into the minutia of the process or of the selling strategy adopted by the receiver. However, the court has a responsibility to decide whether the process was fair. The only part of this process which I could find that might give even a superficial impression of unfairness is the failure of the receiver to give an offering memorandum to those who expressed an interest in the purchase of Air Toronto.

50 I will outline the circumstances which relate to the allegation that the receiver was unfair in failing to provide an offering memorandum. In the latter part of 1990, as part of its selling strategy, the receiver was in the process of preparing

an offering memorandum to give to persons who expressed an interest in the purchase of Air Toronto. The offering memorandum got as far as draft form, but was never released to anyone, although a copy of the draft eventually got into the hands of CCFL before it submitted the first 922 offer on March 7, 1991. A copy of the offering memorandum forms part of the record, and it seems to me to be little more than puffery, without any hard information which a sophisticated purchaser would require in order to make a serious bid.

51 The offering memorandum had not been completed by February 11, 1991. On that date, the receiver entered into the letter of intent to negotiate with OEL. The letter of intent contained a provision that during its currency the receiver would not negotiate with any other party. The letter of intent was renewed from time to time until the OEL offer was received on March 6, 1991.

52 The receiver did not proceed with the offering memorandum because to do so would violate the spirit, if not the letter, of its letter of intent with OEL.

53 I do not think that the conduct of the receiver shows any unfairness towards 922. When I speak of 922, I do so in the context that Air Canada and CCFL are identified with it. I start by saying that the receiver acted reasonably when it entered into exclusive negotiations with OEL. I find it strange that a company, with which Air Canada is closely and intimately involved, would say that it was unfair for the receiver to enter into a time-limited agreement to negotiate exclusively with OEL. That is precisely the arrangement which Air Canada insisted upon when it negotiated with the receiver in the spring and summer of 1990. If it was not unfair for Air Canada to have such an agreement, I do not understand why it was unfair for OEL to have a similar one. In fact, both Air Canada and OEL in its turn were acting reasonably when they required exclusive negotiating rights to prevent their negotiations from being used as a bargaining lever with other potential purchasers. The fact that Air Canada insisted upon an exclusive negotiating right while it was negotiating with the receiver demonstrates the commercial efficacy of OEL being given the same right during its negotiations with the receiver. I see no unfairness on the part of the receiver when it honoured its letter of intent with OEL by not releasing the offering memorandum during the negotiations with OEL.

54 Moreover, I am not prepared to find that 922 was in any way prejudiced by the fact that it did not have an offering memorandum. It made an offer on March 7, 1991, which it contends to this day was a better offer than that of OEL. 922 has not convinced me that if it had an offering memorandum, its offer would have been any different or any better than it actually was. The fatal problem with the first 922 offer was that it contained a condition which was completely unacceptable to the receiver. The receiver, properly, in my opinion, rejected the offer out of hand because of that condition. That condition did not relate to any information which could have conceivably been in an offering memorandum prepared by the receiver. It was about the resolution of a dispute between CCFL and the Royal Bank, something the receiver knew nothing about.

55 Further evidence of the lack of prejudice which the absence of an offering memorandum has caused 922 is found in CCFL's stance before this court. During argument, its counsel suggested as a possible resolution of this appeal that this court should call for new bids, evaluate them and then order a sale to the party who put in the better bid. In such a case, counsel for CCFL said that 922 would be prepared to bid within 7 days of the court's decision. I would have thought that, if there were anything to CCFL's suggestion that the failure to provide an offering memorandum was unfair to 922, that it would have told the court that it needed more information before it would be able to make a bid.

56 I am satisfied that Air Canada and CCFL have, and at all times had, all of the information which they would have needed to make what to them would be a commercially viable offer to the receiver. I think that an offering memorandum was of no commercial consequence to them, but the absence of one has since become a valuable tactical weapon.

57 It is my opinion that there is no convincing proof that if an offering memorandum had been widely distributed among persons qualified to have purchased Air Toronto, a viable offer would have come forth from a party other than 922 or OEL. Therefore, the failure to provide an offering memorandum was neither unfair, nor did it prejudice

the obtaining of a better price on March 8, 1991, than that contained in the OEL offer. I would not give effect to the contention that the process adopted by the receiver was an unfair one.

58 There are two statements by Anderson J. contained in *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg*, supra, which I adopt as my own. The first is at p. 109 [O.R.]:

The court should not proceed against the recommendations of its Receiver except in special circumstances and where the necessity and propriety of doing so are plain. Any other rule or approach would emasculate the role of the Receiver and make it almost inevitable that the final negotiation of every sale would take place on the motion for approval.

The second is at p. 111 [O.R.]:

It is equally clear, in my view, though perhaps not so clearly enunciated, that it is only in an exceptional case that the court will intervene and proceed contrary to the Receiver's recommendations if satisfied, as I am, that the Receiver has acted reasonably, prudently and fairly and not arbitrarily.

In this case the receiver acted reasonably, prudently, fairly and not arbitrarily. I am of the opinion, therefore, that the process adopted by the receiver in reaching an agreement was a just one.

59 In his reasons for judgment, after discussing the circumstances leading to the 922 offer, Rosenberg J. said this:

They created a situation as of March 8th, where the Receiver was faced with two offers, one of which was in acceptable form and one of which could not possibly be accepted in its present form. The Receiver acted appropriately in accepting the OEL offer.

I agree.

60 The receiver made proper and sufficient efforts to get the best price that it could for the assets of Air Toronto. It adopted a reasonable and effective process to sell the airline which was fair to all persons who might be interested in purchasing it. It is my opinion, therefore, that the receiver properly carried out the mandate which was given to it by the order of O'Brien J. It follows that Rosenberg J. was correct when he confirmed the sale to OEL.

II. The effect of the support of the 922 offer by the two secured creditors.

61 As I noted earlier, the 922 offer was supported before Rosenberg J., and in this court, by CCFL and by the Royal Bank, the two secured creditors. It was argued that, because the interests of the creditors are primary, the court ought to give effect to their wish that the 922 offer be accepted. I would not accede to that suggestion for two reasons.

62 The first reason is related to the fact that the creditors chose to have a receiver appointed by the court. It was open to them to appoint a private receiver pursuant to the authority of their security documents. Had they done so, then they would have had control of the process and could have sold Air Toronto to whom they wished. However, acting privately and controlling the process involves some risks. The appointment of a receiver by the court insulates the creditors from those risks. But, insulation from those risks carries with it the loss of control over the process of disposition of the assets. As I have attempted to explain in these reasons, when a receiver's sale is before the court for confirmation, the only issues are the propriety of the conduct of the receiver and whether it acted providently. The function of the court at that stage is not to step in and do the receiver's work, or change the sale strategy adopted by the receiver. Creditors who asked the court to appoint a receiver to dispose of assets should not be allowed to take over control of the process by the simple expedient of supporting another purchaser if they do not agree with the sale made by the receiver. That would take away all respect for the process of sale by a court-appointed receiver.

63 There can be no doubt that the interests of the creditor are an important consideration in determining whether the receiver has properly conducted a sale. The opinion of the creditors as to which offer ought to be accepted is something

to be taken into account. But if the court decides that the receiver has acted properly and providently, those views are not necessarily determinative. Because, in this case, the receiver acted properly and providently, I do not think that the views of the creditors should override the considered judgment of the receiver.

64 The second reason is that, in the particular circumstances of this case, I do not think the support of CCFL and the Royal Bank of the 922 offer is entitled to any weight. The support given by CCFL can be dealt with summarily. It is a co-owner of 922. It is hardly surprising and not very impressive to hear that it supports the offer which it is making for the debtor's assets.

65 The support by the Royal Bank requires more consideration and involves some reference to the circumstances. On March 6, 1991, when the first 922 offer was made, there was in existence an inter-lender agreement between the Royal Bank and CCFL. That agreement dealt with the share of the proceeds of the sale of Air Toronto which each creditor would receive. At the time, a dispute between the Royal Bank and CCFL about the interpretation of that agreement was pending in the courts. The unacceptable condition in the first 922 offer related to the settlement of the inter-lender dispute. The condition required that the dispute be resolved in a way which would substantially favour CCFL. It required that CCFL receive \$3,375,000 of the \$6 million cash payment and the balance, including the royalties, if any, be paid to the Royal Bank. The Royal Bank did not agree with that split of the sale proceeds.

66 On April 5, 1991, the Royal Bank and CCFL agreed to settle the inter-lender dispute. The settlement was that if the 922 offer was accepted by the court, CCFL would receive only \$1 million, and the Royal Bank would receive \$5 million plus any royalties which might be paid. It was only in consideration of that settlement that the Royal Bank agreed to support the 922 offer.

67 The Royal Bank's support of the 922 offer is so affected by the very substantial benefit which it wanted to obtain from the settlement of the inter-lender dispute that, in my opinion, its support is devoid of any objectivity. I think it has no weight.

68 While there may be circumstances where the unanimous support by the creditors of a particular offer could conceivably override the proper and provident conduct of a sale by a receiver, I do not think that this is such a case. This is a case where the receiver has acted properly and in a provident way. It would make a mockery out of the judicial process, under which a mandate was given to this receiver to sell this airline if the support by these creditors of the 922 offer were permitted to carry the day. I give no weight to the support which they give to the 922 offer.

69 In its factum, the receiver pointed out that, because of greater liabilities imposed upon private receivers by various statutes such as the *Employment Standards Act*, R.S.O. 1980, c. 137, and the *Environmental Protection Act*, R.S.O. 1980, c. 141, it is likely that more and more the courts will be asked to appoint receivers in insolvencies. In those circumstances, I think that creditors who ask for court-appointed receivers and business people who choose to deal with those receivers should know that if those receivers act properly and providently, their decisions and judgments will be given great weight by the courts who appoint them. I have decided this appeal in the way I have in order to assure business people who deal with court-appointed receivers that they can have confidence that an agreement which they make with a court-appointed receiver will be far more than a platform upon which others may bargain at the court approval stage. I think that persons who enter into agreements with court-appointed receivers, following a disposition procedure that is appropriate given the nature of the assets involved, should expect that their bargain will be confirmed by the court.

70 The process is very important. It should be carefully protected so that the ability of court-appointed receivers to negotiate the best price possible is strengthened and supported. Because this receiver acted properly and providently in entering into the OEL agreement, I am of the opinion that Rosenberg J. was right when he approved the sale to OEL and dismissed the motion to approve the 922 offer.

71 I would, accordingly, dismiss the appeal. I would award the receiver, OEL and Frontier Airlines Limited their costs out of the Soundair estate, those of the receiver on a solicitor-client scale. I would make no order as to the costs of any of the other parties or intervenors.

McKinlay J.A. :

72 I agree with Galligan J.A. in result, but wish to emphasize that I do so on the basis that the undertaking being sold in this case was of a very special and unusual nature. It is most important that the integrity of procedures followed by court-appointed receivers be protected in the interests of both commercial morality and the future confidence of business persons in their dealings with receivers. Consequently, in all cases, the court should carefully scrutinize the procedure followed by the receiver to determine whether it satisfies the tests set out by Anderson J. in *Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg* (1986), 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 320n, 60 O.R. (2d) 87, 22 C.P.C. (2d) 131, 39 D.L.R. (4th) 526 (H.C.). While the procedure carried out by the receiver in this case, as described by Galligan J.A., was appropriate, given the unfolding of events and the unique nature of the assets involved, it is not a procedure that is likely to be appropriate in many receivership sales.

73 I should like to add that where there is a small number of creditors who are the only parties with a real interest in the proceeds of the sale (i.e., where it is clear that the highest price attainable would result in recovery so low that no other creditors, shareholders, guarantors, etc., could possibly benefit therefore), the wishes of the interested creditors should be very seriously considered by the receiver. It is true, as Galligan J.A. points out, that in seeking the court appointment of a receiver, the moving parties also seek the protection of the court in carrying out the receiver's functions. However, it is also true that in utilizing the court process, the moving parties have opened the whole process to detailed scrutiny by all involved, and have probably added significantly to their costs and consequent shortfall as a result of so doing. The adoption of the court process should in no way diminish the rights of any party, and most certainly not the rights of the only parties with a real interest. Where a receiver asks for court approval of a sale which is opposed by the only parties in interest, the court should scrutinize with great care the procedure followed by the receiver. I agree with Galligan J.A. that in this case that was done. I am satisfied that the rights of all parties were properly considered by the receiver, by the learned motions court judge, and by Galligan J.A.

Goodman J.A. (dissenting):

74 I have had the opportunity of reading the reasons for judgment herein of Galligan and McKinlay JJ.A. Respectfully, I am unable to agree with their conclusion.

75 The case at bar is an exceptional one in the sense that upon the application made for approval of the sale of the assets of Air Toronto, two competing offers were placed before Rosenberg J. Those two offers were that of OEL and that of 922, a company incorporated for the purpose of acquiring Air Toronto. Its shares were owned equally by CCFL and Air Canada. It was conceded by all parties to these proceedings that the only persons who had any interest in the proceeds of the sale were two secured creditors, viz., CCFL and the Royal Bank of Canada. Those two creditors were unanimous in their position that they desired the court to approve the sale to 922. We were not referred to, nor am I aware of, any case where a court has refused to abide by the unanimous wishes of the only interested creditors for the approval of a specific offer made in receivership proceedings.

76 In *British Columbia Developments Corp. v. Spun Cast Industries Ltd.* (1977), 26 C.B.R. (N.S.) 28, 5 B.C.L.R. 94 (S.C.), Berger J. said at p. 30 [C.B.R.]:

Here all of those with a financial stake in the plant have joined in seeking the court's approval of the sale to Fincas. This court does not have a roving commission to decide what is best for investors and businessmen when they have agreed among themselves what course of action they should follow. It is their money.

77 I agree with that statement. It is particularly apt to this case. The two secured creditors will suffer a shortfall of approximately \$50 million. They have a tremendous interest in the sale of assets which form part of their security. I

agree with the finding of Rosenberg J. that the offer of 922 is superior to that of OEL. He concluded that the 922 offer is marginally superior. If by that he meant that mathematically it was likely to provide slightly more in the way of proceeds, it is difficult to take issue with that finding. If, on the other hand, he meant that having regard to all considerations it was only marginally superior, I cannot agree. He said in his reasons:

I have come to the conclusion that knowledgeable creditors such as the Royal Bank would prefer the 922 offer even if the other factors influencing their decision were not present. No matter what adjustments had to be made, the 922 offer results in more cash immediately. Creditors facing the type of loss the Royal Bank is taking in this case would not be anxious to rely on contingencies especially in the present circumstances surrounding the airline industry.

78 I agree with that statement completely. It is apparent that the difference between the two offers insofar as cash on closing is concerned amounts to approximately \$3 million to \$4 million. The bank submitted that it did not wish to gamble any further with respect to its investment, and that the acceptance and court approval of the OEL offer in effect supplanted its position as a secured creditor with respect to the amount owing over and above the down payment and placed it in the position of a joint entrepreneur, but one with no control. This results from the fact that the OEL offer did not provide for any security for any funds which might be forthcoming over and above the initial down payment on closing.

79 In *Cameron v. Bank of Nova Scotia* (1981), 38 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 45 N.S.R. (2d) 303, 86 A.P.R. 303 (C.A.), Hart J.A., speaking for the majority of the court, said at p. 10 [C.B.R.]:

Here we are dealing with a receiver appointed at the instance of one major creditor, who chose to insert in the contract of sale a provision making it subject to the approval of the court. This, in my opinion, shows an intention on behalf of the parties to invoke the normal equitable doctrines which place the court in the position of looking to the interests of all persons concerned before giving its blessing to a particular transaction submitted for approval. In these circumstances the court would not consider itself bound by the contract entered into in good faith by the receiver but would have to look to the broader picture to see that that contract was for the benefit of the creditors as a whole. When there was evidence that a higher price was readily available for the property the chambers judge was, in my opinion, justified in exercising his discretion as he did. Otherwise he could have deprived the creditors of a substantial sum of money.

80 This statement is apposite to the circumstances of the case at bar. I hasten to add that in my opinion it is not only price which is to be considered in the exercise of the judge's discretion. It may very well be, as I believe to be so in this case, that the amount of cash is the most important element in determining which of the two offers is for the benefit and in the best interest of the creditors.

81 It is my view, and the statement of Hart J.A. is consistent therewith, that the fact that a creditor has requested an order of the court appointing a receiver does not in any way diminish or derogate from his right to obtain the maximum benefit to be derived from any disposition of the debtor's assets. I agree completely with the views expressed by McKinlay J.A. in that regard in her reasons.

82 It is my further view that any negotiations which took place between the only two interested creditors in deciding to support the approval of the 922 offer were not relevant to the determination by the presiding judge of the issues involved in the motion for approval of either one of the two offers, nor are they relevant in determining the outcome of this appeal. It is sufficient that the two creditors have decided unanimously what is in their best interest, and the appeal must be considered in the light of that decision. It so happens, however, that there is ample evidence to support their conclusion that the approval of the 922 offer is in their best interests.

83 I am satisfied that the interests of the creditors are the prime consideration for both the receiver and the court. In *Re Beauty Counsellors of Canada Ltd.* (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 237 (Ont. S.C.), Saunders J. said at p. 243:

This does not mean that a court should ignore a new and higher bid made after acceptance where there has been no unfairness in the process. The interests of the creditors, while not the only consideration, are the prime consideration.

84 I agree with that statement of the law. In *Re Selkirk* (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 245 (Ont. S.C.), Saunders J. heard an application for court approval of the sale by the sheriff of real property in bankruptcy proceedings. The sheriff had been previously ordered to list the property for sale subject to approval of the court. Saunders J. said at p. 246:

In dealing with the request for approval, the court has to be concerned primarily with protecting the interests of the creditors of the former bankrupt. A secondary but important consideration is that the process under which the sale agreement is arrived at should be consistent with commercial efficacy and integrity.

85 I am in agreement with that statement as a matter of general principle. Saunders J. further stated that he adopted the principles stated by Macdonald J.A. in *Cameron*, supra, quoted by Galligan J.A. in his reasons. In *Cameron*, the remarks of Macdonald J.A. related to situations involving the calling of bids and fixing a time limit for the making of such bids. In those circumstances the process is so clear as a matter of commercial practice that an interference by the court in such process might have a deleterious effect on the efficacy of receivership proceedings in other cases. But Macdonald J.A. recognized that even in bid or tender cases where the offeror for whose bid approval is sought has complied with all requirements, a court might not approve the agreement of purchase and sale entered into by the receiver. He said at pp. 11-12 [C.B.R.]:

There are, of course, many reasons why a court might not approve an agreement of purchase and sale, viz., where the offer accepted is so low in relation to the appraised value as to be unrealistic; or, where the circumstances indicate that insufficient time was allowed for the making of bids or that inadequate notice of sale by bid was given (where the receiver sells property by the bid method); or, where it can be said that the proposed sale is not in the best interest of either the creditors or the owner. Court approval must involve the delicate balancing of competing interests and not simply a consideration of the interests of the creditors.

86 The deficiency in the present case is so large that there has been no suggestion of a competing interest between the owner and the creditors.

87 I agree that the same reasoning may apply to a negotiation process leading to a private sale, but the procedure and process applicable to private sales of a wide variety of businesses and undertakings with the multiplicity of individual considerations applicable and perhaps peculiar to the particular business is not so clearly established that a departure by the court from the process adopted by the receiver in a particular case will result in commercial chaos to the detriment of future receivership proceedings. Each case must be decided on its own merits, and it is necessary to consider the process used by the receiver in the present proceedings and to determine whether it was unfair, improvident or inadequate.

88 It is important to note at the outset that Rosenberg J. made the following statement in his reasons:

On March 8, 1991 the trustee accepted the OEL offer subject to court approval. The Receiver at that time had no other offer before it that was in final form or could possibly be accepted. The Receiver had at the time the knowledge that Air Canada with CCFL had not bargained in good faith and had not fulfilled the promise of its letter of March 1st. The Receiver was justified in assuming that Air Canada and CCFL's offer was a long way from being in an acceptable form and that Air Canada and CCFL's objective was to interrupt the finalizing of the OEL agreement and to retain as long as possible the Air Toronto connector traffic flowing into Terminal 2 for the benefit of Air Canada.

89 In my opinion there was no evidence before him or before this court to indicate that Air Canada, with CCFL, had not bargained in good faith, and that the receiver had knowledge of such lack of good faith. Indeed, on his appeal, counsel for the receiver stated that he was not alleging Air Canada and CCFL had not bargained in good faith. Air Canada had frankly stated at the time that it had made its offer to purchase, which was eventually refused by the receiver, that it would not become involved in an "auction" to purchase the undertaking of Air Canada and that, although it

would fulfil its contractual obligations to provide connecting services to Air Toronto, it would do no more than it was legally required to do insofar as facilitating the purchase of Air Toronto by any other person. In so doing, Air Canada may have been playing "hardball," as its behaviour was characterized by some of the counsel for opposing parties. It was nevertheless merely openly asserting its legal position, as it was entitled to do.

90 Furthermore, there was no evidence before Rosenberg J. or this court that the receiver had assumed that Air Canada and CCFL's objective in making an offer was to interrupt the finalizing of the OEL agreement and to retain as long as possible the Air Toronto connector traffic flowing into Terminal 2 for the benefit of Air Canada. Indeed, there was no evidence to support such an assumption in any event, although it is clear that 922, and through it CCFL and Air Canada, were endeavouring to present an offer to purchase which would be accepted and/or approved by the court in preference to the offer made by OEL.

91 To the extent that approval of the OEL agreement by Rosenberg J. was based on the alleged lack of good faith in bargaining and improper motivation with respect to connector traffic on the part of Air Canada and CCFL, it cannot be supported.

92 I would also point out that rather than saying there was no other offer before it that was final in form, it would have been more accurate to have said that there was *no unconditional* offer before it.

93 In considering the material and evidence placed before the court, I am satisfied that the receiver was at all times acting in good faith. I have reached the conclusion, however, that the process which he used was unfair insofar as 922 is concerned, and improvident insofar as the two secured creditors are concerned.

94 Air Canada had been negotiating with Soundair Corporation for the purchase from it of Air Toronto for a considerable period of time prior to the appointment of a receiver by the court. It had given a letter of intent indicating a prospective sale price of \$18 million. After the appointment of the receiver, by agreement dated April 30, 1990, Air Canada continued its negotiations for the purchase of Air Toronto with the receiver. Although this agreement contained a clause which provided that the receiver "shall not negotiate for the sale ... of Air Toronto with any person except Air Canada," it further provided that the receiver would not be in breach of that provision merely by receiving unsolicited offers for all or any of the assets of Air Toronto. In addition, the agreement, which had a term commencing on April 30, 1990, could be terminated on the fifth business day following the delivery of a written notice of termination by one party to the other. I point out this provision merely to indicate that the exclusivity privilege extended by the receiver to Air Canada was of short duration at the receiver's option.

95 As a result of due diligence investigations carried out by Air Canada during the months of April, May and June of 1990, Air Canada reduced its offer to \$8.1 million conditional upon there being \$4 million in tangible assets. The offer was made on June 14, 1990, and was open for acceptance until June 29, 1990.

96 By amending agreement dated June 19, 1990, the receiver was released from its covenant to refrain from negotiating for the sale of the Air Toronto business and assets to any person other than Air Canada. By virtue of this amending agreement, the receiver had put itself in the position of having a firm offer in hand, with the right to negotiate and accept offers from other persons. Air Canada, in these circumstances, was in the subservient position. The receiver, in the exercise of its judgment and discretion, allowed the Air Canada offer to lapse. On July 20, 1990, Air Canada served a notice of termination of the April 30, 1990 agreement.

97 Apparently as a result of advice received from the receiver to the effect that the receiver intended to conduct an auction for the sale of the assets and business of the Air Toronto division of Soundair Corporation, the solicitors for Air Canada advised the receiver by letter dated July 20, 1990, in part as follows:

Air Canada has instructed us to advise you that it does not intend to submit a further offer in the auction process.

98 This statement, together with other statements set forth in the letter, was sufficient to indicate that Air Canada was not interested in purchasing Air Toronto in the process apparently contemplated by the receiver at that time. It did not form a proper foundation for the receiver to conclude that there was no realistic possibility of selling Air Toronto [to] Air Canada, either alone or in conjunction with some other person, in different circumstances. In June 1990, the receiver was of the opinion that the fair value of Air Toronto was between \$10 million and \$12 million.

99 In August 1990, the receiver contacted a number of interested parties. A number of offers were received which were not deemed to be satisfactory. One such offer, received on August 20, 1990, came as a joint offer from OEL and Air Ontario (an Air Canada connector). It was for the sum of \$3 million for the good will relating to certain Air Toronto routes, but did not include the purchase of any tangible assets or leasehold interests.

100 In December 1990, the receiver was approached by the management of Canadian Partner (operated by OEL) for the purpose of evaluating the benefits of an amalgamated Air Toronto/Air Partner operation. The negotiations continued from December of 1990 to February of 1991, culminating in the OEL agreement dated March 8, 1991.

101 On or before December 1990, CCFL advised the receiver that it intended to make a bid for the Air Toronto assets. The receiver, in August of 1990, for the purpose of facilitating the sale of Air Toronto assets, commenced the preparation of an operating memorandum. He prepared no less than six draft operating memoranda with dates from October 1990 through March 1, 1991. None of these were distributed to any prospective bidder despite requests having been received therefor, with the exception of an early draft provided to CCFL without the receiver's knowledge.

102 During the period December 1990 to the end of January 1991, the receiver advised CCFL that the offering memorandum was in the process of being prepared and would be ready soon for distribution. He further advised CCFL that it should await the receipt of the memorandum before submitting a formal offer to purchase the Air Toronto assets.

103 By late January, CCFL had become aware that the receiver was negotiating with OEL for the sale of Air Toronto. In fact, on February 11, 1991, the receiver signed a letter of intent with OEL wherein it had specifically agreed not to negotiate with any other potential bidders or solicit any offers from others.

104 By letter dated February 25, 1991, the solicitors for CCFL made a written request to the receiver for the offering memorandum. The receiver did not reply to the letter because he felt he was precluded from so doing by the provisions of the letter of intent dated February 11, 1991. Other prospective purchasers were also unsuccessful in obtaining the promised memorandum to assist them in preparing their bids. It should be noted that, exclusivity provision of the letter of intent expired on February 20, 1991. This provision was extended on three occasions, viz., February 19, 22 and March 5, 1991. It is clear that from a legal standpoint the receiver, by refusing to extend the time, could have dealt with other prospective purchasers, and specifically with 922.

105 It was not until March 1, 1991, that CCFL had obtained sufficient information to enable it to make a bid through 922. It succeeded in so doing through its own efforts through sources other than the receiver. By that time the receiver had already entered into the letter of intent with OEL. Notwithstanding the fact that the receiver knew since December of 1990 that CCFL wished to make a bid for the assets of Air Toronto (and there is no evidence to suggest that at that time such a bid would be in conjunction with Air Canada or that Air Canada was in any way connected with CCFL), it took no steps to provide CCFL with information necessary to enable it to make an intelligent bid, and indeed suggested delaying the making of the bid until an offering memorandum had been prepared and provided. In the meantime, by entering into the letter of intent with OEL, it put itself in a position where it could not negotiate with CCFL or provide the information requested.

106 On February 28, 1991, the solicitors for CCFL telephoned the receiver and were advised for the first time that the receiver had made a business decision to negotiate solely with OEL and would not negotiate with anyone else in the interim.

107 By letter dated March 1, 1991, CCFL advised the receiver that it intended to submit a bid. It set forth the essential terms of the bid and stated that it would be subject to customary commercial provisions. On March 7, 1991 CCFL and Air Canada, jointly through 922, submitted an offer to purchase Air Toronto upon the terms set forth in the letter dated March 1, 1991. It included a provision that the offer was conditional upon the interpretation of an inter-lender agreement which set out the relative distribution of proceeds as between CCFL and the Royal Bank. It is common ground that it was a condition over which the receiver had no control, and accordingly would not have been acceptable on that ground alone. The receiver did not, however, contact CCFL in order to negotiate or request the removal of the condition, although it appears that its agreement with OEL not to negotiate with any person other than OEL expired on March 6, 1991.

108 The fact of the matter is that by March 7, 1991, the receiver had received the offer from OEL which was subsequently approved by Rosenberg J. That offer was accepted by the receiver on March 8, 1991. Notwithstanding the fact that OEL had been negotiating the purchase for a period of approximately 3 months, the offer contained a provision for the sole benefit of the purchaser that it was subject to the purchaser obtaining "a financing commitment within 45 days of the date hereof in an amount not less than the Purchase Price from the Royal Bank of Canada or other financial institution upon terms and conditions acceptable to them. In the event that such a financing commitment is not obtained within such 45 day period, the purchaser or OEL shall have the right to terminate this agreement upon giving written notice of termination to the vendor on the first Business Day following the expiry of the said period." The purchaser was also given the right to waive the condition.

109 In effect, the agreement was tantamount to a 45-day option to purchase, excluding the right of any other person to purchase Air Toronto during that period of time and thereafter if the condition was fulfilled or waived. The agreement was, of course, stated to be subject to court approval.

110 In my opinion, the process and procedure adopted by the receiver was unfair to CCFL. Although it was aware from December 1990 that CCFL was interested in making an offer, it effectively delayed the making of such offer by continually referring to the preparation of the offering memorandum. It did not endeavour during the period December 1990 to March 7, 1991, to negotiate with CCFL in any way the possible terms of purchase and sale agreement. In the result, no offer was sought from CCFL by the receiver prior to February 11, 1991, and thereafter it put itself in the position of being unable to negotiate with anyone other than OEL. The receiver then, on March 8, 1991, chose to accept an offer which was conditional in nature without prior consultation with CCFL (922) to see whether it was prepared to remove the condition in its offer.

111 I do not doubt that the receiver felt that it was more likely that the condition in the OEL offer would be fulfilled than the condition in the 922 offer. It may be that the receiver, having negotiated for a period of 3 months with OEL, was fearful that it might lose the offer if OEL discovered that it was negotiating with another person. Nevertheless, it seems to me that it was imprudent and unfair on the part of the receiver to ignore an offer from an interested party which offered approximately triple the cash down payment without giving a chance to the offeror to remove the conditions or other terms which made the offer unacceptable to it. The potential loss was that of an agreement which amounted to little more than an option in favour of the offeror.

112 In my opinion the procedure adopted by the receiver was unfair to CCFL in that, in effect, it gave OEL the opportunity of engaging in exclusive negotiations for a period of 3 months, notwithstanding the fact that it knew CCFL was interested in making an offer. The receiver did not indicate a deadline by which offers were to be submitted, and it did not at any time indicate the structure or nature of an offer which might be acceptable to it.

113 In his reasons, Rosenberg J. stated that as of March 1, CCFL and Air Canada had all the information that they needed, and any allegations of unfairness in the negotiating process by the receiver had disappeared. He said:

They created a situation as of March 8, where the receiver was faced with two offers, one of which was acceptable in form and one of which could not possibly be accepted in its present form. The Receiver acted appropriately in accepting the OEL offer.

If he meant by "acceptable in form" that it was acceptable to the receiver, then obviously OEL had the unfair advantage of its lengthy negotiations with the receiver to ascertain what kind of an offer would be acceptable to the receiver. If, on the other hand, he meant that the 922 offer was unacceptable in its form because it was conditional, it can hardly be said that the OEL offer was more acceptable in this regard, as it contained a condition with respect to financing terms and conditions "*acceptable to them*."

114 It should be noted that on March 13, 1991, the representatives of 922 first met with the receiver to review its offer of March 7, 1991, and at the request of the receiver, withdrew the inter-lender condition from its offer. On March 14, 1991, OEL removed the financing condition from its offer. By order of Rosenberg J. dated March 26, 1991, CCFIL was given until April 5, 1991, to submit a bid, and on April 5, 1991, 922 submitted its offer with the inter-lender condition removed.

115 In my opinion, the offer accepted by the receiver is improvident and unfair insofar as the two creditors are concerned. It is not improvident in the sense that the price offered by 922 greatly exceeded that offered by OEL. In the final analysis it may not be greater at all. The salient fact is that the cash down payment in the 922 offer constitutes proximately two thirds of the contemplated sale price, whereas the cash down payment in the OEL transaction constitutes approximately 20 to 25 per cent of the contemplated sale price. In terms of absolute dollars, the down payment in the 922 offer would likely exceed that provided for in the OEL agreement by approximately \$3 million to \$4 million.

116 In *Re Beauty Counsellors of Canada Ltd.*, supra, Saunders J. said at p. 243 [C.B.R.]:

If a substantially higher bid turns up at the approval stage, the court should consider it. Such a bid may indicate, for example, that the trustee has not properly carried out its duty to endeavour to obtain the best price for the estate. In such a case the proper course might be to refuse approval and to ask the trustee to recommence the process.

117 I accept that statement as being an accurate statement of the law. I would add, however, as previously indicated, that in determining what is the best price for the estate, the receiver or court should not limit its consideration to which offer provides for the greater sale price. The amount of down payment and the provision or lack thereof to secure payment of the balance of the purchase price over and above the down payment may be the most important factor to be considered, and I am of the view that is so in the present case. It is clear that that was the view of the only creditors who can benefit from the sale of Air Toronto.

118 I note that in the case at bar the 922 offer in conditional form was presented to the receiver before it accepted the OEL offer. The receiver, in good faith, although I believe mistakenly, decided that the OEL offer was the better offer. At that time the receiver did not have the benefit of the views of the two secured creditors in that regard. At the time of the application for approval before Rosenberg J., the stated preference of the two interested creditors was made quite clear. He found as fact that knowledgeable creditors would not be anxious to rely on contingencies in the present circumstances surrounding the airline industry. It is reasonable to expect that a receiver would be no less knowledgeable in that regard, and it is his primary duty to protect the interests of the creditors. In my view, it was an improvident act on the part of the receiver to have accepted the conditional offer made by OEL, and Rosenberg J. erred in failing to dismiss the application of the receiver for approval of the OEL offer. It would be most inequitable to foist upon the two creditors, who have already been seriously hurt, more unnecessary contingencies.

119 Although in other circumstances it might be appropriate to ask the receiver to recommence the process, in my opinion, it would not be appropriate to do so in this case. The only two interested creditors support the acceptance of the 922 offer, and the court should so order.

120 Although I would be prepared to dispose of the case on the grounds stated above, some comment should be addressed to the question of interference by the court with the process and procedure adopted by the receiver.

121 I am in agreement with the view expressed by McKinlay J.A. in her reasons that the undertaking being sold in this case was of a very special and unusual nature. As a result, the procedure adopted by the receiver was somewhat unusual. At the outset, in accordance with the terms of the receiving order, it dealt solely with Air Canada. It then appears that the receiver contemplated a sale of the assets by way of auction, and still later contemplated the preparation and distribution of an offering memorandum inviting bids. At some point, without advice to CCFL, it abandoned that idea and reverted to exclusive negotiations with one interested party. This entire process is not one which is customary or widely accepted as a general practice in the commercial world. It was somewhat unique, having regard to the circumstances of this case. In my opinion, the refusal of the court to approve the offer accepted by the receiver would not reflect on the integrity of procedures followed by court-appointed receivers, and is not the type of refusal which will have a tendency to undermine the future confidence of business persons in dealing with receivers.

122 Rosenberg J. stated that the Royal Bank was aware of the process used and tacitly approved it. He said it knew the terms of the letter of intent in February 1991, and made no comment. The Royal Bank did, however, indicate to the receiver that it was not satisfied with the contemplated price, nor the amount of the down payment. It did not, however, tell the receiver to adopt a different process in endeavouring to sell the Air Toronto assets. It is not clear from the material filed that at the time it became aware of the letter of intent that it knew that CCFL was interested in purchasing Air Toronto.

123 I am further of the opinion that a prospective purchaser who has been given an opportunity to engage in exclusive negotiations with a receiver for relatively short periods of time which are extended from time to time by the receiver, and who then makes a conditional offer, the condition of which is for his sole benefit and must be fulfilled to his satisfaction unless waived by him, and which he knows is to be subject to court approval, cannot legitimately claim to have been unfairly dealt with if the court refuses to approve the offer and approves a substantially better one.

124 In conclusion, I feel that I must comment on the statement made by Galligan J.A. in his reasons to the effect that the suggestion made by counsel for 922 constitutes evidence of lack of prejudice resulting from the absence of an offering memorandum. It should be pointed out that the court invited counsel to indicate the manner in which the problem should be resolved in the event that the court concluded that the order approving the OEL offer should be set aside. There was no evidence before the court with respect to what additional information may have been acquired by CCFL since March 8, 1991, and no inquiry was made in that regard. Accordingly, I am of the view that no adverse inference should be drawn from the proposal made as a result of the court's invitation.

125 For the above reasons I would allow the appeal one set of costs to CCFL-922, set aside the order of Rosenberg J., dismiss the receiver's motion with one set of costs to CCFL-922 and order that the assets of Air Toronto be sold to numbered corporation 922246 on the terms set forth in its offer with appropriate adjustments to provide for the delay in its execution. Costs awarded shall be payable out of the estate of Soundair Corporation. The costs incurred by the receiver in making the application and responding to the appeal shall be paid to him out of the assets of the estate of Soundair Corporation on a solicitor-client basis. I would make no order as to costs of any of the other parties or intervenors.

Appeal dismissed.

TAB 6

Court of Queen's Bench of Alberta

Citation: Bank of Montreal v. Calgary West Hospitality Inc., 2011 ABQB 293

Date: 20110429
Docket: 0903 12151
Registry: Edmonton

2011 ABQB 293 (CanLII)

Between:

Bank of Montreal

Plaintiff

- and -

Calgary West Hospitality Inc., Gamehost Limited Partnership, Gamehost Management Inc., Darcy Will and David Will

Defendants

**Reasons for Judgment
of the
Honourable Madam Justice J.E. Topolniski**

I. Introduction

[1] A consent receivership order granted on August 13, 2009 (the Receivership Order) appointed Deloitte & Touche Inc. the receiver and manager (Receiver) of the assets and undertakings of Calgary West Hospitality Inc. (Calgary West).

[2] There are two interconnected applications now before the court:

1. The Defendants' application for leave to commence litigation (Cause of Action) against the Calgary Exhibition and Stampede Limited (CES), which they say they are entitled to pursue at their own cost and for their own benefit under an agreement made with the Plaintiff Bank of Montreal

(BMO). The Receiver and BMO oppose the application on the basis that there is potential value in the Cause of Action, which should be monetized for the benefit of the creditors of Calgary West.

2. The Receiver's application for directions concerning marketing the Cause of Action. The Receiver suggests a closed auction involving BMO, the Defendants and CES. The Defendants oppose the application, urging that any bidding process for the Cause of Action should exclude BMO and CES.

II. Background

[3] The Defendant Calgary West is a private company that was involved in the operation of a casino on the Calgary Stampede grounds. The casino and grounds are owned by CES. BMO provided a commercial debt facility to Calgary West, secured by assignments of rents and leases and a charge against all of its present and after acquired property, including "choses in action of every kind or nature." The Defendants Gamehost Limited Partnership, Darcy Will and David Will all gave limited guarantees of Calgary West's obligations to BMO. The Defendant Gamehost Management Inc. is the general partner of Gamehost Limited Partnership. After February or March 2009, Calgary West's account was under the management of BMO's special accounts handling unit.

[4] On July 27, 2009, Calgary West informed BMO that it could no longer fund casino operations and intended to cease operations by August 7, 2009 - two days before the opening of the Calgary Stampede.

[5] BMO commenced action against the Defendants on August 6, 2009. It claims that Calgary West owed it \$41,245,554.80 at the time.

[6] Counsel for BMO and the Defendants started negotiating a form of receivership order while their clients engaged in simultaneous settlement discussions that included Calgary West proposing to "hand over the casino keys" to BMO and to waive the notice requirement under s. 244 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 ("BIA"), and the guarantors proposing a payment on the guarantees in satisfaction of their obligations.

[7] The following is a summary of the pertinent events (taken in part from certain "without prejudice" correspondence relating to the settlement discussions entered into evidence on this application by BMO, without objection by the Defendants):

- (a) On July 31, 2009, the Defendants offered to resolve matters with BMO in part by making a deferred \$20,500,000 cash payment in satisfaction of the guarantors' obligations, entering into a management agreement with the

receiver, co-operating with the receiver, and sharing with BMO in any surplus at the end of the receivership.

- (b) On August 6, 2009, BMO responded with a counter-proposal that referred to a receiver and potential for a management agreement with the receiver, but pointing out that any surplus would be paid to other creditors in priority to the Defendants.
- (c) On August 10, 2009, BMO's counsel presented a draft receivership order to Defendants' counsel that provided in clause 3(j) of the order for the usual power of a receiver to prosecute, defend and settle litigation. That provision also required the receiver to investigate the Cause of Action and to report to the court on its investigation on notice to BMO and the Defendants if it chose not to seek court approval to sue CES.
- (d) Defendants' counsel responded on August 10, 2009 by e-mail (the letter is incorrectly dated July 30, 2009) seeking a change to clause 3(j) (the Requested Change) to "...reflect that the Defendants are at liberty, at their cost, to pursue the claim against Calgary Exhibition & Stampede Limited in the event that the Receiver elects not to do so..."
- (e) The Defendants made another settlement offer on August 11, 2009 for \$20,500,000 to be paid by the guarantors by installments, the last of which would occur by September 20, 2009. This offer also spoke of a management agreement with the receiver.
- (f) BMO's counsel responded on August 11, 2009, accepting the money payment offered by the guarantors and offering this comment about the proposed management agreement: "...BMO cannot fetter the discretion of the Court and the entering into any Management Agreement by Deloitte & Touche would be subject to Court approval. That said, if BMO, as the largest creditor of Calgary West and Deloitte, as the Receiver support entering into a Management Contract with your client's management company, we are hopeful that the Court would be persuaded that entering into a Management Contract was in the best interests of all parties." Aspects of BMO's letter of August 6th referencing the receivership also were incorporated by reference.
- (g) On August 12, 2009, a revised draft receivership order incorporating the Requested Change was circulated by counsel for BMO to counsel for the Alberta Gaming and Liquor Commission, Deloitte & Touche, the Defendants and CES (the August 12th Draft). Clause 3(j) of the August 12th Draft read, in part:

...In respect to potential for commencement for proceedings as against (CES), the Receiver shall investigate the commencement of such proceedings and shall report to this Court in respect thereto upon notice to BMO and the Defendants and in the event that the Receiver does not seek the approval of the Court to commence such proceedings, some or all of the Defendants shall be authorized to commence such proceedings. The Receiver shall not settle or compromise any claim against CES without first obtaining the approval of the Defendants and failing such approval, the Order of this Court." [Emphasis added.]

- (h) Deloitte & Touche's counsel indicated that leave of the court would be required before the Defendants could pursue the Cause of Action. On being advised of that, Defendants' counsel sent a letter to BMO's counsel on August 12th (the "August 12th Letter") saying:

You have advised that the solicitor for the Receiver has requested a further change to paragraph 3(j) of the Receivership Order. I do not see the need for the change. However, I also do not see the need for incurring additional costs for the Receiver's solicitor to attend in Court to argue the matter. It does not make economical sense. Having said this, please provide me with a revised form of Receivership Order that includes the change requested for the solicitor for the Receiver.

- (i) The August 12th Draft was amended to reflect the Receiver's request, signed by the Defendants' counsel, and returned to BMO's counsel later in the day on August 12, 2009.
- (j) The Receivership Order was granted on August 13, 2009. The relevant portion of clause 3(j) of the Receivership Order reads as follows:

...In respect to potential for commencement for proceedings as against (CES), the Receiver shall investigate the commencement of such proceedings and shall report to this Court in respect thereto upon notice to BMO and the Defendants and in the event that the Receiver does not seek the approval of the Court to commence such proceedings, some or all of the Defendants may seek leave of the Court to commence such proceedings. The Receiver shall not settle or compromise any claim against CES without first obtaining the approval of the Defendants and failing such approval, the Order of this Court." [Emphasis added.]

- (k) The guarantors' settlement with BMO was concluded in October 2009. Monies were paid and releases given.
- (l) Since its appointment, the Receiver has carried out its mandate, including operating the casino while it was being marketed, and investigating the proposed litigation. A broad marketing effort resulted in sale of the casino for nine million dollars to corporate and trust vehicles controlled by CES. [The Receiver's Third Report to the Court indicates that it had been proposed that concurrent with the sale, CES would acquire all or a portion of the debt and security held by BMO over Calgary West's present and after acquired property. It is unknown whether that occurred.] The sale was approved by the court in May 2010.
- (m) Even with the monies paid on the guarantees and the net proceeds from the casino sale, BMO has sustained a shortfall of more than thirty million dollars. The Receiver reported in May 2010 that it anticipated there would be no funds available for distribution to the unsecured creditors.

[8] The Receiver has not sought the approval of the court to pursue the Cause of Action against CES itself. As a result, the present cross-applications have been brought. The Cause of Action is a chose in action which, subject to any agreement between BMO and the Defendants and the effect of clause 3(j) of the Receivership Order, is captured by the security made in BMO's favour.

III. The Issues

[9] The interconnected issues in relation to the cross-applications are:

- A. Should the Defendants be granted leave to pursue the Cause of Action at their own cost and for their own benefit?
- B. If not, how should the Receiver realize on the value of the Cause of Action?

IV. The Parties' Positions

[10] The Defendants assert that it would be unfair and constitute a miscarriage of justice to deny them leave to pursue the Cause of Action at their own cost and for their own benefit, since BMO agreed that they could do so.

[11] Alternatively, they argue that if leave is denied and the Cause of Action is put to auction, BMO and CES should be excluded from the bidding process; BMO because of the alleged agreement and CES because it is not a known creditor of Calgary West.

[12] BMO contends that the wording of clause 3(j) of the Receivership Order is sufficient evidence of it having reserved the right to argue against the Defendants being allowed to pursue the Cause of Action if the Receiver elected not to do so itself. BMO takes the position that there was no agreement between it and the Defendants. It says that it did not require a consent receivership order as a condition of the settlement with the guarantors and was merely deferring decision-making. It says that it only consented to the final Receivership Order and that the August 12th Draft was just that, a draft. It asserts that it has not released its security in the Cause of Action and wants to bid on it.

[13] The Receiver submits that the Defendants' leave application supports a finding that the Cause of Action is an asset of some value that should not be given away for free. It contends that even if the alleged agreement between BMO and the Defendants exists, it cannot override the Receiver's fiduciary duty to maximize recovery for the creditors or derogate from the court's jurisdiction. The Receiver wants to put the Cause of Action to a bidding process involving the Defendants, CES and BMO as the "most interested" parties.

V. Analysis

A. Should the Defendants be Granted Leave to Pursue the Cause of Action at Their Own Cost and for their Own Benefit?

[14] The Defendants' leave application hinges on whether they can establish in this summary hearing that they should be allowed to pursue the Cause of Action at their own cost and for their own benefit because:

1. all interested parties agreed that they could do so; or
2. the Cause of Action has no value for the estate; or
3. there is some reason why the estate should not benefit from realizing on the value of the Cause of Action.

1. Is there an agreement by all interested parties?

[15] The Defendants contend that BMO agreed that they could pursue the Cause of Action at their own cost and for their own benefit if the Receiver elected not to do so, as evidenced by the August 12th Draft.

[16] However, while the Cause of Action remains the property of Calgary West and while BMO has security in the Cause of Action, neither has control over that property. It is the Receiver which has possession and control over the Cause of Action. There is no dispute that the Receiver refused to agree to the August 12th Draft and insisted that the Defendants would have to seek court approval to commence the litigation.

[17] The Defendants do not allege any agreement on the part of the Receiver to consent to their leave application. Indeed, Victor Kroeger, who swore an affidavit on behalf of the Receiver, deposed that at no time was the Receiver a party to any agreement with the Defendants or any other party to the effect that the Defendants could proceed, for their own benefit, with a claim against CES should the Receiver elect not to pursue such a claim.

[18] Even if BMO did enter into the agreement alleged by the Defendants, that agreement would bind only those two parties. At most, BMO could have agreed to compromise only its own position, not that of Calgary West's other creditors. If the implication of the alleged agreement is that BMO would relinquish its security in the Cause of Action or not take any benefit from it, the Cause of Action would remain the property of the Defendants. That property would still fall under the receivership and should be available to benefit the other creditors. The Defendants do not allege that Calgary West's other creditors agreed that the Defendants could pursue the Cause of Action if the Receiver decided not to do so.

[19] The Receivership Order speaks for itself. The language of clause 3(j) is clear. Leave is required before the Defendants can pursue the Cause of Action. For their own reasons and based on their own perceptions of the consequences, the Defendants agreed to that language. It is a valid, subsisting and binding order. It is also a sensible order as it properly recognizes and preserves the functions of the Receiver and the court.

[20] A court-appointed receiver is an officer of the court with fiduciary obligations to the estate (*Bennett on the PPSA (Ontario)*, 3rd ed. (Markham, Ont.: Butterworths, 2006) at p. 53). A court appointed receiver is not subject to control by the party appointing it or by anyone other than the court.

[21] The Receiver here has not sought the approval of the court to pursue the Cause of Action at the expense of the estate, but rather is proposing a limited sales process which it believes could result in the estate obtaining maximum value and realization on the Cause of Action.

2. Does the Cause of Action have some value for the estate?

[22] I agree with the Receiver that the Defendants' leave application and BMO's support for the Receiver's proposal to allow the Defendants, BMO and CES to bid on the Cause of Action are evidence that the Cause of Action has some value. As a result, the potential exists for the creditors to benefit from a sale of this property.

[23] Having investigated the Cause of Action, the Receiver has elected not to pursue it. Presumably, if the Receiver was of the view that the Cause of Action might have a value of over 30 million dollars, it would have decided otherwise.

[24] As BMO is Calgary West's principal secured creditor (unless its security has been assigned to CES) and as it is still owed over 30 million dollars, the reality is that it is the only creditor which could benefit from the proceeds received from a sale of the Cause of Action, unless the Defendants can prove that BMO agreed to relinquish its security in that asset and/or agreed not to take any benefit from the Cause of Action, in which case the other creditors of Calgary West might receive a benefit.

3. Is there some reason why the estate should not benefit from realizing on the value of the Cause of Action?

[25] No contractual, equitable or other reason has been cited by the Defendants why its creditors, other than BMO, should not benefit from a sale of the Cause of Action.

[26] The Defendants may have a cause of action against BMO if they can prove that the bank impliedly agreed not to contest their leave application. However, that need not be decided now. The Defendants can file a statement of claim against BMO if they choose to do so.

[27] The Defendants contend that the court should not allow a process that could result in BMO reneging on its agreement to allow them to pursue the Cause of Action at their own cost and for their own benefit.

[28] I agree that it would be inequitable to allow BMO (and presumably any assignee of its security in the property of Canada West) to participate in the bidding and/or to benefit from a sale of the Cause of Action if the Defendants can prove that BMO expressly or impliedly agreed not to do so. That issue can be addressed in relation to the Receiver's application. However, as I have stated previously, even if the Defendants can prove the alleged agreement with BMO, that agreement cannot prejudice the rights of other creditors.

[29] The Defendants' application for leave to pursue the Cause of Action at their own cost and for their own benefit is denied.

B. How Should the Receiver Realize on the Value of the Cause of Action?

1. Bidding process

[30] Section 247 of the *BIA* specifies that a receiver must act honestly and in good faith and deal with the property of the insolvent company in a commercially reasonable manner.

[31] The Receiver here is of the view that more can be realized for the estate by putting the Cause of Action up for bidding by the Defendants and CES (the most interested parties to the proposed litigation) and by BMO (the “most interested” creditor), than by pursuing the Cause of Action itself at the expense of the estate.

[32] There is case law which supports the Receiver’s proposal to put the Cause of Action up for bids. In *Re Katz* (1991), 6 C.B.R. (3d) 211 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)), Farley J. considered an application to set aside the sale of a lawsuit by a trustee in bankruptcy who had sold a piece of litigation after seeking sealed bids from the only two likely bidders, the “parties friendly to the two sides of the action.” The highest and successful bidder was a company owned by the defendants to the litigation, which beat out the bankrupt. Mr. Justice Farley observed that the result of the sale was a settlement of the lawsuit for the price of the assignment, concluding that the process and result were legitimate.

[33] Farley J. compared (at para. 5) the trustee’s duty to that of a receiver. Citing *Royal Bank of Canada v. Soundair Corporation* (1991), 4 O.R. (3d) 1 (C.A.), he considered the following to be factors relevant to assessing the propriety of a receiver’s action in selling assets:

- (i) whether the receiver has made a sufficient effort to get the best price and has not acted improvidently;
- (ii) the interests of all parties;
- (iii) the efficacy and integrity of the process; and
- (iv) whether there has been unfairness in the working out of the process.

[34] In my view, these considerations also apply to a receiver’s intended sale process.

[35] There are many ways that a receiver can go about selling an asset. Where, as here, the asset is an unusual one, the court should be open to creative processes to maximize recovery for the estate. In ascertaining whether a suggested process is appropriate, the court’s concern (as on an application to approve a sale completed by a receiver) should be whether the process is reliable, transparent, efficient, fair and one which guards the parties’ interests.

[36] The Defendants do not suggest that the proposed bidding process would constitute champerty and maintenance. Given the commercial interests at stake, I agree (*1239745 Ontario Ltd. v. Bank of America Canada*, [1999] O.J. No. 3178 at para. 67 (S.C.J.) (QL)). They simply take the position that neither BMO nor CES should participate in the bidding. They offer no alternatives, presumably as they wish to be the only bidder.

[37] Like Farley J. in *Re Katz*, I consider the process of calling for tenders one that invites fairness (at para. 12). A bid process or auction involving the only directly interested parties, the Defendants, CES and BMO would provide an efficient and commercially reasonable approach to

monetizing the asset. The question is whether it would be fair and one which guards the parties' interests.

2. Who should be invited to participate?

[38] The Defendants argue that it would make no sense to include CES in the bidding process. However, as the intended defendant in the Cause of Action, CES may well have an interest in bidding as a sale to it would constitute a settlement of the lawsuit.

[39] BMO, assuming it has not assigned its security to some other entity, is the principal secured creditor of Canada West and has an interest in recovering as much as possible on the debt owed to it.

[40] As previously stated, the Defendants urge that it would be unfair to allow BMO (and presumably any assignee of its security in the property of Canada West) to participate in the bidding and/or to benefit from a sale of the Cause of Action since it agreed that the Defendants could pursue the Cause of Action for their own benefit if the Receiver elected not to do so. The Defendants, in bringing their own application and in opposing BMO's right to bid on the Cause of Action, in essence are seeking a form of summary judgment.

[41] It is helpful in framing the analysis to consider the following principles governing summary judgment:

1. The party who applies for summary judgment bears the evidentiary burden of proving all facts necessary to establish its claim on a balance of probabilities (*Pioneer Exploration Inc. (Trustee of) v. Euro-Am Pacific Enterprises Ltd.*, 2003 ABCA 298, 339 A.R. 165); *Bank of Montreal v. Kalin* (1992), 131 A.R. 397 (C.A.)). The evidentiary burden then shifts to the other party to prove that there is a genuine issue for trial, although the ultimate burden remains with the moving party.
2. It must be beyond doubt that no genuine issue for trial exists (*Dow Chemical Canada Inc. v. Shell Chemicals Canada Ltd.*, 2010 ABCA 126 at para. 14, citing *Tottrup v. Clearwater (Municipal District No. 99)*, 2006 ABCA 380 at paras. 9-10, 401 A.R. 88).
3. If the outcome of the case depends on the interpretation of a statute or document or some other issue of law arising from undisputed facts, the test is whether the issue of law can fairly be decided on the record before the court. It may be necessary to have a full trial if the legal issue is unsettled, complex or fact dependent, in order to provide a proper foundation for the decision (*Tottrup* at para. 11).

[42] As to consideration for the agreement alleged by the Defendants, David Will, one of the Defendant guarantors and a director of Calgary West, deposed that:

At the same time as the proposed Consent Receivership Order the Defendants proposed a settlement on the Guarantees which was accepted by the Plaintiff. The settlement included a Consent Receivership Order as well as the payment of \$20,500,00.00 on the Guarantees. However, included in this settlement was the agreement of the Bank of Montreal that the Defendants could proceed with a claim for their own benefit, against the Calgary Exhibition and Stampede Limited in the event that the Receiver elected not to do so.

[43] While it is not entirely clear, this statement seems to suggest that it was a condition of the Defendants' agreement to consent to a receivership order and to reach a settlement on the guarantees that BMO would allow the Defendants to pursue the Cause of Action for their own benefit if the Receiver elected not to do so.

[44] The "without prejudice" correspondence entered into evidence does not disclose an express requirement by BMO for a consent receivership order as a condition of its settlement with the guarantors, nor an express requirement by the guarantors that the Defendants be allowed to pursue the Cause of Action as a condition of their settlement with the bank. However, there were repeated references to receivership that began with the Defendants' opening offer of July 31, 2009 and continued until the parties' attentions turned to drafting the receivership order.

[45] BMO contends that a consent receivership order was not a condition of BMO's settlement with the Defendants, but rather arose from Calgary West's notification of its intention to "hand over the keys" to BMO and its advice that BMO could "continue operations under its security."

[46] David Ross, the lead special accounts manager at BMO assigned to this loan, swore an affidavit in opposition to the Defendants' application. In questioning on that affidavit, he confirmed that settlement discussions with the guarantors and discussions concerning a consent receivership order were being held within the same time frame. However, he denied that the two were a package deal. He reluctantly acknowledged that he had had "no objection" to the Defendants' Requested Change, but later added that the August 12th Draft was a draft order which had to be agreed to by other counsel.

[47] As to the terms of the alleged agreement, the Defendants maintain that BMO's August 12th Draft included their Requested Change and accurately reflects the intentions of BMO and the Defendants and what actually was agreed to by them. It stresses that it was the Receiver and not BMO which sought amendment of clause 3(j).

[48] On August 10, 2009, counsel for the Defendants requested an amendment to the initial draft of the receivership order to "...reflect that the Defendants are at liberty, at their cost, to pursue the claim against Calgary Exhibition & Stampede Limited in the event that the Receiver

elects not to do so..." No mention was made of who was to receive the benefit if the Cause of Action was successfully litigated.

[49] The August 12th Draft stated: "... in the event that the Receiver does not seek the approval of the Court to commence such proceedings, some or all of the Defendants shall be authorized to commence such proceedings..." Again, no mention was made of who was to receive the benefit of pursuing the Cause of Action. Nor was mention made as to who would bear the cost of the litigation.

[50] In its submissions, BMO states that: "[o]n August 12, 2009, the Receivership Order was revised to reflect the changes requested by RMRP to paragraph 3(j) and was circulated ... for comment and agreement thereto." At most then, BMO appears to be acknowledging that the August 12th Draft was intended to reflect the Requested Change that the Defendants be at liberty, at their cost, to pursue the Cause of Action.

[51] Murray Sutherland, a special accounts manager with BMO, deposed that:

1. Before the Receivership Order, BMO deferred making a decision about who would benefit from the proposed litigation as it was unnecessary to do so earlier;
2. Clause 3(j) of the Receivership Order allowed the parties to defer their decisions and advance all available arguments on a leave application;
3. There was no discussion about selling the proposed litigation before the Receivership Order or about BMO releasing its security in it.
4. BMO never entered into the agreement alleged by the Defendants.

[52] BMO is a sophisticated lender. It involved its special accounts branch and veteran insolvency counsel to deal with the Defendants and this receivership. Given the experience of those involved, I would have expected BMO to respond to the Defendants' Requested Change with a clear statement that it wished to defer any decision on who should benefit from the Cause of Action, if that in fact was its intention. Instead, BMO's counsel prepared and circulated the August 12th Draft, which incorporated the Requested Change. In doing so, BMO ran the risk that the Receiver would agree to the August 12th Draft. If BMO's counsel had no objection to the Defendants' Requested Change but questioned whether the Receiver might, why was that not communicated clearly? If BMO was concerned about fettering the court's discretion and the need for court approval, why did it not provide for that in the April 12th Draft?

[53] I note that in communications dated August 11, 2009, the Defendants sought a management contract with the receiver as part of the settlement. BMO's counsel responded, advising that BMO could not agree as it would fetter the court's jurisdiction and that court approval was needed. He went on to say "...we are hopeful that the Court would be persuaded

that entering into a Management Contract was in the best interests of all parties.” This is an unequivocal statement of position. If BMO had decided that it could not accede to the Defendants’ Requested Change without the receiver’s approval and, ultimately, court approval, it is surprising that it did not make a similarly clear statement of position. Rather, BMO’s counsel simply circulated the August 12th Draft.

[54] BMO’s explanation for the August 12th Draft, the position which it now takes, and the conflict in the evidence with respect to consideration for the alleged agreement raise questions of credibility, which cannot be determined summarily. In my view, there is a genuine issue for trial as to whether there was an agreement (aside from any reflected in the Receivership Order) between the Defendants and BMO concerning the Defendants’ pursuit of the Cause of Action and, if there was such an agreement, what the express and implied terms of that agreement were.

[55] I am directing a trial of those issues. Counsel are to appear before me within the next 30 days in order to discuss the manner of proceeding.

[56] Should BMO be precluded from bidding on the Cause of Action in the interim? The tripartite test for an injunction is whether the applicant can demonstrate: (1) there is a serious question to be tried; (2) the applicant would suffer irreparable harm if the stay were refused; and (3) the balance of convenience favours the stay: *Manitoba (Attorney General) v. Metropolitan Stores (MTS) Ltd.*, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 110, 38 D.L.R. (4th) 321; *RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (A.G.)*, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311, 111 D.L.R. (4th) 385; *Harper v. Canada (Attorney General)*, 2000 SCC 57; [2000] 2 S.C.R. 764.

[57] I have already concluded that there is a serious issue to be tried. The parties did not make submissions on the other parts of the tripartite test. Given that there may be a limitation period approaching in terms of the Cause of Action, I conclude that it would be more appropriate as an interim measure to direct the Receiver to file a claim in respect to the Cause of Action in order to preserve the rights of the Defendants and BMO. The Cause of Action can be put up for bidding after the trial of the issues between the Defendants and BMO, if appropriate. If no bids are received, the Receiver may discontinue the litigation. The Receiver may apply to the court for directions as to whether the estate or some other party should be responsible for any costs incurred by the Receiver in commencing the action.

[58] The Receiver and BM are to have their costs of the Defendants' leave application. If the parties cannot agree on costs of the Receiver's application, they may speak to me on issue within the next 30 days.

Heard on the 24th day of March, 2011.

Dated at the City of Edmonton, Alberta this 29th day of April, 2011.

J.E. Topolniski

J.C.Q.B.A.

Appearances:

Richard J. Cotter Q.C.
for the Bank of Montreal

Douglas N. Tkachuk
for Gamehost Limited Partnership, Gamehost Management Inc.,
Darcy Will and David Will

Steven H. Leitzl
for Deloitte & Touche Inc.

TAB 7

CITATION: CCM Master Qualified Fund v. blutip Power Technologies, 2012 ONSC 1750
COURT FILE NO.: CV-12-9622-00CL
DATE: 20120315

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO

COMMERCIAL LIST

RE: CCM Master Qualified Fund, Ltd., Applicant

AND:

blutip Power Technologies Ltd., Respondent

BEFORE: D. M. Brown J.

COUNSEL: L. Rogers and C. Burr, for the Receiver, Duff & Phelps Canada Restructuring Inc.

A. Cobb and A. Lockhart, for the Applicant

HEARD: March 15, 2012

REASONS FOR DECISION

I. Receiver's motion for directions: sales/auction process & priority of receiver's charges

[1] By Appointment Order made February 28, 2012, Duff & Phelps Canada Restructuring Inc. ("D&P") was appointed receiver of blutip Power Technologies Ltd. ("Blutip"), a publicly listed technology company based in Mississauga which engages in the research, development and sale of hydrogen generating systems and combustion controls. Blutip employs 10 people and, as the Receiver stressed several times in its materials, the company does not maintain any pension plans.

[2] D&P moves for orders approving (i) a sales process and bidding procedures, including the use of a stalking horse credit bid, (ii) the priority of a Receiver's Charge and Receiver's Borrowings Charge, and (iii) the activities reported in its First Report. Notice of this motion was given to affected persons. No one appeared to oppose the order sought. At the hearing today I granted the requested Bidding Procedures Order; these are my Reasons for so doing.

II. Background to this motion

[3] The Applicant, CCM Master Qualified Fund, Ltd. ("CCM"), is the senior secured lender to Blutip. At present Blutip owes CCM approximately \$3.7 million consisting of (i) two

convertible senior secured promissory notes (October 21, 2011: \$2.6 million and December 29, 2011: \$800,000), (ii) \$65,000 advanced last month pursuant to a Receiver's Certificate, and (iii) \$47,500 on account of costs of appointing the Receiver (as per para. 30 of the Appointment Order). Receiver's counsel has opined that the security granted by Blutip in favour of CCM creates a valid and perfected security interest in the company's business and assets.

[4] At the time of the appointment of the Receiver Blutip was in a development phase with no significant sources of revenue and was dependant on external sources of equity and debt funding to operate. As noted by Morawetz J. in his February 28, 2012 endorsement:

In making this determination [to appoint a receiver] I have taken into account that there is no liquidity in the debtor and that it is unable to make payroll and it currently has no board. Stability in the circumstances is required and this can be accomplished by the appointment of a receiver.

[5] As the Receiver reported, it does not have access to sufficient funding to support the company's operations during a lengthy sales process.

III. Sales process/bidding procedures

A. General principles

[6] Although the decision to approve a particular form of sales process is distinct from the approval of a proposed sale, the reasonableness and adequacy of any sales process proposed by a court-appointed receiver must be assessed in light of the factors which a court will take into account when considering the approval of a proposed sale. Those factors were identified by the Court of Appeal in its decision in *Royal Bank v. Soundair*: (i) whether the receiver has made a sufficient effort to get the best price and has not acted improvidently; (ii) the efficacy and integrity of the process by which offers are obtained; (iii) whether there has been unfairness in the working out of the process; and, (iv) the interests of all parties.¹ Accordingly, when reviewing a sales and marketing process proposed by a receiver a court should assess:

- (i) the fairness, transparency and integrity of the proposed process;
- (ii) the commercial efficacy of the proposed process in light of the specific circumstances facing the receiver; and,
- (iii) whether the sales process will optimize the chances, in the particular circumstances, of securing the best possible price for the assets up for sale.

¹ (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1 (C.A.).

[7] The use of stalking horse bids to set a baseline for the bidding process, including credit bid stalking horses, has been recognized by Canadian courts as a reasonable and useful element of a sales process. Stalking horse bids have been approved for use in other receivership proceedings,² BIA proposals,³ and CCAA proceedings.⁴

[8] Perhaps the most well-known recent example of the use of a stalking horse credit bid was that employed in the Canwest Publishing Corp. CCAA proceedings where, as part of a sale and investor solicitation process, Canwest's senior lenders put forward a stalking horse credit bid. Ultimately a superior offer was approved by the court. I accept, as an apt description of the considerations which a court should take into account when deciding whether to approve the use of a stalking horse credit bid, the following observations made by one set of commentators on the Canwest CCAA process:

To be effective for such stakeholders, the credit bid had to be put forward in a process that would allow a sufficient opportunity for interested parties to come forward with a superior offer, recognizing that a timetable for the sale of a business in distress is a fast track ride that requires interested parties to move quickly or miss the opportunity. The court has to balance the need to move quickly, to address the real or perceived deterioration of value of the business during a sale process or the limited availability of restructuring financing, with a realistic timetable that encourages and does not chill the auction process.⁵

B. The proposed bidding process

B.1 The bid solicitation/auction process

[9] The bidding process proposed by the Receiver would use a Stalking Horse Offer submitted by CCM to the Receiver, and subsequently amended pursuant to negotiations, as a baseline offer and a qualified bid in an auction process. D&P intends to distribute to prospective purchasers an interest solicitation letter, make available a confidential information memorandum to those who sign a confidentiality agreement, allow due diligence, and provide interested parties with a copy of the Stalking Horse Offer.

[10] Bids filed by the April 16, 2012 deadline which meet certain qualifications stipulated by the Receiver may participate in an auction scheduled for April 20, 2012. One qualification is that the minimum consideration in a bid must be an overbid of \$100,000 as compared to the

² *Re Graceway Canada Co.*, 2011 ONSC 6403, para. 2.

³ *Re Parlay Entertainment Inc.*, 2011 ONSC 3492, para. 15.

⁴ *Re Brainhunter* (2009), 62 C.B.R. (5th) 41 (Ont. S.C.J.), para. 13; *Re White Birch Paper Holding Co.*, 2010 QCCS 4382, para. 3; *Re Nortel Networks Corp.* (2009), 55 C.B.R. (5th) 229 (Ont. S.C.J.), para. 2, and (2009), 56 C.B.R. (5th) 74 (Ont. S.C.J.); *Re Indalex Ltd.*, 2009 CarswellOnt 4262 (S.C.J.).

⁵ Pamela Huff, Linc Rogers, Douglas Bartner and Craig Culbert, "Credit Bidding – Recent Canadian and U.S. Themes", in Janis P. Sarra (ed.), *2010 Annual Review of Insolvency Law* (Toronto: Carswell, 2011), p. 16.

Stalking Horse Offer. The proposed auction process is a standard, multi-round one designed to result in a Successful Bid and a Back-Up Bid. The rounds will be conducted using minimum incremental overbids of \$100,000, subject to reduction at the discretion of the Receiver.

B.2 Stalking horse credit bid

[11] The CCM Stalking Horse Offer, or Agreement, negotiated with the Receiver contemplates the acquisition of substantially all the company's business and assets on an "as is where is" basis. The purchase price is equal to: (i) Assumed Liabilities, as defined in the Stalking Horse Offer, plus (ii) a credit bid of CCM's secured debt outstanding under the two Notes, the Appointment Costs and the advance under the Receiver's Certificate. The purchase price is estimated to be approximately \$3.744 million before the value of Assumed Liabilities which will include the continuation of the employment of employees, if the offer is accepted.

[12] The Receiver reviewed at length, in its Report and in counsel's factum, the calculation of the value of the credit bid. Interest under both Notes was fixed at 15% per annum and was prepaid in full. The Receiver reported that if both Notes were repaid on May 3, 2012, the anticipated closing date, the effective annual rate of interest (taking into account all costs which could be categorized as "interest") would be significantly higher than 15% per annum - 57.6% on the October Note and 97.4% on the December Note. In order that the interest on the Notes considered for purposes of calculating the value of the credit bid complied with the interest rate provisions of the *Criminal Code*, the Receiver informed CCM that the amount of the secured indebtedness under the Notes eligible for the credit bid would have to be \$103,500 less than the face value of the Notes. As explained in detail in paragraphs 32 through to 39 of its factum, the Receiver is of the view that such a reduction would result in a permissible effective annual interest rate under the December Note. The resulting Stalking Horse Agreement reflected such a reduction.

[13] The Stalking Horse Offer does not contain a break-fee, but it does contain a term that in the event the credit bid is not the Successful Bid, then CCM will be entitled to reimbursement of its expenses up to a maximum of \$75,000, or approximately 2% of the value of the estimated purchase price. Such an amount, according to the Receiver, would fall within the range of reasonable break fees and expense reimbursements approved in other cases, which have ranged from 1.8% to 5% of the value of the bid.⁶

C. Analysis

[14] Given the financial circumstances of Blutip and the lack of funding available to the Receiver to support the company's operations during a lengthy sales process, I accept the Receiver's recommendation that a quick sales process is required in order to optimize the

⁶ *Re Parlay Entertainment*, 2011 ONSC 3492, para. 12; *Re White Birch Paper Holding Co.*, 2010 QCCS 4915, paras. 4 to 7; *Re Nortel Networks Corp.* (2009), 56 C.B.R. (5th) 74 (Ont. S.C.J.), para. 12.

prospects of securing the best price for the assets. Accordingly, the timeframe proposed by the Receiver for the submission of qualifying bids and the conduct of the auction is reasonable. The marketing, bid solicitation and bidding procedures proposed by the Receiver are likely to result in a fair, transparent and commercially efficacious process in the circumstances.

[15] In light of the reduction in the face value of the Notes required by the Receiver for the purposes of calculating the value of the credit bid and the reasonable amount of the Expense Reimbursement, I approved the Stalking Horse Agreement for the purposes requested by the Receiver. I accept the Receiver's assessment that in the circumstances the terms of the Stalking Horse Offer, including the Expense Reimbursement, will not discourage a third party from submitting an offer superior to the Stalking Horse Offer.

[16] Also, as made clear in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Bidding Procedures Order, the Stalking Horse Agreement is deemed to be a Qualified Bid and is accepted solely for the purposes of CCM's right to participate in the auction. My order did not approve the sale of Blutip's assets on the terms set out in the Stalking Horse Agreement. As the Receiver indicated, the approval of the sale of Blutip's assets, whether to CCM or some other successful bidder, will be the subject of a future motion to this Court. Such an approach is consistent with the practice of this Court.⁷

[17] For those reasons I approved the bidding procedures recommended by the Receiver.

IV. Priority of receiver's charges

[18] Paragraphs 17 and 20 of the Appointment Order granted some priority for the Receiver's Charge and Receiver's Borrowings Charge. However, as noted by the Receiver in section 3.1 of its First Report, because that hearing was brought on an urgent, *ex parte* basis, priority over existing perfected security interests and statutory encumbrances was not sought at that time. The Receiver now seeks such priority.

[19] As previously noted, the Receiver reported that Blutip does not maintain any pension plans. In section 3.1 of its Report the Receiver identified the persons served with notice of this motion: (i) parties with registered security interests pursuant to the *PPSA*; (ii) those who have commenced legal proceedings against the Company; (iii) those who have asserted claims in respect of intellectual property against the Company; (iv) the Company's landlord, and (v) standard government agencies. Proof of such service was filed with the motion record. No person appeared on the return of the motion to oppose the priority sought by the Receiver for its charges.

[20] Although the Receiver gave notice to affected parties six days in advance of this motion, not seven days as specified in paragraph 31 of the Appointment Order, I was satisfied that

⁷ *Re Indalex Ltd.*, 2009 CarswellOnt 4262 (S.C.J.), para. 7; *Re Graceway Canada Co.*, 2011 ONSC 6403, para. 5; *Re Parlay Entertainment Inc.*, 2011 ONSC 3492, para. 58.

secured creditors who would be materially affected by the order had been given reasonable notice and an opportunity to make representations, as required by section 243(6) of the *BIA*, that abridging the notice period by one day, as permitted by paragraph 31 of the Appointment Order, was appropriate and fair in the circumstances, and I granted the priority charges sought by the Receiver.

[21] I should note that the Appointment Order contains a standard “come-back clause” (para. 31). Recently, in *First Leaside Wealth Management Inc. (Re)*, a proceeding under the *CCAA*, I wrote:

[49] In his recent decision in *Timminco Limited (Re)* (“Timminco I”) Morawetz J. described the commercial reality underpinning requests for Administration and D&O Charges in *CCAA* proceedings:

In my view, in the absence of the court granting the requested super priority and protection, the objectives of the *CCAA* would be frustrated. It is not reasonable to expect that professionals will take the risk of not being paid for their services, and that directors and officers will remain if placed in a compromised position should the Timminco Entities continue *CCAA* proceedings without the requested protection. The outcome of the failure to provide these respective groups with the requested protection would, in my view, result in the overwhelming likelihood that the *CCAA* proceedings would come to an abrupt halt, followed, in all likelihood, by bankruptcy proceedings.

...

[51] In my view, absent an express order to the contrary by the initial order applications judge, the issue of the priorities enjoyed by administration, D&O and DIP lending charges should be finalized at the commencement of a *CCAA* proceeding. Professional services are provided, and DIP funding is advanced, in reliance on super-priorities contained in initial orders. To ensure the integrity, predictability and fairness of the *CCAA* process, certainty must accompany the granting of such super-priority charges. When those important objectives of the *CCAA* process are coupled with the Court of Appeal’s holding that parties affected by such priority orders be given an opportunity to raise any paramountcy issue, it strikes me that a judge hearing an initial order application should directly raise with the parties the issue of the priority of the charges sought, including any possible issue of paramountcy in respect of competing claims on the debtor’s property based on provincial legislation.⁸

[22] In my view those comments regarding the need for certainty about the priority of charges for professional fees or borrowings apply, with equal force, to priority charges sought by a

⁸ 2012 ONSC 1299 (CanLII).

receiver pursuant to section 243(6) of the *BIA*. Certainty regarding the priority of administrative and borrowing charges is required as much in a receivership as in proceedings under the *CCAA* or the proposal provisions of the *BIA*.

[23] In the present case the issues of the priority of the Receiver's Charge and Receiver's Borrowings Charge were deferred from the return of the initial application until notice could be given to affected parties. I have noted that Blutip did not maintain pension plans. I have found that reasonable notice now has been given and no affected person appeared to oppose the granting of the priority charges. Consequently, it is my intention that the Bidding Procedures Order constitutes a final disposition of the issue of the priority of those charges (subject, of course, to any rights to appeal the Bidding Procedures Order). I do not regard the presence of a "come-back clause" in the Appointment Order as leaving the door open a crack for some subsequent challenge to the priorities granted by this order.

V. Approval of the Receiver's activities

[24] The activities described by the Receiver in its First Report were reasonable and fell within its mandate, so I approved them.

[25] May I conclude by thanking Receiver's counsel for a most helpful factum.

(original signed by)

D. M. Brown J.

Date: March 15, 2012

TAB 8

COURT FILE NO.: 09-CL-7950
DATE: 20090723

**SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO
(COMMERCIAL LIST)**

**RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS*
 ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED**

**AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR
ARRANGEMENT OF NORTEL NETWORKS CORPORATION,
NORTEL NETWORKS LIMITED, NORTEL NETWORKS GLOBAL
CORPORATION, NORTEL NETWORKS INTERNATIONAL
CORPORATION AND NORTEL NETWORKS TECHNOLOGY
CORPORATION**

APPLICANTS

**APPLICATION UNDER THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS*
ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED**

BEFORE: MORAWETZ J.

COUNSEL: Derrick Tay and Jennifer Stam, for Nortel Networks Corporation, et al

**Lyndon Barnes and Adam Hirsh, for the Board of Directors of Nortel
Networks Corporation and Nortel Networks Limited**

J. Carfagnini and J. Pasquariello, for Ernst & Young Inc., Monitor

**M. Starnino, for the Superintendent of Financial Services and
Administrator of PBGF**

S. Philpott, for the Former Employees

K. Zych, for Notcholders

**Pamela Huff and Craig Thorburn, for MatlinPatterson Global Advisors
LLC, MatlinPatterson Global Opportunities Partners III L.P. and Matlin
Patterson Opportunities Partners (Cayman) III L.P.**

David Ward, for UK Pension Protection Fund

2009 CanLII 39492 (ON SC)

Leanne Williams, for Flextronics Inc.

Alex MacFarlane, for the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors

Arthur O. Jacques and Tom McRae, for Felske & Sylvain (de facto Continuing Employees' Committee)

Robin B. Schwill and Matthew P. Gottlieb, for Nortel Networks UK Limited

A. Kauffman, for Export Development Canada

D. Ullman, for Verizon Communications Inc.

G. Benchetrit, for IBM

**HEARD &
DECIDED: JUNE 29, 2009**

ENDORSEMENT

INTRODUCTION

[1] On June 29, 2009, I granted the motion of the Applicants and approved the bidding procedures (the "Bidding Procedures") described in the affidavit of Mr. Riedel sworn June 23, 2009 (the "Riedel Affidavit") and the Fourteenth Report of Ernst & Young, Inc., in its capacity as Monitor (the "Monitor") (the "Fourteenth Report"). The order was granted immediately after His Honour Judge Gross of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (the "U.S. Court") approved the Bidding Procedures in the Chapter 11 proceedings.

[2] I also approved the Asset Sale Agreement dated as of June 19, 2009 (the "Sale Agreement") among Nokia Siemens Networks B.V. ("Nokia Siemens Networks" or the "Purchaser"), as buyer, and Nortel Networks Corporation ("NNC"), Nortel Networks Limited ("NNL"), Nortel Networks, Inc. ("NNI") and certain of their affiliates, as vendors (collectively the "Sellers") in the form attached as Appendix "A" to the Fourteenth Report and I also approved and accepted the Sale Agreement for the purposes of conducting the "stalking horse" bidding process in accordance with the Bidding Procedures including, the Break-Up Fee and the Expense Reimbursement (as both terms are defined in the Sale Agreement).

[3] An order was also granted sealing confidential Appendix "B" to the Fourteenth Report containing the schedules and exhibits to the Sale Agreement pending further order of this court.

[4] The following are my reasons for granting these orders.

[5] The hearing on June 29, 2009 (the "Joint Hearing") was conducted by way of video conference with a similar motion being heard by the U.S. Court. His Honor Judge Gross presided over the hearing in the U.S. Court. The Joint Hearing was conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Cross-Border Protocol, which had previously been approved by both the U.S. Court and this court.

[6] The Sale Agreement relates to the Code Division Multiple Access ("CDMA") business Long-Term Evolution ("LTE") Access assets.

[7] The Sale Agreement is not insignificant. The Monitor reports that revenues from CDMA comprised over 21% of Nortel's 2008 revenue. The CDMA business employs approximately 3,100 people (approximately 500 in Canada) and the LTE business employs approximately 1,000 people (approximately 500 in Canada). The purchase price under the Sale Agreement is \$650 million.

BACKGROUND

[8] The Applicants were granted CCAA protection on January 14, 2009. Insolvency proceedings have also been commenced in the United States, the United Kingdom, Israel and France.

[9] At the time the proceedings were commenced, Nortel's business operated through 143 subsidiaries, with approximately 30,000 employees globally. As of January 2009, Nortel employed approximately 6,000 people in Canada alone.

[10] The stated purpose of Nortel's filing under the CCAA was to stabilize the Nortel business to maximize the chances of preserving all or a portion of the enterprise. The Monitor reported that a thorough strategic review of the company's assets and operations would have to be undertaken in consultation with various stakeholder groups.

[11] In April 2009, the Monitor updated the court and noted that various restructuring alternatives were being considered.

[12] On June 19, 2009, Nortel announced that it had entered into the Sale Agreement with respect to its assets in its CDMA business and LTE Access assets (collectively, the "Business") and that it was pursuing the sale of its other business units. Mr. Riedel in his affidavit states that Nortel has spent many months considering various restructuring alternatives before determining in its business judgment to pursue "going concern" sales for Nortel's various business units.

[13] In deciding to pursue specific sales processes, Mr. Riedel also stated that Nortel's management considered:

- (a) the impact of the filings on Nortel's various businesses, including deterioration in sales; and

- (b) the best way to maximize the value of its operations, to preserve jobs and to continue businesses in Canada and the U.S.

[14] Mr. Riedel notes that while the Business possesses significant value, Nortel was faced with the reality that:

- (a) the Business operates in a highly competitive environment;
- (b) full value cannot be realized by continuing to operate the Business through a restructuring; and
- (c) in the absence of continued investment, the long-term viability of the Business would be put into jeopardy.

[15] Mr. Riedel concluded that the proposed process for the sale of the Business pursuant to an auction process provided the best way to preserve the Business as a going concern and to maximize value and preserve the jobs of Nortel employees.

[16] In addition to the assets covered by the Sale Agreement, certain liabilities are to be assumed by the Purchaser. This issue is covered in a comprehensive manner at paragraph 34 of the Fourteenth Report. Certain liabilities to employees are included on this list. The assumption of these liabilities is consistent with the provisions of the Sale Agreement that requires the Purchaser to extend written offers of employment to at least 2,500 employees in the Business.

[17] The Monitor also reports that given that certain of the U.S. Debtors are parties to the Sale Agreement and given the desire to maximize value for the benefit of stakeholders, Nortel determined and it has agreed with the Purchaser that the Sale Agreement is subject to higher or better offers being obtained pursuant to a sale process under s. 363 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and that the Sale Agreement shall serve as a "stalking horse" bid pursuant to that process.

[18] The Bidding Procedures provide that all bids must be received by the Seller by no later than July 21, 2009 and that the Sellers will conduct an auction of the purchased assets on July 24, 2009. It is anticipated that Nortel will ultimately seek a final sales order from the U.S. Court on or about July 28, 2009 and an approval and vesting order from this court in respect of the Sale Agreement and purchased assets on or about July 30, 2009.

[19] The Monitor recognizes the expeditious nature of the sale process but the Monitor has been advised that given the nature of the Business and the consolidation occurring in the global market, there are likely to be a limited number of parties interested in acquiring the Business.

[20] The Monitor also reports that Nortel has consulted with, among others, the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the "UCC") and the bondholder group regarding the Bidding Procedures and is of the view that both are supportive of the timing of this sale process. (It is noted that the UCC did file a limited objection to the motion relating to certain aspects of the Bidding Procedures.)

[21] Given the sale efforts made to date by Nortel, the Monitor supports the sale process outlined in the Fourteenth Report and more particularly described in the Bidding Procedures.

[22] Objections to the motion were filed in the U.S. Court and this court by MatlinPatterson Global Advisors LLC, MatlinPatterson Global Opportunities Partners III L.P. and Matlin Patterson Opportunities Partners (Cayman) III L.P. (collectively, "MatlinPatterson") as well the UCC.

[23] The objections were considered in the hearing before Judge Gross and, with certain limited exceptions, the objections were overruled.

ISSUES AND DISCUSSION

[24] The threshold issue being raised on this motion by the Applicants is whether the CCAA affords this court the jurisdiction to approve a sales process in the absence of a formal plan of compromise or arrangement and a creditor vote. If the question is answered in the affirmative, the secondary issue is whether this sale should authorize the Applicants to sell the Business.

[25] The Applicants submit that it is well established in the jurisprudence that this court has the jurisdiction under the CCAA to approve the sales process and that the requested order should be granted in these circumstances.

[26] Counsel to the Applicants submitted a detailed factum which covered both issues.

[27] Counsel to the Applicants submits that one of the purposes of the CCAA is to preserve the going concern value of debtors companies and that the court's jurisdiction extends to authorizing sale of the debtor's business, even in the absence of a plan or creditor vote.

[28] The CCAA is a flexible statute and it is particularly useful in complex insolvency cases in which the court is required to balance numerous constituents and a myriad of interests.

[29] The CCAA has been described as "skeletal in nature". It has also been described as a "sketch, an outline, a supporting framework for the resolution of corporate insolvencies in the public interest". *ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.* (2008), 45 C.B.R. (5th) 163 (Ont. C.A.) at paras. 44, 61, leave to appeal refused [2008] SCCA 337. ("ATB Financial").

[30] The jurisprudence has identified as sources of the court's discretionary jurisdiction, *inter alia*:

- (a) the power of the court to impose terms and conditions on the granting of a stay under s. 11(4) of the CCAA;
- (b) the specific provision of s. 11(4) of the CCAA which provides that the court may make an order "on such terms as it may impose"; and

- (c) the inherent jurisdiction of the court to “fill in the gaps” of the CCAA in order to give effect to its objects. *Re Canadian Red Cross Society* (1998), 5 C.B.R. (4th) 299 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at para. 43; *Re PSINet Ltd.* (2001), 28 C.B.R. (4th) 95 (Ont. S.C.J.) at para. 5, *ATB Financial, supra*, at paras. 43-52.

[31] However, counsel to the Applicants acknowledges that the discretionary authority of the court under s. 11 must be informed by the purpose of the CCAA.

Its exercise must be guided by the scheme and object of the Act and by the legal principles that govern corporate law issues. *Re Stelco Inc.* (2005), 9 C.B.R. (5th) 135 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 44.

[32] In support of the court’s jurisdiction to grant the order sought in this case, counsel to the Applicants submits that Nortel seeks to invoke the “overarching policy” of the CCAA, namely, to preserve the going concern. *Re Residential Warranty Co. of Canada Inc.* (2006), 21 C.B.R. (5th) 57 (Alta. Q.B.) at para. 78.

[33] Counsel to the Applicants further submits that CCAA courts have repeatedly noted that the purpose of the CCAA is to preserve the benefit of a going concern business for all stakeholders, or “the whole economic community”:

The purpose of the CCAA is to facilitate arrangements that might avoid liquidation of the company and allow it to continue in business to the benefit of the whole economic community, including the shareholders, the creditors (both secured and unsecured) and the employees. *Citibank Canada v. Chase Manhattan Bank of Canada* (1991), 5 C.B.R. (3rd) 167 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at para. 29. *Re Consumers Packaging Inc.* (2001) 27 C.B.R. (4th) 197 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 5.

[34] Counsel to the Applicants further submits that the CCAA should be given a broad and liberal interpretation to facilitate its underlying purpose, including the preservation of the going concern for the benefit of all stakeholders and further that it should not matter whether the business continues as a going concern under the debtor’s stewardship or under new ownership, for as long as the business continues as a going concern, a primary goal of the CCAA will be met.

[35] Counsel to the Applicants makes reference to a number of cases where courts in Ontario, in appropriate cases, have exercised their jurisdiction to approve a sale of assets, even in the absence of a plan of arrangement being tendered to stakeholders for a vote. In doing so, counsel to the Applicants submits that the courts have repeatedly recognized that they have jurisdiction under the CCAA to approve asset sales in the absence of a plan of arrangement, where such sale is in the best interests of stakeholders generally. *Re Canadian Red Cross Society, supra*, *Re PSINet, supra*, *Re Consumers Packaging, supra*, *Re Stelco Inc.* (2004), 6 C.B.R. (5th) 316 (Ont. S.C.J.) at para. 1, *Re Tiger Brand Knitting Co.* (2005) 9 C.B.R. (5th) 315, *Re Caterpillar*

Financial Services Ltd. v. Hardrock Paving Co. (2008), 45 C.B.R. (5th) 87 and *Re Lehndorff General Partner Ltd.* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3rd) 24 (Ont. Gen. Div.).

[36] In *Re Consumers Packaging, supra*, the Court of Appeal for Ontario specifically held that a sale of a business as a going concern during a CCAA proceeding is consistent with the purposes of the CCAA:

The sale of Consumers' Canadian glass operations as a going concern pursuant to the Owens-Illinois bid allows the preservation of Consumers' business (albeit under new ownership), and is therefore consistent with the purposes of the CCAA.

...we cannot refrain from commenting that Farley J.'s decision to approve the Owens-Illinois bid is consistent with previous decisions in Ontario and elsewhere that have emphasized the broad remedial purpose of flexibility of the CCAA and have approved the sale and disposition of assets during CCAA proceedings prior to a formal plan being tendered. *Re Consumers Packaging, supra*, at paras. 5, 9.

[37] Similarly, in *Re Canadian Red Cross Society, supra*, Blair J. (as he then was) expressly affirmed the court's jurisdiction to approve a sale of assets in the course of a CCAA proceeding before a plan of arrangement had been approved by creditors. *Re Canadian Red Cross Society, supra*, at paras. 43, 45.

[38] Similarly, in *PSINet Limited, supra*, the court approved a going concern sale in a CCAA proceeding where no plan was presented to creditors and a substantial portion of the debtor's Canadian assets were to be sold. Farley J. noted as follows:

[If the sale was not approved,] there would be a liquidation scenario ensuing which would realize far less than this going concern sale (which appears to me to have involved a transparent process with appropriate exposure designed to maximize the proceeds), thus impacting upon the rest of the creditors, especially as to the unsecured, together with the material enlarging of the unsecured claims by the disruption claims of approximately 8,600 customers (who will be materially disadvantaged by an interrupted transition) plus the job losses for approximately 200 employees. *Re PSINet Limited, supra*, at para. 3.

[39] In *Re Stelco Inc., supra*, in 2004, Farley J. again addressed the issue of the feasibility of selling the operations as a going concern:

I would observe that usually it is the creditor side which wishes to terminate CCAA proceedings and that when the creditors threaten to take action, there is a realization that a liquidation scenario will not only have a negative effect upon a CCAA applicant, but also upon its workforce. Hence, the CCAA may be employed to provide stability during a period of necessary financial and operational restructuring – and if a restructuring of the “old company” is not

feasible, then there is the exploration of the feasibility of the sale of the operations/enterprise as a going concern (with continued employment) in whole or in part. *Re Stelco Inc, supra*, at para. 1.

[40] I accept these submissions as being general statements of the law in Ontario. The value of equity in an insolvent debtor is dubious, at best, and, in my view, it follows that the determining factor should not be whether the business continues under the debtor's stewardship or under a structure that recognizes a new equity structure. An equally important factor to consider is whether the case can be made to continue the business as a going concern.

[41] Counsel to the Applicants also referred to decisions from the courts in Quebec, Manitoba and Alberta which have similarly recognized the court's jurisdiction to approve a sale of assets during the course of a CCAA proceeding. *Re Boutique San Francisco Inc.* (2004), 7 C.B.R. (5th) 189 (Quebec S. C.), *Re Winnipeg Motor Express Inc.* (2008), 49 C.B.R. (5th) 302 (Man. Q.B.) at paras. 41, 44, and *Re Calpine Canada Energy Limited* (2007), 35 C.B.R. (5th) (Alta. Q.B.) at para. 75.

[42] Counsel to the Applicants also directed the court's attention to a recent decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal which questioned whether the court should authorize the sale of substantially all of the debtor's assets where the debtor's plan "will simply propose that the net proceeds from the sale...be distributed to its creditors". In *Cliffs Over Maple Bay Investments Ltd. v. Fisgard Capital Corp.* (2008), 46 C.B.R. (5th) 7 (B.C.C.A.) ("*Cliffs Over Maple Bay*"), the court was faced with a debtor who had no active business but who nonetheless sought to stave off its secured creditor indefinitely. The case did not involve any type of sale transaction but the Court of Appeal questioned whether a court should authorize the sale under the CCAA without requiring the matter to be voted upon by creditors.

[43] In addressing this matter, it appears to me that the British Columbia Court of Appeal focussed on whether the court should grant the requested relief and not on the question of whether a CCAA court has the jurisdiction to grant the requested relief.

[44] I do not disagree with the decision in *Cliffs Over Maple Bay*. However, it involved a situation where the debtor had no active business and did not have the support of its stakeholders. That is not the case with these Applicants.

[45] The *Cliffs Over Maple Bay* decision has recently been the subject of further comment by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in *Asset Engineering L.P. v. Forest and Marine Financial Limited Partnership* (2009) B.C.C.A. 319.

[46] At paragraphs 24 - 26 of the *Forest and Marine* decision, Newbury J.A. stated:

24. In *Cliffs Over Maple Bay*, the debtor company was a real estate developer whose one project had failed. The company had been dormant for some time. It applied for CCAA protection but described its proposal for restructuring in vague terms that amounted essentially to a plan to "secure sufficient funds" to complete the stalled project (Para. 34). This court, per Tysoe J.A., ruled that although the

Act can apply to single-project companies, its purposes are unlikely to be engaged in such instances, since mortgage priorities are fully straight forward and there will be little incentive for senior secured creditors to compromise their interests (Para. 36). Further, the Court stated, the granting of a stay under s. 11 is “not a free standing remedy that the court may grant whenever an insolvent company wishes to undertake a “restructuring”...Rather, s. 11 is ancillary to the fundamental purpose of the CCAA, and a stay of proceedings freezing the rights of creditors should only be granted in furtherance of the CCAA’s fundamental purpose”. That purpose has been described in *Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto Dominion Bank* (1984) 11 D.L.R. (4th) 576 (Alta. Q.B.):

The legislation is intended to have wide scope and allow a judge to make orders which will effectively maintain the status quo for a period while the insolvent company attempts to gain the approval of its creditors for a proposed arrangement which will enable the company to remain in operation for what is, hopefully, the future benefit of both the company and its creditors. [at 580]

25. The Court was not satisfied in *Cliffs Over Maple Bay* that the “restructuring” contemplated by the debtor would do anything other than distribute the net proceeds from the sale, winding up or liquidation of its business. The debtor had no intention of proposing a plan of arrangement, and its business would not continue following the execution of its proposal – thus it could not be said the purposes of the statute would be engaged...

26. In my view, however, the case at bar is quite different from *Cliffs Over Maple Bay*. Here, the main debtor, the Partnership, is at the centre of a complicated corporate group and carries on an active financing business that it hopes to save notwithstanding the current economic cycle. (The business itself which fills a “niche” in the market, has been carried on in one form or another since 1983.) The CCAA is appropriate for situations such as this where it is unknown whether the “restructuring” will ultimately take the form of a refinancing or will involve a reorganization of the corporate entity or entities and a true compromise of the rights of one or more parties. The “fundamental purpose” of the Act – to preserve the *status quo* while the debtor prepares a plan that will enable it to remain in business to the benefit of all concerned – will be furthered by granting a stay so that the means contemplated by the Act – a compromise or arrangement – can be developed, negotiated and voted on if necessary...

[47] It seems to me that the foregoing views expressed in *Forest and Marine* are not inconsistent with the views previously expressed by the courts in Ontario. The CCAA is intended to be flexible and must be given a broad and liberal interpretation to achieve its objectives and a sale by the debtor which preserves its business as a going concern is, in my view, consistent with those objectives.

[48] I therefore conclude that the court does have the jurisdiction to authorize a sale under the CCAA in the absence of a plan.

[49] I now turn to a consideration of whether it is appropriate, in this case, to approve this sales process. Counsel to the Applicants submits that the court should consider the following factors in determining whether to authorize a sale under the CCAA in the absence of a plan:

- (a) is a sale transaction warranted at this time?
- (b) will the sale benefit the whole “economic community”?
- (c) do any of the debtors’ creditors have a *bona fide* reason to object to a sale of the business?
- (d) is there a better viable alternative?

I accept this submission.

[50] It is the position of the Applicants that Nortel’s proposed sale of the Business should be approved as this decision is to the benefit of stakeholders and no creditor is prejudiced. Further, counsel submits that in the absence of a sale, the prospects for the Business are a loss of competitiveness, a loss of value and a loss of jobs.

[51] Counsel to the Applicants summarized the facts in support of the argument that the Sale Transaction should be approved, namely:

- (a) Nortel has been working diligently for many months on a plan to reorganize its business;
- (b) in the exercise of its business judgment, Nortel has concluded that it cannot continue to operate the Business successfully within the CCAA framework;
- (c) unless a sale is undertaken at this time, the long-term viability of the Business will be in jeopardy;
- (d) the Sale Agreement continues the Business as a going concern, will save at least 2,500 jobs and constitutes the best and most valuable proposal for the Business;
- (e) the auction process will serve to ensure Nortel receives the highest possible value for the Business;
- (f) the sale of the Business at this time is in the best interests of Nortel and its stakeholders; and
- (g) the value of the Business is likely to decline over time.

[52] The objections of MatlinPatterson and the UCC have been considered. I am satisfied that the issues raised in these objections have been addressed in a satisfactory manner by the ruling of Judge Gross and no useful purpose would be served by adding additional comment.

[53] Counsel to the Applicants also emphasize that Nortel will return to court to seek approval of the most favourable transaction to emerge from the auction process and will aim to satisfy the elements established by the court for approval as set out in *Royal Bank v. Soundair* (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3rd) 1 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 16.

DISPOSITION

[54] The Applicants are part of a complicated corporate group. They carry on an active international business. I have accepted that an important factor to consider in a CCAA process is whether the case can be made to continue the business as a going concern. I am satisfied having considered the factors referenced at [49], as well as the facts summarized at [51], that the Applicants have met this test. I am therefore satisfied that this motion should be granted.

[55] Accordingly, I approve the Bidding Procedures as described in the Riedel Affidavit and the Fourteenth Report of the Monitor, which procedures have been approved by the U.S. Court.

[56] I am also satisfied that the Sale Agreement should be approved and further that the Sale Agreement be approved and accepted for the purposes of conducting the “stalking horse” bidding process in accordance with the Bidding Procedures including, without limitation the Break-Up Fee and the Expense Reimbursement (as both terms are defined in the Sale Agreement).

[57] Further, I have also been satisfied that Appendix B to the Fourteenth Report contains information which is commercially sensitive, the dissemination of which could be detrimental to the stakeholders and, accordingly, I order that this document be sealed, pending further order of the court.

[58] In approving the Bidding Procedures, I have also taken into account that the auction will be conducted prior to the sale approval motion. This process is consistent with the practice of this court.

[59] Finally, it is the expectation of this court that the Monitor will continue to review ongoing issues in respect of the Bidding Procedures. The Bidding Procedures permit the Applicants to waive certain components of qualified bids without the consent of the UCC, the bondholder group and the Monitor. However, it is the expectation of this court that, if this situation arises, the Applicants will provide advance notice to the Monitor of its intention to do so.

MORAWETZ J.

Heard and Decided: June 29, 2009

Reasons Released: July 23, 2009

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